Westerfield v. Warden Chillicothe Correctional Institution

Filing 2

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION it is recommendated that this action be dismissed re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Objections to R&R due by 9/7/2012. Signed by Magistrate Judge Terence P Kemp on 8/21/12. (rew)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ERIC R. WESTERFIELD,
Petitioner,

CASE NO. 2:12-CV-0631

v.

JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST

WARDEN, CHILLICOTHE
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,

Magistrate Judge Kemp

Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner, a state prisoner, has filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. This matter is before the Court on its own motion to consider
the sufficiency of the petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in
the United States District Courts. For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge
RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed.
I. PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE COURTS
According to the petition, this action involves petitioner’s conviction (after a jury
trial held in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas) on one count of rape. According
to the exhibits to the petition, petitioner was sentenced on December 6, 2007, to life in
prison and adjudged a sexual predator. He filed a timely appeal of his conviction and
sentence, and in a decision filed on September 4, 2008, a copy of which is also attached to
the petition, the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals overruled his three assignments of
error and affirmed the trial court. See State v. Westerfield, 2008 WL 4078425 (Franklin Co.

App. September 4, 2008). On February 4, 2009, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept
his appeal, and it subsequently denied a motion for reconsideration of that decision. See
State v. Westerfield, 120 Ohio St. 3d 1506 (February 4, 2009); State v. Westerfield, 121 Ohio St.
3d 1442 (April 8, 2009). The petition in this case is undated but was filed in this Court on
July 16, 2012. Petitioner does not allege that he filed any other actions challenging his
conviction, and the state court’s records do not show that he did. Thus, more than three
years has passed between the date of the last state court decision and the date on which this
action was filed.
II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which became
effective on April 24, 1996, imposes a one-year statute of limitations on the filing of habeas
corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides:
(d) (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation
period shall run from the latest of(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented
from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
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retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted
toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
Here, petitioner's conviction became final either on May 5, 2009, which was ninety
days after the Ohio Supreme Court's February 4, 2009, dismissal of his appeal, or, at the
latest, on July 7, 2009, ninety days after his motion for reconsideration was denied on April
8, 2009. The ninety days is added to accommodate the time when a state court defendant
may file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See Bronaugh
v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283 (6th Cir. 2000). Either of these dates is more than three years
before petitioner filed this action. The statute of limitations would therefore appear to bar
petitioner’s claims. .
In some cases, the failure to file a habeas corpus petition in a timely fashion can be
excused by the doctrine of equitable tolling. However, “the petitioner bears the ultimate
burden of persuading the court that he or she is entitled to equitable tolling.” Griffin v.
Rogers, 308 F.3d 647, 653 (6th Cir.2002). Equitable tolling should be used sparingly. Cook v.
Stegall, 295 F.3d 517, 521 (6th Cir.2002); Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of
Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir.2000) (citations omitted). “Typically, equitable tolling
applies only when a litigant's failure to meet a legally-mandated deadline unavoidably

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arose from circumstances beyond that litigant's control.” Id. at 560-61.

“[A] habeas

petitioner must demonstrate both that he has been diligent in pursuing his rights and that
an extraordinary circumstance caused his untimely filing.” Hall v. Warden, Lebanon
Correctional Inst., 662 F.3d 745, 750 (6th Cir. 2011), citing Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549
(2010).
Here, there is nothing in the petition which addresses any of these issues. Although
Paragraph 16 of the form petition (which petitioner used in this case) begins with the
phrase “TIMELINESS OF PETITION” and asks the petitioner to explain, if the conviction
became final over a year before the petition was filed, “why the one-year statute of
limitations as contained in 28 U.S.C. §2244(d) does not bar your petition,” petitioner did
not answer that question. In the absence of affirmative evidence that would justify use of
the doctrine of equitable tolling, the Court cannot excuse the untimely filing of this case.
Section 2244(d) therefore mandates dismissal.
III. RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
The Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that this action be DISMISSED as untimely
because it was not filed within one year after petitioner’s conviction became final.
IV. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within
fourteen (14) days of the date of this report, file and serve on all parties written objections
to those specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made,
together with supporting authority for the objection(s). A judge of this Court shall make
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a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a judge of this
Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the magistrate
judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review the
Report and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the
decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140 (1985);United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
The parties are further advised that, if they intend to file an appeal of any adverse
decision, they may submit arguments in any objections filed, regarding whether a
certificate of appealability should issue should the case be dismissed.

/s/ Terence P. Kemp
____
United States Magistrate Judge

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