Melvin v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 23

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 1 Complaint, filed by Melinda Melvin. It is RECOMMENDED that the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed and that final judgment in favor of the Commissioner be entered pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Objections to R&R due by 1/17/2014. Signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King on 12/31/2013. (pes1)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
MELINDA MELVIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action 2:13-CV-91
Judge Economus
Magistrate Judge King

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an action instituted under the provisions of 42 U.S.C.
§405(g) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security
income.

denying
This

plaintiff’s

matter

is

now

application
before

the

for
Court

supplemental
for

security

consideration

of

plaintiff’s Statement of Errors, Doc. No. 15, and the Commissioner’s
Memorandum

in

Opposition,

Doc.

No.

22.

Plaintiff

has

not

filed

a

third

-

reply.
Plaintiff

Melinda

Melvin

filed

the

current

-

her

application for benefits on September 29, 2009, alleging that she has
been disabled since January 1, 2003, as a result of bipolar disorder
and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). PAGEID 232-34, 297.1 The
application

was

denied

initially

and

upon

reconsideration,

and

plaintiff requested a de novo hearing before an administrative law
judge.
A

hearing

represented

by

was

held

counsel,

on

August

appeared

17,

and

2011,

at

testified,

which
as

plaintiff,

did

Carl

W.

1
In the Statement of Errors filed with this Court, plaintiff amended her date
of onset of disability to October 10, 2009, i.e., the date on which plaintiff
began a three-day psychiatric hospitalization in connection with suicidal
ideation. Statement of Errors, PAGEID 835.

Hartung, who testified as a vocational expert. In a decision dated
October

28,

2011,

the

administrative

law

judge

concluded

that

plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security
Act. PAGEID 85-101. That decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner

of

Social

Security

when

the

Appeals

Council

declined

review on December 11, 2012. PAGEID 70-74.
Plaintiff was 36 years of age at the time of the administrative
hearing. PAGEID 114.

She has a high school education.

PAGEID 116.

Plaintiff has past relevant work as a cashier in the fast food and
retail

industries.

PAGEID

100,

298.

She

lives

with

her

teenage

daughter, who has special needs and who receives supplement security
income.

PAGEID 115-16, 138.

She has not worked since the date on

which she filed her current application for benefits.

PAGEID 116.

Plaintiff’s Testimony
Plaintiff
suffers

from

testified
depression

at
and

the

administrative

anxiety.

PAGEID

hearing2
118,

that

she

She

has

120.

difficulty sleeping; she suffers almost daily crying spells that last
up to 30 minutes. She also experiences panic attacks during which she
experiences “real intense fear,”

PAGEID 120, for 15 or 20 minutes.

PAGEID 121. She also has difficulty with memory and concentration:
don’t finish anything.” Id.

“I

She experiences mood swings every day,

and manic episodes with the change of the seasons.

PAGEID 135-36.

Plaintiff has difficulty getting along with other people.

PAGEID

124. She was let go from a retail job because she “wasn’t very kind to
2

The administrative law judge found that plaintiff suffers from both physical
and mental impairments. Plaintiff challenges only the Commissioner’s
evaluation of her mental impairments. Statement of Errors, PAGEID 834. The
Court will therefor summarize only that evidence relevant to plaintiff’s
claims.

2

the customers.”

Id.; PAGEID 138. She gets into verbal arguments with

grocery clerks.

PAGEID 131-32. She does not talk to her neighbors and

she fights a lot with her daughter.
mother

and

telephone.

sister

often,

although

PAGEID 124.
she

speaks

PAGEID 125. She has no friends.

leave her home.

She does not see her
with

them

on

the

Id. She does not like to

PAGEID 135.

On a typical school day, plaintiff gets her daughter up to make
sure that she’s ready for school.

PAGEID 129.3 She then lies back down

and watches TV, listens to music or reads the Bible.
sometimes uses the computer.

PAGEID 132. She

PAGEID 133. She does not usually go out

because she doesn’t “like to have to deal with people.”
not clean her home.

Id. She does

PAGEID 118. Her daughter’s father “makes” her

clean and get out of the house.

PAGEID 130. Her mother takes her to

the grocery store once per month; her case manager takes her to the
food pantry.

Id.

Plaintiff sees Bela Agabalyan, M.D., a psychiatrist, once per
month

and

a

case

manager/therapist,

who

administers

therapy

at

plaintiff’s home, once per week. PAGEID 125-26, 134. She takes Geodon,
trazodone, Celexa and Buspar, which cause drowsiness. PAGEID 126-27.

Evidence
In November 2005, Alan White, Ph.D., performed a consultative
psychological

evaluation

for

the

state

agency.

PAGEID

395-401.

Plaintiff complained of fatigue, changes in appetite and eating habits

3

Plaintiff also testified, however, that it is her daughter’s father who comes
and gets both of them up. PAGEID 129, 137-38.

3

with weight loss, feelings of worthlessness, guilt, helplessness and
hopelessness,
spells,

a

loss

isolation,

avoidance

of

of

interest

irritability,

crowds/children/noise

in

pleasing

activities,

forgetfulness,
(although

crying

frustration

she

and

socialized

with

family and friends on a weekly basis, PAGEID 397), and restlessness.
PAGEID

396.

She

reported

a

history

of

suicidal

ideation.

Id.

She

performed household duties including cleaning, laundry, shopping, and
cooking.

PAGEID

398.

On

clinical

examination,

Dr.

White

found

plaintiff to be tense, tearful, restless and fidgety; her speech was
fast and pressured; her affect was irritable. PAGEID 398. She was
oriented

and

there

was

no

evidence

of

psychosis.

Id.

Dr.

White

diagnosed bipolar disorder, nos, panic disorder without agoraphobia,
and a personality disorder, nos. PAGEID 399. He assigned a Global
Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 50.4

PAGEID 400.

According

to Dr. White,
Ms. Melvin’s ability to maintain attention, concentration,
persistence, and pace to perform simple repetitive tasks is
not impaired.
Her ability to understand, remember, and
follow instructions is not impaired. Her ability to relate
to others, including fellow workers and supervisors is
mildly impaired due to her personality disorder.
Ms.
Melvin’s ability to withstand the stress and pressures
associated with day-to-day work activity is moderately
impaired due to Bipolar Disorder and Panic Disorder.
PAGEID 401.

3 The GAF is a tool used by health-care professionals to assess a person’s
psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical
continuum of mental illness. It is, in general, a snapshot of a person’s
“overall psychological functioning” at or near the time of the evaluation.
See Martin v. Commissioner, 61 Fed.Appx. 191, 194 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003); see
also Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed., Text
Revision (“DSM-IV-TR”) at 32-34. A GAF of 45-50 indicates "severe symptoms ...
or serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g.,
no friends, unable to keep a job)...." Id.

4

Plaintiff

also

underwent

psychiatric

treatment

Christopher, M.D., from April 2005 through January 2007.

by

James

PAGEID 403-

31. Initially, plaintiff was diagnosed with PTSD, a mood disorder,
attention deficit disorder and r/o bipolar disorder. PAGEID 423.

In

August 2005, plaintiff was assigned a GAF score of 40; by November
2006, her assigned GAF score was 80.

PAGEID 408, 410, 412, 414, 416.

In that same month, Dr. Christopher reported that plaintiff’s mood was
great, her medication was helpful, she was making good choices and she
was doing “the best ever, since I have been working with her.”

PAGEID

408-09.
Plaintiff began mental health treatment at North Central Mental
Health Services (“NCMHS”) in December 2007.

PAGEID 501-05.

She was

diagnosed with bipolar disorder, severe depression, and an anxiety
disorder; she was assigned a GAF score of 52, which is suggestive of
moderate dysfunction.
In

2009,

hospitalized

PAGEID 504.

plaintiff’s

for

three

days

boyfriend
in

died

October

2009

and

plaintiff

following

was

plaintiff’s

articulation of a suicide plan. PAGEID 434-40; 446-67. Upon discharge,
plaintiff’s condition was characterized as stable and improved; she
was not an imminent danger to herself or others. PAGEID 455. She was
assigned a GAF score of 60. Id.
On

November

psychiatrist,

S.

10,

2009,

plaintiff

Nahar,

M.D.,

that

she

reported
had

been

to
doing

an

NCMHS

well

on

prescribed medication before running out 3 days earlier. Plaintiff
reported

difficulty

sleeping,

feeling

5

tired

during

the

day,

and

depression most of the time since her boyfriend's death. PAGEID 47273. Plaintiff was prescribed Trazodone to help with her sleep. Id.
In

December

2009,

state

agency

psychologist

Alice

Chambly,

Psy.D., reviewed the record. PAGEID 549-66.

Dr. Chambly found that

the

that

record

documents

bipolar

attacks were not supported.

disorder,

but

reports

of

panic

PAGEID 551. According to Dr. Chambly,

plaintiff had mild restriction in her activities of daily living, had
moderate

difficulties

in

maintaining

social

functioning

and

concentration, persistence, or pace, and had no episodes of extended
decompensation.
moderately

PAGEID 563. Dr. Chambly opined that plaintiff was

limited

in

her

abilities

to

carry

out

detailed

instructions, to work in coordination with or proximity of others, to
complete a normal work day and work week without interruption from
psychologically

based

symptoms,

to

interact

appropriately

with

the

general public, to accept instructions and respond appropriately to
criticism

from

supervisors,

to

get

along

with

coworkers

or

peers

without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, to respond
appropriately to changes in the work setting, and to set realistic
goals or make plans independently of others. PAGEID 549-50. According
to Dr. Chambly, plaintiff
retains the ability to complete a range of simple, routine,
low stress tasks that do not require strict production
quotas or frequent changes. She is able to interact with
others on a superficial basis, infrequently.
PAGEID 551.
Plaintiff was also hospitalized for five days in January 2010 for
complaints of blurred vision, headaches, tremors, and unsteady gait.
PAGEID 610.

Plaintiff underwent a behavioral health consultation at

6

that time, which revealed soft speech, a depressed mood, and a flat
affect.

PAGEID 601. Hospital notes indicated that plaintiff’s bipolar

disorder

had

been

hospitalization.

controlled

PAGEID

since

594.

her

Discharge

October

2009

diagnoses

psychiatric
included

an

adjustment disorder, PAGEID 607, and plaintiff was advised to followup with NCMHC. PAGEID 610.
Bela Agabalyan, M.D., plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist at NCMHS,
reported on January 27, 2010, that plaintiff’s bipolar disorder was in
partial remission. PAGEID 732-33.
Plaintiff underwent an updated diagnostic assessment at NCMHS on
February 25, 2010.
crying

spells,

PAGEID 818-22.

anxiety,

lack

thoughts and restlessness.

of

Plaintiff complained of insomnia,
appetite,

irritability,

racing

On mental status examination, plaintiff’s

mood was depressed, and her affect was congruent. PAGEID 821. She was
alert

and

oriented.

There

were

no

overt

signs

of

Plaintiff denied current suicidal and homicidal ideation.

psychosis.
Her memory

was intact and her insight and judgment were fair. Id. According to
the

examiner,

independently
causing

her

plaintiff
at

to

an
not

can

perform

adequate
perform

at

level,
her

activities
although

standards.”

of

“her
Id.

daily

living

depression
Diagnoses

is

were

bipolar II disorder, most recent episode depressed, severe, without
psychotic features, and anxiety disorder. Id. Plaintiff was assigned a
GAF score of 50 and her prognosis was characterized as fair. PAGEID
822.
In
Ph.D.,

April

2010,

reviewed

the

state

agency

record,

psychologist

including

7

Douglas

documents

Pawlarczyk,
relating

to

plaintiff’s

October

2009

psychiatric

hospitalization

and

progress notes over the previous year. PAGEID 738-55.

NCMHC’s

According to

Dr. Pawlarczyk, the record documented bipolar disorder but not panic
attacks.

PAGEID 740.

He characterized plaintiff’s restrictions of

activities of daily living as mild, and her ability to maintain social
functioning and her concentration, persistence, or pace as moderate;
plaintiff
PAGEID

had

experienced

752.

Dr.

no

episodes

Pawlarczyk

opined

of

that

extended
plaintiff

decompensation.
was

moderately

impaired in her abilities to maintain attention and concentration for
extended periods, to perform activities within a schedule, to maintain
regular attendance and be punctual within customary tolerances, to
complete

a

normal

psychologically

work

based

day

and

symptoms,

work

to

without

interact

interruptions

appropriately

from

with

the

general public, to accept instructions and respond appropriately to
criticism

from

supervisors,

to

get

along

with

coworkers

or

peers

without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, and to
respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. PAGEID 738-39.
According
static

to

Dr.

Pawlarczyk,

environment

with

no

plaintiff
strict

could

complete

production

quotas

tasks
and

in

a

minimal

contact with others. PAGEID 740.
In
remained

March

2010,

depressed

plaintiff
about

reported

her

to

Dr.

boyfriend’s

Agabalyan

death.

that

PAGEID

she
816.

Plaintiff’s mental status examination was normal in May 2010 and Dr.
Agabalyan reported that plaintiff’s bipolar disorder was in remission.
PAGEID 814-15. In October 2010, plaintiff’s bipolar disorder remained
in

remission.

PAGEID

809.

In

March

and

April

2011,

mental

status

examinations showed an anxious mood, age appropriate judgment, and

8

fair insight. PAGEID 805, 807. When last seen by Dr. Agabalyan on June
20, 2011, plaintiff continued to report fluctuating moods and anxiety.
PAGEID 802.
In

August

2011,

Dr.

Agabalyan

completed

a

mental

functional

capacity assessment in which she found that plaintiff was extremely
limited in her abilities to maintaining attention and concentration
for

extended

maintain

periods, to perform activities within a schedule, to

regular

tolerances,

to

attendance

complete

a

and

to

normal

be

work

punctual
day

and

within
work

customary

week

without

interruption from psychological symptoms, and in her ability to set
realistic goals or make plans independently of others.
Dr.

Agabalyan,

plaintiff

was

markedly

limited

in

According to

her

ability

to

understand and remember detailed instructions, and in her ability to
ask questions or request assistance.

Plaintiff was moderately limited

in her abilities to work in coordination with or proximity to others
without being distracted by them, to accept instructions and respond
appropriately

to

criticism

from

supervisors

appropriately to changes in the work setting.

and

to

respond

Dr. Agabalyan concluded

that plaintiff was unemployable and would remain so for 12 or more
months. PAGEID 829.
Administrative Decision
In

his

decision,

the

administrative

law

judge

found

that

plaintiff’s severe impairments consist of degenerative changes of the
cervical spine, obesity, Meniere’s disease, major depressive disorder,
and post-traumatic stress disorder. PAGEID 90. The administrative law
judge

also

found

that

plaintiff

does

9

not

have

an

impairment

or

combination of impairments that meet or medically equal any listed
impairment, including Listings 1.04, 2.07, 12.04 and 12.06. PAGEID 9093. The administrative law judge next found that plaintiff has the
residual

functional

capacity

to

perform

the

full

range

of

light

exertion but was limited, from a mental standpoint, to simple and
routine tasks in a relatively static environment that does not involve
frequent changes in duties or processes, strict time or production
standards, or more than brief and superficial contact with others.
PAGEID 93.
In

determining

administrative

law

plaintiff’s
judge

residual

accorded

“great

functional
weight”

to

capacity,
Dr.

the

White’s

opinions. PAGEID 99. He also considered the opinions of Drs. Chambly
and Pawlarczyk, finding that their “assessments are consistent with
and are well supported by the objective medical evidence and accepted
as an accurate representation of the claimant's status.” Id.
The

administrative

law

judge

recognized

Dr.

Agabalyan

as

plaintiff’s treating physician, but afforded “little weight” to her
August 2011 opinion:
. . . [H]er opinion is so extreme to be worthy of belief.
The conclusion is inconsistent with the objective medical
findings, including the psychiatrist’s own reports, and is
inconsistent
with
the
claimant’s
reported
level
of
functioning. For example, the conclusion that the claimant
cannot set goals or make independent plans is inconsistent
with the claimant’s current functioning, which included
living independently and insuring care for her special needs
daughter. Indeed, progress notes from this source indicate
that the claimant’s mental symptoms have been stabilized on
medications,
which
further
contradict
the
source[’]s
conclusions, particularly with respect to issues involving
concentration and persistence. Therefore, while the doctor
may be considered a treating source within the meaning of 20
CFR 416.927, I find that her assessment is not supported by
or consistent with the record as a whole.

10

PAGEID 99.
The

administrative

subjective

complaints

law
of

judge

also

disability

by

found
reason

that
of

plaintiff’s
her

mental

impairments were not fully credible:
Although the medical evidence does support that the claimant
has significant depression, anxiety and some PTSD, her
psychotropic medications and psychotherapy controls her
symptoms. She has had some exacerbations of her symptoms;
however, the record does not show a need for frequent
inpatient treatment or even frequent emergency room care.
. . . .
Other
factors
belie
the
claimant’s
allegations
of
disability. . . .
[T]he record, including her testimony,
shows that she can use public transportation as necessary.
She lives with her special needs daughter [and] performs
activities that are typically associated with maintaining a
household.
She also described leisure activities, such as
reading,
using
a
computer,
watching
television,
and
listening to music.
Considering the criteria enumerated in the regulations for
evaluating the claimant’s subjective complaints, I conclude
that her testimony is not credible. The objective evidence
does not confirm the severity of the alleged pain and
functional
restrictions
arising
from
the
documented
conditions, and the claimant’s objectively established
medical condition is not of such severity as to reasonably
be expected to produce disabling discomfort or other
disabling functional conditions.
PAGEID 98.
The

administrative

law

judge

found

that

plaintiff’s

residual

functional capacity precludes the performance of her past relevant
work. PAGEID 99. Relying on the vocational expert’s testimony, the
administrative law judge found that plaintiff can nevertheless perform
other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.
PAGEID 100. Accordingly, the administrative law judge concluded that
plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security
Act.

PAGEID 101.

11

Discussion
Pursuant

to

42

U.S.C.

§405(g),

judicial

review

of

the

Commissioner’s decision is limited to determining whether the findings
of the administrative law judge are supported by substantial evidence
and employed the proper legal standards. Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389 (1971). Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595
(6th Cir. 2005).

Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of

evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 475 (6th Cir. 2003); Kirk
v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir.
1981). This Court does not try the case de novo, nor does it resolve
conflicts

in

the

evidence

or

questions

of

credibility.

Bass

v.

McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007).
In determining the existence of substantial evidence, this Court
must examine the administrative record as a whole. Kirk, 667 F.2d at
536.

If

the

Commissioner’s

decision

is

supported

by

substantial

evidence, it must be affirmed even if this Court would decide the
matter differently, Tyra v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 896 F.2d
1024,

1028

(6th Cir. 1990)(citing Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d

1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983)), and even if substantial evidence also
supports the opposite conclusion. Longworth, 402 F.3d at 595.
In

her

Statement

of

Errors,

plaintiff

contends

that

the

administrative law judge erred in his evaluation of Dr. Agabalyan’s
opinions and in his assessment of plaintiff’s credibility.
will consider each contention in turn.

12

The Court

To be afforded controlling weight, the opinion of a treating
medical source must be well-supported by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and must not be inconsistent
with other substantial evidence in the record. Gayheart v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013);

Rogers v. Commissioner

of Social Security, 486 F.3d 234, 242 (6th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(d)(2).

Even where the administrative law judge declines to

accord controlling weight to the opinion of a treating physician, the
administrative

law

judge “must still determine how much weight is

appropriate. . . .”

Blakley v. Commissioner of Social Security, 581

F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009). In weighing the opinions of the treating
physicians, the administrative law judge is required to consider such
factors

as

the

length,

nature

and

extent

of

the

treatment

relationship, the frequency of examination, the medical specialty of
the treating physician, the opinion's supportability by evidence, and
its consistency with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)(6);

Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th

Cir. 2004).

Moreover, an administrative law judge must provide “good

reasons” for discounting the opinions of a treating physician, i.e.,
reasons

that

are

“sufficiently

specific

to

make

clear

to

any

subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating
source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.”
at 376;
at

*5.

Gayheart,

Rogers, at 242, citing Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188,
However,

an

“exhaustive

factor-by-factor

analysis

not

required.” Francis v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 414 Fed. Appx.
802, 804-05, 2011 WL 915719 (6th Cir. March 16, 2011).
In the case presently before the Court, the administrative law

13

judge’s evaluation of Dr. Agabalyan’s extremely restrictive opinion
is sufficiently specific as to the weight given to that opinion and
the

reasons

for

administrative

that

law

assessment.

judge

evaluating this opinion.

It

considered

is
the

also

apparent

appropriate

that

factors

the
in

Furthermore, the administrative law judge’s

reasons for assigning “little weight” to Dr. Agabalyan’s opinion are
supported

by

substantial

evidence.

Dr.

Agabalyan’s

August

2011

opinion is inconsistent with her own treatment notes which repeatedly
characterized plaintiff’s condition as in partial remission and with
plaintiff’s

largely

normal

status

on

mental

examination.

As

the

administrative law judge also found, Dr. Agabalyan’s opinion was also
inconsistent
including

with

the

evidence

other

that,

objective

even

after

evidence

in

plaintiff’s

the

record,

October

2009

psychiatric hospitalization, plaintiff’s mental condition was improved
and stable with medication.
The Court also concludes that the administrative law judge did
not err in assigning “great weight” to Dr. White’s opinion and in
relying on the opinions of the state agency psychologists. Even though
Dr.

White

rendered

psychiatric
ended,

as

his

opinion

hospitalization,
noted

supra,

with

years

that

brief

plaintiff’s

before
period

plaintiff’s
of

discharge

2009

hospitalization
as

stable

and

improved and with a GAF score of 60.
In short, the Court concludes that the administrative law judge’s
evaluation of the medical source opinions in the record applied the
appropriate standards and enjoys substantial support in the evidence.
The Court likewise concludes that the administrative law judge
did

not

err

in

his

assessment

of

14

plaintiff’s

credibility.

An

administrative law judge’s credibility determination is accorded great
weight and deference because of the administrative law judge’s unique
opportunity to observe a witness' demeanor while testifying. Buxton v.
Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gaffney v. Bowen,
825 F.2d 98, 973 (6th Cir. 1987)). However, credibility determinations
must be clearly explained. See Auer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
830 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1987). If the administrative law judge's
credibility determinations are explained and enjoy substantial support
in

the

record,

a

court

is

without

authority

to

revisit

those

determinations. See Torres v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 490 F. App’x 748,
755 (6th Cir. 2012); Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1036 (6th Cir.
1994); Beavers v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 577 F.2d 383,
386–87 (6th Cir. 1978).
In the case presently before this Court, the administrative law
judge found that plaintiff’s subjective complaints were inconsistent
with

the

objective

medical

evidence,

treatment and her level of activity.
substantial support in the record.

her

relatively

conservative

Again, these findings enjoy
Even if, as plaintiff argues,

there is also evidence to the contrary, the Court must, under these
circumstances, affirm the decision of the Commissioner.
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the decision of the Commissioner
be affirmed and that final judgment in favor of the Commissioner be
entered pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42

U.S.C. § 405(g).

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report
and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file
and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation,

15

specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part
thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto. 28
U.S.C. §636(b)(1); F.R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections must be
filed

within

fourteen

(14)

days

after

being

served

with

a

copy

thereof. F.R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to
the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to
de novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the
decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation.
See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Federation of
Teachers, Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Date: December 31, 2013

s/Norah McCann King
Norah McCann King
United States Magistrate Judge

16