Sharpe et al v. Sierra Leone Ministry of Surveys, Lands and Environment et al

Filing 23

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS and ORDER that 19 Answer filed on behalf of defendant Miles Investments is stricken, and the Court recommends that the Cross-Claim filed on behalf of Miles Investments be dismissed. Objections to R&R due within fourteen days of the date of this Report. Signed by Magistrate Judge Terence P Kemp on 1/20/2015. (agm1)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
James Johannes Sharpe, et al., :
Plaintiffs,

:

v.

:

Sierra Leone Ministry of
:
Surveys, Lands and Environment,
et. al.,
:
Defendants.

Case No. 2:13-cv-00187
JUDGE MICHAEL H. WATSON
Magistrate Judge Kemp

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AND ORDER
By Order dated September 22, 2014, this matter was referred
to the undersigned for an initial review and Report and
Recommendation.

(Doc. 22).

More specifically, the Order

directed the undersigned to “analyze preliminary issues raised by
this case, perhaps such as whether the Court has jurisdiction
over this case, whether any abstention doctrine warrants
declining jurisdiction in this case, whether defendants were
properly served, whether Miles Investments (S.L.) Ltd. is a
proper defendant, or any other issues ... pertinent in this case
at this posture.”

Id. at 2.

After setting forth the relevant

background, the Court examines whether it has subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims against defendant the Sierra Leone
Ministry of Surveys, Lands and Environment.

Next, the Court will

consider whether plaintiffs James Johannes Sharpe and Ubadire
Nathaniel Nwoko have effected proper service over the remaining
defendants in this case.

Finally, the Court will address

plaintiffs’ failure to move for the entry of default against Mr.
Mohamed and the Estate of Jamil S. Mohamed, despite the fact that
the complaint has been served upon those defendants and the time
for filing an answer has passed.

For the reasons set forth below, the answer filed on behalf
of defendant Miles Investments will be stricken, and the Court
will recommend that the cross-claim filed on behalf of Miles
Investments be dismissed.

(Doc. 19).

Further, the Court will

order plaintiffs to file a brief, within twenty-one days from the
issuance of this report and recommendation and order, explaining
how, based on the relevant law, the commercial activity exception
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act applies to the particular
facts of this case.

In addition, the Court will order plaintiffs

to show cause, within fourteen days of the issuance of this
report and recommendation and order, as to why this action should
not be dismissed against Miles Investments based upon their
failure to effect proper service on that defendant in accordance
with Rule 4(m).

Plaintiffs’ service on Mr. Mohamed and the

Estate of Jamil S. Mohamed is presumed to be effective, and the
Court will not recommend dismissal of those defendants on this
basis.

However, the Court will order plaintiffs to show cause

within fourteen days from the issuance of this report and
recommendation and order as to why this action should not be
dismissed against those defendants.

Plaintiffs’ filing shall be

accompanied, if appropriate, by a request to enter default
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55, and a separate motion for default
judgment.

While the Court anticipates problems with plaintiffs’

ability to enforce such a judgment against Mr. Mohamed and the
Estate of Jamil S. Mohamed based upon issues of personal
jurisdiction, those issues are not before this Court for
resolution at this juncture.
I. Background
This case involves a dispute over real estate located in
Sierra Leone.

In the amended complaint, plaintiffs James

Johannes Sharpe and Ubadire Nathaniel Nwoko, both United States
citizens, allege that they are owners of defendant Miles
2

Investments (S.L.) Ltd. (“Miles Investments”), a Sierra Leone
corporation.

Plaintiffs allege that Miles Investments leased a

parcel of beach-front property identified as No. 18 Beach Road
Tokeh Village, Sierra Leone from defendant the Sierra Leone
Ministry of Surveys, Lands and Environment for purposes of
establishing an industrial ice factory in the western area of
Sierra Leone.

The lease was for a 21-year period, with an option

to renew for an additional 21-year period.

Plaintiffs claim

that, on July 1, 2008, Miles Investments started producing and
distributing ice bars at the ice factory.
Plaintiffs further allege that defendant Bassem Mohamed,
administrator and beneficiary of the estate of Jamil S. Mohamed,
also a defendant in this action, subsequently brought an action
in Sierra Leone High Court (Case No. CC 281/08), challenging
Sierra Leone Ministry of Surveys, Lands and Environment’s title
of ownership in the property.

Plaintiffs assert that, on October

22, 2008, “the Sierra Leone High Court, in Case No. CC281/08
issued an interlocutory injunction that restrains Miles
Investments, including Directors and Shareholders from doing
anything on the land leased from the Sierra Leone Government.”
(Doc. 6 at 7).

Plaintiffs also allege that, on June 20, 2011,

the Sierra Leone High Court granted possession of the property to
Bassem Mohamed.

According to plaintiffs, between 2008 and 2011

and contrary to their requests, Sierra Leone Ministry of Surveys,
Lands and Environment “took no action to defend its title of
ownership to the land” which it leased to Miles Investments.

Id.

Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs brought this lawsuit seeking
to recover the funds invested in the ice project in Sierra Leone.
More specifically, plaintiffs seek “monetary relief ... for the
loss of capital invested, the cost of the capital, and the
reasonable projected investment-backed expectation of a net
profit of at least $137,500 per year between 2008 and 2012.”
3

Id.

at 3. On September 25, 2013, Mr. Sharpe attempted to file an
“answer, affirmative defenses and cross-claim” on behalf of Miles
Investments.

(Doc. 19).

None of the other defendants has made

any attempt to appear in this case.
II. Discussion
As an initial matter, the Court first examines Mr. Sharpe’s
attempt to file an “answer, affirmative defenses and cross-claim”
on behalf of Miles Investments.

It is well established that “[a]

corporation must be represented by counsel and cannot proceed pro
se.”

Reich v. Pierce, 1994 WL 709292, at *4, n.1 (6th Cir. Dec.

20, 1994), citing Doherty v. American Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 334,
340 (6th Cir. 1984); see also United States v. Jolly, 2000 WL
1785533, at *2 n.4 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2000)(“a corporation may
not be represented by a pro se individual”).

Consequently, and

as noted in the Court’s order issued on September 22, 2014, Mr.
Sharpe cannot represent Miles Investments in this case.
22).

(Doc.

For this reason, the answer will be stricken and the Court

will recommend that the cross-claim be dismissed.

(Doc. 19).

The Court now examines whether it has subject matter jurisdiction
over the claims against the Sierra Leone Ministry of Surveys,
Lands and Environment.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In examining whether this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims against the Sierra Leone
Ministry of Surveys, Lands and Environment, the Court turns to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”).
said to consist of “two major components.”

The FSIA has been

Peterson v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010).

The first

component arises from 28 U.S.C. §1604, which provides that,
“[s]ubject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act[,]
a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
4

courts of the United States and of the States except as provided
in sections 1605 and 1607 of this chapter.”

The second

component relates to attachment, arrest, and execution of
“property in the United States of a foreign state....” 28 U.S.C.
§1610.

The first component of the FSIA is relevant to this case.

Although no defendant has made an appearance and raised subject
matter jurisdiction under the FSIA as an issue in this case,
“federal courts have an independent obligation to consider the
presence or absence of subject-matter jurisdiction under [the]
FSIA sua sponte.”

Hu v. Communist Party of China, 2012 WL

7160373, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2012).
The FSIA defines “foreign state” as including “a political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of
a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state as defined in subsection (b).”

28 U.S.C. §1603(a).

Subsection (b) defines “agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state” to mean any entity:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or
otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United
States as defined in section 1332(c) and (e) of this
title, nor created under the laws of any third country.
Id.

Here, the Sierra Leone Ministry of Surveys, Lands and

Environment is an agency of the foreign state of Sierra Leone,
and thus it properly falls within the scope of the FSIA.

See,

e.g., Human v. Czech Republic–Ministry of Health, 2014 WL
3956747, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2014)(finding that the Ministry
of Health is an agency of the Czech Republic and therefore is
within the purview of the FSIA).

Consequently, unless an

exception applies, sovereign immunity bars this Court from
hearing plaintiffs’ claims against the Sierra Leone Ministry of
5

Surveys, Lands and Environment.

See id.

With respect to this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction,
plaintiffs allege the following in the complaint:
The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Acts grants original
jurisdiction to the U.S. District courts in any nonjury
civil action against the [Sierra Leone Ministry of
Surveys, Lands and Environment] that is not entitled to
immunity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1605(a)(2)(3);
since the [Sierra Leone Ministry of Surveys, Lands and
Environment] engaged in a “Commercial Activity” by
engaging land leasing Agreement, and had the Judiciary of
the local forum expropriated the leased property from
[Miles Investments] without payment of prompt and
effective compensation; preventing the timely loan
payment by [Miles Investments] to Defendant Dairy Land
Express, Inc. of 2555 Petzinger Road, Columbus, Ohio USA
43209.
(Doc. 6 at 5).

Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs rely on the

following exceptions:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the
States in any case-(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of
international law are in issue and that property or any
property exchanged for such property is present in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or
that property or any property exchanged for such property
is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of
the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is
engaged in a commercial activity in the United States;
28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2),(3).
Here, plaintiffs do not allege that the beach-front property
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was taken in violation of international law and the beach-front
property or property exchanged for it is in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by Sierra Leone.

Plaintiffs likewise do not allege that

the beach-front property or any property exchanged for it is
owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of Sierra Leone
engaged in a commercial activity in the United States.
Consequently, 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(3) does not apply.
Similarly, plaintiffs do not allege that the Sierra Leone
Ministry of Surveys, Lands and Environment carried on a
commercial activity in the United States, nor do they allege that
the Sierra Leone Ministry of Surveys, Lands and Environment
engaged in an act in the United States in connection with its
commercial activity elsewhere.

Therefore, the sole question

remaining is whether, under 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2), this case is
based upon an act outside the United States in connection with
the Sierra Leone Ministry of Surveys, Lands and Environment’s
commercial activity elsewhere which caused a direct effect in the
United States.

This is known as the “direct effect” requirement

of the commercial activity exception to the FSIA.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has explained the direct
effect requirement as follows:
[A]n effect is direct if it follows as an immediate
consequence of the defendant’s activity. Immediacy
implies no unexpressed requirement of substantiality or
foreseeability, but rather ensures that jurisdiction may
not be predicated on purely trivial effects in the United
States. Congress did not intend to provide jurisdiction
whenever the ripples caused by an overseas transaction
manage eventually reach the shores of the United States.
Virtual Countries, Inc. v. Republic of South Africa, 300 F.3d
230, 236 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).

Thus, the effect in the United States must “be more

than ‘purely trivial’ or ‘remote and attenuated.’”
7

Terenkian v.

Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012), quoting
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618
(1992).
In this case, plaintiffs allege that the actions of the
Sierra Leone Ministry of Surveys, Lands and Environment caused
them to suffer financial harm in the United States, and the
financial harm resulted in Miles Investments’ inability to make
timely payment on a loan in the United States.

Under the

relevant law, financial injury in the United States alone is not
a legally sufficient effect to satisfy the “direct effect”
requirement.

As one court observed, “If a loss to an American

individual and firm resulting from a foreign tort were sufficient
standing alone to satisfy the direct effect requirement, the
commercial activity exception would in large part eviscerate the
FSIA’s provision of immunity for foreign states.”

Antares

Aircraft, L.P. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33, 36
(2nd Cir. 1993).

Thus, the fact that plaintiffs may have

suffered some financial injury from a foreign land dispute
cannot, standing alone, trigger the commercial activity exception
to the FSIA.

See, e.g., Guirlando v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S.,

602 F.3d 69, 79 (2nd Cir. 2010).

Where, as here, all legally

significant acts took place in Sierra Leone and the only alleged
direct effect in the United States is a monetary loss, the
exception does not apply.

See id.

The Court notes that plaintiffs bear the burden of
demonstrating that the Sierra Leone Ministry of Surveys, Lands
and Environment does not have immunity because an exception to
the FSIA applies.

See Kettey v. Saudi Ministry of Education,

2014 WL 2919152, at *5 (D.D.C. June 27, 2014).

For the reasons

stated above, they do not appear to have met that burden at this
stage of litigation.

Rather than recommending immediate

dismissal of the action against the Sierra Leone Ministry of
8

Surveys, Lands and Environment at this juncture, however, and
because plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the Court will grant
plaintiffs the opportunity to brief the issue of this Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction over their claims against the Sierra
Leone Ministry of Surveys, Lands and Environment.

More

specifically, plaintiffs shall file a brief explaining how, based
on the relevant law, the commercial activity exception applies to
the particular facts of this case.

Plaintiffs shall file this

brief within twenty-one days from the issuance of this report and
recommendation and order.
B. Service of Process
The Court now examines whether plaintiffs have properly
served the remaining defendants, namely Bassem Mohamed, the
Estate of Jamil S. Mohamed, and Miles Investments.

Fed. R. Civ.

P. 4(m) sets forth the general requirement that a complaint and
summons be served on each defendant within 120 days of the date
the complaint is filed.

By its terms, the rule requires that the

Court take either one of two actions if service is not made
within that time frame – either “dismiss the action without
prejudice against that defendant” or “order that service be made
within a specified time.”
Rule 4 also contains a mandate concerning extension of time
to make service; it provides that “if the plaintiff shows good
cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service
for an appropriate period.”

The Advisory Committee Notes to the

1993 amendments to Rule 4 interpret this language to mean that
when a plaintiff has not shown good cause, the Court still may
grant an extension if that would represent a sound exercise of
the Court’s discretion.

This Court has adopted that

interpretation of Rule 4(m).

See Vergis v. Grand Victoria Casino

& Resort, 199 F.R.D. 216 (S.D. Ohio 2000).

Other District Courts

within the Sixth Circuit have reached similar conclusions.
9

See,

e.g., In re Aredia and Zometa Prods. Liab. Litig., 2007 WL
4376098, *2 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 13, 2007) (“this Court may clearly
grant more time without showing good cause....”); see also
Slenzka v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 322 (E.D. Mich.
2001); Burnett v. Martin, 2007 WL 2156541 (W.D. Ky. July 24,
2007).

These courts also generally identify, as factors to be

taken into account, whether failure to grant an extension would,
in effect, cause any dismissal to be with prejudice due to the
running of the statute of limitations; whether the unserved
defendant was on notice that suit had been filed; and whether
dismissal would subvert the goal of deciding cases on their
merits.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f) generally provides three mechanisms of
service upon individuals in foreign countries.

Specifically,

Rule 4(f) provides:
Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual –
other than a minor, an incompetent person, or a person
whose waiver has been filed – may be served at a place
not within any judicial district of the United States:
(1) by any internationally agreed means of service that
is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those
authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents;
(2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an
international agreement allows but does not specify other
means, by a method that is reasonably calculated to give
notice:
(A) as prescribed by the foreign country’s law for
service in that country in an action in its courts
of general jurisdiction;
(B) as the foreign authority directs in response to
a letter rogatory or letter of request;
(C) unless prohibited by the foreign country’s law,
by:

10

(i) delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to the individual personally; or

the

(ii) using any form of mail that the clerk
addresses and sends to the individual and that
requires a signed receipt; or
(3) by other means not prohibited
agreement, as the court orders.

by

international

Sierra Leone is neither a signatory of the Hague Convention nor a
Non-Member Contracting State; therefore, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1)
does not provide this Court with guidance in perfecting service
in this case.

In examining these three mechanisms, it is

important to keep in mind that Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f) does not
denote any hierarchy or preference of one method of service over
another.

See Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284

F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002).
Turning to service of process in this case, the Court first
notes that plaintiffs do not appear to have made any effort to
serve Miles Investments.

Although plaintiffs are owners of that

corporation, and this case presents a unique set of circumstances
in that plaintiffs have, in effect, sued themselves, the fact
remains that Miles Investments is its own entity under the law
which must be served in accordance with Rule 4(m).

See, e.g.,

Miles v. Kohli & Kaliher Assoc., Ltd., 917 F.2d 235, 254 (6th
Cir. 1990)(“a corporation is presumed to be an autonomous entity,
wholly separate from its shareholders”).

Consequently, the Court

will order plaintiffs to show cause as to why this action should
not be dismissed against Miles Investments based on their failure
to effect proper service on that defendant under Rule 4(m).
Plaintiffs shall file a brief in response to this Court’s show
cause order within fourteen days of the issuance of this report
and recommendation and order.

The Court now examines service of

process as it pertains to Bassem Mohamed and the Estate of Jamil

11

S. Mohamed.
After several failed attempts at service, Mr. Sharpe
ultimately attempted to serve defendants Mr. Mohamed and the
Estate of Jamil S. Mohamed in Sierra Leone under Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(f)(2)(C)(ii), using a form of mail sent by the Clerk which
required a signed receipt.

More specifically, on July 23, 2013,

Mr. Sharpe filed returns of service for Bassem Mohamed and the
Estate of Jamil S. Mohamed (Doc. 17), attaching DHL tracking
showing signed receipt for the documents sent by the Clerk of
Court.

Although this service occurred nearly one month beyond

the 120-day requirement set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), the
Court, in its discretion, finds it appropriate to extend the time
period for service in this instance.

The record reflects that,

prior to the service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(C)(ii), Mr.
Sharpe made repeated efforts to serve the defendants at issue.
Further, the delay in serving the defendants is not
extraordinary.

Based on the foregoing, service is presumed to be

effective, and the Court will not recommend dismissal against Mr.
Mohamed and the Estate of Jamil S. Mohamed on this basis.
C. Default
As noted above, the docket reflects that the complaint has
been served upon Mr. Mohamed and the Estate of Jamil S. Mohamed.
The docket likewise reflects that the time for filing an answer
has passed, and that plaintiffs have not moved for the entry of
default against Mr. Mohamed and the Estate of Jamil S. Mohamed.
Local Rule of Court 55.1 provides as follows:
55.1 DEFAULTS and DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
(a) If a party makes proper service of a pleading seeking
affirmative relief but, after the time for making a
response has passed without any response having been
served and filed, that party does not request the Clerk
to enter a default, the Court may by written order direct
the party to show cause why the claims in that pleading
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
12

(b) If a party obtains a default but does not, within a
reasonable time thereafter, either file a motion for a
default judgment or request a hearing or trial on the
issue of damages, the Court may by written order direct
the party to show cause why the claims upon which default
was entered should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute.
(c) Nothing in this Rule shall be construed to limit the
Court’s power, either under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41 or otherwise,
to dismiss a case or to dismiss one or more claims or
parties for failure to prosecute.
Pursuant to that Rule, plaintiffs are directed to show cause
within fourteen days from the issuance of this report and
recommendation and order as to why this action should not be
dismissed.

Plaintiffs’ filing shall be accompanied, if

appropriate, by a request to enter default pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55, and a separate motion for default judgment.

While a

default judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. 55(b), a default
judgment cannot be entered unless a default has been entered
previously by the Clerk under Rule 55(a).

While the Court

anticipates problems with plaintiffs’ ability to enforce such a
judgment against Mr. Mohamed and the Estate of Jamil S. Mohamed
based upon issues of personal jurisdiction, those issues are not
before this Court for resolution at this time.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the answer filed on behalf of
defendant Miles Investments is stricken, and the Court recommends
that the cross-claim filed on behalf Miles Investments be
dismissed.

(Doc. 19).

Further, the Court orders:

•

plaintiffs to file a brief, within twenty-one days
from the issuance of this report and recommendation
and order, explaining how, based on the relevant
law, the commercial activity exception to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act applies to the
particular facts of this case;

•

plaintiffs to show cause, within fourteen days of
13

the issuance of this report and recommendation and
order, as to why this action should not be
dismissed against Miles Investments based upon
their failure to effect proper service on that
defendant in accordance with Rule 4(m); and
•

plaintiffs to show cause within fourteen days from
the issuance of this report and recommendation and
order why this action should not be dismissed
against those defendants. Plaintiffs’ filing shall
be accompanied, if appropriate, by a request to
enter default pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55, and a
separate motion for default judgment.
IV. Procedure on Objections

Procedure on Objections to Report and Recommendation
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that
party may, within fourteen days of the date of this Report, file
and serve on all parties written objections to those specific
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made,
together with supporting authority for the objection(s).

A judge

of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.

Upon proper

objections, a judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify,
in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein,
may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.

28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object
to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the
right to have the district judge review the Report and
Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the
right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the
Report and Recommendation.

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Procedure on Objections to Order
Any party may, within fourteen days after this Order is
14

filed, file and serve on the opposing party a motion for
reconsideration by a District Judge.

28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A),

Rule 72(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.; Eastern Division Order No. 91-3, pt.
I., F., 5.

The motion must specifically designate the order or

part in question and the basis for any objection.

Responses to

objections are due fourteen days after objections are filed and
replies by the objecting party are due seven days thereafter.
The District Judge, upon consideration of the motion, shall set
aside any part of this Order found to be clearly erroneous or
contrary to law.
This order is in full force and effect, notwithstanding the
filing of any objections, unless stayed by the Magistrate Judge
or District Judge.

S.D. Ohio L.R. 72.3.
/s/Terence P. Kemp
United States Magistrate Judge

15