Hendricks et al v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Corrections et al

Filing 27

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 1 Complaint, filed by Gerald Lupinski, George Coverdale, Mark Randall, Benjamin Hendricks, Earl Steidl, Geoffrey Dupuis, Donald Williams, John Nameth. Plaintiffs are ORDERED to correct the deficienc ies in the complaint within THIRTY (30) DAYS. It is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Hendricks claims for injunctive relief be DISMISSED AS MOOT because he has been released from PCI. Objections to R&R due by 3/2/2015. Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Preston Deavers on 2/13/2015. (mas1)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

BENJAMIN HENDRICKS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action 2:14-cv-1841
Judge Gregory L. Frost
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

v.

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF
REHABILITATION & CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs, state-inmates presently housed at Pickaway Correctional Institution (“PCI”),
bring this action against Defendants 1 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act. This matter
is before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint,

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Plaintiffs name Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Corrections (“ODRC”), Pickaway
Correctional Institute (“PCI”), Gary Mohr (Director of ODRC), Steve Huffman (Assistant
Director of ODRC), Stuart Hudson (Regional Director of ODRC), Wanza Jackson (Religious
Services Administer/ Coordinator at ODRC), Brian Cook (Warden at PCI), Mike Davis (Deputy
Warden of Special Services at PCI), Doug Richards (Deputy Warden of Operations at PCI),
Major Ratcliff (Major at PCI), Carole Crockett-Harris (Unit Manager Administrator and the
ADA Coordinator at PCI), Ms. Rose (Unit Manager at PCI and assistant to Defendant CrockettHarris), Timothy Prushing (Unit Manager for Frazier Health Center (“FHC”) at PCI and assistant
to Defendant Crockett-Harris); Oscar Young (Unit Manager at FHC at PCI and assistant to
Defendant Crockett-Harris), Mary Lawrence (Inspector of Institutional Services at PCI), Ms.
Igwe (Librarian at PCI), Ms. Oshobee (Assistant Librarian at PCI), James Dankwah (Educational
Administrator at PCI), Jeremy Huffman (corrections officer at PCI), Chaplain Liu (State
Chaplain at PCI), Sgt. Woods (Unit Sergeant at FHC at PCI), State of Ohio Building Inspector,
State of Ohio Fire Marshall, John Doe Construction Company, and twenty-five (25) John/Jane
Does as the Defendants in this case.

or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2).
The Undersigned notes that the claims of Plaintiffs Austin, Carpenter, and Backus have
been dismissed from this action. Thus, the remaining Plaintiffs in this action are Hendricks,
Steidl, Dupuis, Nameth, Williams, Coverdale, Randall, and Lupinski.
I.
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).
In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e) 1 as part of the
statute, which provides in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that–
***
(B) the action or appeal-(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .

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Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
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28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, Section 1915(e) requires sua
sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or
malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the
basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual
demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,
727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on
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a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for
the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court
holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”
n Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr.
1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however,
has limits; “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v.
Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591,
594 (6th Cir. 1989)).
II.
The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ Complaint, which contains approximately 140
paragraphs, and has determined that Plaintiffs’ submission violates Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)’s requirement that a complaint contain a short, plain statement of the claim. Rule
8(a) provides as follows:
(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
(1)
a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim
needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2)
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3)
a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in
the alternative or different types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
Plaintiffs’ current submission is deficient for a number of reasons. First, Plaintiffs fail to
set out the particular facts that support each of their claims. Further, the Court is unable to
discern which claims each Plaintiff seeks to assert against each Defendant. For example,
Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants have deprived and continue[] to deprive Plaintiffs of their right
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to free exercise of religion . . . by substantially burdening Plaintiffs’ religious exercise without a
compelling governmental interest and by discriminating against Plaintiffs.” (Plaintiffs’ Compl. ¶
124, ECF 1.) Here, Plaintiffs do not specify which Plaintiff(s) were deprived of their rights or
which Defendant(s) deprived them of their right to exercise religion. All claims in Plaintiffs’
Complaint are similarly vague.
The Court reminds Plaintiffs that each of them lacks standing to assert the rights of
others. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (“A federal court’s jurisdiction [] can
be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered some threatened or actual injury
resulting from the putatively illegal action”); see also Dodson v. Wilkinson, 304 F. App’x 434,
438 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 381 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
prisoner “‘lacks standing to assert the constitutional rights of other prisoners’”). Thus, each
Plaintiff’s claims are limited to alleged violations of his own rights.
Plaintiffs are also reminded that “a complaint must allege that the defendants were
personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F.
App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is
inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,
through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). Accordingly,
Plaintiffs must plead facts from which the Court can determine that each individual Defendant
deprived Plaintiffs of their rights under the Constitution and/or federal law.
Plaintiffs are ORDERED to correct the foregoing deficiencies within THIRTY (30)
DAYS. To comply with this order, Plaintiffs must submit an amended complaint that complies
with Rule 8(a)’s requirements, as set forth above. More specifically, for each Defendant,
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including the John and Jane Doe Defendants, Plaintiffs must include a “short and plain statement
of the claim[s]” each seeks to advance, together with allegations showing that they are entitled to
the relief sought. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiffs are directed to remove immaterial
allegations against the Defendants. The Court cautions Plaintiffs that it may dismiss their action
if they fail to timely comply with this Order.
Finally, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Hendricks’ claims for injunctive relief be
DISMISSED AS MOOT because he has been released from PCI.
Article III of the United States Constitution limits a federal court’s exercise of judicial
power to actual, ongoing “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement subsists throughout all stages of the litigation. United States v.
Juvenile Male, 131 S.Ct. 2860, 2864 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“It
is a basic principle of Article III that a justiciable case or controversy must remain extant at all
stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.”). The doctrine of mootness is a
corollary of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement. “The mootness doctrine provides that
although there may be an actual and justiciable controversy at the time the litigation is
commenced, once that controversy ceases to exist, the federal court must dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction.” 15 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 101.9, at 101–238
(3d ed. 2011).
When an inmate files suit against prison officials at the institution of his incarceration
based upon those officials’ wrongful conduct seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and that
inmate is subsequently transferred or released, courts routinely dismiss the declaratory and
injunctive relief claims as moot. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1669–70 (2011) (citations
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omitted) (“A number of . . . suits seeking injunctive relief have been dismissed as moot because
the plaintiff was transferred from the institution where the alleged violation took place prior to
adjudication on the merits.”); see, e.g., Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that inmate’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were rendered moot upon
inmate’s transfer from the prison about which he complained); Abdur-Rahman v. Michigan
Dep’t of Corr., 65 F.3d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1995) (inmate’s request for injunctive relief mooted
upon transfer from relevant prison); Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1993) (same).
This is because an inmate’s transfer or release ends the alleged violations of his or her
constitutional rights, which “render[s] the court unable to grant the requested relief.” Berger,
983 F.2d at 724; Fredette v. Hemingway, 65 F. A’ppx 929, 931 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that
an inmate’s request for injunctive relief to prevent his transfer to another prison became moot
upon the inmate’s subsequent transfer because “the district court was unable to grant the relief
requested”).
“There is . . . an exception to the mootness doctrine for claims that are capable of
repetition, yet evade review.” Fredette, 65 F. A’ppx at 931 (citation omitted). This narrow,
capable-of-repetition exception is limited to situations in which “the challenged action was in its
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration” and “there was a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action
again.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, the Undersigned concludes that
Plaintiff Hendricks’ injunctive relief claims are moot. Plaintiff Hendricks was released from PCI
on November 24, 2014. (ECF No. 21.) Given that Plaintiff Hendricks has been released, an
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entry of equitable relief would accomplish nothing. This Court does not have jurisdiction to
accord Plaintiff Hendricks with prospective relief that has no effect or impact on Defendants. In
addition, because Plaintiff Hendricks has no reasonable expectation that he will again be
incarcerated at PCI, the capable-of-repetition exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply.
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss any claims that Plaintiff Hendricks
may assert for injunctive relief without prejudice as moot. Accordingly, to the extent that he
remedies the above-mentioned deficiencies, Plaintiff Hendricks may only proceed on any
plausible claims for monetary damages.
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that
party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and
Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in
question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and
waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex
Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate
judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district
court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that
defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to
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magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, appellate
review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994
(6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to specify the
issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation omitted)).

Date: February 13, 2015

/s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
United States Magistrate Judge

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