Jurado et al v. Stone et al

Filing 16

ORDER finding as moot 6 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 12 Motion for Leave to File; denying 15 Sealed Motion. Signed by Judge Gregory L. Frost on 4/17/15. (kn)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ARISTIDES JURADO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 2:15-cv-74
JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST
Magistrate Judge Terence P. Kemp

v.
AMY C. STONE, et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiffs’ April 16, 2015 emergency
motion for a temporary restraining order and an expedited preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 15.)
In this motion, Plaintiffs ask this Court to issue a temporary restraining order without notice to
Defendants that would enjoin the state court from issuing any judgments or orders and from
conducting any proceedings in an underlying state court child custody case. Plaintiffs also
specifically seek to enjoin the state court from proceeding on any collateral matters, including a
contempt proceeding against Plaintiff Aristides Jurado scheduled for April 16, 2015.
The Court can issue a temporary restraining order without notice to Defendants under
limited circumstances: if Plaintiffs have alleged specific facts that “clearly show that immediate
and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to [Plaintiffs] before [Defendants] can be heard
in opposition” or if Plaintiffs’ “attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and
the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). Impossibility of notice is
not at issue here. Rather, the pro se Plaintiffs argue that exceptional circumstances exist to
justify a without-notice injunction. Specifically, Plaintiffs again contend that a conspiracy exists
involving numerous state actors and other individuals who are discriminating against them.

Similar to their first motion for an ex parte injunction, Plaintiffs’ newest vague and
essentially conclusory allegations of wrongdoing present insufficient facts to support granting a
temporary restraining order without notice–or even with notice. Moreover, despite Plaintiffs’
conclusory assertion to the contrary, their filings, including their proffered 1,004-paragraph
amended complaint, indicate that abstention and dismissal are ultimately warranted.
Plaintiffs’ convoluted and often inapplicable claims and the relief sought invoke
application of the abstention doctrine recognized in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In
that case, the United States Supreme Court explained that federal courts should not interfere with
state court proceedings under specified circumstances. Id. at 43-44. More recently, the Supreme
Court defined the scope of the doctrine in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584
(2013). The Supreme Court explained that the doctrine applies to “ongoing state criminal
prosecutions,” “certain ‘civil enforcement proceedings,’ ” and “pending ‘civil proceedings
involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their
judicial functions.’ ” Id. at 591 (quoting New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of
New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989)).
Following Sprint Communications, Inc., Younger has been applied to a federal action
arising from an ongoing child custody dispute. See Graham v. N.Y. Center for Interpersonal
Dev., No. 15-CV-00459 (PKC), 2015 WL 1120120, at *3 (E.D. N.Y. Mar. 21, 2015). This Court
agrees with Graham and the conclusions that “ ‘there can be no doubt that a custody dispute . . .
raises important state interests’ ” and is traditionally an area of state concern. Id. at *3 (quoting
Reinhardt v. Commonwealth of Mass. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 715 F. Supp. 1253, 1256 (S.D. N.Y.
1989)); see also Graham v. Criminal Court of the City of New York, No. 15-CV-00337, 2015

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WL 427981, at *3 (E.D. N.Y. Feb. 2, 2015) (recognizing that Younger applies where the relief a
plaintiff seeks involves intervening and interfering with orders issued in a state custody
proceeding); Meyers v. Franklin Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 23 F. App’x 201, 204 (6th Cir.
2001) (Younger abstention case stating that “cases out of the Supreme Court and this Court make
it clear that abstention is generally appropriate in matters of family relations such as child
custody”); Hughes v. Hamann, 23 F. App’x 337, 337 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court also recognizes
that the Younger doctrine applies to a state court contempt proceeding. Cf. Sprint Commc’n,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 592; see also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335-36 & n.12 (1977); Tarapchak
v. Schuylkill Cnty., No. 3:13-1895, 2014 WL 4626701, at *16 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2014).
None of the possible exceptions disfavoring abstention are present here. Plaintiffs have
failed to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate by directing this Court to any
requisite extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate, such as bad faith,
harassment, or a patently invalid state statute. There is no basis to conclude that the Ohio state
court is an inadequate forum in which Plaintiffs can raise any constitutional claims.
Because Younger applies, this Court cannot afford Plaintiffs the injunctive relief they
seek. See Sun Refining & Mktg. Co., 921 F.2d at 639 (“when a case is properly within the
Younger category of cases, there is no discretion on the part of the federal court to grant
injunctive relief” (citing Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 816 n.22 (1976))). Cf. Wong-Opasi, 8 F. App’x 340 (holding Younger abstention
appropriate to § 1983 action in which plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order). The fact
that the Younger doctrine precludes the exercise of jurisdiction in this action–an action in which
Plaintiffs’ diverse claims overlap so that they invariably spill into interference with the state

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court proceedings or demand overturning decisions in contravention of another abstention
doctrine–also means that the Court may in its discretion dismiss the case. See Nimer v. Litchfield
Twp. Bd. of Tr., 707 F.3d 699, 702 (6th Cir. 2013) (recognizing dismissal when Younger applies
and injunctive relief is sought); Am. Family Prepaid Legal Corp. v. Columbus Bar Ass’n, 498
F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2007) (upholding dismissal predicated on Younger abstention).
In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES the request for issuance of an ex parte
temporary restraining order or, in the alternative, a temporary retraining order issued after notice
to Defendants (ECF No. 15), ABSTAINS from exercising jurisdiction, and DISMISSES the
captioned case without prejudice.1 The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate
this case on the docket records of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Eastern Division.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Gregory L. Frost
GREGORY L. FROST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1

Although Plaintiffs did not strictly comply with this Court’s filing procedures, the
Clerk’s Office filed the motion under seal pursuant to this Court’s direction in light of the fact
that the motion was for ex parte injunctive relief. The Clerk should now unseal the motion on
the electronic docket.
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