Kister v. Kelly et al

Filing 73

ORDER granting 58 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 59 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; granting 59 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 60 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Algenon L. Marbley on 12-572. (cw1)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CHAD KISTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
PAT KELLY, ATHENS COUNTY
SHERIFF, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 2:12-cv-00572
JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY

Magistrate Judge King

OPINION & ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants,
Margaret Sterling and Tri-County Mental Health and Counseling (Doc. 58), Defendants, Reddy
Vaka and Jane Krason’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Immunity, and Summary
Judgment (Doc. 59), and Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants, Athens County Sheriff
Pat Kelly, Bruce Frick, Jack E. Taylor, Brian Cooper, Rodney Smith, and Athens County, Ohio,
(Doc. 60). For the reasons set forth herein, all three Motions for Summary Judgment are
GRANTED. This action is hereby DISMISSED.
II.

BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background

This action arises out of involuntary commitment proceedings related to Plaintiff, Chad
Kister (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, alleges various constitutional violations
under § 1983, including claims of inadequate medical treatment, unconstitutional conditions of
confinement, and invasion of privacy while at ABH, and malicious prosecution and false arrest.
Further, Plaintiff asserts that various Defendants subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of
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confinement during his involuntary commitment at Athens Behavioral Healthcare. Plaintiff
seeks monetary damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
1. Events Leading to Plaintiff’s Involuntary Commitment
Plaintiff alleges that, during 2010, certain individuals broke into his residence and
intercepted his telephone calls. (Compl, Doc. 4, ¶¶ 14, 16, 27). Plaintiff claims that he
demanded that Defendant Pat Kelly, the Athens County Sheriff, several of his deputies, and an
Upper Arlington Police Lieutenant arrest these individuals, but his requests were refused. (Id. at
¶¶ 15, 17, 60-64).
On June 14, 2011, Athens County Detective Jack Taylor, Sheriff Kelly, and Captain
Bryan Cooper heard Plaintiff call into a local radio station, FM 107.7, and state on air that
“Sheriff Kelly…lost his privilege to be alive. He needs capital punishment. I am going to take
him down.” (Taylor Aff., Doc. 60-1 at ¶ 5). Detective Taylor asserts that Plaintiff made
additional statements accusing Sheriff Kelly of murdering him by personally placing an implant
into Plaintiff’s brain and concluded by stating “Adolf Kelly, you are going down.” (Id.).
Detective Taylor also avers that he became aware that Plaintiff called Sheriff Kelly directly on
the same day he made comments on the radio show and made additional aggressive statements.
(Id. at ¶ 6). Based on Plaintiff’s comments on the radio show and his call to Sheriff Kelly,
Detective Taylor, Sheriff Kelly, and Captain Cooper believed there was probable cause to charge
Plaintiff with “Aggravated Menacing” under Ohio Revised Code § 2903.21(A). (Id. at ¶ 8).
On June 15, 2011, Detective Taylor prepared a criminal complaint charging Plaintiff with
Aggravated Menacing and a “Request and Affidavit for Arrest Warrant,” requesting a warrant to
arrest Plaintiff for the charges in the complaint. (Id. at ¶ 11). That same day, the Athens County
Prosecutor approved the request, and Athens County Municipal Court Judge William Grimm

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signed a Warrant on Complaint for Plaintiff’s arrest. (Id. at ¶ 12). On June 17, 2011, members
of the Athens County Sheriff’s Department (“ACSO”), including ACSO Deputy Ryan Gillette,
proceeded to Plaintiff’s residence and placed Plaintiff in custody. (Gillette Aff., Doc. 60-2, at ¶¶
5-9). According to Deputy Gillette, the arrest was “peaceable” and Plaintiff was taken into
custody without the use of force. (Id. at ¶ 9).
On July 29, 2011, just over a month after Plaintiff’s first arrest for Aggravated Menacing,
Plaintiff again called into the same FM 107.7 radio show. Detective Taylor asserts that, during
this call, Plaintiff told Sharon Elliott, who apparently is a radio station employee, that she was
not taking him seriously and that he hoped she would be robbed and killed. (Taylor Aff., Doc.
60-1, at ¶ 15). Thereafter, Ms. Elliott contacted ACSO and said she believed Plaintiff’s
statements were threats intended to cause her physical harm. (Id. at ¶ 16). Detective Taylor
determined that, based on Plaintiff’s statements, he again was in violation of O.R.C. § 2903.21
for Aggravated Menacing. On that same day, an arrest warrant was issued again by Judge Grim
and Plaintiff was arrested at his residence by ACSO deputies. (Id. at ¶ 20). This arrest was also
made without incident or injury. (Gillette Aff, Doc. 60-2, at ¶ 17).
While Plaintiff was in custody, the Athens County Sheriff’s Department contacted
Defendant Margaret Sterling, Licensed Practicing Clinical Counselor and Crisis Pre-screener at
Tri-County Mental Health and Counseling (“Tri-County”) and asked her to perform a
psychological screening on Plaintiff to determine if he presented a danger to himself or others
and if he should be involuntarily placed in a psychiatric hospital. (Sterling Aff., Doc. 58-1, at ¶¶
6-7). Sterling claims she met with Plaintiff at the Athens County Sheriff’s Office and performed
a “psychological prescreening”: a risk assessment and mental status exam focused on
determining whether the person appears oriented, confused, or suicidal. (Id. at ¶ 8). During the

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prescreening, Sterling found that Plaintiff exhibited bizarre behavior. (Id. at ¶ 10). She
ultimately concluded that Plaintiff represented a danger to himself or others, and thus should be
referred to Athens Behavioral Healthcare (“ABH”), a mental health hospital run and operated by
the Ohio Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (see McGee Aff., Doc. 59-2, ¶ 3),
for further observations. (Id.). Plaintiff refers to this action as “being pink-slipped.” (Compl.,
Doc. 4 at ¶13).
Following the mental evaluation, Plaintiff was transported to ABH and turned over to the
custody of ABH staff. (Gillette Aff, Doc. 60-2 at ¶¶ 15-16). After Sterling signed the pink-slip
advising that Plaintiff be involuntary committed, she claims neither she, nor Tri-County, had any
further involvement with Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s confinement at Appalachian Behavioral Health.
(Sterling Aff., Doc. 58-1 at ¶¶ 11-12).
2. Plaintiff’s Confinement
Plaintiff alleges that, during his thirteen day involuntary commitment at ABH, he was
subjected to violations of his First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Compl.,
Doc. 4, at ¶¶ 31-34, 37, 41-43, 48). Specifically, he claims that he was blackmailed into taking
medication; that he was prevented from making phone calls and/or that his phone calls were
intercepted; that he was prevented from using the internet or email, which caused difficulty in
operating his business; that he was hit in the head by a fellow patient and ABH did not
adequately respond; that he was unable to live in a way that kept his greenhouse gas emissions
low; that he was unable to practice his religion, which requires daily walks through the forest;
that he was unable to get filtered water; and that he was subjected to invasions of his privacy.
(Id. at ¶¶ 38, 39, 41, 42, 48-54). In addition, Plaintiff alleges that while at ABH, he was given
inadequate medical care for his inguinal hernia. Plaintiff maintains that these actions were taken

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by Defendants in retaliation for his criticism of Sheriff Kelly and his successful prior lawsuits
against police agencies, and that these actions flowed from his wrongful arrest. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-32,
34, 37, 54).
Plaintiff’s Complaint names only two Defendants who were employed at ABH at the
time of the involuntary commitment at issue in this action: Dr. Reddy Vaka, an ABH
Psychiatrist, and Jane Krason, Director of ABH.
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff initiated this action in June 2012, and sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges various constitutional violations under § 1983, including allegations
of inadequate medical treatment and unconstitutional conditions of confinement at ABH under
the Eighth Amendment, and claims of malicious prosecution and false arrest. (Compl., Doc. 4 at
¶¶ 31-34, 37, 41-43, 48, 57, 63).
The Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, and
conducted an initial screening of the case. In its July 25, 2012 Report and Recommendation
(Doc. 2), the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff
Kelly, Defendants Bruce Fick, Jack E. Taylor, Brian Cooper and Rodney Smith, ASCO officers,
Ernie Ankrom, a Lieutenant of the Upper Arlington Police Department, and Athens County,
Ohio for their alleged failure to prosecute the individuals who Plaintiff claims broke into his
home, citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (holding that a private citizen
has no “judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another.”). The
Magistrate Judge allowed Plaintiff’s claims against Margaret Sterling and her employer TriCounty, and against Dr. Reddy Vaka and Jane Krason, employees of Athens Behavioral

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Healthcare, in connection with Plaintiff’s involuntary hospitalization to proceed. Defendants
Sterling, Vaka, and Krason are each sued in both their individual and official capacities.
In this Court’s November 29, 2012 Opinion and Order (Doc. 25), this Court found that
the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation did not specifically address Plaintiff’s false
arrest or malicious prosecution claims. Thus, “[a]lthough the precise nature of plaintiff’s claims
in this regard are not clear, the Court concludes that at this juncture the action may proceed on …
[plaintiff’s] false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.” (Doc. 25 at 3). Further, this Court
dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages in connection with lawfulness of his
involuntary confinement pursuant to the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
This Court also dismissed all claims against Ernie Ankrom, Athens County, Ohio, and the Upper
Arlington Police Department. In all other respects, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation, was adopted and affirmed.
On March 13, 2014, Defendants Margaret Sterling and Tri-County Mental Health and
Counseling filed a joint Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 58). On that same day,
Defendants Dr. Reddy Vaka and Jane Krason filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
Immunity, and Summary Judgment, (Doc. 59). On March 15, 2014, Defendants Brian Cooper,
Bruce Fick, Rodney Smith, Jack E. Taylor, Athens County Sheriff Pat Kelly, and Athens County,
Ohio, filed a joint Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 60). All three motions have been fully
briefed and, thus, these matters are now ripe for review.
III.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Judgment on the Pleadings

A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made “[a]fter the pleadings are closed
but within such time as not to delay the trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on

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the pleadings under Rule 12(c) attacks the sufficiency of the pleadings and is reviewed under the
same standard applicable to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt.,
249 F.3d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2001); E.E.O.C. v. J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851
(6th Cir. 2001). “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a test of the plaintiff’s cause
of action as stated in the complaint, not a challenge to the plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Golden
v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 958-59 (6th Cir. 2005).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), and thus 12(c), the Court must construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, accept all factual allegations as true, and make
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v.
Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008); Murphy v. Sofamor Danek
Gp., Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir.1997). The Court is not required, however, to accept as
true mere legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Although liberal, the Rule 12(b)(6) standard
requires more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions to survive a motion to dismiss. Allard
v. Weitzman, 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). While a complaint need not
contain “detailed factual allegations,” its “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, 127 S.Ct. at 1964. A complaint
that suggests “the mere possibility of misconduct” is insufficient; rather, the complaint must state
“a plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S at 556, 127
S.Ct. 1955).
Thus, a complaint will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(c) only if there is no law to
support the claims made, or if the facts alleged are insufficient to state a claim, or if on the face

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of the complaint there is an insurmountable bar to relief. See Rauch v. Day & Night Mfg. Corp.,
576 F.2d 697, 702 (6th Cir. 1978); Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir. 1976); Cmty.
Mental Health Serv. V. Mental Health & Recovery Bd., 395 F.Supp.2d 644, 649 (S.D.Ohio
2004).
B. Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides, in relevant part, that summary judgment is
appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A fact is deemed
material only if it “might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing substantive law.”
Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48, (1986)). The nonmoving party must then present “significant probative
evidence” to show that “there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339-40 (6th Cir.1993). The suggestion of a mere
possibility of a factual dispute is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See
Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.1992). Summary judgment is
inappropriate, however, “if the dispute is about a material fact that is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The necessary inquiry for this Court is “whether ‘the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law.’” Patton v. Bearden, 8 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52). In evaluating such a motion, the evidence must be viewed in the

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light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States S.E.C. v. Sierra Brokerage Servs.,
Inc., 712 F.3d 321, 327 (6th Cir.2013). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support
of the opposing party's position will be insufficient to survive the motion; there must be evidence
on which the jury could reasonably find for the opposing party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251;
Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995).
C. Pro Se Litigants
As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, “pro se litigants are to be afforded liberal
construction of their pleadings and filings.” Yagley v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin.,
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 461 F. App’x 411, 414 (6th Cir. 2012). Nonetheless, “the lenient treatment
generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits….” Geboy v. Brigano, 489 F.3d 752, 766 (6th
Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, “Plaintiff’s status as a pro se litigant does not
discharge him from adhering to the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the
local Rules for this District.” Longino v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:12-cv-424, 2013 WL 831738,
at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 6, 2013).
IV.

ANALYSIS

Defendants Margaret Sterling and Tri-County Mental Health and Counseling (“TriCounty”) move for summary judgment asserting that neither Sterling nor Tri-County were
involved with Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement, they are not state actors for the purpose of §
1983, and they are entitled to statutory immunity for Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. 58 at 1).
Defendants Dr. Reddy Vaka and Jane Krason move for judgment on the pleadings,
asserting that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against either of them based on his conditions of
confinement at Appalachian Behavioral Health (“ABH”). In the alternative, Defendants Vaka
and Krason argue that they are entitled to total immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for

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actions taken in their official capacities and qualified immunity for actions taken in their
individual capacities. (Doc. 59 at 6-7). Defendants Vaka and Krason also move for summary
judgment, claiming that Plaintiff does not satisfy his burden for a claim of inadequate medical
care under the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 14).
Defendants Bruce Frick, Jack E. Taylor, Brian Cooper, Rodney Smith, Athens County
Sheriff Pat Kelly, and Athens County, Ohio (collectively, the “Athens County Defendants”)
move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution,
claiming: (1) on both June 17, 2011 and July 29, 2011, Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to facially
valid warrants; and (2) even without facially valid arrest warrants, the Athens County Defendants
had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
The Court will address each of these motions and corresponding arguments seriatim.
A. Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Margaret Sterling and Tri-County
Mental Health and Counseling

This Court has already dismissed Plaintiff’s claims contesting the lawfulness of his
involuntary confinement because Plaintiff’s Complaint did not allege that his commitment has been
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set aside, as required under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Doc. 25 at 6).

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In this Court’s November 29, 2012 Opinion and Order, this Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims attacking the
lawfulness of his commitment: “Plaintiff’s claims challenging the conditions of his confinement may proceed. To
the extent that they challenge the validity of his confinement, however, plaintiff’s claims cannot proceed in this
action.” (Doc. 25 at 6). This Court reasoned:
Under Heck and its progeny, a state prisoner cannot state a cognizable claim under § 1983 “if a
ruling on his claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and confinement until
such time that the conviction is reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.” Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, 1005–06 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–
87). The rule in Heck is not limited to claims challenging the validity of criminal convictions. See
Huftile v. Miccio–Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying Heck to a § 1983 claim
challenging civil commitment under California's Sexually Violent Predators Act); Von Flowers v.
Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs., 58 F. App’x 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[Plaintiff] cannot
sue for damages under § 1983 for his allegedly unconstitutional confinement, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render his commitment invalid, until that
commitment has been declared invalid through the proper channels.”) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at
486–87). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages arising out of his civil commitment and the Complaint

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Consequently, the only potential claims remaining from Plaintiff’s Complaint that he could bring
against Defendant Sterling or Defendant Tri-County is a § 1983 claim based on the conditions of
confinement at ABH. (Id.).
Defendants Sterling and Tri-County support their Motion for Summary Judgment with an
Affidavit submitted by Defendant Sterling. In the Affidavit, Defendant Sterling avers that
neither she, nor her employer Tri-County, were involved in the conditions of Plaintiff’s
confinement at ABH. (Sterling Aff., Doc. 58-1, at ¶¶ 11-12). Indeed, Defendant Sterling avers
that, after she conducted a psychological prescreening on Plaintiff at the ACSO station and
concluded, by signing the “pink-slip,” that Plaintiff should be involuntarily committed, neither
she nor Tri-County had any involvement whatsoever with Plaintiff. (Id.).
In his response to Defendant Sterling and Tri-County’s request for summary judgment,
Plaintiff presents no evidence or assertions of either of the Defendants’ involvement in his
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. (See generally Doc. 64). Instead, the only
arguments Plaintiff puts forth that are related to Defendant Sterling or Tri-County are about why
he believes Defendant Sterling conducted a flawed pre-screening and why he should not have
been “institutionalized.” (Id.). Such arguments relate only to the lawfulness of Plaintiff’s
confinement, a claim which this Court already has foreclosed in its prior Opinion and Order.
(See Doc. 25 at 6).
A movant for summary judgment meets its initial burden “by showing…that there is an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Dixon v. Anderson, 928 F.2d 212,

does not allege that his commitment has been set aside. Complaint, p. 14. To this extent, then, the
Complaint fails to state a claim under Heck.
(Id.). Accordingly, based on this Court’s November 29, 2012 Opinion and Order, in conjunction with the
Magistrate Judge’s July 25, 2012 Report and Recommendation, the only possible remaining claims against
Defendants Sterling and Tri-County pertain to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement.

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216 n. 5 (6th Cir.1991) (internal citations omitted). In other words, the movant bears the burden
to show “the absence of a genuine dispute as to a material fact.” Automated Solutions Corp. v.
Paragon Data Sys., Inc., 756 F.3d 504, 520 (6th Cir.2014) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). At that point, the non-movant must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)); Automated Solutions Corp.,
756 F.3d at 520 (“The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must put forth enough evidence
to show that there exists a genuine issue for trial.”) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, summary
judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
In this case, movants have met their burden by coming forth with evidence that neither
Defendant Sterling nor Tri-County were involved in the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement.
Plaintiff has not responded with any, let alone enough, evidence to show that there exists a
genuine issue for trial. Accordingly, even when viewing all evidence and inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant, and when viewing Plaintiff’s pleadings with leniency
appropriately afforded to pro se litigants, this Court cannot say that a reasonable jury could find
for Plaintiff.
Because this Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Defendant Sterling or Defendant Tri-County violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights related to
the conditions of his confinement at ABH, the Court need not address the movant’s alternative
arguments regarding whether either party is properly considered a “state actor” under § 1983 or
whether the movants are entitled to state law immunity under Ohio Revised Code § 5122.34.

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B. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Immunity, and Summary Judgment by
Defendant Reddy Vaka and Defendant Jane Krason

This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Defendants Reddy Vaka and
Jane Krason Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Immunity, and Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff claims that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement and that he
was denied adequate medical care during his confinement at ABH. Defendants assert that
Plaintiff failed to state a claim based on his conditions of confinement and, in the alternative,
invoke absolute and qualified immunity. Further, Defendants assert that the ABH medical staff
was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs, and therefore move for summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at
14).
1. Plaintiff’s Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff challenges several conditions of his confinement at ABH as violations of his
First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Compl., Doc. 4, at ¶¶ 31-34, 37, 4143, 48). Specifically, he claims that he was blackmailed into taking medication; that he was
prevented from making phone calls and/or that his phone calls were intercepted; that he was
prevented from using the internet or email, which caused difficulty in operating his business; that
he was hit in the head by a fellow patient and ABH did not adequately respond; that he was
unable to live in a way that kept his greenhouse gas emissions low; that he was unable to practice
his religion, which requires daily walks through the forest; that he was unable to get filtered
water; and that he was subjected to invasions of his privacy. (Id. at ¶¶ 38, 39, 41, 42, 48-54).  

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a. Failure to State a Claim
As this Court has previously explained in another case involving Plaintiff,
Generally, an action will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “if on the face of
the complaint there is an insurmountable bar to relief.” Gascho v. Global Fitness
Holdings, LLC, 863 F.Supp.2d 677, 690 (S.D.Ohio 2012). One insurmountable
bar to relief is the failure to meet minimum pleading standards. According to Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Supreme Court
has laid out a “two-pronged approach” for determining facial plausibility. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679. First—“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. Second—
focus on the remaining “well-pleaded factual allegations” to “determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
Several considerations guide whether a complaint meets the facial-plausibility
standard. On one hand, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Further, the factual
allegations of a pleading “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. On the other hand, a complaint will
not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). When
making this determination, a court must construe the claim at issue in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, accept all factual allegations as true, and
make reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits
Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434
(6th Cir.2008) (citations omitted).
Kister v. Appalachian Behavioral Health Care, No. 2:13-CV-00071, 2014 WL 272467, at *4
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 23, 2014) (Sargus, J). Because a judgment on the pleadings reviewed under the
same standard applicable to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt.,
249 F.3d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2001), the analysis set out in Kister v. Appalachian Behavioral
Health Care is appropriate in this case.
Plaintiff is obligated to allege, with a minimum level of specificity, the extent of each
individual Defendants' involvement in his case. For example, Plaintiff must allege that the
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individual Defendants “in some ... way directly participated in” the alleged conduct upon which
he bases his claims. Petty v. Cnty. of Franklin, Ohio, 478 F.3d 341. 349 (6th Cir. 2007).
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has held that “[m]erely listing names in the caption of the complaint
and alleging constitutional violations in the body of the complaint is not enough to sustain
recovery under § 1983.” Gilmore v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App'x 188, 190 (6th Cir.2004).
Even when viewing Plaintiff’s Complaint in the light most favorable to him, he fails to
allege that the individual Defendants – Vaka and Krason – had any role in the alleged violation
of his constitutional rights while at ABH. Plaintiff does not charge Vaka or Krason as having
caused, or participated in, the conduct any of the conditions of confinement about which he
complains. In fact, he does essentially what the court in Gilmore prohibited: he lists the
Defendants in the caption of his Complaint, states their name and affiliation in the body of the
Complaint, and then alleges general constitutional violations throughout the remainder of his
Complaint. Without more, the Court cannot “draw the reasonable inference that” either
Defendant is “liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff, therefore,
fails to meet the pleading standards required by Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 8(a)(2). Accordingly, he fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and Defendants’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings granted.
Because this Court finds that Defendants Vaka and Krason are entitled to judgment on
the pleadings in their individual capacities for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim, the Court need
not address Defendants’ alternate arguments that they are entitled qualified immunity.
b. Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment states: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the

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United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” The
Supreme Court has determined that this language bars private lawsuits by citizens against their
own state. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72–73, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522
(2000); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79
L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Such suits are barred by the Eleventh Amendment unless the state expressly
consents to suit, thereby waiving its sovereign immunity.
Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity applies not just to suits against a “State,” but
also to those against “one of its agencies or departments.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100; see also
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)
(“arm of the state”).” In addition, a suit for monetary damages against an individual in his or her
official capacity is to be deemed an action against the state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974); see also See Johnson v. Unknown Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 545 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding
that the Eleventh Amendment barred a pro se prisoner’s § 1983 action against the prison
librarian in her official capacity); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct.
2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“But a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is
not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no
different from a suit against the State itself.”).
This Court has previously determined that ABH is “arm of the state entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity.” Kister v. Appalachian Behavioral Health Care, No. 2:13-CV-00071,
2014 WL 272467, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 23, 2014) (Sargus, J.) (also noting that Ohio state courts
and statutes support this conclusion). Indeed, the Court previously determined that the Eleventh
Amendment barred claims against both ABH and its employees in their official capacity. (Id.).
The same logic applies in this case. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Vaka and

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Defendant Krason, in their official capacities, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and, thus,
are dismissed.
2. Plaintiff’s Medical Care
In addition to challenging the conditions of his confinement, Plaintiff alleges that while at
ABH, he was given inadequate medical care for his inguinal hernia, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
Defendants contend that the medical treatment Plaintiff received while at ABH was “well
within the medical standard of care.” (Doc. 59 at 17). Defendants submit the affidavit of Dr.
Mark McGee, ABH’s Chief Clinical Officer, who avers that Plaintiff was examined on two
occasions during his thirteen-day stay at ABH for symptoms related to a hernia; that his hernia
showed no evidence of strangulation or incarceration that would cause a bowel obstruction; that
the hernia was not an immediate threat to his health and did not require immediate surgery; and
that Plaintiff was advised to contact a surgeon when he was discharged to discuss having an
elective surgical procedure completed if he so desired. (McGee Aff., Doc. 59-2, ¶ 10-13).
Defendant also submitted Plaintiff’s medical records attached to Dr. McGee’s affidavit which
confirms the affidavit’s summary of Plaintiff’s treatment while at ABH. (See id. at 4-19).
The Eighth Amendment protects individuals against cruel and unusual punishment, which
includes the rights of those involuntarily committed to mental institutions to be provided with
adequate medical care. See Jackson v. Schultz, 429 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir. 2005). The Sixth
Circuit applies the same analysis for violations of the Eighth Amendment for inadequate medical
care in the context of prisons and mental institutions. See Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff's
Dep't, 374 F. App'x 612 (6th Cir. 2010).

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To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate care, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant acted with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Grose v. Corr.
Med. Servs., Inc., 400 F. App’x 986, 988 (6th Cir. 2010). The claim has objective and subjective
components. The objective components require proof of a “sufficiently serious medical need.”
Id. The subjective component requires proof “that the official being sued subjectively perceived
facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference,
and that he disregarded that risk.” Id. Ordinary medical malpractice does not satisfy the
subjective component. Id. Instead, a claim of inadequate medical treatment states a
constitutional claim only if the treatment given is “so woefully inadequate as to amount to no
treatment at all.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860-61 (6th Cir. 1976).
Here, Plaintiff received medical treatment while involuntarily committed. Plaintiff’s
medical records and Dr. McGee’s affidavit, however, do not indicate that Plaintiff’s inguinal
hernia required emergent care or immediate medical surgery. Indeed, Dr. McGee informs the
Court that an inguinal hernia is only an immediate threat to a patient’s health if there is
“strangulation or incarceration that would cause a bowel obstruction.” (McGee Aff, Doc. 59-2, at
¶ 11). There is no evidence that Plaintiff had symptoms that would cause the hernia to be an
immediate threat to his health in this case, thus a reasonable jury could not find objective proof
of a sufficiently serious medical need.
Additionally, even if Plaintiff’s medical need could be construed as sufficiently serious,
Plaintiff has not met his burden to bring forth evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material
fact as to the subjective prong of the medical indifference claim – that is, “that the official being
sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did
in fact draw the inference, and that he disregarded that risk.” Grose, 400 F. App’x at 988. There

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is no evidence on the record that indicates there was a “substantial risk” to be perceived, let alone
that such a risk was in fact inferred by a medical professional treating Plaintiff while he was at
ABH. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claim for inadequate medical treatment is dismissed.

C. Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Athens County Sheriff Pat Kelly,
Bruce Frick, Jack E. Taylor, Brian Cooper, Rodney Smith, and Athens County,
Ohio
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges he was falsely arrested and subjected to malicious
prosecution. (Compl., Doc. 4 at ¶¶ 57, 63). Although it is not explicitly stated in the Complaint,
this Court presumes Plaintiff intended to assert these claims against the Athens County
Defendants. The Athens County Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims
for false arrest and malicious prosecution, claiming: (1) Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to facially
valid warrants; and (2) the Athens County Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
(Doc. 60 at 1).
In response, Plaintiff maintains that he did not violate Ohio’s Aggravated Menacing
statute, and, instead, was arrested for engaging in protected speech. (Doc. 63 at 7). He further
insists that the arrest warrants, issued on June 16 and July 29, 2011 respectively, were not
facially valid because “Plaintiff does not own a car or gun,” thus he was not a threat. (Id. at 6-7).
Plaintiff maintains that he was “simply speaking on the phone about his interest in justice” and
the arrest warrants were issued in retaliation for Plaintiff’s criticism of Sheriff Kelly. Similarly,
Plaintiff claims he was maliciously prosecuted in retaliation for Plaintiff’s past lawsuits against
the Sheriff and other law enforcement, and Plaintiff’s declared intention to sue the Sheriff in the
future. (Id. at 16-17).
The Court will address the claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution in turn.

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1. False Arrest
In the context of a § 1983 action, “[a] false arrest claim under federal law requires a
plaintiff to prove that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.” Voyticky
v. Vill.of Timberlake, 412 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2005); Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 872
(6th Cir. 2002). “An officer has probable cause when ‘the facts and circumstances known to the
officer warrant a prudent man in believing that an offense has been committed.’” Miller v.
Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 248 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,
102, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959)). An officer's actions are measured by what a
reasonable officer would have done under the same circumstances. Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d
1250, 1256 (6th Cir. 1997). In a civil case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving an absence of
probable cause. Fridley, 291 F.3d at 872.
An arrest made pursuant to a facially valid warrant issued by a neutral and detached
magistrate who has determined there is probable cause to issue the warrant is generally a
complete defense to a constitutional claim for false arrest or false imprisonment. Stahl v.
Czernik, 496 F. App'x 621, 624 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143–
44, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). A plaintiff may overcome the complete defense by
showing that a defendant intentionally misled or intentionally omitted information from the
probable cause hearing for an arrest warrant, if the misleading or omitteed information was
critical to a finding of probable cause. See Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 677 n. 4 (“A facially valid
warrant is not always sufficient to merit summary judgment in an action brought pursuant to §
1983 when evidence exists that a defendant intentionally mislead or intentionally omitted
information at a probable cause hearing for an arrest or a search warrant provided that the
misleading or omitted information is critical to the finding of probable cause. In this case,

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however, Plaintiff never alleges, much less offers evidence, that any of Defendants intentionally
misled the magistrate or that they omitted material information at the probable cause hearing.”)
(internal citations omitted).
On both June 17, 2011 and July 29, 2011, Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to arrest
warrants issued by Judge Grim of the Athens County Municipal Court. (Taylor Aff., Doc. 60-1 at
¶¶ 12, 20). The Athens County Defendants set forth affidavit testimony regarding the issuance
of the arrest warrant, as well as the arrest warrants themselves. (See generally Doc. 60-1).
Plaintiff, on the other hand, has not put forth any evidence demonstrating that Judge Grimm was
not a “neutral and detached” magistrate, challenging the validity of the arrest warrant, or
claiming that the Athens County Defendants intentionally misled Judge Grim or omitted critical
information from the probable cause hearing or otherwise misrepresented any facts. See
Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 677 n. 4. Further, this Court does not detect any readily-apparent facial
deficiency in the warrants in the facts set forth in the warrant requests or the underlying criminal
complaints upon which the warrants were based. Plaintiff argues that the warrants were issued in
retaliation for his criticism of Sheriff Kelly and for past law suits he has filed against members of
law enforcement. On summary judgment, however, in response to Defendant’s evidence
demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact, Plaintiff is obligated to come
forward with evidence sufficient to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for the
jury. Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden here. Therefore, the Athens County Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s false arrest claim.
2. Malicious Prosecution
Defendants also move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for malicious
prosecution. The Sixth Circuit “recognize[s] a separate constitutionally cognizable claim of

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malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment,” which “encompasses wrongful
investigation, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration.” Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 715–
16 (2006). In Sykes v. Anderson, this Circuit articulated the elements of a § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim for the first time. 625 F.3d 294, 308 (6th Cir. 2010). To succeed on a
malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that a criminal prosecution was initiated
against the plaintiff and that the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to
prosecute; (2) that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) that as a
consequence of a legal proceeding, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from the
initial seizure; and (4) the criminal case must have been resolved in plaintiff's favor. Id. at 308–
09.
The Athens County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution
must fail because his arrests were supported by probable cause that he engaged in aggravated
menacing and telecommunications harassment.2 Plaintiff responds that there was no probable
cause for his arrest because he claims he is a non-violent person with no car or firearm, facts
which he claims the Athens County Defendants knew.
In this case, Plaintiff was charged and arrested for violations of Ohio Revised Code §§
2903.21(A) and 2917.21.3 R.C. § 2903.21(A) provides:
(A) No person shall knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will
cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person, the
other person's unborn, or a member of the other person's immediate family. In
addition to any other basis for the other person's belief that the offender will cause
serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person, the other
person's unborn, or a member of the other person's immediate family, the other
person's belief may be based on words or conduct of the offender that are directed

2

A charge for Telecommunications Harassment was added against Plaintiff in August 2012 by Detective Brice
Frick. (Taylor Aff., Doc. 60-1, at ¶ 14).
3
Defendants’ brief mistakenly cites to § 2717.21 (“Proceedings to change name of person”). The Court presumes
the parties intended to cite to § 2917.21 (“Telecommunications harassment”).

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at or identify a corporation, association, or other organization that employs the
other person or to which the other person belongs.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.21. R.C. § 2917.21 provides:
No person shall knowingly make or cause to be made a telecommunication, or
knowingly permit a telecommunication to be made from a telecommunications
device under the person's control, to another, if the caller does any of the
following: … [d]uring the telecommunication, violates section 2903.21 of the
Revised Code.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2917.21.
Probable cause exists when “‘the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a
prudent man in believing that an offense has been committed.’” Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606
F.3d 240, 248 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4
L.Ed.2d 134 (1959)). To determine whether an officer had probable cause courts consider the
totality of the circumstances. See Sykes, 625 F.3d at 306 (citing Hinchman v. Moore, 312 F.3d
198, 204 (6th Cir. 2002)). Nonetheless, an arrest supported by probable cause is improper if the
police officer “knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false
statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood and such statements or omissions [we]re
material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Sykes, 625 F.3d at 305 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Ghaith v. Rauschenberger, 493 F. App'x 731,
736 (6th Cir. 2012); Hinchman, 312 F.3d at 205–06 (“Falsifying facts to establish probable cause
to arrest and prosecute an innocent person is of course patently unconstitutional....”).
In this case, the event leading to Plaintiff’s June 17, 2011 arrest was that members of
ACSO, including Detective Taylor, heard Plaintiff’s call in to a radio show and make comments
suggesting bodily harm to Sheriff Kelly. Specifically, Detective Taylor maintains that he heard
Plaintiff say, “Sheriff Kelly…lost his privilege to be alive. He needs capital punishment. I am
going to take him down,” and “Adolf Kelly, you are going down.” (Taylor Aff., Doc. 60-1 at ¶
23

5). Detective Taylor is the officer who ultimately drafted and filed the charging documents and
who requested the arrest warrant. In his affidavit, Detective Taylor avers that he reasonably
believed the comments threatened bodily harm to the Sheriff, in violation of § 2903.21(A). (Id.
at ¶¶ 8-10).
Similarly, with respect to Plaintiff’s July 29, 2011 arrest, Detective Taylor asserts that he
was provided with information that Plaintiff called into the same radio show, but this time, made
remarks to radio host Sharon Elliott that were perceived as threatening – specifically, that
Plaintiff hoped Ms. Elliott would be robbed and killed and that she would deserve it. (Id. at ¶
15). Detective Taylor avers that he spoke directly to Ms. Elliott regarding the comments
Plaintiff made during her radio show. (Id. at ¶ 16). Detective Taylor maintains that it was on
these bases that he again believed Plaintiff violated § 2903.21(A). (Id. at ¶ 17).
Based on the evidence put before this Court, it is apparent that Plaintiff’s comments in
both June and July 2011 refer to imposing serious physical harm on others that a reasonable
person could believe violate Ohio law. Again here, Plaintiff has not come forward with any facts
or evidence opposing the evidence put forward by the Athens County Defendants or
demonstrating that the Athens County Defendants knowingly, deliberately, or recklessly made
false statements that were material or necessary to the probable cause finding. See Sykes, 625
F.3d at 305. Instead, Plaintiff merely continues to make conclusory assertions that he was only
arrested and charged with Aggravated Menacing as retaliation for his outspoken criticism of the
Athens County Sheriff, and that he is a non-violent person who does not own a car or a gun.
The Court cannot say that, without more, Plaintiff’s assertions alone are sufficient to
show that there was no probable cause for his arrest and the subsequent charges against him. If
Plaintiff cannot prove a lack of probable cause, he cannot make out a claim for malicious

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prosecution. See id. at 308-09. Accordingly, this Court cannot find that Plaintiff has
demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on this claim sufficient to surpass
summary judgment. Cf., e.g., Underwood v. Wasko, No. 2:11-CV-171, 2012 WL 4087411, at
*8-10 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2012) (“A jury could determine that [Officer] Wasko's account of the
facts in the criminal complaint, given their contradictory nature to the facts in the affidavits
presented by [Plaintiff] Underwood, stated ‘deliberate falsehood or showed reckless disregard for
the truth,’ and that the allegedly false or omitted information was material to the finding of
probable cause. Consequently, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing that
there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Underwood's malicious prosecution
claim.”) (internal citations omitted).
Thus, Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution must be dismissed.4
D. John and Jane Does 1-12
After a review of the present record, the Court also finds that Plaintiff fails to state a
claim against John and Jane Does 1-12.5 To date, Plaintiff has not indicated the identity of these
persons, nor has he specified their involvement in the violation of his constitutional rights. In
Gilmore v. Corrections Corp. of America, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
plaintiff’s complaint where plaintiff named 22 defendants in the caption of the complaint, but
failed to indicate how the defendants violated his constitutional rights. 92 Fed. App’x 188 (6th
Cir. 2004). The Court of Appeals stated:

4

The Athens County Defendants make several alternative arguments in their request for summary judgment. In
addition to the foregoing, they also argue: (1) the Athens County Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to
the individual claims against them; (2) under Monell, there is no policy, custom, or practice to support Plaintiff’s
claim against Sheriff Kelly in his official capacity; and (3) Athens County is not sui juris. (Doc. 60 at 1). Because
the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution cannot surpass summary judgment
on other grounds, the Court need not address the Athens County Defendants’ alternative arguments.
5
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court must dismiss the claims of a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis “at any
time” if the Court determines that the plaintiff fails to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

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A complaint must contain allegations respecting all the elements to sustain a
recovery under some viable legal theory. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops,
Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1988). Merely listing names in the caption of the
complaint and alleging constitutional violations in the body of the complaint is
not enough to sustain recovery under § 1983. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149, 155-57, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978)
Gilmore, 92 Fed. App'x at 190. In this case, Plaintiff fails to state a facially plausible claim
against John and Jane Does 1-12. Accordingly, those claims must be dismissed.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Margaret Sterling and Tri-County Mental Health
and Counseling’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED (Doc. 58); Defendants Reddy
Vaka and Jane Krason’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Immunity, and Summary
Judgment is GRANTED (Doc. 59); Defendants Athens County Sheriff Pat Kelly, Bruce Frick,
Jack E. Taylor, Brian Cooper, Rodney Smith, and Athens County, Ohio’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED (Doc. 60); and, Plaintiff’s claims against Does 1-12 are hereby
DISMISSED. The Clerk of Courts is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the
Defendants. This action is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Algenon L. Marbley
ALGENON L. MARBLEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: March 26, 2015

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