CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Nyamusevya et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER denying 20 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Algenon L. Marbley on 3/5/2015. (pes1) (This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CITIMORTGAGE, INC.,
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Plaintiff,
v.
LEONARD NYAMUSEVYA, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:13-CV-00680
JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY
Magistrate Judge King
OPINION & ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 20),
requesting that this Court reconsider its March 21, 2014 Opinion and Order (Doc. 18) adopting
the Magistrate Judge’s July 17, 2013 Report and Recommendation (Doc. 5), modified in part.
The Report and Recommendation recommended that this action be dismissed on the grounds that
removal to this Court was improper because all Defendants did not consent to removal, there is
no federal question, and the parties are not diverse. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s
Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 20) is DENIED and the case is hereby REMANDED to the
Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County.
II.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff CitiMortgage, Inc. (“CitiMortgage”) brought this foreclosure action on
September 14, 2010, in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County against Defendants
Leonard Nyamusevya, Consolata Nkurunziza, the Franklin County Treasurer, and the unknown
spouses of Nyamusevya and Nkurunziza. (Compl., Doc. 1-5 at 1). Defendant Nyamusevya
removed the case to this Court on July 15, 2013 on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.
(Notice of Removal, Doc. 1-2 at 1-2).
On July 17, 2013, the Magistrate Judge issued her Order and Report and
Recommendation (Doc. 5) on Nyamusevya’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
(Doc. 1). The Magistrate Judge ordered that Defendant be allowed to proceed without payment
of fees or costs (id. at 1), but concluded that removal was improper for four reasons: (i)
Defendants did not unanimously agree to removal; (ii)the case does not involve a question of
federal law; (iii) the parties are not diverse; and (iv) removal was untimely. (Id. at 2-3).
Accordingly, the Report and Recommendation recommended that the action be dismissed. (Id.
at 3). Defendant Nyamusevya objected on August 7, 2013, (Doc. 9), claiming that he was the
only proper party in interest, and thus consent of the other Defendants was not required to
remove the case. (Id. at 13-14). He also claimed that he properly asserted federal counterclaims,
giving this Court federal question subject matter jurisdiction. (Id. at 19-21).
On September 18, 2013, Nyamusevya filed a Motion to Consolidate this case with a case
he intended to file in this Court against CitiMortgage. (Doc. 13). Nyamusevya filed an
Amended Motion to Consolidate two days later, clarifying that case is Case No. 2:13-CV-972.
(Doc. 14). These motions remain pending.
On March 4, 2014, Plaintiff CitiMortgage filed a Motion to Remand, (Doc. 15), alleging
that Defendant Nyamusevya removed this case as an attempt to thwart the judgment of the Court
of Common Pleas of Franklin County. The Court of Common Pleas had entered summary
judgment in favor of Plaintiff only a week before Nyamusevya filed his Notice of Removal in
July 2013. Nyamusevya responded to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand on March 10, 2014 (Doc.
16).
On March 21, 2014, this Court issued an Opinion and Order (Doc. 18) adopting the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 5), modified in part, and overruling
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Defendant’s Objections (Doc. 9). In its Opinion and Order, this Court found that it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to hear this case because there is not federal question jurisdiction or diversity
jurisdiction. (Doc. 18 at 5-6). Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, (Doc. 15), was granted and
the case was remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County.
Defendant Nyamusevya filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 27, 2014,
requesting “[r]econsideration of the March 21, 2014 Court’s Order to [r]emand [c]ase to State
Court.” (Doc. 20 at 2).
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for a “motion for
reconsideration.” In the Sixth Circuit, however, a timely motion so styled arguably may be
“pursued either under Rule 59(e)-motion to alter or amend-or under Rule 60(b)-relief from
judgment or order.” Peake v. First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Marquette, 717 F.2d 1016, 1019
(6th Cir. 1983) (footnotes omitted); see also, Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 268
(6th Cir. 1998) (“Where a party's Rule 59 motion is not filed within the mandatory 10–day
period,1 it is appropriate for a court to consider the motion as a motion pursuant to Rule 60 for
relief from judgment.”) (citing Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir.
1991)); Evans v. Cordray, No. 2:09-CV-587, 2012 WL 3309642, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 13,
2012) (noting that, in the Sixth Circuit, a motion styled as a “Request for Reconsideration” that
does not cite a statute or civil rule may be pursued under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)). Because
Defendant’s motion is styled as a “motion for reconsideration” and does not state expressly the
statute or civil rule relied on, the Court will consider the motion under both standards.
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The applicable mandatory filing-time provision of Rule 59(e) has since been extended to 28 days by amendment of
the rule.
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A. Rule 59(e)
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), a district court will reconsider a prior decision if there is
“(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling
law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.” Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620
(6th Cir. 2005) (citing Gen. Corp., Inc. v. Am. Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir.
1999)).
B. Rule 60(b)
Rule 60(b) sets out six reasons for which the Court is authorized to grant relief:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on
an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b). Most grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) “relate to, if not require, new
information about the case that could not reasonably have been discovered earlier.” GenCorp.
Inc. v. Olin Corp., 477 F.3d 368, 372 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Abrahamsen v. Trans–State Exp.,
Inc., 92 F.3d 425, 428 (6th Cir. 1996); United Coin Meter Co., Inc. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R.,
705 F.2d 839, 844–46 (6th Cir. 1983).
IV.
LAW & ANALYSIS
Defendant Nyamusevya makes several arguments for the Court to reconsider its Opinion
and Order (Doc. 18). (See Doc. 20). First, Defendant asserts that this Court’s reconsideration is
necessary because federal jurisdiction will exist if his pending Amended Motion for
Consolidation, (Doc. 14), is granted. (Doc. 20 at 6). Second, Defendant insists that this Court
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should raise the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine’s fraud exception to “dispose of this action” and
therefore grant his Motion for Reconsideration.2 (Id. at 7-8). Third, Defendant claims that
Plaintiff is not the real party in interest who may properly foreclose upon Defendant’s property,
thus the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim.
(Doc. 20 at 5).
Defendant further asserts that Plaintiff violated Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 81(c) and 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c) due to Plaintiff’s “unlawful and unconstitutional and extremely belated[] Motion to
Remand” the case to state court. (Doc. 20 at 9). Defendant also questions why this Court found
Defendant’s lack of unanimous consent for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and 28 U.S.C. §
1446(b)(2)(A) to be defective, but did not require Plaintiff to properly serve his Motion to
Remand on Defendant Franklin County Treasurer.3 (Doc. 20 at 10). Defendant requests the
convening of a three-judge district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2284 “to challenge the
constitutionality and applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)” as related to this case. (Doc. 20 at
10).
A. Rule 59(e)
The Court first will consider Defendant’s arguments under Rule 59(e). A motion under
Rule 59(e) is “not an opportunity to re-argue a case.” Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa
Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998). Rule 59(e) “may not be used to relitigate
old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the
2
Generally, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine stands for the proposition that federal courts are unable to exercise
jurisdiction over claims that allege a state court decision error. See Hall v. Callahan, 727 F.3d 450, 453 (6th Cir.
2013). The doctrine “prevents [] lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court
losers’ challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.’” Lance v.
Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005)). Otherwise, Rooker-Feldman does not “override or supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the
circumscribed doctrines that allow federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court actions.”
(Id.).
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Defendant argues that the certificate of service included in Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, (Doc. 15), was defective
and thus a violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). (Doc. 20 at 10).
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entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n. 5 (2008) (quotation
omitted). Generally, a finding of manifest injustice or a clear error of law requires “unique
circumstances,” such as complete failure to address an issue or claim. McWhorter v. ELSEA,
Inc., No. 2:00-CV-473, 2006 WL 3483964, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2006) (citing Collison v.
Int'l Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 34 F.3d 233, 236 (4th Cir. 1994)). The grant or denial of
a Rule 59(e) motion “is within the informed discretion of the district court.” Huff v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1982). Significantly, “justice does not require that the
district court [grant reconsideration] on an issue that would not alter the district court’s prior
decision.” Rodriguez v. Tennessee Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 F. App’x 949, 959-60
(6th Cir. 2004).
Unfortunately, Defendant’s arguments are not grounds for reconsideration under Rule
59(e). None of Defendant’s arguments provide any evidence that was previously unavailable,
reference an intervening change of law, or point to newly discovered evidence. See Intera Corp.,
428 F.3d at 620. Neither has Defendant Nyamusevya demonstrated to this Court that its ruling is
the product of a clear error of law or that it results in a manifest injustice. Id.; Compare Maddux
v. United States, No. 1:08-CV-442, 2010 WL 5478529, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 30, 2010) (denying
motion to reconsider when moving party could “point to no binding precedent establishing that
this Court has made a clear error”).
Defendant’s argument that this Court will have federal question jurisdiction if it grants
his pending Amended Motion for Consolidation misses the point: at the time this case was
removed to the Court, removal was improper. Further, Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff’s
Motion to Remand should be invalid because Plaintiff failed to serve all Defendants is irrelevant
to the question of whether removal was proper and thus does not state a ground for
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reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Moreover, Defendant’s arguments do not demonstrate the
unique circumstances required for a manifest injustice. Rather, Defendant’s arguments reveal
that he simply disagrees with this Court’s finding that Defendant’s lack of unanimous consent for
removal was defective under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).
Defendant’s argument about the real party in interest has no bearing on this Court’s
Opinion and Order, (Doc. 18), and therefore is not grounds for reconsideration. Further,
Defendant’s Rooker-Feldman Doctrine argument does not demonstrate that this Court made a
clear error of law or that a manifest injustice will result if this Court does not reconsider its prior
decision. A Motion for Reconsideration is not the proper venue for Defendant to re-argue that an
exception to the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine applies.
The Defendant’s remaining arguments, that a three-judge district court should be
convened under 28 U.S.C. § 22844, (Doc. 20 at 10), and that his due process and equal protection
rights have been denied, (Id.), do not provide any reason for granting his motion for
reconsideration under Rule 59(e). See Svete v.Wunderlich, No. 2:07-CV-156, 2009, 2009 WL
330297, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 2009) (noting the “major grounds justifying reconsideration are
‘an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct
a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.’”) (citation omitted). Defendant’s claims do not
purport to identify an intervening change in controlling law or newly discovered evidence.
Defendant does not state any reason why these remaining issues present a manifest injustice. If
Defendant believes that this Court either omitted or misinterpreted key facts, the Court of
Appeals is the proper venue for such arguments.
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Defendant’s request also misinterprets the function of three-judge courts. Three-judge courts are convened when
“otherwise required by Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the
apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body.” 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
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Defendant’s disagreement with this Court’s decision is not a viable basis for arguing that
manifest injustice will result. See Nayyar v. Mt. Carmel Health Sys., No. 2:10-CV-00135, 2014
WL 619394, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2014) (noting that a court “will not find manifest injustice
when the moving party simply reargues the issues that were not previously successful”); Gore v.
AT & T Corp., No. 2:09–CV–854, 2010 WL 3655994, *1 (S.D.Ohio Sept.14, 2010) (“Motions
for reconsideration should not be used as a substitute for appeal nor should they be used as a
vehicle for mere disagreement with a district court's opinion.”).
B. Rule 60(b)
The Court will now consider Defendant’s arguments under Rule 60(b). The “public
policy favoring finality of judgments” generally limits the availability of relief under the rule.
See Waifersong Ltd., Inc. v. Classic Music Vending, 976 F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1992). This is
“especially true” for the catch-all provision in Rule 60(b)(6), “which applies only in exceptional
or extraordinary circumstances which are not addressed by the first five numbered clauses of the
Rule.” Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trustees of UMWA Combined Ben. Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524
(6th Cir. 2001) (citing Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990)); see
also GenCorp. Inc., 477 F.3d at 372.5
Defendant’s motion does not meet his burden of demonstrating his entitlement to relief
for any of the limited reasons set forth in Rule 60(b)(1)-(5). Although Defendant suggests that a
fraud exception applies, his argument is not permitted under Rule 60(b)(3). Under Rule
60(b)(3), this Court may order relief from a final judgment for “fraud (whether previously called
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” Fed.R. Civ. P.
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Indeed, subsection (b)(6) of Rule 60 should be applied “only as a means to achieve substantial justice when
something more than one of the grounds contained in Rule 60(b)'s first five clauses is present.” Ford Motor Co. v.
Mustangs Unlimited. Inc., 487 F.3d 465, 468–69 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d
357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990)). “The ‘something more’ ... must include unusual and extreme situations where principles
of equity mandate relief.” Id.
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60(b)(3). Defendant fails to demonstrate that this Court’s judgment was obtained by fraud or
misconduct. 6 See Crehore v. United States, 253 F. App’x at 549.
Defendant also fails to meet the “rigorous standard” for relief from a judgment or order
that is required by Rule 60(b)(6). See U.S. v. Short, No. 3:04-CV-7559, 2012 WL 5835372, *2
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2012) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Mustangs Unlimited, Inc., 487 F.3d at 468)
(internal quotations omitted). Defendant does not articulate any “exceptional or extraordinary
circumstances” required to warrant invoking the catch-all provision of Rule 60(b)(6). Blue
Diamond Coal Co., 249 F.3d at 524 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910
F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990)); see also GenCorp. Inc., 477 F.3d at 372. “[T]he decision to grant
Rule 60(b)(6) relief is a case-by-case inquiry that requires the trial court to intensively balance
numerous factors, including the competing policies of the finality of judgments and the incessant
command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.” Blue Diamond
Coal Co., 249 F.3d at 529 (internal quotations omitted); see also Olle, 910 F.2d at 365 (citation
omitted) (noting that Rule 60(b)(6) may provide relief in cases of “extreme and undue
hardship”).
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To raise an independent action for fraud upon the court, Defendant has to prove five elements: “(1) conduct by an
officer of the court (2) that is directed towards the judicial machinery itself, (3) that is intentionally false, willfully
blind to the truth or is in reckless disregard for the truth, (4) that is a positive averment or concealment when one is
under a duty to disclose and (5) that deceives the court.” Crehore v. United States, 253 F. App’x 547, 549 (6th Cir.
2007). Here, Defendant’s argument that fraud existed in the July 10, 2013 interlocutory state court judgment
decision is not grounds for demonstrating that this Court’s Order and Opinion, (Doc. 18), was obtained through
fraud.
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V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 20) is
DENIED. This case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin
County.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Algenon L. Marbley
s
ALGENON L. MARBLEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: March 5, 2015
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