Fritz v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 16

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 1 Complaint filed by Wendy A. Fritz in that it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Statement of Errors be SUSTAINED to the extent that the case be REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Objections to R&R due by 2/1/2016. Signed by Magistrate Judge Terence P. Kemp on 1/13/16. (sem)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Wendy A. Fritz,

:

Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

Case No. 2:14-cv-1911

Commissioner of Social Security, :

JUDGE JAMES L. GRAHAM
Magistrate Judge Kemp

Defendant.

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I.

Introduction

Plaintiff, Wendy A. Fritz, filed this action seeking review
of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her
application for disability insurance benefits.

That application

was filed on May 26, 2011, and alleged that Plaintiff became
disabled on December 9, 2009.
After initial administrative denials of her claim,
Plaintiff was given a video hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge on March 22, 2013.
ALJ denied benefits.

In a decision dated June 7, 2013, the

That became the Commissioner’s final

decision on August 22, 2014, when the Appeals Council denied
review.
After Plaintiff filed this case, the Commissioner filed the
administrative record on December 16, 2014.

Plaintiff filed her

statement of specific errors on January 25, 2015, to which the
Commissioner responded on April 2, 2015.

Plaintiff filed a reply

brief on April 16, 2015, and the case is now ready to decide.
II.

Plaintiff’s Testimony at the Administrative Hearing

Plaintiff, who was 45 years old at the time of the
administrative hearing and who has a high school education plus
coursework toward an associate’s degree, testified as follows.
Her testimony appears at pages 43-63 of the administrative
record.

Plaintiff first testified that her last job was with Life
Ambulance Service.

She had been both a paramedic and a manager,

working in that field since 2001.

She was an EMT before that.

The problems which prevented her from working included being
unable to lift, flashbacks, having to change positions
constantly, and discomfort being around people.

She was taking

various medications including Depakote, Wellbutrin, hydrocodone,
Trazodone, and Valium.

Side effects from her medications

included drowsiness and dizziness.
Plaintiff had been hospitalized once for suicidal thoughts
after not taking her medicine.

She had also had surgery in the

past, and had been taking injections for her back since she
stopped working.

She testified to constant aching in her back

which traveled into her buttocks, as well as tingling and
numbness in her left leg and foot.

She needed to reposition

herself when sitting and could stand and walk for only five
minutes at a time.
difficulty.

Lifting her 19-pound grandson caused her

She also described memory problems and issues with

anger management.
In a typical day, Plaintiff did some household chores like
sweeping, mopping, and vacuuming, but those tasks took her all
day.

She could load and unload a dishwasher and did some

laundry.

She was also able to play games on a computer and let

her dog in and out.
or concentrate.

Reading was hard because she could not focus

She was able to prepare light meals.

When asked

if she could do a job which did not require contact with people,
Plaintiff said that concentration would be a major issue.
In response to additional questions from her attorney,
Plaintiff explained that she had been in an accident in 2008 when
an ambulance she was riding in flipped over.
of work at that time.

She missed a week

The event which caused her to stop working

occurred when she injured her back lifting a patient.
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She

returned to work for one day in 2010, doing office work, but fell
asleep.

She also said that she had been put on Depakote due to

an incident with her daughter and that she had a panic attack
when leaving her daughter’s home.

There was a period where she

could not drive, but she was now able to travel in a 20-mile
radius around her home.
attack.

Any stress caused her to have a panic

At least once a week she would have a bad day where she

could not get dressed or leave the house.

She was most

comfortable in a recliner and had some circulation issues in her
foot if it was not elevated.

Finally, she needed reminders, such

as setting the alarm on her phone, to take her medications.
III.

The Medical and Other Records

The medical records in this case are found beginning on page
313 of the administrative record.
summarized as follows.

The pertinent records can be

Because Plaintiff’s statement of errors

focuses on the evidence relating to her psychological
impairments, this summary will deal primarily with records
relating to that issue.
Plaintiff underwent a psychological assessment on April 21,
2010 at the request of the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.
Plaintiff reported depressive symptoms beginning at about the
time of her December, 2009 injury.

She had been diagnosed with

post-traumatic stress disorder in January, 2010, by Dr. Richetta,
whose report appears at Tr. 700-05, and had reported some
psychological symptoms to her family doctor in December, 2009.
Plaintiff exhibited pain behavior during the evaluation and was
tearful and described PTSD symptoms which had stabilized since
she stopped working.

The examiner, Dr. Farrell, diagnosed PTSD

and rated Plaintiff’s GAF at 70.

He thought her depressive

symptoms were “sub-clinical in nature” and related to the
December, 2009 injury.

He recommended up to 20 counseling

sessions with a psychologist or licensed counselor and also a
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medication consult with a psychiatrist.

He thought that her PTSD

would prevent her from returning to her previous employment.
(Tr. 342-48).
Another psychological evaluation was done on July 19, 2010,
this time by Dr. Murphy.

He noted that Plaintiff showed no

evidence of cognitive dysfunction but had intermittent problems
with short-term memory.

She reported daily crying spells,

flashbacks, avoidance/social withdrawal, and nightmares.
also said she preferred being alone.

She

Dr. Murphy concluded that

Plaintiff could sustain focus and attention long enough to
complete tasks in the workplace and could maintain regular
attendance.

Her PTSD was mild and not work-prohibitive.

recommend some additional counseling, however.

He did

(Tr. 349-57).

The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation sent Plaintiff for
another psychological evaluation on April 21, 2011.
performed that evaluation.

Dr. Levy

He noted that Plaintiff had been

receiving psychotherapy from Dr. Barnett and medication from Dr.
Kang, a psychiatrist.

His interpretation of their notes was that

Plaintiff had experienced some improvement in her flashbacks and
was able to begin driving again, and that the medication had
improved her condition although she still had significant
residual symptoms.

She continued to be depressed, teary,

anxious, and edgy.

She remained fairly withdrawn.

Dr. Levy did

not think that Plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement
and said that her PTSD rendered her disabled from working.

He

suggested that she might be able to return to work with
additional treatment.

(Tr. 388-90).

Plaintiff sought treatment at the emergency room on July 21,
2011, for suicidal thoughts.

She reported having experienced

persistent nightmares, flashbacks, and hypervigilance since the
2008 accident, with an exacerbation after her psychiatrist did
not renew her medications.

Medication was restarted and she
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improved.

She was discharged the next day.

(Tr. 449-50).

Dr. Kang’s office notes are part of the record.

He first

saw Plaintiff on October 14, 2010, based on a referral from her
counselor.

She appeared at that time to be withdrawn and

depressed and reported a variety of depressive symptoms.
affect was blunt.
GAF at 50.

Her

Dr. Kang diagnosed PTSD and rated Plaintiff’s

He started her on medications.

When he next saw her,

Plaintiff felt better but was not sleeping well, and she had not
taken one of her medications as prescribed.

At a return visit in

November, 2010, Plaintiff said she was still depressed and having
nightmares.

By December, she was improving, and at the last

visit in 2010 she appeared less depressed and less agitated
although she still reported anxiety attacks and difficulty
sleeping.

As her treatment progressed into 2011, Dr. Kang did

not see much change, but Plaintiff continued to report symptoms
like crying spells.

Improvement was reported in a March 21, 2011

note, however, and a note from April 11, 2011 said she was
sleeping better.

She looked “bright and calmer” on May 3, 2011,

and at the subsequent visit Plaintiff told Dr. Kang that her
medication was helping her.

She missed some visits in the summer

of 2011 due to issues with her workers’ compensation claim, which
was also when she was briefly hospitalized, and appeared
withdrawn and depressed when Dr. Kang saw her on August 1, 2011.
Subjectively, she reported doing better once she was back on her
medication, but in September, 2011, she developed insomnia.

She

continued to appear depressed throughout the rest of 2011.

(Tr.

545-63).

His notes from 2012 showed additional improvement,

including an improved affect and elimination of headaches.

She

told Dr. Kang that as long as she was taking her medications she
was doing “okay.”

(Tr. 741-51).

On February 17, 2012, Plaintiff underwent yet another
psychological evaluation at the request of the Bureau of Workers’

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Compensation.

Dr. Clary, who did the evaluation, reported that

Plaintiff’s mood was reactive and appropriate and she said her
mood varied from day to day.
and decreased her nightmares.
evaluation.

Trazodone had improved her sleep
She was tearful during part of the

She said that she watched television several hours

per day, read, and used the computer.

After reviewing the

results of the in-person session and records from Dr. Kang and
Dr. Barnett, Dr. Clary concluded that Plaintiff had reached
maximum medical improvement but was still unable to return to her
former position due to PTSD.

However, she could do other work as

long as it did not involve driving and was consistent with her
physical limitations.

(Tr. 607-12).

In August, 2012, the BWC sent her to see another
psychologist, Dr. Deardorff.

Plaintiff told him that she was

anxious more than half the time and worried all the time.
was depressed less than half the time, however.
some anger issues with her family.
coping skills.

She described

Counseling had improved her

She appeared anxious and mentioned panic attacks

and avoidant behavior.
severely depressed.
others.

She

Testing showed her to be moderately to

She was uncomfortable interacting with

Dr. Deardorff, unlike Dr. Clary, did not think she had

reached maximum medical improvement, especially due to a recent
setback involving the accidental death of a patient and worker at
her former employer.

He concluded that she could not go back to

her previous job but “would very likely function most effectively
in a relatively stress-free environment providing patient
supervision and adequate break-time.”

(Tr. 616-24).

Dr. Barnett’s treatment of Plaintiff began in May, 2010, and
the record contains a large number of his notes.

In his initial

evaluation, Dr. Barnett reported that Plaintiff’s activities of
daily living were limited by her physical problems, that she had
poor concentration and focus, that her social functioning was

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limited, and that she could not handle stress.

Subsequent notes

show that she was usually tearful and upset but her prognosis was
described as good and she was improving.

By November of that

year she reported that the medication prescribed by Dr. Kang was
helping her.

She had made progress by driving herself to

Columbus for her therapy appointments, but that did cause her
some anxiety.

By 2012, she was presenting with a full range of

affect, but still reporting issues with anxiety, irritability,
and anger.

In April, 2012, she described for Dr. Barnett the

effect that learning about the accident involving her former
place of employment had had on her.

She seemed much better when

Dr. Barnett saw her on June 26, 2012.

Throughout the course of

his treatment notes, Dr. Barnett did not change his evaluation of
Plaintiff’s functional ability.

(Tr. 626-99).

He also wrote a

letter on April 9, 2012, directed to the issue of whether
Plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement.

He thought

she had not, and that although the frequency and intensity of her
anxiety had been reduced, it was not eliminated, she was very
anxious when driving, and she had not resumed normal social
activities.

He mentioned the recent setback she experienced,

which triggered a relapse involving more nightmares and
flashbacks, did not think she could be employed in any capacity
at that time, and recommended additional therapy.

(Tr. 614).

Finally, Dr. Barnett completed a mental residual functional
capacity questionnaire on October 7, 2012.

He concluded that

Plaintiff was extremely limited in eight different areas,
including accepting criticism, relating to the public, tolerating
work stress, concentrating and attending to tasks, dealing with
work stress, and behaving in an emotionally stable manner.

He

thought she was markedly limited in other work-related areas.

He

also said she would miss more than five days of work per month
and would have difficulty functioning on a work schedule.

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(Tr.

753-55).

Dr. Reynolds, a psychiatrist who evaluated Plaintiff on

December 18, 2012, also at the request of the BWC, concurred in
that assessment, stating that “the severity of psychiatric
symptoms would preclude an ability to return to any employment at
this time despite any reasonable accommodations.”

(Tr. 766-73).

In addition to the records of medical evaluation and
treatment, the file contains opinions from state agency
reviewers.

Dr. Richardson, who had records available to him up

through September 16, 2011, the date of his opinion, concluded
that Plaintiff suffered from a severe anxiety disorder which
caused moderate limitations on her ability to interact with the
general public, but that she did not have any limitations on her
ability to sustain concentration and persistence or to maintain
socially appropriate behavior.

(Tr. 82-86).

Dr. Haskins did a

subsequent review and on January 25, 2012, concluded that
Plaintiff would have difficulty adapting to more than occasional
changes in the workplace, and she could interact only
occasionally and superficially with others.

She also had a

moderate limitation on her ability to sustain effort and
concentration but could work in a setting without demands for
fast pace or high production.
IV.

(Tr. 107-09).

The Vocational Testimony

Deborah Dutton-Lambert was the vocational expert in this
case.

Her testimony begins on page 63 of the administrative

record.
Ms. Dutton-Lambert testified that Plaintiff’s past work as a
paramedic was very heavy and skilled.
medium and skilled.

The EMT position was

Plaintiff had also been a child care

attendant (a medium, unskilled job), a school cafeteria cook (a
skilled, medium job) and a stores laborer, which was medium and
unskilled.
Ms. Dutton-Lambert was then asked some questions about a

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hypothetical person of Plaintiff’s age, education, and work
experience who could work at the medium exertional level and who
could carry out both simple, repetitive tasks and some complex
tasks.

The person also had to work in an environment without

demands of fast pace or high production and could adjust to
occasional changes with some supervisory support.

Lastly, the

person could have only occasional superficial contact with
coworkers, supervisors, and the public.

According to Ms. Dutton-

Lambert, someone with those limitations could still work as a
stores laborer and could also be an industrial cleaner, a hand
packager, a merchandise deliverer, or a laundry worker.

If the

person was limited to light work, no past work would be
available, but he or she could do jobs like housekeeper cleaner,
shipping/receiving weigher, and bagger.
Next, Ms. Dutton-Lambert was asked if someone who also had
side effects like drowsiness or dizziness from medication could
do any of those jobs.

She testified that they would all be

affected by that symptom.

She also said that someone who was off

task more than 15 percent of the day could not be competitively
employed, nor could someone who would miss five days of work per
month.

Similarly, someone with a marked inability to respond

appropriately to coworkers and peers, to work in proximity to
others without disrupting them, or to carry out instructions and
complete tasks could not be employed competitively.

Finally, she

said that if someone could not complete a normal workday or work
week at a consistent pace more than 50 percent of the time, that
person could not work.
V.

The Administrative Law Judge’s Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision appears at pages 1931 of the administrative record.

The important findings in that

decision are as follows.
The Administrative Law Judge found, first, that Plaintiff
met the insured requirements of the Social Security Act through
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December 31, 2014.

Next, she found that Plaintiff had not

engaged in substantial gainful activity since her onset date of
December 9, 2009.

Going to the second step of the sequential

evaluation process, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had severe
impairments including lumbar sprain and strain and post-traumatic
stress disorder.

The ALJ also found that these impairments did

not, at any time, meet or equal the requirements of any section
of the Listing of Impairments (20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1).
Moving to step four of the sequential evaluation process,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity
to perform work the light exertional level.
number of non-exertional limitations.

However, she had a

She could do simple,

repetitive tasks and some multi-step tasks in a setting without
demands for fast pace or high production, could have occasional
and superficial contact with others, and could adjust to
occasional changes with some supervisor support.
The ALJ found that, with these restrictions, Plaintiff could
not do any of her past relevant work.

However, she could do

three of the jobs identified by the vocational expert housekeeper/cleaner, weigher, and hand packager/bagger.

The ALJ

further found that such jobs existed in significant numbers in
the regional and national economies.

Consequently, the ALJ

concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits.
VI.

Plaintiff’s Statement of Specific Errors

In her statement of specific errors, Plaintiff raises one
issue: the ALJ did not properly weigh the medical opinion
evidence from Dr. Barnett, the treating mental health source.
This claim is evaluated under the following standard.
Standard of Review.

Under the provisions of 42 U.S.C.

Section 405(g), "[t]he findings of the Secretary [now the
Commissioner] as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ."
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Substantial evidence is

"'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
Richardson v. Perales, 402

adequate to support a conclusion'"

U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Company v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
scintilla.'" Id.
Cir. 1976).

It is "'more than a mere

LeMaster v. Weinberger, 533 F.2d 337, 339 (6th

The Commissioner's findings of fact must be based

upon the record as a whole.

Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435

(6th Cir. 1985); Houston v. Secretary, 736 F.2d 365, 366 (6th
Cir. 1984); Fraley v. Secretary, 733 F.2d 437, 439-440 (6th Cir.
1984).

In determining whether the Commissioner's decision is

supported by substantial evidence, the Court must "'take into
account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.'"
Beavers v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 577 F.2d
383, 387 (6th Cir. 1978) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)); Wages v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 755 F.2d 495, 497 (6th Cir. 1985).

Even if this Court

would reach contrary conclusions of fact, the Commissioner's
decision must be affirmed so long as that determination is
supported by substantial evidence.

Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708

F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983).
It is always helpful to begin a discussion of how an ALJ
weighed a treating source opinion by examining in some detail the
rationale provided by the ALJ in the administrative decision.
The ALJ devoted almost a full page to Dr. Barnett’s various
opinions (Tr. 29) but gave all of them little weight.

In

particular, she discounted his October 7, 2012 opinion because
the limitations in that opinion “are not supported by his
treatment records and are inconsistent with reports of the
claimant’s improvement.

Further, these limitations are not

consistent with the claimant’s conservative mental health
treatment, or the totality of the medical evidence of record.”
Id.

She also gave little weight to his oft-expressed view that

Plaintiff could not handle stress, had problems with focus and
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concentration, and had slow persistence and pace, for the reasons
that these limitations “are not supported by the substantial
medical evidence of record and are inconsistent with the
psychological findings reported by Dr. Barnett and Dr. Kang, more
fully discussed above.”

Earlier in the administrative decision,

the ALJ discussed Dr. Kang’s notes, pointing out that his
observations about Plaintiff’s decrease in obvious symptoms,
improved affect, and orientation were “not indicative of
debilitating mental impairments.”

(Tr. 26).

The ALJ gave “good

weight” to opinions from Drs. Clary and Deardorff that Plaintiff
could work at jobs other than her past employment.

She made no

mention of Dr. Reynolds’ opinion, nor did she discuss or assign
weight to the opinions of the two state agency reviewers
concerning Plaintiff’s psychological limitations, even though it
appears she adopted Dr. Haskins’ view of those limitations
essentially verbatim.
Plaintiff identifies the following deficiencies in this
analysis.

She faults the ALJ for not citing to the controlling

regulation, 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c), or discussing the various
factors contained in that rule.

Next, she points out that the

ALJ made reference several times to “the totality of the medical
evidence of record” without specifying what portion of that
evidence either supported or was inconsistent with Dr. Barnett’s
opinions.

Plaintiff also contends that the general dismissal of

the multitude of opinions generated through the workers’
compensation process was improper; that the ALJ did not properly
characterize the evidence concerning Plaintiff’s GAF scores; that
the ALJ used her own medical judgment in determining how much
treatment was indicative of a serious psychological condition and
in deciding how to interpret Dr. Barnett’s and Dr. Kang’s
treatment notes; and that the ALJ improperly gave more weight to
the views of the state agency reviewers who never treated or
examined Plaintiff and did not have the benefit of all of the
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relevant treatment records.
The Commissioner, in turn, argues that it was proper for the
ALJ to have interpreted Dr. Kang’s and Dr. Barnett’s notes as
showing a general trend toward improvement and that the ALJ was
also permitted to evaluate Plaintiff’s activities of daily living
as evidence that she was not as limited as either Dr. Barrett or
Dr. Kang had concluded.

The Commissioner also contends that the

ALJ had, and articulated, a valid basis for discounting Dr.
Barrett’s opinions, based upon the amount of improvement shown in
his notes and the extent and variety of her daily activities, all
of which, according to the Commissioner, are inconsistent with
the extreme or marked limitations expressed by Dr. Barnett.
As this issue is conceptualized in the reply memorandum
(Doc. 15), the key question is whether any of the reasons given
by the ALJ for discounting Dr. Barnett’s opinions, and instead
adopting in full the state agency reviewers’ opinions, are “good
reasons” as that phrase is used in §404.1527(c).

Plaintiff

asserts that none of them are; in her view, the treatment notes
show more limitations than improvement in functional abilities,
the course of treatment is what would be expected even for a
debilitating psychological illness, and there is no conflict
between Plaintiff’s activities of daily living and the marked or
extreme workplace limitations described by Dr. Barnett.
First, the Court concludes that the conflicting opinions of
the state agency reviewers provide little support for the ALJ’s
opinion in this particular case.

The latter of the two was

rendered well before a number of psychological evaluations were
conducted, before Dr. Barnett’s opinion was issued, and without
the benefit of a number of treatment notes which the ALJ thought
showed a trend toward improvement.

Those are all significant

records, and without having the benefit of them, Dr. Haskins’
opinion, while not necessarily without weight, is only as
reliable as the records which were reviewed.
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The more significant issue, however, is whether the ALJ
reasonably interpreted the treatment notes and Plaintiff’s
activities of daily living as being inconsistent with Dr.
Barnett’s view of her abilities.

As noted above, those notes do

show improvement from time to time, although they also show, as
the ALJ pointed out, “ups and downs in the claimant’s condition
....”

(Tr. 26).

As to specific instances of improvement,

however, apart from statements made by Plaintiff that she felt
better when taking her medication, the ALJ pointed to Dr. Kang’s
findings that, at various times, “claimant was casually dressed
and cooperative; she was less withdrawn, less depressed, and less
agitated; her affect was appropriate with no suicidal ideation,
homicidal ideation, or mood swings; her judgment and insight were
unimpaired; her memory was normal; she was alert and well
oriented to all three spheres; she denied having delusional
thoughts or hallucinations; she was coherent and relevant; and
she had no medication side effects.”

(Tr. 26).

In a case where the limitations expressed in the treating
source opinion were directly related to these various aspects of
Plaintiff’s presentation, the ALJ might be entitled to use such
notations as a reason for discounting the source opinion.

Here,

however, the primary reason why Dr. Barnett expressed the view
that Plaintiff had severe limitations in her ability to function
in the workplace was that she suffered from PTSD and it affected
her ability to deal with work stress.

He said she did not deal

with stress well at all and it induced anxiety and panic attacks.
The observations made by Dr. Kang, and also by Dr. Barnett, are
simply not inconsistent with that conclusion.

Plaintiff did not

claim to have issues with memory, judgment, insight, mood swings,
orientation, delusions, or medication side effects.
Consequently, the fact that she had a normal presentation in
these areas could not properly be used by the ALJ to undermine
Dr. Barnett’s opinions, and, indeed, Dr. Barnett was fully aware
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of them but did not view them as inconsistent.
In this regard, this case very much resembles Robertson v.
Astrue, 2008 WL 659458 (W.D. Ky. March 7, 2008).

There, as here,

the ALJ had discounted a treating source psychological opinion on
grounds that it was not supported by the source’s own treatment
notes.

After pointing out that (as is also true here) the state

agency reviewers did not address the treating source opinions,
the court found both that “no medical opinion in the record
indicating the limitations adopted by [the treating source] are
inconsistent with clinical findings in the treatment records or
the level of treatment plaintiff received” and that “there is no
medical opinion in the record suggesting plaintiff's course of
treatment is incommensurate with her purported mental
impairment.”

Consequently, the court concluded that “the ALJ

impermissibly substituted his own views for the uncontroverted
medical opinion of the treating psychiatrist.”

Id. at *6.

The

same can be said of this case; without some substantial evidence
in addition to the ALJ’s own belief that the notes in question
and the course of treatment are not consistent with the
limitations expressed by Dr. Barnett, that reasoning cannot
stand.
The ALJ also relied on Plaintiff’s activities of daily
living as being inconsistent with Dr. Barnett’s views.

However,

a close examination of those activities does not show that
Plaintiff was functioning adequately in a work or work-like
setting.

In fact, the evidence about her activities included

extreme limits on socialization beyond her own family and anxiety
whenever stress was introduced into her environment.

The ALJ

also commented that Dr. Barnett’s opinion was not consistent with
the “totality of the medical evidence of record,” but that is too
vague an observation to be of much use to a reviewing court, at
least to the extent that it meant to convey some inconsistency
beyond that already discussed.

See, e.g., Van Houten v. Comm’r
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of Social Security, 2015 WL 792395, *6 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2015),
adopted and affirmed 2015 WL 4537244 (S.D. Ohio July 24, 2015).
For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that the case
should be remanded to the Commissioner for a further evaluation
of the opinion evidence.
VII.

Recommended Decision

Based on the above discussion, it is recommended that the
Plaintiff’s statement of errors be sustained to the extent that
the case be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g), sentence four.
VIII.

Procedure on Objections

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation,
that party may, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this
Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those
specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection
is made, together with supporting authority for the objection(s).
A judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions

of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.

Upon proper

objections, a judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify,
in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein,
may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.

28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to
object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a
waiver of the right to have the district judge review the
Report and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a
waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the District
Court adopting the Report and Recommendation.

See Thomas v.

Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d
947 (6th Cir. 1981).
/s/ Terence P. Kemp
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United States Magistrate Judge

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