Dotson v. Twin Valley Behavioral Healthcare

Filing 2

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 1 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is granted. It is recommended that this case be dismissed. ( Objections to R&R due by 12/8/2014) Terminating:( 1 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis filed by Natalie M. Dotson.) Signed by Magistrate Judge Terence P Kemp on 11/20/2014. (agm1)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Natalie M. Dotson,

:

Plaintiff,

Twin Valley Behavioral
Healthcare,
Defendant.

Case No.

:

v.

:

2:14-cv-1831

JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST

:

Magistrate Judge Kemp

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Natalie M. Dotson, who, at the time this action
was filed, was confined at the Twin Valley Behavioral Healthcare
facility located in Columbus, Ohio, filed this action alleging
that she had been assaulted by another resident of the facility,
identified only as “Amanda.”
in forma pauperis.

She has moved for leave to proceed

When she submitted that motion, it appears

she was a “prisoner” as defined in 28 U.S.C. §1915(h) because she
was, in the words of that statute, “detained in a facility” and
accused of ... violations of criminal law ....”

However,

according to the records of the Licking County Court of Common
Pleas, see www.lcounty.com/clerkofcourts/frmCourtView.aspx, her
case was dismissed on November 14, 2014.

The Court therefore

does not assess a partial filing fee, but rather grants her
application for leave to proceed.

For the following reasons,

however, it will be recommended that this case be dismissed.
I.

The In Forma Pauperis Statute

28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2) provides that in proceedings in forma
pauperis, “[t]he court shall dismiss the case if ... (B) the
action ... is frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim
on which relief can be granted....”

The purpose of this

statutory section is to prevent suits which are a waste of

judicial resources and which a paying litigant would not initiate
because of the costs involved.
319 (1989).

See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous only when

the plaintiff fails to present a claim with an arguable or
rational basis in law or fact.

See id. at 325.

Claims which

lack such a basis include those for which the defendants are
clearly entitled to immunity and claims of infringement of a
legal interest which does not exist, see id. at 327-28, and
“claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with
which federal district judges are all too familiar.”
see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992).

Id. at 328;

A complaint

may not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted if the complaint contains “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).

Claims

against defendants who are immune from suits for money damages,
such as judges or prosecutors acting in their judicial or
prosecutorial capacity, are also within the ambit of §1915A. Pro
se complaints are to be construed liberally in favor of the pro
se party.

See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).

Ms.

Dotson’s complaint will be reviewed under these legal standards.
II.

The Facts

The facts of the case, taken from the complaint and from the
Licking County Court records, can be stated as follows.

Ms.

Dotson was initially confined to Twin Valley for purposes of a
psychological evaluation and in order to attempt to restore her
to competency.
County.

She had been charged with a crime in Licking

The Common Pleas Court records indicate that she was not

restored to competency within the allowable period, that the
charge against her was dismissed, and that she was ordered to be
held an additional ten days to permit the State to file a
petition to have her involuntarily committed.
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While at Twin Valley, Ms. Dotson claims that she was one of
three people assaulted by “Amanda.”

All of the assaults

allegedly occurred in September of this year.

Her complaint

identifies four members of Twin Valley’s staff who were present
during one or more of these incidents.

She provides the

following details, which the Court will quote from her complaint:
9/18/2014 approximately 3:30 PM I had an argument with
Amanda. I was telling Amanda not to slap me or punch
me playfully anymore. Amanda punched me in the face.
The staff did not call a code. They did not call the
assist team. They took Amanda outside for fresh air
twice. I specifically told the staff I wanted to press
charges. Amanda has come into my room without
permission. Amanda has punched 4 different clients.
Amanda has been informed she will be moving to level 2
soon. Amanda does not respect the rules here and acts
immature, vengeful on purpose, and then acts as if she
is “dissociating” so that she won’t be held accountable
for her actions. The staff refuses to allow me to
discover her last name. Therefore the staff is
inhibiting my right to press charges. I do believe she
may have broken my nose or fractured my maxilla.
III.

Legal Analysis

The first issue with Ms. Dotson’s complaint is that it names
only Twin Valley Behavioral Health as a defendant.

According to

records of the Ohio Department of Mental Health and Addiction
Services, Twin Valley Behavioral Healthcare Hospital is a “state
psychiatric hospital.”

As this Court has noted, “Twin Valley

Behavioral Healthcare is a regional psychiatric hospital
administered by the Ohio Department of Mental Health. See http//:
www.mentalhealth.ohio.gov.”

Franklin v. Astrue, 2010 WL 2667388,

*2 n.2 (S.D. Ohio June 10, 2010), adopted and affirmed 2010 WL
2653332 (S.D. Ohio June 30, 2010).

As an agency or arm of the

State of Ohio, it cannot be sued in a federal court under 42
U.S.C. §1983 both because it is not a “person” which can be sued
under that statute and because the State of Ohio has immunity

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from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491

U.S. 58 (1989); see also Bremiller v. Cleveland Psychiatric
Institute, 879 F. Supp. 782, 787 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (holding that
the Cleveland Psychiatric Institute, which is also a psychiatric
hospital created and maintained by the Ohio Department of Mental
Health, “is an ‘arm’ or ‘alter ego’ of the state entitled to
Eleventh Amendment protection from plaintiff's federal
constitutional and state law claims”).
Even if Ms. Dotson had sued the staff members she identifies
in the complaint, however, the complaint states no federal
constitutional claim against them.

If an inmate of a prison

facility or similar facility is assaulted by another inmate or
resident, the staff of that facility can be held responsible only
if the staff were aware beforehand of a substantial risk of
assault and took no steps to prevent it.

As the Court of Appeals

said in Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 508 (6th Cir. 2001), for
prison officials to be liable for an inmate-on-inmate assault,
there must be an allegation that they “were aware that [the
assaultive inmate] posed a risk of substantial injury to [other]
inmates and were deliberately indifferent to that risk.”
Although Ms. Dotson claims that “Amanda” assaulted a few
other residents, she provides no details which would support a
claim that, at the time of her encounter with Amanda, the staff
who were present were both aware that Amanda posed a substantial
risk of harm to her and that they deliberately or recklessly
disregarded that risk.

She does not plead any facts about the

nature or seriousness of the prior assaults.

Further, she

describes a situation in which she was voluntarily interacting
with Amanda when Amanda suddenly punched her.

Although she

faults staff for not “calling a code,” she provides no facts to
suggest that they did not provide her with adequate medical
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attention after the assault, and she says that they took Amanda
outside after it occurred and then proposed an increase in her
security level.

A reasonable person could not infer from these

facts that staff members intentionally or recklessly disregarded
a risk that Amanda would harm Ms. Dotson by not intervening in
some way before the actual assault occurred.

Even if they were

negligent, “any claim against the defendants based on the theory
of negligence does not state a cognizable federal claim.”
Sexton v. Neil, 2014 WL 1418298, *5 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2014).
Ms. Dotson’ primary complaint appears to be that staff would
not give her enough information about Amanda to be able to press
criminal charges against her.

The Court knows of no federal

constitutional right to such information.

Consequently, that

action cannot form the basis for a suit in this Court.
IV.

Recommendation

For all of the reasons set forth above, it is recommended
that this case be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2).

Should

this recommendation be adopted, the Clerk should be directed to
mail a copy of the complaint, this Report and Recommendation, and
any dismissal order to the defendant.
V.

Procedure on Objections

Any party may, within fourteen days after this Order is
filed, file and serve on the opposing party a motion for
reconsideration by a District Judge.

28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A),

Rule 72(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.; Eastern Division Order No. 14-01,
pt. IV(C)(3)(a).

The motion must specifically designate the

order or part in question and the basis for any objection.
Responses to objections are due fourteen days after objections
are filed and replies by the objecting party are due seven days
thereafter.

The District Judge, upon consideration of the

motion, shall set aside any part of this Order found to be
clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
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This order is in full force and effect even if a motion for
reconsideration has been filed unless it is stayed by either the
Magistrate Judge or District Judge.

S.D. Ohio L.R. 72.4.

/s/ Terence P. Kemp
United States Magistrate Judge

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