Sunderman v. Jackson

Filing 14

OPINION AND ORDER granting (9) Motion to Consolidate Cases in case 2:14-cv-01219-MHW-TPK. All future matters are to be filed in Case No. 2:14-cv-1219. Signed by Magistrate Judge Terence P Kemp on 2/25/2015. (agm1)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Henry Sunderman,
Plaintiff,

:
:

Case No. 2:14-cv-971

v.

:

JUDGE MICHAEL H. WATSON
Magistrate Judge Kemp

Wanza Jackson,

:

Defendant.
Lamar Chaney,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:

Case No. 2:14-cv-1054

v.

:

JUDGE MICHAEL H. WATSON
Magistrate Judge Kemp

Dr. Wanza Jackson,

:

Defendant.
Jesse Prim,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:

Case No. 2:14-cv-1219

v.

:

JUDGE MICHAEL H. WATSON
Magistrate Judge Kemp

Dr. Wanza Jackson,

:

Defendant.

:

Lambert Dehler,

:

Plaintiff,

:

Case No. 2:14-cv-2099

v.

:

JUDGE MICHAEL H. WATSON
Magistrate Judge Kemp

Gary C. Mohr, et al.,

:

Defendants.

:

Grady Krzywkowski,
Plaintiff,

:
:

Case No. 2:14-cv-2159

v.

:

Gary C. Mohr, et al.,

:

Defendants.

:

JUDGE MICHAEL H. WATSON
Magistrate Judge Kemp

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Jesse Prim, an inmate currently housed at Grafton
Correctional Institution, has brought this action against state
employee Wanza Jackson in her individual and official capacities
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.

He alleges that Defendant violated

his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States

Constitution,

and

the

Religious

Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).

Land

Use

and

Defendant has

filed a motion to consolidate his case with two other cases:
Sunderman v. Jackson, No. 2:14-cv-971 and Chaney v. Jackson, No.
2:14-cv-1054. (Doc. 9). “A district court can consolidate related
cases under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) sua sponte.”
See, e.g., Devlin v. Transp. Commc'ns Int'l Union, 175 F.3d 121,
130 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

The Court, here, will

consider the motion to consolidate and will also consider, sua
sponte whether to consolidate the other cases that have been
identified by the Court as related cases.
For the following reasons, the motion to consolidate (Doc. 9)
will be granted and the Court will order the consolidation of Case
Nos. 2:14-cv-971, 2:14-cv-1054, 2:14-cv-1219, 2:14-cv-2099, and
2:14-cv-2159.
I. BACKGROUND
This case is one of six cases that the Court has deemed
related and transferred to the above-captioned judges.

The

earliest filed of those cases, Dehler v. Jackson, 2:14-cv-614,
originally contained claims related to the other cases, but
plaintiff voluntarily severed his claims and filed a new action
bearing docket number 2:14-cv-2099, in which he raised his claims
2

for religious accommodation.

The case bearing docket number

2:14-cv-614 now only contains a claim against Defendant Mohr for
turning off the electricity at the Grafton Correctional
Institution and does not contain claims that involve common
questions of law or fact with the other cases.

Accordingly,

there are five related cases that currently include common
questions of law or fact, and those cases are the following:
Sunderman v. Jackson, 2:14-cv-971 (Related case memo at doc.
2 deeming this case related to 2:14-cv-614 (as noted above,
docket number 14-2099 contains the related claims from that
action));
Chaney v. Jackson, 2:14-cv-1054 (Related case memo at doc.
10 deeming this case related to 14-971 and 14-1219);
Prim v. Jackson, 14-1219 (Related case memo at doc. 13
deeming this case related to 14-971 and 14-1054);
Dehler v. Mohr, 2:14-cv-2099 (Related case memo at doc. 5
deeming this case related to 2:14-cv-614, 2:14-cv-971, 2:14-cv1054, and 2:14-cv-1219; this case (2:14-cv-2099) is the case that
was severed from 2:14-cv-614, and this case contains the claims
related to the other cases); and
Krzywkowski v. Mohr, 2:14-cv-2159 (Related case memo at doc.
5 deeming this case related to 2:14-cv-614, 2:14-cv-971, 2:14-cv1054, and 2:14-cv-1219; as noted above, 2:14-cv-614 was
subsequently voluntarily severed such that the new case, 2:14-cv2099, contained the related claims).
Those five cases were each brought by a pro se plaintiff
against one or more defendants including Wanza Jackson.

The

plaintiffs in those cases are inmates who claim to be of the
faith described as the “Notzrim” or “Natsarim” faith (alternately
identified in the complaints as “Messianic Israelite” or
“Messianic Jewish”) or the “Hebrew Israelite” faith.

The

plaintiffs allege that their faith requires them to abstain from
3

unclean foods as specified in the Torah and, therefore, to be
placed on a kosher diet.

All of the cases include a claim that

Defendant Jackson (and potentially other defendants) violated
their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution and RLUIPA by denying their requests for kosher
meals.

The fifth case, Krzywkowski v. Mohr, 14-2159, differs to

some degree in that it alleges that Mr. Krzywkowski’s request for
kosher meals, while denied for a time in violation of his rights,
was ultimately approved.

These cases seek declaratory relief and

injunctive relief in addition to damages.

Two of the cases

allege various other violations of their rights relating to the
practice of their faith.
Defendant has moved to consolidate three of the civil
actions.

The Court sua sponte considers whether to consolidate

all five of the above-described actions.
II. ANALYSIS
Consolidation of cases is provided for in Rule 42(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states, in pertinent
part, that the Court may order consolidation of actions involving
“a common question of law or fact . . . .”
42(a).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

The purpose of consolidation is to “administer the

court's business ‘with expedition and economy while providing
justice to the parties.’”

Advey v. Celotex, Corp., 962 F.2d

1177, 1180 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting 9 Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure, §2381 (1971)).

Courts should

thoughtfully consider “[w]hether the specific risks of prejudice
and possible confusion [are] overborne by the risk of
inconsistent adjudications of common factual and legal issues,
the burden on parties, witnesses and available judicial resources
posed by multiple lawsuits, the length of time required to
conclude multiple suits as against a single one, and the relative
expense to all concerned of the single-trial, multiple-trial
alternatives.”

Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007, 1011 (6th

Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“[C]onsolidation does not merge the suits into a single
action, change the rights of the parties, or make parties in one
suit parties in the other.”

Twaddle v. Diem, 200 F. App'x 435,

438 n.4 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289
U.S. 479, 496–97 (1933) (interpreting predecessor of Rule
42(a))).

“[I]t is the district court's responsibility to ensure

that parties are not prejudiced by consolidation.”

Lewis v. ACB

Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 412-13 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing
Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2385 (2d ed.1994)).
Mr. Prim opposes this motion.

He opposes it on the grounds

that The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) “forbids
inmates from filing joint complaints” and “overrides joinder
rules.”

(Doc. 14 at 1).

In support of his argument, he cites

Spencer v. Bynum, which does not say that the PLRA forbids joint
complaints, but rather points out the “significant practical
problems with allowing several prisoners to file a joint
complaint.”

No. 2:13-13056, 2013 WL 4041870, at *3 (E.D. Mich.

Aug. 8, 2013).

Those practical problems arise in the context of

joinder under Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure
and not in the context of consolidation pursuant to Rule 42(a).
The distinction between the two has been described by the Third
Circuit decision in Hagan v. Rogers:
It is noteworthy that the statutory construction
problems posed by applying Rule 20 in the face of the
strictures of §§ 1915(b) and (g) do not arise in the
context of consolidation of suits under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 42(a). The difference between joinder
under Rule 20 and consolidation under Rule 42(a) is not
a distinction without a difference. Under the latter
rule, before there is a consolidation there are, by
definition, separate actions, for each of which a
filing fee is paid and each of which must stand on its
own merit. See Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S.
479, 496–97, 53 S.Ct. 721, 77 L.Ed. 1331 (1933); In re
5

Community Bank of Northern Virginia, 418 F.3d 277, 298
n.12 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming Johnson as the
“authoritative” statement on the law of consolidation)
(citation omitted). Rule 42(a) stands as an independent
and solid foundation for bringing efficiencies to
related prisoner lawsuits, as district courts may, on a
case-by-case basis, deem fit. See Young v. City of
Augusta, 59 F.3d 1160, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 1995) (when
the “core issue of liability” was “the same in both
cases[,]” consolidation of actions involving prison
deliberate indifference claims would be warranted).
Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 161 (3d Cir. 2009).
Accordingly, the question before the Court is whether there
is a common question of law or fact and whether risks of
prejudice and confusion are outweighed by the risk of
inconsistent adjudications and various burdens and expenses.
Cantrell, 999 F.2d at 1011 (citation omitted).

In his opposition

brief, Mr. Prim does not dispute that the actions before the
court involve numerous common questions of law and fact.

While

the affidavit attached to his opposition states that each of the
cases contains distinct facts, it does not dispute that common
questions of law and fact exist.

All of the cases address the

question of whether plaintiffs were denied kosher meals in
violation of their rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and RLUIPA.

Furthermore, all of the cases seek

declaratory judgment as to that issue, and four of the cases seek
injunctive relief ordering Defendant Jackson to grant the
plaintiffs’ requests for kosher meals.

Mr. Prim has not raised

any risks of confusion, nor is the Court aware of any.

The case

law makes it clear that consolidation does not change the rights
of the parties.

It appears that all parties will benefit from

the consolidation of the actions, and judicial economy favors
consolidation.

Accordingly, it is appropriate here to

consolidate the actions.
III.

CONCLUSION
6

For all the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Consolidate is
granted and the Court sua sponte orders the consolidation of two
additional cases.
The Court ORDERS the consolidation of Case Nos. 2:14-cv-971,
2:14-cv-1054, 2:14-cv-1219, 2:14-cv-2099, and 2:14-cv-2159 under
Case No. 2:14-cv-1219, and DIRECTS the parties to file all future
matters in Case No. 2:14-cv-1219.

The Clerk of Courts is

directed to file a copy of this order in Case Nos. 2:14-cv-971,
2:14-cv-1054, 2:14-cv-1219, 2:14-cv-2099, and 2:14-cv-2159.
IV.

PROCDURE ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Any party may, within fourteen days after this Order is
filed, file and serve on the opposing party a motion for
reconsideration by a District Judge.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

Rule 72(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.; Eastern Division Order No. 14–01,
pt. IV(C)(3)(a).

The motion must specifically designate the

order or part in question and the basis for any objection.
Responses to objections are due fourteen days after objections
are filed and replies by the objecting party are due seven days
thereafter.

The District Judge, upon consideration of the

motion, shall set aside any part of this Order found to be
clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
This order is in full force and effect even if a motion for
reconsideration has been filed unless it is stayed by either the
Magistrate Judge or District Judge. S.D. Ohio L.R. 72.3.
/s/ Terence P. Kemp
United States Magistrate Judge

7