Snyder v. Fleetwood RV, Inc. et al

Filing 91

OPINION AND ORDER granting 44 Motion for Summary Judgment on Ms. Snyder' s Lemon Law claim; denying to the extent that it seeks summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, but granting to as to the Lemon Law claim 46 Motion for Summa ry Judgment; denying 47 Motion to Compel; denying 55 Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; overruling 65 Motion to Exclude; denying 86 Motion for Leave to disclose expert witnesses; denying as moot 89 Motion to Strike. Signed by Magistrate Judge Terence P. Kemp on 1/28/2019. (agm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Lora F. Snyder,

:

Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

Fleetwood RV, Inc., et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 2:13-cv-1019

:

Magistrate Judge Kemp

:

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on numerous motions.
Specifically, currently before the Court for consideration are a
motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Spartan Chassis,
Inc. (“Spartan”) (Doc. 44), a motion for summary judgment on
Counts I and II of the complaint filed by defendant Fleetwood RV,
Inc. (“Fleetwood”) (Doc. 46),

a motion to compel discovery

responses from Fleetwood and Spartan filed by plaintiff Lora F.
Snyder (Doc. 47), a cross-motion for summary judgment filed by
Ms. Snyder (Doc. 55), a joint motion objecting to the
consideration of certain exhibits attached to Ms. Snyder’s crossmotion for summary judgment filed by Fleetwood and Spartan (Doc.
65), a motion for leave to disclose expert witnesses filed by Ms.
Snyder (Doc. 86), and defendants’ joint motion to strike Ms.
Snyder’s reply brief in support of her motion for leave to
disclose expert witnesses (Doc. 89).

The motions have been

briefed fully and are now ripe for consideration.

For the

reasons set forth below, Ms. Snyder’s motion to compel and motion
for leave to disclose expert witnesses will be denied.
Defendants’ joint motion to strike Ms. Snyder’s reply brief in
support of her motion for leave to disclose expert witnesses also
will be denied.

Fleetwood’s motion for summary judgment will be

granted in part and denied in part.

The motion will be denied to

the extent that it seeks summary judgment on the breach of
contract claim, but it will be granted to as to the Lemon Law
claim.

Spartan’s motion for summary judgment on Ms. Snyder’s

Lemon Law claim will be granted, and Ms. Snyder’s cross-motion
for partial summary judgment will be denied.

Finally,

defendants’ joint objection to Ms. Snyder’s exhibits will be
overruled.
I. General Background
In August 2011, Ms. Snyder sued Fleetwood and Spartan in the
Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 11-CV-460.

Ms.

Snyder alleged that, despite paying $780,964.00 for a 2011
American Coach Motor Home, the mobile home was so substantially
impaired that it was worthless and unsafe for use.
eventually settled the case.

The parties

Under the settlement agreement,

Fleetwood and Spartan provided Ms. Snyder with a 2012 American
Coach Motor Home (“the Replacement Motor Home”).
Ms. Snyder was not happy with the Replacement Motor Home,
either.

Consequently, she filed a second lawsuit in the

Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 13-CV-426,
relating to the Replacement Motor Home, alleging that, despite
numerous attempts to repair the Replacement Motor Home, it
remains substantially impaired and unfit for use.

On October 15,

2013, Fleetwood removed the Jefferson County case to this Court
based on diversity jurisdiction.
In the complaint, Ms. Snyder alleges that the defects and
nonconformities in the Replacement Motor Home include, but are
not limited to, the following:
Life Threatening
<

Entrance steps extend (or may improperly stay
extended) while the 2012 Replacement Motor Home is
moving; the driver and occupants are unable to
ascertain this malfunction until a collision
occurs, such as most recently encountered by a
2

Spartan employee;
<

Hydraulic leveling system uses steel jacks that do
not always retract completely, or dangerously,
partially retract;

<

Burning rubber smell;

<

Differential, defective and noisy;

<

Steering problems:
a.

Too much play in the steering wheel, which
allows the 2012 Replacement Motor Home to
drift;

b.

Defective king pins and/or bushings/washers
which make the front end so stiff that the
2012 Replacement Motor Home will frequently
cause the overload valve on the hydraulic pump
to kick out, which in turn shuts off the power
steering;

c.

Erratic hydraulic steering pump, which at time
requires more than 100 pounds of force to run
the steering wheel and yet a split second
later requires only a force of 3 pounds of
effort, resulting in the 2012 Replacement
Motor Home lurching rapidly and dangerously;

d.

Power steering pump completely malfunctioned,
which results in the 2012 Replacement Motor
Home being impossible to steer; and

e.

Electrical
system;
periodically,
the
windshield wipers, cruise control, horn, etc.
quit working without warning.

Unsafe, Unusable:
<

Air-conditioners do not work properly;

<

Stench in the shower;

<

Door does not lock properly;

<

Problems extending and retracting the generator;

3

<

Frequently, engine batteries will not start the
2012 Replacement Motor Home;

<

Full bathroom gets extremely hot;

<

Loud vibration noise;

<

Windows leak;

<

Passenger side awnings are defective to the extent
that damage occurred to the outside of the 2012
Replacement Motor Home; and

<

The driver’s side rollout top on the full slide is
pulled open and dangling.

(Doc. 3 at ¶11)(emphasis in original).

Ms. Snyder avers that

these defects and nonconformities, which violate the warranties
issued to her, render the Replacement Motor Home worthless and
unusable.

In Count I of the complaint, Ms. Snyder sets forth a

claim for breach of contract.

In Count II of the complaint, Ms.

Snyder alleges a violation of the “Ohio Motor Vehicles with
Warranty Conformities [sic] Act,” O.R.C. §1345.72.

Id. at 8.

In

Count III of the complaint, Ms. Snyder claims that she is
entitled to “revocation in whole.”

Id.

More specifically, Ms.

Snyder alleges that “Defendants have failed to deliver the 2012
Replacement Motor Home as described in O.R.C. §1302.60 (UCC 2601),” and “[a]s such, [she] may rightfully reject the 2012
Replacement Motor Home and has done so ....”

Id. at ¶31.

II. The Motions
A. Spartan’s Summary Judgment Motion
On March 24, 2015, Spartan filed a motion for summary
judgment as to Count II of the complaint, namely Ms. Snyder’s
O.R.C. §1345 claim, also known as an Ohio “Lemon Law” claim.
(Doc. 44).

In the motion, Spartan argues that, because it is the

manufacturer of the chassis and is not the “final manufacturer”
of the Replacement Motor Home, it cannot be held liable under

4

Ohio’s Lemon Law.

Id. at 4.

Spartan has not moved for summary

judgment as to Counts I and III of the complaint.
B. Fleetwood’s Summary Judgment Motion
On March 30, 2015, Fleetwood filed a motion for summary
judgment as to Ms. Snyder’s the breach of contract claim in Count
I and the Ohio Lemon Law claim in Count II.

(Doc. 46).

First,

Fleetwood argues that, because Ms. Snyder has not identified an
expert who will offer testimony about the value of the RV as
accepted, she is unable to prove her claim for breach of
contract, which is actually an express warranty claim.

Fleetwood

contends that “without that proof, there can be no warranty
damages,” and “[w]ithout warranty damages, there is no claim for
breach of warranty...”

Id. at 12.

Thus, Fleetwood asserts that

it is entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Snyder’s breach of
contract claim.

Fleetwood also asserts that it is separately

entitled to summary judgment as to the “punitive damages and
attorney fee claims associated with this cause of action....”
Id.

Next, Fleetwood argues that Indiana law should apply to Ms.

Snyder’s Lemon Law claim and, under that law, Ms. Snyder’s claim
is precluded.

Fleetwood further argues that, even if Ohio law

applies, Ms. Snyder’s Lemon Law claim is without merit because
“the issues she complains of were not warranted by Fleetwood,
thus cannot constitute a non-conformity.”

Id. at 20.

Fleetwood

also asserts that Ms. Snyder “does not have the service history
or necessary expertise to establish any of the statutory
presumptions necessary to state a lemon law claim.”

Id.

On this

basis, Fleetwood claims that it is entitled to summary judgment
on Ms. Snyder’s Lemon Law claim.
C. Ms. Snyder’s Motion to Compel
On April 1, 2015, Ms. Snyder filed a motion to compel
discovery responses from Fleetwood and Spartan.

(Doc. 47).

Specifically, Ms. Snyder requests that this Court issue an order
5

compelling Fleetwood and Spartan to provide full and proper
answers and responses to her third set of interrogatories and
requests for production of documents.

She also requests that

this Court issue an order compelling Fleetwood to respond to her
requests for admission.

Spartan filed an opposition to the

motion and “a demand for sanctions against Plaintiff and
Plaintiff’s Counsel.”

(Doc. 51).

opposition to the motion.

Fleetwood also filed an

(Doc. 52).

Ms. Snyder filed separate

reply briefs addressing Spartan’s opposition and demand for
sanctions (Doc. 53) and Fleetwood’s opposition (Doc. 61).
D. Ms. Snyder’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
On April 23, 2015, Ms. Snyder filed a cross-motion for
partial summary judgment as to her claims “under the Ohio Lemon
Law, Breach of Contract, and Breach of Warranty.”
1).

(Doc. 55 at

Her primary argument is that Fleetwood and Spartan failed to

deliver a conforming motor home to her, and, that she properly
rejected or revoked her acceptance of the Replacement Motor Home.
She does appear to concede that although “Defendant Spartan may
be liable to Defendant Fleetwood, it may not be liable to
Plaintiff under Lemon Law [sic].”

Id. at 18.

She also argues

that she has proved her entitlement to reject the motor home in
its entirety and that an expert witness (or any witness) on
damages is not necessary in order for her to prevail on that
claim.
E. Ms. Snyder’s Motion to Disclose Experts
On November 30, 2015, Ms. Snyder filed a motion for leave to
disclose expert witnesses in this matter.

(Doc. 86).

Ms. Snyder

argues that defendants will not be prejudiced if her motion is
granted because she has already retained the experts’ services,
defendants still have to complete their own inspections, and a
trial date had not been set in this case.

Defendants filed a

joint opposition to Ms. Snyder’s motion (Doc. 87), Ms. Snyder
6

filed a reply brief in support of her motion (Doc. 88), and
defendants filed a joint motion to strike Ms. Snyder’s reply
brief (Doc. 89).
III. Motion to Compel
In her motion to compel, Ms. Snyder first requests that this
Court order Fleetwood and Spartan to provide full and proper
answers and responses to her third set of interrogatories and
requests for production of documents.

Ms. Snyder explains that

the requested discovery seeks information related to Fleetwood’s
transfer of the Replacement Motor Home to Spartan’s facility for
repairs.

Ms. Snyder states that both Fleetwood and Spartan deny

having any information responsive to her request.

Ms. Snyder

states that it is “very challenging to believe” that Fleetwood
and Spartan do not have documentation relating to the transfer of
the Replacement Motor Home.

(Doc. 47 at 3).

She states:

It defies logic and regular business principles that
there is not one communication, order, signature, or any
other document alluding to the transfer of the
Replacement Motor Home between Defendants. Therefore,
Plaintiff files this Motion to Compel as the weight of
reason suggests that Defendants have not made full
disclosure of information related to the transfer of the
Replacement Motor Home from Fleetwood’s facility in
Decatur, Indiana to Spartan’s facility in Charlotte,
Michigan other than what has already been produced.
Id.

Thus, Ms. Snyder insists that additional documents

concerning the transfer of the Replacement Motor Home must exist.
Ms. Snyder also seeks an order compelling Fleetwood to
respond to her requests for admission.

Ms. Snyder claims that

Fleetwood improperly objected to her requests on the grounds that
they exceeded the maximum number allowable (which, under Local
Civil Rule 36.1 is 40, including subparts), they were vague and
ambiguous, and they referenced documents which were not attached.
Ms. Snyder admits that each of the requests for admission
contained a subpart, so she acknowledges that they may have been
7

objectionable beginning with request number twenty.

Ms. Snyder

explains “only those beyond Request No. 20 may be deemed to have
exceeded Rule 36.1; yet, Defendant Fleetwood began objecting
based upon the total number of Requests at Request for Admission
No. 16 by stating that some of the requests [sic] and based this
upon its suggestion that Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission
contained discreet [sic] subparts....”

Id. at 4.

Ms. Snyder

further argues that her requests for admission were not vague and
ambiguous, and they referred to documents produced by Fleetwood
using Fleetwood’s Bates label.

Finally, Ms. Snyder requests that

this Court award her reasonable expenses, including attorney’s
fees, incurred as a result of filing the motion to compel.
In opposition to Ms. Snyder’s motion to compel, Spartan
suggests that the transfer of the Replacement Motor Home was a
routine event.

Spartan states:

In short, during repairs, Defendant [Fleetwood] asked
Defendant Spartan to look at the subject motor home and
determine if there were any repairs that for which
Defendant Spartan may be better equipped to make. As it
is a vehicle, and both Defendants work with vehicles
regularly, this can be accomplished via a phone call and
a drop off.
As Plaintiff specifically states in her
Motion, the vehicle was only transported approximately
one hundred and fifty miles.
This is far from the
dramatic distance Plaintiff and her Counsel make it out
to be.
(Doc. 51 at 2).

Spartan adds that all the parties have produced

“hundreds of pages of documents,” and within those documents “is
work order with a notation that the subject vehicle was received
from Fleetwood....”

Id.

Spartan states that, aside from the

work order which has already been produced, it “is confounded as
to what documentation Plaintiff anticipates finding.” Id.
Spartan asserts that it has made a good faith attempt to
determine if any additional responsive documents exist, but it
has been unable to locate any.

Spartan maintains that it should
8

not be required to “prove a negative” by somehow demonstrating
that the documents do not exist.

Id.

Further, Spartan argues

that because the motion is frivolous and Ms. Snyder filed it in
an effort to cause undue delay, Ms. Snyder should be subject to
sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.
Fleetwood filed a separate opposition to Ms. Snyder’s
motion.

Fleetwood asserts that Ms. Snyder is incorrect in her

assertion that there are no documents relating to the transfer of
the Replacement Motor Home.

Fleetwood states:

Attached hereto as Ex. B is FW 000154, which clearly
states: “Take unit to Spartan for steering. Took to
Spartan.” The sending of the unit to Spartan was also
addressed in handwriting in FW000203, Ex. C, and the same
content was then entered into typed form FW000200. Ex. D.
It is difficult to understand how plaintiff makes the
representation that there is no reference to sending the
unit to Spartan, given that one of her requests for
admissions is based upon this very work order (#193138,
RFA 4, discussed below.)
(Doc. 52 at 4).

Fleetwood argues that additional documents

concerning the transfer do not exist, stating “given the
relationship between Fleetwood and Spartan, a trip of less than
three hours to deliver a unit built on a Spartan chassis to
Spartan for chassis service – with knowledge of the owners –
would not generate the paperwork that plaintiff posits.”
3.

Id. at

Fleetwood adds that, because Spartan provided a separate

warranty for the chassis and Ms. Snyder picked the unit up from
Spartan, there is no reason that it would have received an
invoice or generated any additional paperwork related to the
transfer.

Fleetwood also states that, despite Ms. Snyder’s

counsel’s deposing Dispute Resolution Administrator John Mestlin
for five hours, the motion to compel is silent as to any
testimony which supports her argument that additional
documentation must exist.

Based on its position that there are

no additional documents to compel, Fleetwood urges the Court to
9

deny Ms. Snyder’s motion for that discovery.
Fleetwood also asserts that Ms. Snyder filed the incorrect
motion to the extent that she is challenging its responses to her
requests for admission.

More specifically, Fleetwood states that

Ms. Snyder should have filed a motion as to the sufficiency of an
answer or objection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a), as opposed to a
motion to compel under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, and the Court should
deny the motion on this basis.

Alternatively, Fleetwood asserts

that if “the Court elects to treat the motion to compel as a
motion as to the sufficiency of an answer or objection under Civ.
R. 36(a)(6), it should be denied because plaintiff fails to
articulate any measure by which the responses are insufficient.”
Id. at 5.

Fleetwood explains that, despite its objections, it

responded to each of Ms. Snyder’s requests.

For these reasons,

Fleetwood urges this Court to deny Ms. Snyder’s motion and to
award it attorney’s fees.
In reply to Spartan’s opposition, Ms. Snyder reiterates that
her motion to compel “is based on her logical belief that two
large corporate entities such as Defendants in this matter would
have documentation of transferring a twenty-five ton motor home,
valued at more than $800,000, between two facilities for a period
of four months during unsuccessful attempts to repair.”
at 1-2).

(Doc. 53

More specifically, Ms. Snyder argues:

Defendants have produced no document which indicates why
Defendant Fleetwood had to send the 2012 Replacement
Motor Home to Defendant Spartan’s facility for
unsuccessful attempted repairs. From May 7, 2012 through
July of 2013, the 2012 Replacement Motor Home was
serviced at Defendant Fleetwood’s facility at least five
different times, and yet, there is no evidence that, on
those previous occasions, the 2012 Replacement Motor Home
was taken to Defendant Spartan’s facility for repairs.
Thus, Plaintiff is confident there is some kind of
documentation from either or both Defendants which
explains why the 2012 Replacement Motor Home had to be
taken to Spartan’s facility in July of 2013 when prior
10

practice regarding the 2012 Replacement Motor Home did
not include such a transport. Plaintiff has filed this
Motion to Compel because she views Defendants [sic]
Answers and Responses to Plaintiff’s Third Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents
as evasive and incomplete.
Id. at 2.

Ms. Snyder also reiterates her request for reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs associated with filing the motion to
compel.

She urges the Court to deny Spartan’s request for

sanctions, stating that the motion to compel is “substantially
justified....”

Id. at 3.

In reply to Fleetwood’s opposition, Ms. Snyder incorporates
the arguments she made in reply to Spartan’s opposition.

Again,

she asserts that additional documents must exist relating to the
transfer of the Replacement Motor Home.

Ms. Snyder elaborates

further, stating:
Defendant Fleetwood’s Exhibit C to Doc. 52 states there
is “nothing wrong” with the 2012 Replacement Motor Home
concerning Plaintiff’s complaints of steering defects and
nonconformities, and yet, that same sentence on the same
document states the 2012 Replacement Motor Hone was sent
to Spartan.
With no other documentation produced,
Plaintiff is somehow expected to believe that there was
“nothing wrong” with the steering of the 2012 Replacement
Motor Home, according to Defendant Fleetwood, yet
Fleetwood still decided to send the vehicle to Defendant
Spartan, where it then stayed for four months whole
further unsuccessful steering repairs were attempted and
most major steering parts were replaced. Obviously, this
makes no sense.
(Doc. 61 at 2).

Ms. Snyder states that although Mr. Mestlin was

not the appropriate person to testify as to whether additional
documents exist pertaining to the transfer, he testified about a
different repair issue and stated that Fleetwood had not produced
the work orders related to that particular repair.

Thus, Ms.

Snyder claims that Mr. Mestlin’s testimony supports her position
that Defendants have not been forthcoming in producing responsive

11

documents.

In addition, Ms. Snyder hypothesizes that the

documents related to the transfer of the Replacement Motor Home
would refer to the defects and nonconformities, would explain the
need for further repairs, would contain guidance from Fleetwood
to Spartan concerning the work that needed to be done, would note
the individuals making the decision to transport, and would
contain the identity of the individual responsible for physically
transporting the Replacement Motor Home from Fleetwood to
Spartan.

Further, Ms. Snyder acknowledges the production of the

documents relating to the transfer attached to Fleetwood’s
response, but she claims that they contradict one another
concerning the date on which the Replacement Motor Home was
received, the date service began, and the date service was
completed.

These contradictions, she claims, demonstrate that

additional documents must exist.
As to the requests for admission, Ms. Snyder requests that
the Court construe her motion to compel as a motion regarding the
sufficiency of the answer or objection under Fed. R. Civ. P.
36(a)(6).

Ms. Snyder claims that it is Fleetwood’s

interpretation of the requests, and not the requests themselves,
that is unclear.

More specifically, Ms. Snyder claims that

Fleetwood is “inserting ambiguity [into the requests] where none
exists.”

Id. at 5.

Ms. Snyder then provides examples in an

effort to demonstrate that Fleetwood improperly provided
qualified responses over its objections, “to even the most
simplistic Requests where a simple admission or denial could be
utilized.”

Id. at 8.

Finally, Ms. Snyder reiterates her request

for reasonable attorney fees and costs associated with filing the
motion to compel.
The Court first addresses Ms. Snyder’s argument that
additional documents relating to the transfer of the Replacement
Motor Home must exist and that she is entitled to the production
12

of those documents.

Ordinarily, the representation of a party’s

attorney that no additional documents exist is sufficient to
defeat a motion to compel absent credible evidence that the
representation is inaccurate.

Consequently, if a plaintiff such

as Ms. Snyder does “not provide any evidence demonstrating that
responsive documents do, in fact, exist and are being unlawfully
withheld, the[ ] motion to compel must fail.”
F.B.I., 194 F.R.D. 299, 301 (D.D.C. 2000).

Alexander v.

In this case, Ms.

Snyder has produced only speculation as to the existence of
additional documents relating to the transfer of the Replacement
Motor Home from Fleetwood to Spartan.

So long as Fleetwood and

Spartan represent, through counsel, and in a written response to
the document request at issue, that they have produced all
responsive documents, that is sufficient without the need for
further attestation by corporate representatives.

See, e.g.,

Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 611, 620 (D.
Kan. 2005).

Of course, trial counsel themselves have an

affirmative obligation to insure that what their clients are
telling them is accurate, see Bratka v. Anheuser-Busch Co., Inc.,
164 F.R.D. 448 (S.D. Ohio 1995)(Graham, J.), and the Court
presumes that they have discharged their duties in this case
accordingly.

Thus, Ms. Snyder’s motion to compel additional

documents relating to the transfer of the Replacement Motor Home
will be denied.
The Court now examines the motion to compel as it relates to
Fleetwood’s responses to Ms. Snyder’s requests for admission.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a) provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Scope.
A party may serve on any other party a
written request to admit, for purposes of the pending
action only, the truth of any matters within the scope of
Rule 26(b)(1) relating to:
(A) facts, the application of law to fact, or
opinions about either; and
13

(B) the genuineness of any described documents.
* * *
(4) Answer. If a matter is not admitted, the answer must
specifically deny it or state in detail why the answering
party cannot truthfully admit or deny it. A denial must
fairly respond to the substance of the matter; and when
good faith requires that a party qualify answer or deny
only a part of a matter, the answer must specify the part
admitted and qualify or deny the rest. The answering
party may assert lack of knowledge or information as a
reason for failing to admit or deny only of the party
states that it made a reasonable inquiry and that the
information it knows or can readily obtain is
insufficient to enable it to admit or deny.
(5) Objections. The grounds for objecting to a request
must be stated. A party must not object solely on the
ground that the request presents a genuine issue for
trial.
(6) Motion Regarding the Sufficiency of an Answer or
Objection. The requesting party may move to determine
the sufficiency of an answer or objection. Unless the
Court finds an objection justified, it must order than an
answer be served. On finding that an answer does not
comply with this rule, the court may either order that
the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be
served.
The court may defer its decision until a
pretrial conference or a specified time before trial.
Rule 37(a)(5) applies to an award of expenses.
Id.

The purpose of Rule 36 “is to reduce the costs of litigation

by eliminating the necessity of proving facts that are not in
substantial dispute, to narrow the scope of the disputed issues,
and to facilitate the presentation of cases to the trier of
fact.”

T. Rowe Price Small-Cap Fund, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co.,

Inc., 174 F.R.D. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
In this case, Fleetwood is correct that Ms. Snyder should
have brought her motion as a motion as to the sufficiency of an
answer or objection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(6), as opposed to
a motion to compel under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.
14

The Court, in its

discretion, will construe the motion as having been filed
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(6) and will address the motion
on its merits.

As the movant, Ms. Snyder bears the burden of

demonstrating that Fleetwood’s answers or objections were
insufficient.
In her motion, Ms. Snyder fails to cite a particular answer
or objection, making only general arguments that the answers are
inadequate and the objections are improper.

Ms. Snyder discusses

Requests No. 4 and No. 5 for the first time in her reply brief,
only after Fleetwood addressed those particular requests in its
opposition to the motion.

To the extent she addresses those

particular requests, Ms. Snyder makes arguments concerning
disputed facts.

See, e.g., Doc. 61 at 6 (“[t]he crooked steering

wheel is not the main problem; the main problem is the reason why
it is crooked”).

As one court explained, disputed facts are

better left to be explored through other discovery devices:
[r]equests for admissions are not intended for factual
discovery that should be done through interrogatories and
depositions. They are a cruder device because a party
may accept, deny or object to facts phrased by the
opposition. They exist to narrow the issues at trial
where the parties’ unambiguously agree. The fact is that
parties in litigation conflict. They believe different
things and they have different interpretations of both
words and events. The party that proffers the requests
must recognize that its opponent may read those words
differently.
Joseph v. Fratar, 197 F.R.D. 20, 22 (D. Mass. 2000), quoting
Russo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 51 F. Supp.2d 70, 79 (D.R.I.
1999); see also Piskura v. Taser Intern., 2011 WL 6130814, at *1
(S.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2011)(“[r]equsts for admissions are not a
general discovery device”)(Litkovitz, J.)(citations omitted).
Fleetwood represents through counsel that it answered each
request for admission to the best of its ability, providing
qualified responses only when necessary and “admitting that the
15

documents it produced were genuine and described the services” it
provided.

(Doc. 52 at 10-11).

Thus, Ms. Snyder fails to satisfy

her burden of demonstrating that Fleetwood’s answers or
objections were insufficient.
Ms. Snyder also claims that there was no ambiguity in the
documents referred to in the requests, yet in her reply brief she
“acknowledges that there were instances of minor typographical
errors (i.e. Request for Admission No. 5 Work Order No. 556164
was inadvertently transposed to 556154), particularly where the
document numbers are difficult to read.”

(Doc. 61 at 7-8).

Although Ms. Snyder attaches a reference sheet using Fleetwood’s
Bates numbers in an effort “to provide clarity,” Ms. Snyder
acknowledges that the documents referenced belong to Fleetwood.
Id. at 8.

It is unclear to this Court whether the substance of

Fleetwood’s answers would have been different if it had possessed
Ms. Snyder’s clarifying information at the time that it answered
the requests.

In any event, a party who has answered a request

for admission has a duty to supplement its responses even absent
a Court order.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A)(“A party ... who

has responded to ... [a] request for admission – must supplement
or correct its disclosure or response in a timely manner if the
party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or
response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or
corrective information has not otherwise been made known to other
parties during the discovery process or in writing”).

Thus, Ms.

Snyder’s clarifying information does not constitute grounds for
granting her motion.
In addition, it is worth noting that Ms. Snyder acknowledges
that her requests for admission exceed the maximum allowable
under Local Rule 36.1, yet she never moved for leave to exceed
the limit or attempted to explain why the additional requests
were necessary.

By answering all of Ms. Snyder’s discovery
16

requests, Fleetwood opted to provide Ms. Snyder with more
discovery than she was entitled to under the federal rules.

For

the reasons set forth above, Ms. Snyder’s motion will be denied.
(Doc. 47).
With respect to the request for attorneys’ fees, Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37(a)(5) authorizes an award of expenses, including
attorneys’ fees unless any opposition to the motion is
substantially justified, or other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.

Given the record as it relates to Ms. Snyder’s

motion, the Court finds that an award of expenses would be
unjust.

Thus, the requests for attorneys’ fees and expenses will

be denied.
IV. Motion for Leave to Disclose Expert Witnesses
Ms. Snyder’s motion for leave to disclose expert witnesses,
which at this juncture, would be untimely, states that she now
retained the services of two experts, defendants’ inspections
have not been completed, a trial date has not been set, and
defendants will suffer no prejudice if the motion is granted.
Defendants filed a joint opposition to Ms. Snyder’s motion,
arguing that the motion should be denied on the grounds that it
is untimely.

In addition, defendants also maintain that they

will suffer prejudice if the motion is granted because they will
incur additional discovery-related costs.

Defendants also argue

that they will suffer prejudice because the pending motions for
summary judgment are based in part upon the fact that Ms. Snyder
is unable to support her claims with expert testimony.

In reply,

Ms. Snyder argues that the delay in this case was caused by the
inspection and mediation process, not by her actions.

Ms. Snyder

again points to the fact that the Court has not set a trial date
or decided any dispositive motions.

Consequently, Ms. Snyder

asserts that the disclosure of expert witnesses at this juncture
would not adversely impact defendants.
17

Defendants filed a joint

motion to strike Ms. Snyder’s reply, claiming that the reply
improperly raises new arguments concerning the inspection.
Defendants also reiterate that Ms. Snyder’s request is untimely
and should be denied on that basis.
The Court agrees that Ms. Snyder’s motion is untimely.
case was filed in 2013.

This

On December 12, 2013, the parties filed

a Rule 26(f) report recommending that primary expert designations
be made by August 11, 2014.

The Court adopted that date in its

December 18, 2013 preliminary pretrial Order.

(Doc. 9).

In an

Opinion and Order issued on May 14, 2015, this Court observed
that Ms. Snyder “has had ample opportunity to have her own
experts inspect and test the motor home” but has not done so.
(Doc. 63 at 3-4).

Despite these facts, Ms. Snyder waited to file

her motion for leave to disclose expert witnesses until November
30, 2015, well after the Court-ordered deadline.
As defendants point out, Ms. Snyder’s only explanation for
the delay is set forth for the first time in her reply brief.
Thus, that argument is not properly before the Court for
consideration.

See Scottsdale Ins. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 553

(6th Cir. 2008)(noting that issues are waived when they are
raised for the first time in a reply brief).

Even if it were

properly before the Court, Ms. Snyder’s argument is without
merit.

If Ms. Snyder’s counsel needed additional time for the

disclosure of her experts based on the delays caused by either
the inspection of the motor home by defendants’ experts – a
contention that seems misplaced – or due to efforts at mediation,
her counsel could have filed a motion for an extension time
before the relevant deadline passed.

Further, new counsel

entered an appearance in this case on June 15, 2015 and did not
file a motion for leave until November 30, 2015, over five months
later.

Whether to disclose an expert witness in support of her

claims and whether to seek an extension of time in order to do so
18

were strategic decisions made by Ms. Snyder’s counsel; there is
nothing in the record to suggest that counsel wished to disclose
an expert but was somehow prevented from doing so.

Accordingly,

Ms. Snyder’s motion is untimely, and she does not offer good
cause for the delay.
Although not stated directly, Ms. Snyder’s reply brief
suggests that the timing of the instant motion may be due to her
new counsel’s strategic decision to pursue expert testimony
despite the fact that her former counsel opted not to do so.

As

noted previously, however, new counsel did not file the motion in
a timely fashion.

Even if new counsel had moved for leave

promptly, the change in strategy is an insufficient basis for
granting leave where doing so would cause defendants to suffer
prejudice.

Whether Ms. Snyder’s testimony alone is sufficient to

establish the value of the Replacement Motor Home or whether she
needs expert testimony in support of her claims is an issue in
the pending motions for summary judgment.

As discussed more

fully below, Ms. Snyder argues that her testimony alone is
sufficient and that she need not rely on expert testimony.
Fleetwood opposes Ms. Snyder’s position and argues that expert
testimony is required.

The relevant motions have been briefed

fully and are now ripe for resolution.

Further, additional

discovery would be necessary if Ms. Snyder were permitted to
disclose expert witnesses at this time.

In light of these facts,

defendants would suffer prejudice if Ms. Snyder’s motion were
granted.

For the reasons set forth above, Ms. Snyder’s motion

for leave to disclose expert witnesses will be denied (Doc. 86),
and defendants’ joint motion to strike Ms. Snyder’s reply will be
denied as moot (Doc. 89).
V. Motions for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial when facts
material to the Court’s ultimate resolution of the case are in
19

dispute.

It may be rendered only when appropriate evidentiary

materials, as described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), demonstrate the
absence of a material factual dispute and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962).

Poller v. Columbia
The moving party bears

the burden of demonstrating that no material facts are in
dispute, and the evidence submitted must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).

Adickes v. S.H. Kress &

“[I]f the evidence is insufficient to

reasonably support a jury verdict in favor of the nonmoving
party, the motion for summary judgment will be granted.”

Cox v.

Kentucky Dept. of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir.
1995)(citation omitted).

Additionally, the Court must draw all

reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the
nonmoving party.
(1962).

United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654

The nonmoving party does have the burden, however, after

completion of sufficient discovery, to submit evidence in support
of any material element of a claim or defense on which that party
would bear the burden of proof at trial, even if the moving party
has not submitted evidence to negate the existence of that
material fact.

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317

(1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).

Of

course, since “a party seeking summary judgment ... bears the
initial responsibility of informing the district court of the
basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the
record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact,” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, the responding
party is only required to respond to those issues clearly
identified by the moving party as being subject to the motion.
It is with these standards in mind that the instant motions must
be decided.
A. Breach of Contract Claim
20

In the briefs on summary judgment, Fleetwood and Ms. Snyder
disagree about the nature of the breach of contract claim.

While

Fleetwood maintains that this claim is based upon an alleged
breach of warranty, Ms. Snyder claims that it based upon a breach
of the settlement agreement.

As the Court of Appeals has

observed, “the label which a plaintiff applies to [a] pleading
does not determine the nature of the cause of action.”

Mead

Corp. v. ABB Power Generation, Inc., 319 F.3d 790, 795 (6th Cir.
2003), quoting United States v. Louisville & Nashville RR Co.,
221 F.2d 698, 701 (6th Cir. 1955).

Rather, the Court is required

to “probe deeper and examine the substance of the complaint.”
Id., quoting Minger v. Green, 239 F.3d 793, 399 (6th Cir. 2001).
In this case, Ms. Snyder’s breach of contract claim
provides, in pertinent part:
Fleetwood and Spartan are engaged in the business of
making motor homes, a consumer product, available to
Snyder and performing repairs on said vehicle pursuit
[sic] to its warranties. Snyder’s acquisition of the
2012 Replacement Motor Home was accompanied by written
factory warranties covering nonconformities or defects in
material or workmanship.
Said warranties were a
significant part of the basis of the bargain between
Snyder and the Defendants herein for the acquisition of
the 2012 Replacement Motor Home. Snyder’s acceptance of
the 2012 Replacement Motor Home was induced by, and
Snyder relied upon, these written warranties. Snyder has
met all obligations and preconditions as provided in the
written warranties. Fleetwood and Spartan, by its [sic]
failure to attempt repairs and their unsuccessful
attempts at repairs, have breached the written warranties
issued with the 2012 Replacement Motor Home. The conduct
of Fleetwood and Spartan in attempting to repair, failing
to repair and scheduling repairs is malicious, willful,
wanton and reckless, all resulting in Snyder failing to
receive the benefit of her bargain and use of the 2012
Replacement Motor Home. As a direct and proximate result
of the conduct of Fleetwood and Spartan described above,
Snyder has suffered damages.
(Doc. 3 at ¶¶20-26).

Under the plain language of the complaint,

21

the breach of contract claim is based on a breach of written
factory warranties.

Ms. Snyder argues that she is entitled to

summary judgment on this claim because there is no dispute of
material fact as to defendants’ breach of the settlement
agreement.

Because the complaint sets forth a claim for breach

of the written factories warranties, and not a claim for breach
of the settlement agreement, Ms. Snyder’s cross-motion for
partial summary judgment on this claim will be denied.
In its motion for summary judgment, Fleetwood raises a
choice of law issue concerning whether the substantive law of
Indiana or Ohio should apply to Ms. Snyder’s claim.

As to the

breach of contract claim, however, Fleetwood acknowledges that
Indiana law and Ohio law are the same.

Fleetwood asserts that

Ms. Snyder is not entitled to recover damages for this claim
“because she is incapable of proving damages under either Indiana
law or Ohio law.”

(Doc. 46 at 8)(footnote omitted).

Fleetwood

states that the following standard governs damages for the breach
of an express warranty in both Indiana and Ohio:
The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the
difference at the time and place of acceptance between
the value of the goods accepted and the value they would
have had if they had been as warranted, unless special
circumstances show proximate damages of a different
amount.
Id., quoting Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 26-1-2-714, O.R.C. Ann.
1302.88.

According to Fleetwood, Ms. Snyder “has not identified

an expert with regard to the value of the RV as accepted.”
at 9.

Id.

Fleetwood does not deny that both Indiana and Ohio allow

an owner of a motor vehicle to opine on the value of a motor
vehicle based upon its purchase.

In this case, however,

Fleetwood states that Ms. Snyder “expressly disclaims any
capability to offer a value on the RV as accepted.”

Id. at 9.

Thus, the issue is whether Ms. Snyder’s testimony is sufficient

22

prove damages for breach of contract claim.
Ms. Snyder does not dispute Fleetwood’s recitation of the
standard for the measure of damages, but she disagrees with
Fleetwood’s assertion that she needs an expert to establish such
damages.

Ms. Snyder states that she has “consistently testified

that the 2012 Replacement Motor Home has no value to her.”
55 at 20).

(Doc.

According to Ms. Snyder, her testimony alone is

permissible to establish the value of the Replacement Motor Home
accepted.

This Court agrees.

The relevant law provides that “[t]he owner of personal
property is competent to testify as its value,” including a motor
vehicle.

See Coyle Chevrolet Co. v. Carrier, 397 N.E.2d 1283,

1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1979); see also Raymond v. Raymond,
2011 WL 5999039, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. Dec. 1,
2011)(noting that a lay witness may testify as to the value of
the property if the witness “is familiar with the property itself
and has current sufficient knowledge of the value of the
item”)(internal citation omitted).

Fleetwood’s asserts that Ms.

Snyder’s deposition testimony, wherein she stated that she “ha[d]
no idea” about the vehicle’s value on the marketplace, renders
her incompetent to testify.

(Doc. 46 at 9-10).

Here, the record

reflects that Ms. Snyder is familiar with Replacement Motor Home,
and she is aware of its value based on her first-hand knowledge
of its characteristics, condition, and potential use.

Ms. Snyder

has maintained throughout this litigation that the Replacement
Motor Home has no value.

Because she sufficient knowledge of the

value of the Replacement Motor Home, she will be permitted to
testify as to its value.

It is up to the jury to determine what

weight to attribute to Ms. Snyder’s testimony.
Based on the foregoing, the Court will deny Fleetwood’s
motion for summary judgment on Ms. Snyder’s breach of contract
claim on the ground that she is unable to provide expert
23

testimony concerning the value of the vehicle.

Fleetwood also

states that it “is separately entitled to summary judgment as to
plaintiff’s punitive damages and attorney fee claims associated
with this cause of action as a matter of law.”

(Doc. 46 at 12).

The Court finds this argument to be premature.

Consequently, the

Court will deny that portion of Fleetwood’s motion without
prejudice.
B. Lemon Law Claim
In its motion for summary judgment, Fleetwood raises a
choice of law issue, arguing, inter alia, that Ms. Snyder’s Lemon
Law claim should be decided based on Indiana law.

Ms. Snyder

disagrees, asserting that Ohio’s Lemon Law governs her claim.
According to Ms. Snyder, the Court does not need to engage in a
traditional choice of law analysis because the settlement
agreement contains a choice of law provision which reflects that
this dispute is governed by Ohio law.

The settlement agreement

does provide that Ohio law governs any claims arising out of the
agreement.

However, the plain language of the agreement resolves

the lawsuit concerning the 2011 American Coach Motor Home against
Fleetwood and Spartan, which was pending in the Jefferson County
Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 11-CV-460.

Although the

agreement does not prejudice Ms. Snyder from bringing claims
related to the Replacement Motor Home, those claims do not arise
out of the agreement such that its choice of law provisions would
apply.

Because this court is exercising diversity jurisdiction

in this case, it will apply Ohio’s choice of law rules to
determine the applicable law.

See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.

Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477 (1941).
Courts analyzing a case under Ohio’s choice of law rules must
utilize a “flexible case-by-case approach.”

Curl v. Greenlee

Textron, Inc., 404 F. Supp.2d 1001, 1005 (S.D. Ohio 2005)
(Marbley, J.)(citation omitted).
24

The Court must examine “two threshold questions ...
embarking on a choice of law analysis in Ohio.”

before

Sirlouis v. Four

Winds Int’l Corp., 2012 WL 1068709, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29,
2012).

The first question is whether Ohio law and Indiana law

genuinely conflict with respect to Ms. Snyder’s Lemon Law claim.
Fleetwood bears the burden of demonstrating that an actual
conflict in the relevant state law exists.

See id.

Here,

Fleetwood has satisfied its burden of demonstrating that a
genuine conflict exists because Indiana’s Lemon Law does not
apply to recreational vehicles and Ohio’s Lemon Law does.
Compare Ind. Code Ann. §24-5-13-5 with Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§1345.71(D).

The second question is whether the Lemon Law claim

should be classified as sounding in contract or in tort.
Sirlouis, 2012 WL 1068709, at *4.

In the factually similar case

of Sirlouis v. Four Winds International Corp., 2012 WL 1068709,
*4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012), the Court noted that its “research
revealed no case law answering th[e] specific question” of
whether a Lemon Law claim should be classified as a contract
claim or a tort claim.

Although the Sirlouis Court assumed that

the Lemon Law claim in that case should be classified as a tort,
it analyzed the claim both as a contract claim and as a tort
claim.

Id. at *4-10.

To the extent that the Lemon Law claim arises under tort
law, a presumption exists that the place of injury controls,
unless another jurisdiction has a more significant relationship
to the lawsuit.
§146.

See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws

Here, the place of injury is Indiana, where the vehicle

was manufactured, acquired, and underwent warranty service.
Thus, this Court must determine if Ohio has a more significant
relationship to the lawsuit.

In doing so, the Court must

consider the contacts set forth in the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws §145 in applying the principles in Restatement
25

(Second) of Conflict of Laws §6.

Section 145 instructs the Court

to consider the following contacts in applying §6:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality and place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between
the parties is centered.
Id. at §145(2).

These contacts weigh strongly in favor of

applying Indiana law.

As Fleetwood points out, it is located in

Indiana, the Replacement Motor Home was manufactured in Indiana,
Ms. Snyder received the warranty when accepting delivery of the
Replacement Motor Home in Indiana, and the warranty repairs took
place in Indiana.

Ohio’s only connection to this case appears to

be based on the fact that Ms. Snyder is an Ohio resident.
Although the complaint generally alleges that Fleetwood and
Spartan conduct business in Ohio, none of that business appears
to be related to this case.
Certainly some of the §6 factors weigh in favor of applying
Ohio law.1

For instance, the needs of interstate systems support

the application of Ohio law because an Ohio resident may hesitate
to purchase an RV in Indiana
knowing that she may not have a Lemon Law claim to
protect her. On the other hand, there would be little
risk of disrupting commercial intercourse if Ohio law
applied, since the RV consumer would have no such
disincentive in making an out of state purchase.

1

The §6 factors include: (a) the needs of interstate and international
systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of
other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified
expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied.

26

Sirlouis, 2012 WL 1068709, *9.

Further, Ohio’s policy of

protecting its residents from purchasing vehicle that is a lemon,
even if that vehicle is purchased out of state, weighs in favor
of Ohio law.

Id. at *8 (noting that “[t]he Ohio Lemon Law,

unlike that of some states, contains no statutory requirement
that a vehicle be purchased in state to invoke the law’s
protection”).

These factors, while noteworthy, cannot overcome

the presumption that Indiana applies because Ohio does not have a
more significant relationship to this lawsuit.
Indiana law applies.

Consequently,

Because Indiana specifically exempts RVs

from coverage under its Lemon Law, see Ind. Code Ann. §24-5-13-5,
Fleetwood’s motion for summary judgment will be granted as to Ms.
Snyder’s Lemon Law claim.
The Court notes that the outcome would be the same even if
it were to analyze Ms. Snyder’s Lemon Law claim as sounding in
contract.

That analysis requires the Court to examine:

(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract,
and
(e)the domicil, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §188.

All factors weigh

in favor of applying Indiana law, except that Ms. Snyder is an
Ohio resident.

Thus, Indiana law applies, and Fleetwood’s motion

for summary judgment will be granted (Doc. 46), and Ms. Snyder’s
cross-motion for partial summary judgment will be denied (Doc.
55) as to Ms. Snyder’s Lemon Law claim.
For the same reasons, Ms. Snyder’s Lemon Law claim against
Spartan is without merit.

Moreover, even if Ohio law applied to
27

this claim, it would be subject to dismissal on the ground that
Spartan cannot be liable to the consumer as a component
manufacturer of the chassis, as opposed to a final manufacturer.
See Dillow v. Mallard Coach Co., 83 Ohio App.3d 801, 803 (4th
App. Dist. 1992).

Ms. Snyder acknowledges this in her cross-

motion for summary judgment which effectively abandons this
claim.

(Doc. 55 at 18)(stating that “though Defendant Spartan

may be liable to Defendant Fleetwood, it may not be liable to
Plaintiff under Lemon Law.

However, this does not allow Spartan

to escape liability under Plaintiff’s breach of warranty and
breach of contract claims”).

For these reasons, Spartan is

entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Snyder’s Lemon Law claim.
C. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Claim
In her cross-motion for partial summary judgment, Ms. Snyder
claims that she “is entitled to recovery for breach of warranty
under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.”

(Doc. 55 at 14).

Both

Fleetwood and Spartan argue that Ms. Snyder cannot recover under
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act because her complaint does not
plead a claim under that statute.

This Court agrees with

defendants. Ms. Snyder has not sought leave to amend her
complaint to add a new cause of action, and she is thus moving
for summary judgment on a claim which is not currently before the
Court.

Consequently, Ms. Snyder’s motion for partial summary

judgment on a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim will be denied.
(Doc. 55).
D. Joint Objection
Fleetwood and Spartan filed a “joint objection to the
consideration of certain exhibits to Doc # 55,” which is Ms.
Snyder’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

(Doc. 65).

Specifically, Fleetwood and Spartan object to the statement of
undisputed material facts, Ms. Snyder’s affidavit, the affidavit
of her husband, Don Snyder, and uncertified transcripts of
28

telephone calls.

According to Fleetwood and Spartan, these

exhibits “either fail to adhere to this Court’s procedure, are
incompetent, or contain rank hearsay.”

Id. at 1.

Thus,

Fleetwood and Spartan request that the Court “disregard, exclude
or strike” the documents at issue.

Id. at 6.

Because the Court

did not rely on the disputed exhibits in reaching its decision on
the pending motions for summary judgment, the joint objection
will be overruled.
VI. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Snyder’s motion to compel is
denied (Doc. 47).

Ms. Snyder’s motion for leave to disclose

expert witnesses is also denied (Doc. 86), and defendants’ joint
motion to strike Ms. Snyder’s reply brief in support of her
motion for leave to disclose expert witnesses is denied as moot
(Doc. 89).

Fleetwood’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 46) is

denied to the extent that it seeks summary judgment on the breach
of contract claim, but it is granted to as to the Lemon Law
claim.

Spartan’s motion for summary judgment on Ms. Snyder’s

Lemon Law claim is granted (Doc. 44), and Ms. Snyder’s crossmotion for partial summary judgment is denied (Doc. 55).
Finally, defendants’ joint objection to Ms. Snyder’s exhibits is
overruled (Doc. 65).

The parties shall contact the undersigned’s

courtroom deputy to obtain a trial date.

/s/ Terence P Kemp
United States Magistrate Judge

29