Jackson v. Allen

Filing 15

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS. Signed by Judge Gregory L Frost on 7/24/14. (kn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

EDWARD JACKSON,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:14-cv-580
JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST
Magistrate Judge Mark R. Abel

v.
JEFFREY ALLEN,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of the Magistrate Judge’s June 23, 2014
Initial Screening Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 8) and Plaintiff’s July 11, 2014
objections (ECF No. 11). When a party objects within the allotted time to a report and
recommendation, the Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report
or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court “may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Plaintiff, Edward Jackson, a prisoner at the Lebanon Correctional Facility initiated the
present action against Defendant Jeffrey Allen. In his objections, Plaintiff argues that the
Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which this Court can grant relief.
Plaintiff did not attach to his complaint his prior court proceedings, including the decision
of the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Tenth District. Nevertheless, the prior proceedings will be
used to supplement the sparse facts of the complaint because the prior proceedings are “integral

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to the complaint [such that they] may be relied upon [despite not being] attached [to the
complaint].” Mediacom Se. LLC v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 672 F.3d 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2012)
(internal citations omitted). Because Plaintiff is a pro se prisoner, however, the complaint is to
be “liberally construed,” and it “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers . . . .” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
In 1989, a jury found Plaintiff guilty on “three counts of kidnapping, one count of
attempted rape, one count of gross sexual imposition, and one count of having a weapon while
under a disability. [Plaintiff] was also found guilty on the firearm and prior offense-of-violence
specifications.” State v. Jackson, No. 97APA12-1660, 1998 WL 354023, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 30, 1998). Plaintiff appealed his sentence to the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Tenth
District, which, on August 23, 1990, “affirmed the trial court in substantial part and reversed
only on sentencing errors affecting the firearm specifications and the attempted rape of
Bohannon.” Id. On October 9, 1990, the trial court then, “in accordance with [the appellate
court’s] opinion, resentenced appellant.” Id.
In the present action, Plaintiff’s nine claims arise out of the same incident, which Plaintiff
mischaracterizes as the “reversing and remanding [of his] entire sentencing package” by the
Tenth District Court of Appeals. (ECF No. 3, at Page ID # 38.) Plaintiff first argues that
Defendant violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights through a cruel and unusual delay in
sentencing. Plaintiff’s characterization, however, misstates the actions of both the trial and
appellate courts. As explained above, the Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court, only reversing sentencing errors in the firearm specification and attempted rape of
Bohannon. Then, on October 9, 1990, the trial court resentenced appellant pursuant to the

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appellate court’s instructions. Plaintiff, contrary to his understanding, has been resentenced.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s first objection, that the Magistrate Judge erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s claim
for a cruel and unusual delay in resentencing, fails.
Plaintiff also argues that, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 2953.13, the warden should
have transferred Plaintiff to the county jail for his resentencing. Section 1983, however, is an
inappropriate vehicle for a complaint regarding a state administrative action. Instead, when a
prisoner challenges the “alleged unconstitutionality of [a] state administrative action,” the
“exclusive remedy available” is that of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489
(1973). Plaintiff’s second objection, therefore, also fails.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts “that he has established a ‘MONELL Claim.’ ” (ECF No. 11, at
Page ID # 74.) The alleged Monell claim, however, was not raised in the complaint and,
therefore, cannot be raised in Plaintiff’s objections. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Hillerich
& Bradsbury Co., 598 F.3d 257, 275 (6th Cir. 2010). Further, Plaintiff alleges no facts that
support a Monell claim. The complaint thus fails to meet the Rule 8(a) pleading standard
because it does not “give defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
545 (2007)). Plaintiff’s Monell claim, therefore, also fails.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections (ECF No. 11),
ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the Initial Screening Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 8), and
ORDERS that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant. The Clerk shall enter judgment
accordingly and terminate this action on the docket records of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Gregory L. Frost
GREGORY L. FROST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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