Quintanilla et al v. Mansfield Correctional Institution et al

Filing 5

ORDER & REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 4 Complaint: The Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Complaint be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. Objections to R&R due within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Report. Plaintiff Castle, Jr.'s 3 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Preston Deavers on 3/8/2013. (er1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

ALLEN QUINTANILLA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action 2:13-cv-121
Judge Peter C. Economus
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

v.

MANSFIELD CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTION, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs initiated this action on February 11, 2013. (ECF No. 1.) The Court granted
Plaintiff Allen Quintanilla’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In forma Pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) This
matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff Wayne Castle, Jr.’s Motion for Leave to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (ECF No. 3.) This matter is also before the Court for an initial
screen pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff
Wayne Castle, Jr.’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is GRANTED. It is
RECOMMENDED that the Complaint be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
I.
Plaintiffs, both of whom are inmates of the Mansfield Correctional Institution who
proceed without the assistance of counsel, allege that on the evening of December 13, 2012, two
other inmates verbally threatened them with harm to their persons and families. (Compl. 5, ECF
No. 1-1.) According to Plaintiffs, they reported these threats to Defendant Lieutenant
Christopher Lynch the following day. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Lynch is the supervising

officer responsible for ensuring the safety and security of inmates in the segregation unit.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Lynch failed to investigate the threats or report them to state law
enforcement. Plaintiff Allen Quintanilla allegedly suffered severe emotional and mental stress as
a result of Defendant Lynch’s failure to investigate the threats. He contends that he has engaged
in self-mutilation as a result of his distress. Id. at 6. Plaintiffs seek $30,000 in damages.
II.
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff Wayne Castle, Jr.’s Motion to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis is GRANTED. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff Castle is required to pay the full amount of the
Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
Plaintiff Castle’s certified trust fund statement reveals that he currently possesses the sum
of eighty cents in his prison account, which is insufficient to pay the full filing fee. His
application indicates that his average monthly deposits for the six-month period prior to filing his
application to proceed in forma pauperis were $10.96.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff Wayne Castle Jr.’s inmate
trust account (Inmate Id # A504596) at Mansfield Correctional Institution is DIRECTED to
submit to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an
initial partial payment, 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate
trust account or the average monthly balance in the inmate trust account, for the six-months
immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint.
After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the
inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the
account exceeds $10.00 until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).
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Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The checks
should be sent to:
Prisoner Accounts Receivable
260 U.S. Courthouse
85 Marconi Boulevard
Columbus, Ohio 43215
The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.
It is ORDERED that Plaintiff Castle be allowed to prosecute his action without
prepayment of fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do
so as if the costs had been prepaid.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff Wayne
Castle, Jr. and the prison cashier’s office. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of
this Order to the Court’s financial office in Columbus.
III.
Having conducted an initial screen pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, the
Undersigned recommends dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint for failure to state a claim.
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower
judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing
so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed
by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing
frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)1 as part of the
statute, which provides in pertinent part:

1

Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
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(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-*

*

*

(B) the action or appeal-(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or
upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements
set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ .
. . [a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, a complaint will not “suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

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U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id.
In considering whether this facial plausibility standard is met, a Court must construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accept all factual allegations as
true, and make reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning
Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted). The Court is not required, however, to accept as true mere legal conclusions
unsupported by factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In
addition, the Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923,
at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).
To plead a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Plaintiff must plead two elements:
(1) a person acting under color of state law caused deprivation of a right that is (2) secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States. Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. School Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
542 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008). To sufficiently plead the first element, a plaintiff must allege
“personal involvement” on the part of the defendant. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). This requirement arises because Ҥ 1983 liability cannot be
imposed under a theory of respondeat superior.” Id. (citation omitted). “A supervisor is not
liable under § 1983 for failing to train unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific
incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Everson v. Leis, 556
F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). Put another way, to hold a supervisor
liable under § 1983, a plaintiff “must show that the official at least implicitly authorized,
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approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct . . . .” Id.
Here, Plaintiffs’ purported claims fail for numerous reasons. With respect to Defendant
Mansfield Correctional Institution, Plaintiffs have failed to allege any personal involvement that
would subject this Defendant to § 1983 liability. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d at 575. Plaintiffs
cannot hold Defendant Mansfield Correctional Institution liable on a theory of respondeat
superior. Id.
Moreover, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts indicating that Defendant Lynch deprived
them of a right secured by the Constitution.

Hunt, 542 F.3d at 534. The Eighth Amendment

obligates prison officials to “‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’”
Varmado-El v. Martin, 52 Fed. App’x 764, 765 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). Not “‘every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . .
. translates into constitutional liability for prison officials.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Rather, to establish that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment
in failing to prevent harm, the inmate must show that “prison conditions pose a substantial risk
of serious harm and that prison officials are deliberately indifferent to their safety.” Id. The
prison official “‘must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.’” Id. (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Moreover, “‘threats between inmates are common and do not, under
all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm.’” Id. (quoting
Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1996)).
Here, Plaintiffs have failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiffs fail to allege
that they suffered any physical harm from the alleged incident, much less that Defendant Lynch

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inferred and ignored a substantial risk of harm.2 Moreover, threats between inmates are
common. Varmado-El, 52 Fed. App’x 765. Defendant Lynch’s mere failure to investigate a
common jail-house threat that does not lead to injury does not rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation. It is, RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs’ Complaint be DISMISSED for
failure to state a claim.
IV.
Accordingly, Plaintiff Wayne Castle, Jr.’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis is GRANTED. It is RECOMMENDED that the Complaint be DISMISSED for
failure to state a claim.
V.
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that
party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and
Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in
question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and
waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex
Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate

2

Plaintiff Quintanilla’s alleged self-mutilation is self-inflicted and, at least under these
facts, too attenuated from the alleged threats to qualify as the type of harm that the Eighth
Amendment protects.
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judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district
court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that
defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed,
appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d
981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to
specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation
omitted)).

Date: March 8, 2013

/s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
United States Magistrate Judge