Hyde v. McAllister et al

Filing 33

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 3 Complaint, 7 Amended Complaint: It is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief. Plaintiff is ORDERED to file a notice with the Court WI THIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS indicating whether he intends to prosecute the remaining claims in this action. Objections to R&R due by 4/7/2016. Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Preston Deavers on 3/21/2016. (mas)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

TAD JASON HYDE,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action 2:15-cv-176
Judge Michael H. Watson
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

v.

OFFICER JEFF MCALLISTER, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Tad Jason Hyde, a state inmate who is proceeding without the assistance of
counsel, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a number employees of
Pickaway Correctional Institution (“PCI”) and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction (“ODRC”), challenging alleged prison policies, asserting medical indifference claims,
and seeking monetary and injunctive relief. Plaintiff was incarcerated at PCI when he
commenced this action. He was subsequently transferred to West Central Community
Correctional Facility (“WCCCF”). As explained below, Plaintiff’s intervening transfer rendered
his claims for injunctive relief moot. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court
DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT. In
addition, in October 2015, Defendants moved for dismissal of Plaintiff’s remaining claims
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 29.) Despite seeking and
obtaining an extension of time to file a Memorandum in Opposition (ECF Nos. 30 and 31), to
date, Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, Plaintiff is

ORDERED to file a notice with the Court WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS indicating
whether he intends to prosecute this action. Plaintiff is advised that failure to timely file a notice
could result in dismissal of this action without prejudice for failure to prosecute pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
I.
Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief are premised upon his allegations that four named
Defendants implemented a policy at PCI that departs from ODRC regulations and that violates
his constitutional rights. More specifically, he alleges that four Defendants implemented a
policy at PCI wherein medications are discontinued for inmates suspected of medication abuse
without first assessing the inmates. Plaintiff alleges that instead, ODRC regulations require
implementation of a “crush and immerse” practice when medication abuse is suspected, such that
the inmate would still obtain the benefit of his or her prescribed medications. (Pl.’s Am. Compl.
2, ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ application of this policy has deprived him of
adequate medical treatment and caused him to suffer from significant back and nerve pain. He
asks the Court to enjoin Defendants from continuing this practice.
II.
The Court properly raises the jurisdictional issue of mootness sua sponte. See North
Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (“Mootness is a jurisdictional question because the
Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions . . . .” (internal
quotations marks and citations omitted)); Berger v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bar Ass’n, 983 F.2d 718,
721 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Questions of jurisdiction are fundamental matters which [a court] may
review sua sponte.”).
Article III of the United States Constitution limits a federal court’s exercise of judicial
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power to actual, ongoing “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement subsists throughout all stages of the litigation. U.S. v. Juvenile
Male, 131 S.Ct. 2860, 2864 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“It is a basic
principle of Article III that a justiciable case or controversy must remain extant at all stages of
review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.”). The doctrine of mootness is a corollary
of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement. “The mootness doctrine provides that although
there may be an actual and justiciable controversy at the time the litigation is commenced, once
that controversy ceases to exist, the federal court must dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.” 15 James Wm. Moore et al, Moore’s Federal Practice § 101.9, at 101–238 (3d ed.
2011).
When an inmate files suit against prison officials at the institution of his incarceration
based upon those officials’ wrongful conduct seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and that
inmate is subsequently transferred or released, courts routinely dismiss the declaratory and
injunctive relief claims as moot. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1669–70 (2011) (citations
omitted) (“A number of . . . suits seeking injunctive relief have been dismissed as moot because
the plaintiff was transferred from the institution where the alleged violation took place prior to
adjudication on the merits.”); see also Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that inmate’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were rendered moot upon
inmate’s transfer from the prison about which he complained); Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t of
Corr., 65 F.3d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1995) (inmate’s request for injunctive relief mooted upon
transfer from relevant prison); Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1993) (same). This is
because an inmate’s transfer or release ends the alleged violations of his or her constitutional
rights, which “render[s] the court unable to grant the requested relief.” Berger, 983 F.2d at 724;
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Fredette v. Hemingway, 65 F. A’ppx 929, 931 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that an inmate’s
request for injunctive relief to prevent his transfer to another prison became moot upon the
inmate’s subsequent transfer because “the district court was unable to grant the relief
requested”).
“There is . . . an exception to the mootness doctrine for claims that are capable of
repetition, yet evade review.” Fredette, 65 F. A’ppx at 931. This narrow, capable-of-repetition
exception is limited to situations in which “the challenged action was in its duration too short to
be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration” and “there was a reasonable expectation that
the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
III.
Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, the Undersigned concludes that
Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief are moot. Plaintiff challenges a policy that he alleges four
of the named Defendants have implemented at PCI, the institution where he was formerly
incarcerated. Thus, the Court’s entry of equitable relief in Plaintiff’s favor would have no effect
on Defendants’ behavior toward him because Defendants perform their duties at an institution
where Plaintiff is not incarcerated. Put another way, an entry of equitable relief would
accomplish nothing. This Court does not have jurisdiction to accord Plaintiff with prospective
relief that has no effect or impact on Defendants. In addition, because Plaintiff’s claims for
injunctive relief are PCI-specific and because there is no reasonable expectation that he will be
transferred back to PCI or that he will be subjected to the same action again at WCCCF, the
capable-of-repetition exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply. It is therefore
RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT Plaintiff’s
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claims for injunctive relief.
IV.
In sum, for the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court
DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief. In
addition, Plaintiff is ORDERED to file a notice with the Court WITHIN FOURTEEN (14)
DAYS indicating whether he intends to prosecute the remaining claims in this action. Plaintiff is
advised that failure to timely file a notice could result in dismissal of this action without
prejudice for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that
party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and
Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in
question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and
waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex
Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate
judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district
court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that
defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to
magistrate judge's report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, appellate
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review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994
(6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to specify the
issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation omitted)).

DATE: March 21, 2016

/s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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