Tran v. Chubb Group of Insurance Companies et al

Filing 89

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 45 AND 57 MOTIONS for Protective Order filed by Federal Insurance Company; DENYING 56 MOTION to Compel Discover and Extend Discovery Dates filed by Ngoc Tran. Signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King on 8/26/2015. (pes)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

NGOC TRAN,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action 2:14-cv-447
Judge Watson
Magistrate Judge King

vs.

CHUBB GROUP OF INSURANCE
COMPANIES, et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendant Federal Insurance
Company’s motions for protective order, ECF 45 (“Defendant’s First
Motion for Protective Order”) and ECF 57 (“Defendant’s Second Motion
for Protective Order”), as well as plaintiff’s motion to compel
discovery and to extend discovery dates, ECF 56 (“Plaintiff’s Motion
to Compel”).1
I.

BACKGROUND
In October 2012, plaintiff applied to defendant Federal Insurance

Company (“defendant”)2 for insurance coverage in connection with
plaintiff’s jewelry with an appraised value in the amount of
$266,825.00 (“the jewelry”).

See ECF 56-7 (copy of application).

1

The

The Court concludes that these motions may be resolved on the parties’
filings and therefore declines to schedule oral argument on the motions. In
addition, the Court notes that the parties have withdrawn their request for
attorney’s fees and monetary sanctions in connection with these motions. See
Joint Notice, ECF 86.
2
With the agreement of the parties, all other defendants have been dismissed.
Preliminary Pretrial Order, ECF 17, p. 3.

1

application included a section entitled “Valuable Articles Profile[,]”
which contained certain representations including, inter alia, a
specification of the safety precautions taken for maintaining the
jewelry.

See ECF 56-6 (copy of profile).

Plaintiff alleges that

defendant issued an insurance policy providing coverage to plaintiff
for jewelry having an appraised value of $266,825.00 (“the Policy”).
Complaint, ECF 11, ¶ 2.

The Policy specifically advises, “We do not

provide coverage if you or any covered person has intentionally
concealed or misrepresented any material fact relating to this policy
before or after a loss.”

ECF 56-8, PAGE Y-1 (excerpt from the

Policy).
Plaintiff alleges that, on June 13, 2013, her home was
burglarized and that all but four pieces of her jewelry were stolen.
Complaint, ¶ 3.

Plaintiff further alleges that the remaining four

pieces of jewelry were stolen during a second robbery that occurred on
October 24, 2013.

Id. at ¶ 7.

Plaintiff claims that, although she

“fully complied” with the Policy’s requirements, defendant has
“wrongfully refused to pay for this insured loss.”

Id. at ¶¶ 4-5, 8-

9.
Plaintiff originally filed this action in the Court of Common
Pleas for Franklin County, Ohio, seeking recovery under the Policy.
See Complaint.

The action was thereafter removed to this Court on the

basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
ECF 1.

Notice of Removal,

This Court’s scheduling order, issued pursuant to the

provisions of Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
2

required, inter alia, that all discovery be completed by March 31,
2015.

Preliminary Pretrial Order, ECF 17, p. 2.

Upon plaintiff’s

motions, ECF 24 and 62, the discovery deadline was ultimately extended
to September 30, 2015, and the deadline for filing dispositive motions
was extended to October 31, 2015.

Order, ECF 67, p. 1 (“There will be

no further extension of these dates.”) (emphasis in the original).
On May 13, 2015, plaintiff noticed the deposition of defendant’s
corporate representative pursuant to the provisions of Rule 30(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Notice to Take Rule 30(b)(6)

Deposition of Defendant Federal Insurance Company, ECF 36 and 45-1
(“Rule 30(b)(6) Notice”).

Plaintiff identified the following topics

for deposition, which was noticed to take place on June 10, 2015:
[1.] The inception of the insurance contract relationship
with the plaintiff;
[2.] The process of review for insurance applications for
valuables articles coverage;
[3.] The decision to grant coverage in October of 2012, and
renew coverage for the plaintiff in October of 2013, and
the status of coverage on both loss dates;
[4.] The investigation by Defendant of the loss of June 13,
2013, and October 24, 2013 by plaintiff;
[5.] The investigation of the sufficiency of the appraisals
of the valuable articles insured by plaintiff;
[6.] The history of granting or denial of the valuable
article coverages or similar coverage, by the defendant for
other applicants, and the reasons for denial of valuable
article coverages for any applicants, between October 1,
2009 and October 31, 2012;
[7.] All other matters reasonably related to the issues
stated in the complaint.
3

[8.] It is required that Defendant bring the entire file
relating to subject claim including all electronic data and
correspondence not previously provided by the Defense.
[9.] It is required that Defendant bring all
Correspondence, Emails and Other Documents, relating to any
applications for valuable articles coverage, or similar
coverage, received for either Chubb Group of Insurance
Companies or Federal Insurance Company, between October 1,
2009, and October 31, 2012, including but not limited to,
valuable articles profile(s), and personal inland marine
application(s), including all information relating to
acceptance of application for coverage, or denial of
application for coverage.
Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added).
After defense counsel objected to the scope of this notice, the
parties discussed proposed stipulations regarding their dispute.
Specifically, plaintiff proposed that the parties stipulate to, inter
alia, the following:
The parties hereby stipulate and agree the application for
insurance submitted by Plaintiff and the valuable articles
profile submitted by Plaintiff with the application for
insurance, contained no concealment or misrepresentation of
any material fact, relating to the issuance of the policy
of insurance, and the policy of insurance was in full force
and effect as of June 13 2013, the date of the original
loss.
ECF 45-4, PAGEID#:264 (emphasis in the original).

Defendant rejected

this language and instead proposed, inter alia, the following
language:
The parties hereby stipulate and agree that Federal has
not, and will not, attempt to rescind or have Federal
Insurance Company Policy No. 13969002-01 issued to Ms. Tran
declared void ab initio based on the concealment or
misrepresentation of any fact in the application of
insurance or valuable articles profile submitted by Ms.
Tran.
ECF 45-6, PAGEID#:274 (emphasis in the original).
4

The parties were

unable to agree on stipulated language.

See ECF 45-2, 45-3, 45-4, 45-

5, 45-6.
On June 8, 2015, Defendant’s First Motion for Protective Order
was filed, seeking a protective order from Topics 1 and 2, the first
portion of Topic 3, and Topic 63 of the Rule 30(b)(6) Notice.
Notwithstanding this filing, plaintiff deposed Lisa Darr, an
investigator for defendant’s Special Investigations Unit, on June 10,
2015.

See Deposition of Federal Insurance Company by and through Lisa

Darr, ECF 68-1, p. 6 (“Darr Deposition”).4
On June 12, 2015, plaintiff noticed the deposition of Jonathan L.
Beauchamp for June 23, 2015,5 identifying the following topics for
deposition:
[1.] The inception of the insurance contract relationship
with the plaintiff;
[2.] The process of review for insurance applications for
valuables articles coverage;
[3.] The decision to grant coverage in October of 2012, and
renew coverage for the plaintiff in October of 2013, and
the status of coverage on both loss dates;
[4.] The investigation by Defendant of the loss of June 13,
2013, and October 24, 2013 by plaintiff;
3
Defendant inadvertently omitted one of the topics in the Rule 30(b)(6)
Notice, resulting in defendant’s mistaken reference to Topic 5 instead of
Topic 6. Compare Defendant’s First Motion for Protective Order, p. 2, with
ECF 36 and 45-1. It is clear from defendant’s argument that it intended to
seek a protective order as to Topic 6 regarding the history of granting or
denying coverage by the defendant for other applicants. See supra and infra.
4
Defendant notes that this transcript, at the time of filing, is a draft
transcript. Federal Insurance Company’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s June 17,
2015 Motion to Compel Discovery and Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 56.), ECF
69 (“Opposition to Motion to Compel”), p. 6 n.3 (noting that she has 30 days
after her deposition, i.e., until July 22, 2015, to note and change any
errata).
5
Plaintiff also served a subpoena on Mr. Beauchamp on the same day. See ECF
55 and 57-1.

5

[5.] The investigation of the sufficiency of the appraisals
of the valuable articles insured by plaintiff;
[6.] The history of granting or denial of the valuable
article coverages or similar coverage, by the defendant for
other applicants, and the reasons for denial of valuable
article coverages for any applicants, between October 1,
2009 and October 31, 2012;
[7.] All other matters reasonably related to the issues
stated in the complaint.
[8.] It is required that Defendant bring the entire file
relating to subject claim including all electronic data and
correspondence not previously provided by the Defense.
[9.] It is required that Defendant bring all
Correspondence, Emails and Other Documents, relating to any
applications for valuable articles coverage, or similar
coverage, received for either Chubb Group of Insurance
Companies or Federal Insurance Company, between October 1,
2009, and October 31, 2012, including but not limited to,
valuable articles profile(s), and personal inland marine
application(s), including all information relating to
acceptance of application for coverage, or denial of
application for coverage.
Notice to Take Deposition, ECF 55 and 57-1, pp. 1-2 (emphasis added)
(“Beauchamp Notice”).6
On the same day, plaintiff also served a notice of deposition and
a subpoena on the Records Custodian for Marketsource Agency Network,
LLC, and directed the witness to bring “[a]ll records for contracts
for Federal Insurance Company initiated or processed by Marketsource
Agency Network LLC [“Marketsource”] for 2012 and 2013, including the
contract with Ngoc Tran.”7

Subpoena to Testify at a Deposition in a

6

The italicized deposition topics in the Rule 30(b)(6) Notice and Beauchamp
Notice will be referred to collectively as “the disputed deposition topics.”
7
Marketsource is an excess surplus lines broker who finds hard-to-place
insurance carriers. Deposition of Amy Jenkins, ECF 52-1, p. 12 (“Jenkins
Deposition”). Marketsource was apparently the entity that selected defendant

6

Civil Action, ECF 57-2, p. 3 (“Marketsource Subpoena”).

Upon receipt

of the Beauchamp Notice and the Marketsource Subpoena, defense counsel
asked plaintiff’s counsel to hold these requests in abeyance pending
resolution of Defendant’s First Motion for Protective Order, which
defendant believed would also resolve the dispute regarding Mr.
Beauchamp and Marketsource.

ECF 57-3, PAGEID#:954-955.

Defendant

also advised that Mr. Beauchamp was unavailable on the date
unilaterally chosen by plaintiff, offering to provide alternative
dates if plaintiff would hold the current Beauchamp Notice in
abeyance.

Id.

Plaintiff’s counsel refused to hold the Beauchamp

Notice and Marketsource Subpoena in abeyance, see ECF 57-4, and
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel was filed,8 complaining that Ms. Darr was
unprepared, had not been advised prior to her deposition that she
would be testifying as a corporate representative, and, “on advice of
counsel refused to answer any questions relating to five of the seven
areas listed in the notice of deposition.”
Compel, p. 7.

Plaintiff’s Motion to

Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, an order compelling

defendant “to respond in good faith to the document request contained
in the Civil Rule 30(b)(6) notice of deposition served on May 13,
2015, providing all information, including the electronic page used by
the defendant to offer coverage in this case, and in other cases over
a three year time.”

Id. at 14.

Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s Motion

to Compel and has filed Defendant’s Second Motion for Protective

as the potential insurer of plaintiff’s jewelry. Id. at 13-14.
8
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is apparently plaintiff’s response to
Defendant’s First Motion for Protective Order.

7

Order, seeking protection in connection with Topics 1 and 2, the first
portion of Topic 3, and Topics 6 and 9 of the Beauchamp Notice, as
well as the request for defendant’s contracts processed by
Marketsource (except for production of plaintiff’s contract) sought by
the Marketsource Subpoena.

Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant’s

Second Motion for Protective Order.
II.

STANDARDS
Plaintiff has moved to compel certain documents.

Rule 37 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a motion to compel
discovery when a party fails to make a disclosure required under Rule
26(a), when a deponent fails to answer a question asked under Rule 30
or 31, a corporation fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6)
or 31(a)(4), or when a party fails to provide a proper response to an
interrogatory under Rule 33 or a proper response to a request for
production of documents under Rule 34.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3).

“The proponent of a motion to compel discovery bears the initial
burden of proving that the information sought is relevant.”

Martin v.

Select Portfolio Serving Holding Corp., No. 1:05–cv–273, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 68779, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2006) (citing Alexander
v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 186 F.R.D. 154, 159 (D.D.C. 1999)).
Rule 26(b) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

purposes is extremely broad.
389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998).

Relevance for discovery

Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d

“The scope of examination permitted under
8

Rule 26(b) is broader than that permitted at trial.

The test is

whether the line of interrogation is reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.”

Mellon v. Cooper-Jarrett,

Inc., 424 F.2d 499, 500-01 (6th Cir. 1970).

However, “district courts

have discretion to limit the scope of discovery where the information
sought is overly broad or would prove unduly burdensome to produce.”
Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305
(6th Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)).

See also Lewis,

135 F.3d at 402 (determining the proper scope of discovery falls
within the broad discretion of the trial court).

In determining the

proper scope of discovery, a district court balances a party’s “right
to discovery with the need to prevent ‘fishing expeditions.’”

Conti

v. Am. Axle & Mfg. Inc., 326 F. App’x 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1998)).
The party moving to compel discovery also must certify that it
“has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or
party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain
it without court action.”
Ohio Civ. R. 37.2.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).

See also S.D.

Although plaintiff has failed to technically

comply with this requirement, it is clear that the parties have
reached impasse.

See supra.

Defendant has moved for the issuance of protective orders.

Rule

26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a person
resisting discovery may move the court, for good cause shown, to issue
an order protecting the person or party from “annoyance,
9

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]”
Civ. P. 26(c)(1).

Under Rule 26, a court may limit the scope of the

disclosure or discovery to certain matters.
26(c)(1)(D).

Fed. R.

Fed. R. Civ. P.

The grant or denial of motions for protective orders

falls within the “broad discretion of the district court in managing
the case.”

Conti v. Am. Axle & Mfg., No. 08-1301, 326 F. App’x 900,

at *903-04 (6th Cir. May 22, 2009) (quoting Lewelling v. Farmers Ins.
of Columbus, Inc., 879 F.2d 212, 218 (6th Cir. 1989)).
Finally, the party seeking a protective order must certify that
it “has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other
affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court
action.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).

This prerequisite has been met.

See also S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 37.2.

See Defendant’s First Motion for

Protective Order, p. 2 (citing Exhibits A through F, attached
thereto); Defendant’s Second Motion for Protective Order, p. 2 (citing
Exhibits C and D, attached thereto).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks an order compelling production of the documents
identified in its Rule 30(b)(6) Notice, “including the electronic page
used by the defendant to offer coverage in this case, and in other
cases over a three year time” as well as an order compelling defendant
to produce “Rule 30(b)(6) representative(s)[] who will testify they
have reviewed all information known or reasonably available to the
Defendant[.]”

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, p. 14.

According to

plaintiff, this discovery is relevant and necessary because defendant
10

“clearly alleges a defense based upon concealment or misrepresentation
of material fact in the two page valuable articles profile, the four
page application for insurance, and globally” and that “[e]ven though
the defendant admits that it failed to incorporate policy language
required under Ohio law to create a remedy of void ab initio,
defendant still wants to argue it can avoid responsibility for any
intentional concealment or misrepresentation of material fact.”

Id.

at 8 (citing, inter alia, the Policy, PAGE Y-1 regarding concealment
or fraud).

See also id. at 9-10.

Plaintiff contends that defendant

bears the burden under Ohio law when “seeking to void liability on the
basis of an alleged material misstatement of fact[.]”

Id. at 8.

Plaintiff explains that “historical evidence of other transactions
with other insureds for the same type of coverage would show Defendant
would have offered the policy at the same rate” and that “[t]he only
way to evaluate what is material is to review historical transactions,
and evaluate when coverage was denied, and why coverage was denied.”
Id. at 10, 12.
Defendant disagrees that the requested discovery is relevant,
explaining that representations material to the risk at the inception
of an insurance policy are distinguished from representations material
to the investigation of a claim, as are the defenses based on these
misrepresentations.

Opposition to Motion to Compel, pp. 4-5;

Defendant’s Second Motion for Protective Order, pp. 1-2 (complaining,
inter alia, that plaintiff erroneously attempts to merge the two
separate defenses).

According to defendant, only the latter defense
11

based on misrepresentations material to the claim investigation is at
issue in this case; defendant specifically represents that it is not
seeking rescission of the Policy nor is it seeking to void the Policy
ab initio.

Defendant’s First Motion for Protective Order, pp. 3-11

(explaining further that its refusal to agree to plaintiff’s proposed
stipulation — which stipulated, inter alia, that plaintiff’s
application contained no concealment or misrepresentation of any
material fact – was because plaintiff’s application contained material
false statements and defendant “cannot stipulate to something that is
factually untrue”); Defendant’s Second Motion for Protective Order,
pp. 1-2; Opposition to Motion to Compel, pp. 3-5, 7.

Defendant

therefore argues that the disputed discovery is irrelevant to the
claims and defenses in this action because it relates only to whether
defendant would have issued the Policy to plaintiff had it known the
truth at the time of plaintiff’s application – i.e., a matter not at
issue in this case.
Order, pp. 11-12.

Id.; Defendant’s First Motion for Protective
Defendant goes on to clarify that, contrary to

plaintiff’s contentions, Ms. Darr understood that she was testifying
in her representative capacity for defendant on certain topics
identified in the Rule 30(b)(6) Notice.

Opposition to Motion to

Compel, pp. 6-7 (citing Darr Deposition, pp. 8, 11-12, and that
defendant produced Ms. Darr on “the status of coverage on both loss
dates” and on “[a]ll other matters reasonably related to the issues
stated in the complaint”).

See also Defendant’s Second Motion to

Compel, p. 2 (arguing that plaintiff’s counsel deposed Ms. Darr on
12

June 10, 2015, and “had every opportunity to enquire as to which
misrepresentations by Plaintiff Tran were relevant to her
investigation of the loss and/or hampered her investigation”).
Defendant further argues that the request to produce the documents
identified in the deposition notices and in the Marketsource Subpoena
is unduly burdensome.

Defendant’s First Motion for Protective Order,

pp. 4-5; Defendant’s Second Motion for Protective Order, pp. 6-7.
Defendant represents that it does not seek rescission of or to
void the Policy ab initio because defendant concedes that it does not
believe that its Policy contains the necessary language required under
Ohio law.

Plaintiff’s First Motion for Protective Order, p. 7 (citing

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boggs, 27 Ohio St.2d 216, 219 (1971)).

See also

Boggs, 27 Ohio St.2d at 218-19 (providing, inter alia, that if an
insured’s statement is a warranty — i.e., an insured’s statement or
description appearing on the face of the policy — a misstatement of
fact voids a policy ab initio and that “[t]he insurer’s decision to
incorporate the statement in or to omit it from the policy generally
controls whether the statement is a warranty or [simply] a
representation”).

Instead, defendant intends to rely on plaintiff’s

alleged misrepresentations made during defendant’s investigation of
plaintiff’s claimed loss.

See, e.g., Defendant’s First Motion to

Compel, p. 11; Opposition to Motion to Compel, p. 5.9

9

However, according to defendant, “[t]hat is not to say that
Plaintiff’s [alleged] misrepresentations in the application documents are
irrelevant on other issues such as credibility and Plaintiff Tran’s pattern
and practice of conduct, etc.” Defendant’s First Motion to Compel, p. 11
n.2.

13

Based on this record and on defendant’s articulation of its
defense, the Court concludes that discovery regarding the “inception
of the insurance contract relationship with the plaintiff,” “[t]he
process of review for insurance applications for valuable articles
coverage,” and defendant’s decision to grant coverage in October 2012
and renew coverage in October 2013 as well as the “history of granting
or denial of the valuable article coverages or similar coverage, by
the defendant for other applicants, and the reasons for denial of
valuable article coverages for any applicants, between October 1, 2009
and October 31, 2012” is of limited, if any, relevance to any party’s
claim or defense.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Defendant also contends that plaintiff’s request for the
production of a second Rule 30(b)(6) designee and Mr. Beauchamp on the
disputed deposition topics is unduly burdensome.

Defendant’s First

Motion for Protective Order, p. 3; Defendant’s Second Motion for
Protective Order, pp. 6-7.

For example, plaintiff served the

Beauchamp Notice eleven days — only seven of which were business days
-- prior to the specified deposition date, which fell on a date when
Mr. Beauchamp, who was located in Arizona, was unavailable.

See

Beauchamp Notice (served on June 12, 2015 noticing a deposition on
June 23, 2015); Defendant’s Second Motion for Protective Order, p. 7.
This notice was unreasonable.

See, e.g., Brown v. Hendler, No. 09-

CIV-4486, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9476, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2011)
(“Federal courts have also found compliance times of eight and seven
days not to be reasonable.”); Donahoo v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs.,
14

211 F.R.D. 303, 306 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B)
sets a reasonable time as fourteen days after service of the
subpoena.”); In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 183 F.R.D. 684, 687
(D. Nev. 1999) (finding that six days’ notice for deposition is
unreasonable).
Moreover, defendant represents that it has nothing further to
produce because it has already produced its file and plaintiff has not
moved to compel the items listed in defendant’s privilege log.
Opposition to Motion to Compel, p. 8.

See

Under these circumstances,

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel in this regard is not well-taken.
Finally, the Court notes that defendant seeks a protective order
as to the records requested in the Marketsource Subpoena.
Defendant’s Second Motion to Compel, pp. 8-9.

See

See also Marketsource

Subpoena (directing the witness to bring “[a]ll records for contracts
for Federal Insurance Company initiated or processed by
Marketsource”).

Under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, parties may command a nonparty to, inter alia, attend a
deposition and/or produce documents.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1).

“[O]rdinarily a party has no standing to seek to quash a subpoena
issued to someone who is not a party to the action unless the party
claims some personal right or privilege with regard to the documents
sought[.]”

Mann v. University of Cincinnati, Nos. 95-3195 and 95-

3292, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12482, at *13 (6th Cir. May 27, 1997)
(quoting 9A Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2459 (1995)).

See also Novovic v. Greyhound Lines,
15

Inc., 2:09-CV-00753, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9203, at *23 (S.D. Ohio
Jan. 26, 2012) (“[A]bsent a claim of privilege, a party has no
standing to challenge a subpoena to a nonparty.”) (quoting Donahoo v.
Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 211 F.R.D. 303, 306 (N.D. Ohio 2002))
(internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendant asserts that

information sought by plaintiff in the Marketsource Subpoena seeks
“confidential and proprietary business/underwriting information of
Federal and confidential personal information of other Federal clients
who are not party to this litigation.”
Compel, p. 2.

Opposition to Motion to

Plaintiff has not challenged defendant’s assertion.

The Court therefore concludes that defendant has standing to challenge
the Marketsource Subpoena.

Moreover, for the reason discussed supra,

the requested documents, which contain proprietary and confidential
information, have little, if any, probative value to the claims and
defenses in this case.
WHEREUPON, Federal Insurance Company’s motions for protective
order, ECF 45 and ECF 57, are GRANTED, and plaintiff’s motion to
compel discovery and to extend discovery dates, ECF 56, is DENIED.
Specifically, plaintiff is PROHIBITED from inquiring into Topics 1
(“[t]he inception of the insurance contract relationship with the
plaintiff”) and 2 (“[t]he process of review for insurance applications
of valuable articles coverage”), the first part of Topic 3 (“[t]he
decision to grant coverage in October of 2012, renew coverage for the
plaintiff in October of 2013”), Topic 6 (“[t]he history of granting or
denial of the valuable article coverages or similar coverage, by the
16

defendant for other applicants, and the reasons for denial of valuable
article coverages for any applicants, between October 1, 2009 and
October 31, 2012”), and Topic 9 (“all Correspondence, Emails and Other
Documents, relating to any applications for valuable articles
coverage, or similar coverage, received for either Chubb Group of
Insurance Companies or Federal Insurance Company, between October 1,
2009, and October 31, 2012”) of the Rule 30(b)(6) Notice and Beauchamp
Notice.10

Plaintiff is PROHIBITED from obtaining from Marketsource

“[a]ll records for contracts for Federal Insurance Company initiated
or processed by Marketsource Agency Network LLC for 2012 and 2013[,]”
excluding plaintiff’s application and processing documents.
Because the Court has determined that plaintiff is not entitled
to compel the requested information, the Court concludes that
plaintiff has not established good cause for extending the discovery
completion date for 90 days following resolution of Plaintiff’s Motion
to Compel.

The deadlines for completing discovery and for filing

dispositive motions therefore remain September 30, 2015, and October
31, 2015, respectively.

Order, ECF 67, p. 1.

August 26, 2015

s/Norah McCann King
Norah McCann King
United States Magistrate Judge

10

Defendant appears otherwise willing to produce Mr. Beauchamp on a mutually
agreeable date. See, e.g., Defendant’s Second Motion for Protective Order,
p. 8.

17