Painter-Payne et al v. Vesta West Bay, LLC

Filing 79

OPINION AND ORDER denying 59 Motion for Sanctions; denying 67 Motion to Strike. Signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King on 4/21/2014. (pes1)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DISTRICT
LENA PAINTER-PAYNE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Case No.2:12-cv-00912
Magistrate Judge King

vs.

VESTA WEST BAY, LLC,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This is an action under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et
seq., in which Plaintiffs, a person with disabilities and her son and
authorized live-in caretaker, allege that Defendant, the landlord of
the

Section

8

apartment

in

which

Plaintiffs

resided,

improperly

evicted them based on plaintiff Christopher Painter’s residency in the
apartment. Plaintiff Lena M. Painter-Payne specifically alleges that
Defendant denied requests for reasonable accommodations in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(A), (f)(3)(B). Plaintiff Christopher Painter
asserts a claim of defamation per se. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and
monetary relief.
This matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiffs’
Motion

for

Cooperate

Sanctions
in

Against

Discovery

Defendant

(“Plaintiffs’

for

Defendant’s

Motion”),

Doc.

Failure

to

No.

59,

Defendant’s Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions
(“Defendant’s

Response”),

Doc.

No.

68,

and

Plaintiffs’

Reply

to

Defendant’s Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions
(“Plaintiffs’ Reply”), Doc. No. 72.
Also before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Strike Portion of
Plaintiffs’

Motion

for

Sanctions

Related

to

Jennifer

Moran’s

Deposition (“Defendant’s Motion to Strike”), Doc. No. 67, Plaintiffs’
Memorandum Contra to Defendant’s Motion to Strike Portion of Motion
for

Sanctions

Related

to

Jennifer

Moran’s

Deposition

(“Plaintiffs’

Memorandum contra Defendant’s Motion to Strike”), Doc. No. 74, and
Defendant’s

Reply

Motion

Strike

to

Contra”),

Doc.

to

Plaintiffs’

Memorandum

(“Defendant’s

No.

75.

Reply

Because

Contra

to

to

Plaintiffs’

Defendant’s

Motion

to

Defendant’s
Memorandum
Strike

and

Defendant’s Response relate to the same deposition and present similar
arguments, the arguments in Defendant’s Motion to Strike will be taken
into

consideration

in

deciding

Plaintiff’s

Motion.

Therefore,

Defendant’s Motion to Strike, Doc. No. 67, is DENIED.
I. Background
Plaintiff Lena Painter-Payne (“Ms. Painter-Payne”) is a person
with disabilities who formerly resided with her son and live-in aide,
plaintiff Christopher Painter (“Mr. Painter”), in an apartment complex
owned by Defendant, Vesta West Bay, LLC (“West Bay” or “Defendant”).
Verified

Complaint,

disabilities,

Ms.

Doc.

No.

Painter-Payne

1,
was

p.

1,

¶

provided

7.
a

Because
Section

8

of

her

housing

voucher by the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority (“CMHA”). Id.
at

¶¶

5-6.

On

June

1,

2012,

CMHA

notified

both

Plaintiffs

and

Defendant that Mr. Painter had been approved as Ms. Painter-Payne’s
live-in aide. Id. at ¶ 14.

2

Plaintiffs allege that, in August 2012, Defendant asked either
that

Mr.

Painter

vacate

the

premises

or

that

Ms.

Painter-Payne

relocate. Id. at ¶ 16. According to Plaintiffs, Defendant based its
demand on its belief that Mr. Painter was a sex offender in light of
Mr. Painter’s 1999 arrest on a charge of rape, even though that charge
had been dismissed. Id. at ¶¶ 16-17.
Plaintiffs further allege that, after Ms. Painter-Payne refused
Defendant’s request, Defendant demanded that Ms. Painter-Payne sign a
mutual

rescission

of

the

lease

(as

a

predicate

for

Defendant’s

issuance of a voucher for relocation); otherwise, Ms. Painter-Payne
would be evicted.

Id. at ¶ 18. Ms. Painter-Payne signed the mutual

rescission agreement but, because her signature had not been notarized
as required by CMHA’s policies, Plaintiffs were refused a relocation
voucher. Id. at ¶ 20. Defendant served a notice to vacate on October 1,
2012. Id. at ¶ 30. Plaintiffs initiated this action on October 4, 2012.
Id. at p. 1.1
II.

Plaintiffs’ Motion
Plaintiffs’

Motion

alleges

deficiencies

in

Defendant’s

preparation of its corporate designees, in Defendant’s inclusion in
its

initial

disclosures

under

Rule

26(a)(1)(A)(i)

of

one

Jennifer

Moran as a witness with personal knowledge of discoverable information,
and in Defendant’s production of discoverable information after the
July 30, 2013 discovery completion date.

1

The parties thereafter agreed to Plaintiffs’ relocation. Report on Status of
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Doc. No. 22.

3

Rule

30(b)(6)

Designees.

On

June

4,

2013,

Plaintiffs

noticed

Defendant’s deposition, pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), on the following
topics:
1.

West Bay’s policies and procedures and application of
same for tenant screening and selection, including but
not limited to background checks, reference checks,
and certifications for compliance with tax credit
properties between January 2010 and present.

2.

Any changes in West Bay’s policies and procedures for
tenant screening in the past five years.

3.

West Bay’s policies and procedures and application of
same for requests for reasonable accommodations under
the Fair Housing Act, including those for live-in
aides.

4.

West Bay’s policies and procedures for
notices to tenants of lease violations.

5.

West Bay’s policies and procedures and application of
same for terminating tenants for conduct of household
members or guests.

6.

West Bay’s policies and procedures and application of
same for recertification of tenants.

7.

West Bay’s management structure and responsibility and
authority to admit or terminate tenants.

8.

West Bay’s knowledge of Columbus Metropolitan Housing
Authority’s Section 8 program, rules, policies, and
procedures.

9.

Lena
Painter-Payne
tenancy,
process and termination.

10.

Barbara Douglas tenancy, including admission process
and termination.

11.

West
Bay’s
policies
and
procedures
including
application of same for live-in aide application,
approval and termination.

including

providing

admission

Plaintiffs’ Motion, Exhibit 1. Defendant designated Gary Weekley to
testify on “events surrounding termination of tenancy of Lena PainterPayne,” and Dixie Pyne to testify on the remaining topics.
4

Id.,

Exhibit 4A.

Plaintiffs deposed these designees on July 1, 2013, see

Deposition of Gary Weekley, Doc. No. 52; Deposition of Dixie Pyne, Doc.
No.

53.

In

their

motion

for

sanctions,

Plaintiffs

contend

that

Defendant failed to properly prepare these witnesses as required by
Rule 30(b)(6).
Disclosure

Plaintiff’s Motion.
of

Jennifer

Moran

pursuant

to

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

26(a)(1)(A)(i). In its initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) of the
Federal

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure,

Defendant

identified

four

(4)

persons likely to have discoverable information, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(1)(A)(i), including Jennifer Moran, whom Defendant identified as
“the

area

property

manager

at

Vesta

corporation

[who]

may

have

personal knowledge of the rules, procedures, and policies of West Bay
Apartments, LLC [,] and [who] also has personal knowledge of the facts
and circumstances giving rise to this action.”

Id., Exhibit 4A. In

their motion for sanctions, Plaintiffs contend that, because their
deposition

of

Ms.

Moran

demonstrated

that

she

had

no

personal

knowledge relevant to the issues presented in this action, her name
should not have been included in Defendant’s initial disclosures.
Production of Discovery after the Discovery Completion Date. On
August 7, 2013, i.e., following the close of discovery, Defendant
provided to Plaintiffs contact information for three (3) individuals
who

had

been

identified

by

other

deponents

as

knowledge of the issues presented in this action.

having

Id., Exhibit 17.

Defendant also produced Ms. Painter-Payne’s rent ledger.
17A.

In

their

motion

for

sanctions,

5

Plaintiffs

personal

Id., Exhibit

contend

that

this

information should have been produced by Defendant prior to the close
of discovery.
Plaintiffs
reasonable

seek

attorneys’

sanctions
fees,

in

the

form

associated

with

of
the

costs,

including

depositions

of

Defendant’s corporate designees and Ms. Moran; Plaintiffs also seek to
preclude Defendant’s introduction of evidence relating to information
on

which

these

deponents

were

unable

to

testify

and

relating

to

discovery produced by Defendant after the discovery completion date.
Id.
A. Rule 30(b)(6) Depositions:
Plaintiffs deposed both Ms. Pyne and Mr. Weekley on July 1, 2013.
See Deposition of Dixie Pyne, Doc. No. 53; Deposition of Gary Weekley,
Doc. No. 52. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant failed to designate a

corporate

representative

under

Rule

30(b)(6)

who

could

appropriately testify on behalf of Defendant. Plaintiffs’ Motion,
p. 4.
Rule

30(b)(6)

of

the

Federal

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

provides in pertinent part:
[A] party may name as the deponent a public or private
corporation . . . and must describe with reasonable
particularity the matters for examination. The named
organization must then designate one or more . . . persons
who consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out
the
matters
on
which
each
person
designated
will
testify. . . . The persons designated must testify about
information
known
or
reasonably
available
to
the
organization.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). “[A]n organization which is served with a
Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice is obligated to produce a witness

6

knowledgeable

about

the

subjects

described

in

the

notice

and

to

prepare that witness to testify not just to his or her own knowledge,
but

the

corporation's

knowledge.”

Prosonic

Corp.

v.

Stafford,

No.

2:07-cv-803, 2008 WL 2323528, at *1 (S.D. Ohio June 2, 2008). “A
corporation has a duty under Rule 30(b)(6) to provide a witness who is
knowledgeable in order to provide binding answers on behalf of the
corporation.”

U.S.,

ex

rel.

Fry

v.

Health

Alliance

of

Greater

Cincinnati, No. 1:03-cv-167, 2009 WL 5227661, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20,
2009).

This

includes

“preparing

the

witness

to

answer

fully

and

without evasion all questions about the designated subject matter.” Id.
A party “may not circumvent this rule simply by producing a witness
without knowledge of the subjects believed to be irrelevant.” Prosonic,
2008 WL 2323528 at *4. Further, the duty to prepare a 30(b)(6) witness
extends

not

only

to

the

matters

within

the

designee’s

personal

knowledge, but also to all matters reasonably known by the corporation.
U.S.,

ex

rel.

Fry,

2009

WL

5227661

at

*2.

A

party

has

the

responsibility under Rule 30(b)(6) to prepare its designee “to the
extent matters are reasonably available, whether from documents, past
employees, or other sources. . . .” Id.
1. Deposition of Dixie Pyne
Plaintiffs contend that Ms. Pyne lacked sufficient knowledge to
testify

as

Defendant’s

corporate

designee

and

refer

to

four

(4)

portions of her deposition as evidence of that contention. First,
Plaintiffs

assert

that

Ms.

Pyne

“did

not

possess

basic

corporate

information regarding events that are at the heart of this litigation”
because she was unable to testify on the termination of Lena Painter-

7

Payne’s

tenancy.

Plaintiffs’

Motion,

p.

5.

However,

Defendant

specifically designated Mr. Weekley, not Ms. Pyne, to testify as to
“[e]vents surrounding termination of tenancy of Lena Painter-Payne.”
Id., Exhibit 4A.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Pyne was unprepared to testify
as Defendant’s designee because she lacked sufficient knowledge as to
Mr. Painter’s criminal history and the eviction proceeding. Id. at p.
5.
A highly disputed issue in this case is whether the
Defendant initiated the eviction process against Plaintiffs
based partially on unsupported allegations that Mr. Painter
had a prior rape conviction, (he did not) and if this was
in fact the grounds on which the eviction was initiated,
whether, when and how the Defendant came to know this
information. On this crucial matter the corporation, with
Ms. Pyne speaking as its chosen corporate representative,
possessed absolutely no knowledge.
Id. Again, because Ms. Pyne was not designated to testify about Mr.
Painter’s

background

check

or

about

Mr.

Painter’s

tenancy

or

the

termination of that tenancy, this Court concludes that matters fell
outside the scope of Ms. Pyne’s designation.
Third, Plaintiffs complain that Ms. Pyne “failed to review even
the

most

rudimentary

documents

pertaining

to

the

subject

areas,

noticed by Plaintiffs, about which she would be testifying on behalf
of West Bay” because she did not review Lena Painter Payne’s complete
tenant file. Id. at p. 6. Plaintiffs complain, for example, that Ms.
Pyne was unable to state when Mr. Painter began living at the complex
or when Defendant provided the form lease renewal to Ms. Painter-Payne.
Id. Although the subject of the lease renewal fell within Ms. Pyne’s
designated subject area, the document to which Plaintiffs (and Ms.

8

Pyne) referred was neither dated nor notarized.

Deposition of Dixie

Pyne, p. 77 l. 24 – p. 78 l. 2. The fact that neither Defendant’s
corporate records nor Ms. Pyne could specify when Ms. Painter-Payne
received

the

lease

renewal

does

not

warrant

a

conclusion

that

Defendant failed to meet its obligations under Rule 30(b)(6).
Fourth, Plaintiffs complain that Ms. Pyne was unable to testify
as to actions taken by West Bay’s former employee, Sue Mollette, or to
the termination of Ms. Mollette’s employment at West Bay. Plaintiffs’
Motion, p. 6.
The specific actions taken by West Bay’s agent and property
manager, Sue Mollette, in furtherance of what Plaintiffs
contend was Defendant’s unlawfully forcing them out of
their home, is perhaps the single most important issue in
this case. It is also on this issue that the boiling
exasperation of all involved in this unproductive endeavor
became unambiguously evident . . . .
Id. Plaintiffs also refer to the following as evidence of Ms. Pyne’s
lack of preparedness:
Q:

Why is Sue [Mollette] no longer working at West Bay?

A:

I don’t know. I don’t know. I was on leave of absence.

Q:

You’re West Bay. Did West Bay terminate Sue?

A:

I believe it was mutual agreement.

Deposition of Dixie Pyne, p. 146 l. 2-4. However, this area of inquiry
did not fall within Plaintiffs’ specified topics of inquiry.

The fact

that Ms. Pyne was unable to testify as to the termination of Sue
Mollette’s employment did not violate Rule 30(30)(6).
In short, it does not appear that Ms. Pyne was unable to testify
on the topics for which she was designated.

9

2. Deposition of Gary Weekley
Defendant’s
designated

to

termination

of

other

testify
tenancy

corporate
on
of

the

representative,

following

Lena

topic:

Painter-Payne.”

Mr.

Weekley,

“Events

was

surrounding

Plaintiffs’

Motion,

Exhibit 4A. Plaintiffs refer to two (2) portions of Mr. Weekley’s
deposition as evidence that Defendant failed to meet its obligations
under Rule 30(b)(6).
First, Plaintiffs refer to the following:
Q.

Have you reviewed Lena Painter-Payne's file at all?

A.

No.

Q.

As West Bay, you were designated to testify about the
termination of Lena Painter-Payne from the complex.
Are you aware of that?

A.

When you say "terminate", termination -- I knew that
her address was on the board for maintenance to have
the unit turned, so yes, I knew she was leaving because
of that.

Q.

Okay. Let me give you what we have previously marked
as Exhibit 1. And I ask you to take a look at that and
let me know whether you've seen that before.

A.

No, I can't say I've seen this.

[Plaintiffs’ Counsel]:
Counsel, are you presenting him as a 30(B) on No. 9 in
this notice?
[Defendant’s Counsel]:
May I see a copy of it?
[Plaintiffs’ Counsel]:
Yes.

They sent designations.

[Defendant’s Counsel]:

We are, regarding the process -- the admission process
10

and termination.
[Plaintiffs’ Counsel]:
Okay.

On No. 9?

[Defendant’s Counsel]:
Uh-huh.
[Plaintiffs’ Counsel]:
Q.

Mr. Weekley, do you have knowledge of Lena PainterPayne's tenancy, including her admission process and
her termination as a tenant at West Bay?

A.

No.

[Plaintiffs’ Counsel]:
Counsel, what are we going to do here? He says he
doesn't have knowledge about the subject area that –
THE WITNESS:
I mean, I know she lived there.

I know she was moving.

[Defendant’s Counsel]:
We understood that the termination there was regarding
his knowledge about the incident with Christopher
Painter-Payne that led to the termination.
[Plaintiffs’ Counsel]:
Well, this is a notice to the corporation. So we were
asking for all of West Bay's knowledge in
connection with the termination of Lena Painter-Payne,
not Gary Weekley's knowledge.
[Defendant’s Counsel]:
He is the only employee, to my knowledge, working for
West Bay today who was working at the property when the
incident occurred, which is why he's presented here
today to answer these questions.
Deposition of Gary Weekley, p. 8 l. 13 - p. 10 l. 12.
Mr.

Weekley

thereafter

testified

Plaintiffs’ tenancy:
11

regarding

the

termination

of

Q.

So let's start with the reason that the Painter-Paynes
were asked to leave West Bay. It's my understanding
that West Bay decided that Lena Painter-Payne and
Christopher Painter had to move out; is that correct?

A.

Correct.

Q.

What was the reason that West Bay decided that Lena
Painter-Payne and Chris Painter had to move out?

A.

Because Chris Painter -- Painter is it? Yeah, Painter
-- did not meet the criteria of West Bay.

Id. at p. 13 l. 5-16. Plaintiffs also complain that Mr. Weekley was
unable

to

testify

when

Mr.

Painter

began

living

at

the

complex.

Plaintiffs’ Motion, p. 10. Plaintiffs cite the following portion of Mr.
Weekley’s deposition transcript:
Q:

Okay. I’m handing you what’s marked as Exhibit 4, the
affidavit of Sue Mollette. And based on Sue
Mollette’s affidavit, when did Chris Painter start
living at the complex?

A:

I can’t honestly answer when he started. I really
don’t know.

Q:

Okay. As West Bay, when did West Bay know that Chris
was living at the complex?

A:

That, I can’t answer, either, because I really don’t
know when he actually started living there.

Id. at p. 14 l. 10-20.
Q.

Would Sue Mollette know?

A.

She may have known.

Q.

She was the property manager?

A.

She was the property manager.
than anybody.

Q.

According to her affidavit,
started living there?

A.

That's what I was looking -- I didn't read the whole
thing yet. She's saying August.

12

She would know more

when

did

she

say

he

Q.

Okay. In August of 2009, Ms. Painter-Payne moved in?

A.

Okay.

Q.

When did she say Chris Painter began living there?

A.

March of 2012.

Id. at p. 14 l. 21 - p. 15 l. 10.
As noted supra, Mr. Weekley was designated to testify on behalf
of Defendant only about the “[e]vents surrounding [the] termination of
tenancy of Lena Painter-Payne.” Plaintiffs’ Motion, Exhibit 1, p. 15.
He was not designated to testify as to when Mr. Painter began living
at the complex, nor was he designated as Defendant’s representative to
testify about Ms. Painter-Payne’s tenancy in general. Plaintiffs have
not established that this witness was not properly prepared to testify
pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6).
B.

Deposition of Jennifer Moran

As noted supra, Defendant identified Ms. Moran in its initial
disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1). Plaintiffs deposed Ms. Moran on July
2, 2013, Deposition of Jennifer Moran, and complain that Ms. Moran did
not in fact have any personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
giving rise to this action. Plaintiffs seek sanctions pursuant to Rule
37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “falsely representing
that

[Ms.

Moran]

possessed

actually possess. . . .”

personal

knowledge

that

she

did

not

Plaintiffs’ Motion, p. 16.

Plaintiffs provided, in an effort to minimize expense, Plaintiffs’
Motion, p. 12 n. 3, only ten (10) pages of Ms. Moran’s deposition
transcript, which apparently consists of 85 pages.
Memorandum

contra

Motion

to

Strike,

13

Exhibit.

See Plaintiffs’

Defendant

argues

in

response that a “full and fair presentation” of this issue requires a
complete transcript of the deposition. Defendant’s Motion to Strike, p.
2 (citing S. D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.2(e)).
Plaintiffs specifically complain that Ms. Moran had no knowledge
of

most

of

the

circumstances

surrounding

Plaintiffs’

“ouster

from

their home,” and that the little information that she did provide came
third-hand

from

Defendant’s

former

property

manager,

Sue

Mollette.

Plaintiffs’ Motion, p. 12(citing Deposition of Jennifer Moran, p. 7 l.
9-20).

Plaintiffs

refer

to

the

following

portion

of

Ms.

Moran’s

deposition as evidence of her lack of personal knowledge relating to
this action:
Q:

Okay. What are [sic] your personal knowledge of the
facts and circumstances giving rise to this action,
being this lawsuit?

A:

I don’t know what this one is about. So what is the
question?

Q:

What are [sic] your personal knowledge of the facts
and circumstances giving rise to this action, being
this lawsuit?

A:

This is strictly saying I know about policies and
procedures. I mean, I don’t know how to answer your
question.

Q:

Do you not have any personal knowledge about the facts
and circumstances giving rise to this action?

A:

What I’ve answered you already.

Q:

I’m asking what are your personal – not – what
personal knowledge do you have regarding the facts and
circumstances about this lawsuit?

A:

I’m not aware of any facts in regards to this lawsuit.

Deposition of Jennifer Moran, p. 9 l. 1-19.

14

This Court is unable to determine, based only on the portions of
the

deposition

provided

by

Plaintiffs,

whether

Ms.

Moran

improperly included in Defendant’s initial disclosures.

was

Although Ms.

Moran may not have had personal knowledge of the facts giving rise to
Plaintiffs’

particular

claims,

it

appears

that

she

may

personal knowledge of Defendant’s policies and procedures.
those

policies

and

procedures

may

be

relevant

to

the

have

had

Because

claims

and

defense of the parties, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant acted
improperly in including Ms. Moran in its initial disclosures.
B.

Information Produced after the Discovery Completion Date

Finally, Plaintiffs complain that Defendant identified additional
individuals who could testify about the facts and circumstances of the
action and produced a relevant rent ledger only after the close of
discovery.

Plaintiffs’

Motion,

p.

14.

Plaintiffs

argue

they

were

prejudiced by Defendant’s failure to timely produce this information
because

Defendant

needlessly

and

“impeded

Plaintiffs’

exponentially

increased

fact-finding

ability

and

litigation

costs.”

Id.

Defendant does not deny or attempt to justify its belated disclosures
but notes only that Plaintiffs rejected Defendant’s offer to extend
the discovery completion date.
Although the Court cannot condone Defendant’s failure to produce
this discovery in timely fashion, and does not criticize Plaintiffs’
refusal to accept Defendant’s unilateral suggestion that the Court’s
discovery

completion

concludes

that

the

date

be

imposition

extended,
of

the

sanctions

Court
in

nevertheless

connection

with

Defendant’s failure in this regard is, at this juncture, unwarranted.

15

Had

Defendant

produced

this

information

in

a

timely

fashion,

Plaintiffs could have conducted such further discovery as they might
see fit. Defendant’s motions for summary judgment, Doc. Nos. 50, 51,
are fully briefed and awaiting resolution, as is Plaintiffs’ motion
for

partial

conference

summary

and

trial

judgment,

Doc.

have

yet

not

No.
been

60.

A

scheduled.

final
It

pretrial
therefore

appears that, should the Court reopen discovery, Plaintiffs can be
placed in the position they would have occupied had Defendant produced
this discovery in a timely fashion.
Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that a reopening
of discovery will serve not only the parties’ interests but also the
Court’s interest in assuring that cases are resolved on their merits.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that discovery be REOPENED to permit
Plaintiffs to conduct such discovery, including depositions, as they
deem appropriate in connection with Defendant’s belated production.
All such discovery must be completed no later than June 20, 2014.

WHEREUPON, Defendant’s Motion to Strike, Doc. No. 67, is DENIED
and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions, Doc. No. 59, is likewise DENIED.

April 21, 2014

s/ Norah McCann King
Norah McCann King
United States Magistrate Judge

16