Imani v. Warden, Noble Correctional Institution et al

Filing 22

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 19 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Hupp. It is RECOMMENDED that the motion be GRANTED. Objections to R&R due by 9/11/2015. Signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King on 8/245/2015 (pes)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

SEKOU MUATA IMANI,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action 2:14-cv-1358
Judge Frost
Magistrate Judge King

WARDEN, NOBLE CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTION, et al.,
Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Sekou Muata Imani, a state inmate currently
incarcerated at the Ross Correctional Institution, filed this action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive and monetary relief in
connection with disciplinary proceedings against him and his
subsequent transfer from the Noble Correctional Institution (“NCI”).
This Court previously dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims except
plaintiff’s First Amendment claim for denial of access to the courts,
asserted against defendant Julie Hupp.
Report and Recommendation, ECF 5.

Order, ECF 14; Order and

This matter is now before the Court

on Defendant Julie Hupp’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendant’s
Motion”), ECF 19, and Plaintiff’s Response, ECF 21.

For the reasons

that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion be GRANTED.
I.

Background
Defendant Hupp is identified in the Complaint as the librarian at

NCI. Complaint, ECF 4, PAGEID# 44. Plaintiff alleges that, beginning
on September 13, 2013, he requested a copy of “the Adm. Rules” as well

as “the rule book of the Ohio State Supreme Court and to have some
copies made from motions I had to send to an attorney . . . .” Id. at
PAGEID# 44-45.

“[A]fter 33 days she complied with my request.” Id. at

PAGEID# 45. See also Defendant’s Motion, Exhibit A at p. 5 (“[S]he
brought me what I asked for on 10.21.13 (33 days) well after the
fact.”).

Because of her alleged failures, plaintiff alleges, he

missed Ohio Supreme Court filing deadlines and “the attorney declined
to take my case. . . .” Id. Plaintiff also alleges that, because he
had no access to “the Adm. Rules” at his prison disciplinary hearing,
he was “unable to cite specific errors from the Adm. Rules and was
prohibited from making a fair, solid, defense.” Id.
Plaintiff filed this action on August 18, 2014. In it, plaintiff
alleges that defendant Hupp violated his “rights to access the
Administrative Rules” and violated his “rights to counsel and access
to the courts.”
II.

Id. at PAGEID# 44.

Standard
The standard for summary judgment is well established.

This

standard is found in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides in pertinent part: “The court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

In making this determination, the

evidence “must be viewed in the light most favorable” to the nonmoving party.

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).

Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is
genuine, “that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

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could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty

However, summary judgment is

appropriate if the opposing party “fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

The “mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [opposing
party’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on
which the jury could reasonably find for the [opposing party].”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
The “party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its
motion, and identifying those portions” of the record that demonstrate
“the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
U.S. at 323.

Celotex Corp., 477

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who “must

set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

“Once the moving party has proved that no material facts exist, the
non-moving party must do more than raise a metaphysical or conjectural
doubt about issues requiring resolution at trial.”

Agristor Fin.

Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986)).

Instead, the non-moving party must support the assertion

that a fact is genuinely disputed.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment “ʽ[a] district court
is not . . . obligated to wade through and search the entire record

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for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party’s
claim.’”

Gover v. Speedway Super Am., LLC, 284 F. Supp. 2d 858, 862

(S.D. Ohio 2003) (quoting InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d
108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989)).

Instead, a “court is entitled to rely, in

determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists on a
particular issue, only upon those portions of the verified pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with any affidavits submitted, specifically called to its
attention by the parties.”

Id.

See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

III. Discussion1
The Complaint alleges that plaintiff requested a copy of the Ohio
Administrative Rules and of the rules of practice for the Supreme
Court of Ohio, and copies of motions previously filed by him in lower
state courts, but that defendant Hupp did not provide the requested
materials for 33 days.

Plaintiff argues that this delay violated his

First Amendment right of access to the courts.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
to inmates a right of access to the courts.

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 346 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Pilgrim v.
Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996).

Although the

Constitution assures “adequate, effective, and meaningful” access,
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822, the right is not unlimited.

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Rather, the

Defendant Hupp contends, inter alia, that plaintiff’s remaining claims cannot
proceed because he failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as
to these claims prior to instituting the action. Defendant’s Motion, PAGEID#
218-22 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). The evidence presented by the parties
in support of and against this contention is both ambiguous and contested.
Because Defendant’s Motion can be resolved without consideration of this
evidence, the Court will not further address this contention.

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right secured by the Constitution relates only to challenges to the
inmate’s conviction or sentence or to challenges to the conditions of
confinement.

Casey, 518 U.S. at 355.

See also Thaddeus-X v. Blatter,

175 F.3d 378, 391 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Thus, a prisoner's right to access
the courts extends to direct appeals, habeas corpus applications, and
civil rights claims only.”).

In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim

concerning the denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must make
some showing of prejudice or actual injury as a result of the
challenged conduct.

Casey, 518 U.S. at 352-53; McCurtis v. Wood, 76

F. App'x 632, 634 (6th Cir. 2003).
Here, plaintiff alleges that he was denied access to the courts
because defendant Hupp waited 33 days to deliver the legal materials
requested by plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleges that he “requested the

rules to the Ohio Supreme Court” for the following reason: “I had
other arguments I needed to exhaust before I went into federal court
and I was looking for direction as to how to consolidate all my
arguments in one brief.”

Complaint, PAGEID# 45.

Plaintiff conceded

on deposition that that he had already filed a memorandum in support
of jurisdiction with the Ohio Supreme Court when he requested the copy
of the rules from defendant, but he explained that he needed the rules
in order to determine how to supplement his memorandum in support of
jurisdiction.

Deposition of Sekou Muata Imani (“Imani Deposition”),

ECF 18-1, PAGEID# 180-83.
The Ohio Supreme Court does not ordinarily permit the
supplementation of jurisdictional statements. See Ohio S.Ct.Prac.R.
7.01(A)(1) (titled “Time to file and documents required”), 7.04(A)(1)

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(“Except as provided in S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.13, jurisdictional memoranda
shall not be supplemented.”), 7.04(C) (“The Clerk of the Supreme Court
shall refuse to file supplemental or reply memoranda received for
filing in violation of this rule . . . .”). Even assuming that
plaintiff would have been permitted to amend or supplement his
jurisdictional memorandum with the Supreme Court, however, plaintiff
has not established that defendant Hupp’s alleged delay in providing
the rules and copies of previous motions caused a litigation-related
injury to him.

Notably, plaintiff received the materials requested by

him no later than October 27, 2013. See Defendant’s Motion, Exhibit A
at pp. 5 (“I filed an Informal Complaint, then she brought me what I
asked for on 10.21.13 (33 days) well after the fact.”); 10 (“Copies
were taken to Seg. on 10/27/13.”). The Supreme Court of Ohio declined
jurisdiction in plaintiff’s criminal appeal on December 24, 2013.
Defendant’s Motion, Exhibit B.

Thus, plaintiff had approximately two

months after defendant provided the materials requested by him in
which to seek leave to supplement his jurisdictional memorandum.
Plaintiff does not explain why he could not supplement his
jurisdictional memorandum during that time, nor is it apparent how any
delay in providing the requested materials caused the Ohio Supreme
Court to decline jurisdiction in his criminal case. Simply put,
plaintiff has produced no evidence, nor has he even argued, that
defendant’s alleged conduct resulted in a “litigation-related
detriment.”

See Pilgrim, at 416.

Plaintiff also seems to argue that the alleged delay in producing
the administrative rules denied him his right of access to the courts

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because, without the rules, he could not adequately defend himself at
the prison disciplinary hearing.

See Plaintiff’s Response, PAGEID#

256; Imani Deposition, PAGEID# 184-85.

However, the First Amendment

right of access to the courts does not extend to prison RIB hearings.
See Casey, 518 U.S. at 355; Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 391. But see
Watson v. Tennessee Dept. of Correction, 2014 WL 4402084, *3 (W.D.
Tenn. Sept. 5, 2014). In any event, however, plaintiff offers no
evidence that defendant Hupp’s alleged failure to timely provide a
copy of the prison administrative rules resulted in any actual
prejudice to him.
Plaintiff “also asks this Court to dismiss this summary judgment
due to the fact that [he] asked for complete discovery twice and
failed to receive it.”

Plaintiff’s Response, p. 2.

Plaintiff

specifically contends that he needs transcripts from his RIB hearings
and emails from Lieutenant Burghy to defendant Hupp in order to
“prove[] Ms. Hupp has been not truthful in regards to the dates she
was notified and also when she complied.”

Id. at p. 3.

The discovery

sought by plaintiff would not, however, create a genuine issue of
material fact because, as discussed supra, plaintiff has offered no
evidence that defendant Hupp’s conduct caused a court-related injury.
In short, plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material
fact and defendant Hupp is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
plaintiff’s remaining claims of denial of access to the courts in
violation of the First Amendment.2

It is therefore RECOMMENDED that

2

Plaintiff also argues that defendant Hupp’s alleged delay in providing him a
copy of the administrative rules violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to
procedural due process because he was unable to adequately defend himself

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Defendant Julie Hupp’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF 19, be
GRANTED.
IV.

Procedure on Objections
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report

and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file
and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation,
specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part
thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto.
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

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Response to objections

must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy
thereof.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to
the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to
de novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the
decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation.
See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of
Teachers, Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

August 24, 2015

s/Norah McCann King_______
Norah McCann King
United States Magistrate Judge

during a hearing before the Rules Infraction Board (“RIB”) at NCI. See
Plaintiff’s Response, pp. 2-4. However, this Court previously dismissed
plaintiff’s procedural due process claims arising from the disciplinary
proceedings. Opinion and Order, ECF 14; Order and Report and Recommendation,
ECF 5.

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