Parrot v. Schneider National Carriers, Inc. et al

Filing 39

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 10 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; denying 13 Motion to Dismiss; denying 15 Motion to Change Venue. Signed by Judge Algenon L. Marbley on 8/21/2015. (cw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ANDREW PARROT,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAY TO DAY LOGISTICS, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 2:14-CV-01462
JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY
Magistrate Judge Kemp

OPINION & ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the following motions: (1) the motion of
Defendant Day to Day Logistics, Inc. (“Day to Day”) to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, or, in
the Alternative, to Transfer Venue to the Western District of Virginia, (Doc. 10); (2) the motion
of Day to Day to Dismiss the Cross Claim, or in the Alternative Transfer Venue to the Western
District of Virginia, (Doc. 13); (3) the motion of Defendant Schneider National Carriers, Inc.
(“Schneider”) to Change Venue to the Western District of Virginia, (Doc. 15).
The motions pending before this Court are completely identical in form and substance to
the motions filed in the related case, Grubb, et al. v. Day to Day Logistics, Inc., et al., upon
which this Court ruled in a plenary Opinion & Order, filed on July 2, 2015. (No. 2:14-cv-01462,
Doc. 43). In both cases, the Plaintiffs are Ohio residents who were involved in the same
September 21, 2013 multi-vehicle accident on Interstate I-77 near Fancy Gap, Virginia. Both sets
of plaintiffs bring their claims against the same Defendants—Schneider National Carriers, Inc.
and Day to Day Logistics, Inc.—both of whom employed truck drivers whom Plaintiffs similarly
allege were responsible for the accident, and, thus, the injuries that both sets of plaintiffs
incurred.

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Both sets of plaintiffs filed nearly identical complaints. They both allege that Defendants
are subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction pursuant to the Federal Motor Carriers Act
(“FMCA”), 49 U.S.C. §13304, under which Day to Day designated and registered an agent for
service of process in Ohio. Further, they both allege negligence-based torts, as well as respondeat
superior, and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention.
For these reasons, on December 19, 2014, the Magistrate Judge held a telephone
conference with counsel from both cases and ruled that “[t]hese two cases are consolidated for
pretrial purposes only, which shall include resolution of the pending motions,” which include the
three identical motions detailed, supra, “and any discovery.” (Doc. 28). The record does not
show that either party objected to this ruling. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 governs
consolidation of cases and states:
(a) Consolidation. If actions before the court involve a common question of law
or fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the
actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid
unnecessary cost or delay.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42.
In this Court’s July 2, 2015 Opinion & Order in the Grubb case, which, as stated,
resolved Defendants’ motions which are literally identical in every way to those filed and
pending in this case, the Court addressed in detail all of Defendants’ arguments pertaining to
jurisdiction, transfer of venue, applicable law, and motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for
negligent supervision and training. (See Doc. 43 in Case No. No. 2:14-cv-01462). In that Order,
the Court declined to dismiss either the complaint or the cross claim on the basis of lack of
personal jurisdiction, and declined to transfer venue to Virginia. The Court concluded, however,
that Virginia law applied to the case, and that, under Virginia law, Plaintiffs’ claims for negligent
supervision and training were dismissed.
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Both the Grubb case and the Parrot case share all relevant facts and legal arguments for
the purposes of resolving the Defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint and cross-claim for
lack of jurisdiction, as well as Defendants’ argument that the law of Virginia should apply. Thus,
pursuant to this Court’s interest in consolidation for the sake of judicial economy, as well as the
fact that all relevant facts and arguments are identical in both sets of motions, this Court extends
its holding in Grubb regarding jurisdiction, choice-of-law, and the dismissal of Plaintiffs’
negligent supervision and training claims to this case.
In terms of Defendants’ motion to transfer venue, in Grubb, this Court applied an
intensive fact-based test which weighed both public interest factors of systemic integrity, and
private concerns of the parties. The Grubb Plaintiffs and the Parrot Plaintiff make very similar
arguments in opposition to Defendants’ identical arguments in favor of transfer, including:
Defendants’ failure to meet their burden of proof of showing the materiality of out-of-state
witnesses or inability to obtain evidence, and the greater weight this Court should give to the
Plaintiffs’ choice of forum. In the Grubb case, however, this Court gave weight to the Plaintiffs’
arguments that they were physically and financially unable to travel to Virginia; the Plaintiff in
Parrot does not make a similar argument. On balance, however, and considering this Court’s
broad discretion in ruling on a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) motion to transfer venue, see Reese v. CNH
Am. LLC, 574 F.3d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2009), as well as this Court’s interest in consolidating
these cases for the purposes of discovery to “avoid unnecessary cost or delay,” see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 42, this Court holds that its ruling in Grubb denying transfer of venue also extends to Parrot.
Thus, in sum, Day to Day’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, or, in the
Alternative, to Transfer Venue to the Western District of Virginia is DENIED; Day to Day’s
request to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for negligent supervision and training, however, is

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GRANTED. (Doc. 10). Additionally, Day to Day’s Motion to Dismiss the Cross Claim, or in the
Alternative Transfer Venue to the Western District of Virginia is DENIED. (Doc. 13). Finally,
Schneider’s Motion to Transfer Venue to the Western District of Virginia is DENIED. (Doc.
15).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Algenon L. Marbley_________
Algenon L. Marbley
United States District Court Judge
DATE: August 21, 2015

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