Ruiz-Bueno, III et al v. Scott et al

Filing 174

ORDER denying 137 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge Gregory L Frost on 4/16/14. (kn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JOHN C. RUIZ BUENO, III, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 2:12-cv-00809
JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST
Magistrate Judge Terence P. Kemp

v.
ZACK SCOTT, et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of Defendant Douglas Edgington’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 137), Plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition
(ECF No. 146), and Defendant Edgington’s reply (ECF No. 151). For the reasons that follow,
the Court DENIES the motion.
I.

BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the death of Edward Peterson (“Peterson”), who died while

incarcerated at the Franklin County Correctional Center II (“FCCC”). Plaintiffs, the
administrator of Peterson’s estate and Peterson’s son, brought a claim for Eight Amendment
violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state-law claims for negligent provision of medical
care, wrongful death, and loss of consortium. Plaintiffs named fifty-four defendants to this
action, all of whom worked in the FCCC section where Peterson was confined. Defendant
Edgington was the facility commander of FCCC at the time of Peterson’s death.
The facts set forth below are taken from Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and are assumed
true for purposes of this analysis. On August 5, 2011, Peterson was arrested for a misdemeanor
and held in custody at FCCC. At the time of his incarceration, Peterson suffered from
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hypertensive cardiovascular disease, for which he received a daily regimen of medications.
FCCC received a copy of Peterson’s medical records and therefore was aware of Peterson’s
medical condition.
On August 8, 2011, Peterson was placed in an isolation cell. Peterson’s cell was cleaned
twice during the twenty-six days he was in isolation. Between cleanings, his cell was covered in
trash and feces. Peterson’s cell also lacked a mattress, although an internal affairs investigative
report (which Plaintiffs incorporated into their Amended Complaint) indicates that Peterson was
provided a mattress but destroyed it.
On September 4, 2011, at approximately 3:30 a.m., Peterson began to suffer breathing
difficulties. A neighboring inmate asked Peterson if he was okay, to which Peterson replied,
“no.” Peterson was found unresponsive in his cell shortly after 9:00 a.m. and was pronounced
dead at approximately 9:45 a.m.
Plaintiffs make several allegations regarding the quality of care Peterson received once he
was found, but those allegations are irrelevant to this present motion. Plaintiffs do not suggest
that Defendant Edgington was involved in that care.
Potentially relevant to this motion, however, is the allegation that two different deputies
(Defendant Edgington’s subordinates) assigned to make rounds on the isolation floor did not do a
proper head count of the inmates on the day Peterson died. Presumably, drawing all inferences
in Plaintiffs’ favor, those deputies would have discovered Peterson’s condition earlier had they
properly performed their rounds. Plaintiffs also allege that the “Supervising officers” (which
presumably include Defendant Edgington) “knew that their subordinates were not properly
performing their duties and encouraged the falsification of reports to give the appearance of

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compliance with the Rules, Regulations, and Procedures of the Franklin County Sheriff’s
Office.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 96.)
Regarding Defendant Edgington specifically, Plaintiffs allege that he “knew of the
inhumane conditions in Peterson’s cell, knew that they posed a serious risk of harm to his health
or safety, yet disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” (Id. ¶ 368.)
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Edgington failed to adequately supervise subordinates who
noticed deficiencies in the condition of Peterson’s cell and deliberately failed to enter the
common area of single cells to observe his subordinates’ work during his rounds as supervisor,
all the while “act[ing] with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner in
disregarding the known risk to Decedent.” (Id. ¶ 371.)
As stated above, Plaintiffs incorporate into their Amended Complaint a report from an
internal affairs investigation (“Report”) conducted after Peterson’s death. The Report appears to
conflict with some of Plaintiffs’ allegations. For example, according to the Report, Defendant
Edgington stated that he never had any contact with Peterson, never observed him in his cell, was
never advised by any supervisor/deputy under his command of the condition of Peterson’s cell or
that Peterson was missing a mattress, and was never aware that his supervisors were not entering
the common area of single cells to observe inmates during their rounds. (ECF No. 119-1, at 36.)
The Report states that Defendant Edgington did not personally inspect any isolation cells
during the time Peterson was incarcerated at FCCC. Defendant Edgington occasionally
reviewed cell inspections completed by subordinates; he did not believe he was obligated to
review them. Defendant Edgington stated that he did not remember seeing an inspection report
dated August 31, 2011 that listed Peterson’s cell as being in “fair” to “adequate” condition, with
only two lights needing repair. (Id.) Defendant Edgington acknowledged that he ultimately is

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responsible for the cleanliness of FCCC. Finally, the Report concludes that Defendant
Edgington was neglectful for failing to supervise his direct subordinates, not personally spot
checking and/or inspecting isolation cells, and not reviewing and/or approving cell inspection
reports. (Id. at 92.)
Defendant Edgington answered Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint by denying many of the
allegations contained therein. He subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), which the Court now considers.
II.

ANALYSIS
Rule 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay

trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The Court
reviews motions made under Rule 12(c) in the same manner it would review a motion made
under Rule 12(b)(6). Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complaint must provide fair
notice of each claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 570 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A court, in ruling on a
Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c) motion, must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and treat all well-pleaded allegations contained therein as true. Id. at 555–56. The
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief.
Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007).
Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although Rule 8
does not require “detailed factual allegations,” “it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79

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(2009). A court need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Once the
court has identified the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, it should view each allegation
in the context of the entire complaint to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient
facts to support his or her claims. See In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d
777, 782 (N.D. Ohio 2011).
Considering only those well-pleaded facts, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). A plaintiff’s factual allegations must be enough to raise the claimed right to relief
above the speculative level and to create a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence to support the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. If the “well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the court should dismiss
the complaint. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
1. Federal Claim – Eighth Amendment Violation Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s guidance in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, (2009), the Court begins its analysis by identifying the elements Plaintiffs must allege to
state an Eighth Amendment claim under § 1983.
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
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42 U.S.C. § 1983. There is no dispute that Defendant Edgington acted under color of state law at
all times relevant. Accordingly, to state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiffs were required to allege that a
constitutional violation occurred, a sufficient causal connection between Defendant Edgington
and the violation, and that Defendant Edgington acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.
See, e.g., Lillard v. Shelby Cty Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that the
threshold inquiry for bringing a § 1983 claim is “ ‘whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a
right secured by the Constitution and laws’ ” (citing Banker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140
(1979))); Lynn v. City of Detroit, 98 F. App’x 381, 387 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing causation);
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (explaining the state of mind requirement).
Plaintiffs bring their claim under the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which prescribes cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In the
prison context, the Eighth Amendment imposes certain duties on prison officials, including the
duties to provide “humane conditions of confinement” and to “ensure that inmates receive
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. An Eighth
Amendment violation can be found only if the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” and
the prison official’s act or omission resulted “in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities.” Id. at 834 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)).
Where, as here, a plaintiff challenges a prisoner’s “conditions of confinement,” the
plaintiff must prove that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s
health or safety. Id. That means that the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Id. at 837. Negligence cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim. See, e.g., Gregory
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v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 751 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041,
1048 (6th Cir. 1999)).
The present dispute involves the issue of supervisory liability. It is well settled that
liability under § 1983 cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Leary v.
Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 903 (6th Cir. 2003). In other words, supervisors cannot be held liable
under § 1983 for the acts of their agents.
As such, when a plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim against a supervisor premised on the acts
or omissions of his or her subordinates, the plaintiff must allege and show an additional element:
that the supervisor “encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly
participated in it.” Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). “At a minimum, a §
1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or
knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.” Id. (citing
Hays v. Jefferson Cty., 668 F.2d 869, 872–74 (6th Cir. 1982)).1 The plaintiff must make this
showing in addition to the three elements (violation, causation, and intent) set forth above.
It is important that note that supervisors are never immune from liability simply because
of their status as supervisors. If a supervisor violates an inmate’s constitutional rights through
the active performance of his or her duty, then liability is direct (not vicarious), and a § 1983
action may lie. See, e.g., Taylor v. Michigan Dep’t of Corrections, 69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir.
1995) (finding that a supervisor could be liable for his conduct in approving inmate transfers
without a reasonable policy in place to insure that the transferees were not placed in grave
danger); Hill v. Marshall, 962 F.2d 1209, 1213 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that a supervisor could
be liable for, inter alia, referring inmate complaints to a nurse that he knew to be wrongly
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Defendant argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal “called into question the notion of
personal involvement by knowing acquiescence.” (ECF No. 151, at 2.) Because the Court does not rely on that
theory of liability in its holding, however, it does not address this issue.

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altering and destroying inmate prescriptions); Essex v. Cty. of Livingston, 518 F. App’x 351, 355
(6th Cir. 2013) (“In both Taylor and Hill, it was the defendant supervisors’ active engagement in
a function of their position that directly resulted in injury to the plaintiffs.” (emphasis added));
see also Gregory, 444 F.3d at 752.
Turning to the Amended Complaint in this case, the Court acknowledges that the
allegations against Defendant Edgington are sparse. The Court also acknowledges that
Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Report’s recommendation that Defendant Edgington be disciplined for
“neglect or inattention to duty” is misplaced, as neglect or negligence cannot form the basis of a
§ 1983 claim. See Gregory, 444 F.3d at 751. Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendant Edgington can
be liable for “fail[ing] to perform his duties in monitoring his supervisors and deputies to ensure
that rounds were being performed,” (ECF No. 146, at 7), is similarly misplaced, as such “failure
to supervise” allegations do not state a § 1983 claim. See Gregory, 444 F.3d at 751–52 (rejecting
the notion that a supervisor’s failure to review his or her subordinates’ work can form the basis
of a § 1983 claim against that supervisor in his or her individual capacity); Essex, 518 F. App’x
at 355–56 (same). Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint states a § 1983 claim against Defendant Edgington.
Plaintiffs allege that Peterson’s cell was covered in trash and feces for much of the time
Peterson was incarcerated. Because the Eighth Amendment imposes on prison officials the duty
to provide “humane conditions of confinement” to inmates, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832, such an
allegation could, if proved, establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Larson, 505 F. App’x 475, 478 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a prisoner-plaintiff stated a claim for
an Eighth Amendment violation when he allegedly was confined for three days in a cell covered
with feces). Plaintiffs therefore satisfied the first element of a § 1983 claim.

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Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant knew about the conditions in Peterson’s cell, knew
that they posed a serious risk of harm to Peterson’s health and safety, yet failed to take
reasonable measures to fix those conditions, despite being responsible for the cleanliness of
FCCC. Necessarily viewing those allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in
Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court finds those allegations sufficient to allege causation and intent.
Although several explanations might exist for the conditions in Peterson’s cell and for why
Defendant did not rectify those conditions, the Court cannot speculate about those reasons at the
pleadings stage of this litigation. The Court also cannot discount Plaintiffs’ allegation that
Defendant Edgington knew of the conditions in Peterson’s cell, despite the seemingly conflicting
statements in the Report that he was not aware of those conditions. That discrepancy presents a
factual issue that is more appropriately resolved after discovery is complete.
Defendant Edgington argues that Plaintiffs failed to properly allege intent, stating:
“Plaintiffs have alleged no specific facts indicating how Mr. Edgington was aware of the
conditions of Decedent’s confinement or how Mr. Edgington was aware that such conditions
posed a risk to Decedent’s health.” (ECF No. 137, at 4–5.) But Rule 8—even postTwombly/Iqbal—does not require a plaintiff to allege facts explaining “how” a defendant
acquired certain knowledge. Indeed, even under the heightened pleading requirements of Rule
9(b) (which do not apply to this case), “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a
person’s mind” may still “be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Defendant next argues that “a supervisor’s knowledge of misdeeds by his agents or an
alleged failure to act cannot form the basis for § 1983 liability.” (ECF No. 137, at 5.) But that
argument assumes that Defendant delegated responsibility for cleaning Peterson’s cell to a
subordinate or was not otherwise responsible for cleaning it himself. That may be true; however,

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Defendant offers no authority that would permit the Court to assume that fact at the Rule 12(c)
stage of this litigation. Instead, the Court must rely on Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendant was
responsible for the cleanliness of FCCC, knew that Peterson’s cell was covered in trash and
feces, and acted in bad faith by failing to take any action to rectify that condition. Those
allegations state a claim for direct liability against Defendant; the Bellamy factors for supervisory
liability do not come into play.
Even assuming, however, that Plaintiffs are attempting to invoke supervisory liability,
both parties agree that such liability can be imposed where the supervisor “encouraged the
specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Bellamy v.
Bradley, 729 F.2d at 421. Plaintiffs alleged that the “Supervising officers” (which, as stated
above, presumably include Defendant Edgington) “encouraged the falsification of reports to give
the appearance of compliance with Rules, Regulations, and Procedures of the Franklin County
Sheriff’s Office.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 96.) The Court acknowledges that this allegation is light on
facts; however, combined with Plaintiffs’ other allegations that a cell inspection report did not
accurately reflect the condition of Peterson’s cell, the Court finds it sufficient to survive
Defendant’s Rule 12(c) motion. See In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d at
782 (stating that a court should view each allegation in the context of the entire complaint to
determine whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support his or her claims).
Defendant does not address this allegation in his motion.
For those reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 allegations state a claim against
Defendant Edgington. The Court therefore DENIES Defendant Edgington’s motion with respect
to Count One.

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2. State Law Claims
Defendant Edgington offers two arguments as to why Plaintiffs’ state law claims should
be dismissed. First, Defendant Edgington argues that he is immune from liability for Plaintiffs’
state law claims pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 2744.03(a)(6). Second, Defendant Edgington
argues that Plaintiffs failed to set forth the elements of a wrongful death claim under Ohio law.
As explained below, these arguments are without merit.
Regarding immunity, § 2744.03(a)(6) provides that an employee of a political
subdivision is immune from liability unless, inter alia, his or his acts or omissions were made
with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. For the same reasons
that Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to infer deliberate indifference, they are sufficient to
infer malicious purpose, bad faith, or wanton/reckless behavior. Defendant Edgington does not
offer any persuasive arguments to the contrary.2
Regarding the wrongful death claim, Ohio law requires that a party asserting such a
claim allege and prove three elements: a duty owed to the decedent, a breach of that duty, and
proximate causation between the breach of duty and the death. See, e.g., Littleton v. Good
Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 39 Ohio St. 3d 86, 454, 529 N.E.2d 449 (1988). Plaintiffs allege
that “FCCC personnel” (which presumably includes Defendant Edgington) received a copy of
Peterson’s medical records and therefore were aware of his medical issues. (Am. Compl. ¶ 65.)
Plaintiffs similarly allege that, as facilities commander, Defendant Edgington was responsible for
his subordinates’ cell inspections and rounds of the isolation unit. And, taking Plaintiffs’
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Defendant Edgington’s argument relies on several passages from the Report reflecting his statements that he did
not know Peterson’s cell was dirty and had no reason to know that his subordinates were not properly inspecting
cells. As stated above, however, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Edgington knew of the conditions in Peterson’s cell
yet failed to rectify them. (Am. Compl. ¶ 368.) The Court is obligated, at this stage of the litigation, to accept
Plaintiffs’ allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. To the extent there exists a
discrepancy between Plaintiffs’ allegations and Defendant Edgington’s statements in the Report, the Court is
obligated to draw the inference that Plaintiffs’ allegation is factually correct and Defendant Edgington’s statements
in the Report are incorrect.

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allegations as true, the Court must assume that Defendant Edgington’s subordinates did not
properly perform their rounds on the night Peterson died and therefore did not find Peterson
unresponsive for several hours after they otherwise would have. Necessarily accepting these
allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs’ wrongful death allegations are sufficient to survive Defendant Edgington’s Rule 12(c)
motion. The Court therefore DENIES Defendant Edgington’s motion with respect to Plaintiffs’
state law claims.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendant Edgington failed to meet his

burden in demonstrating that judgment on the pleadings is proper. Accordingly, the Court
DENIES Defendant Edgington’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 137.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Gregory L. Frost
GREGORY L. FROST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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