Chamberlain v. Cardinal Health et al

Filing 57

ORDER granting 41 Defendant Cardinal Health 220, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge George C. Smith on 12/15/16. (sem)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
TANYA L. CHAMBERLAIN,
Plaintiff,
Case No.: 2:15–CV–1335
JUDGE SMITH
Magistrate Judge Jolson

v.

CARDINAL HEALTH, et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant
Cardinal Health 200, LLC (Doc. 41). Plaintiff opposed Defendant’s Motion (Doc. 42) and
Defendant replied in support (Doc. 44). The Motion is now ripe for review. For the following
reasons, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND

This case arises from the former employment relationship between Tanya Chamberlain
(“Plaintiff”) and Defendant Cardinal Health 200, LLC (“Cardinal”). (Doc. 3, Compl. at 2).
Plaintiff began working at Cardinal in 2006 and resigned in 2013. (Id.). This case specifically
revolves around Plaintiff’s two attempts to obtain a promotion to a Senior Analyst position in the
Inventory Management group, Plaintiff’s attempts to work from home, and Cardinal’s selection
of another employee for a special project.
Plaintiff, a forty-seven year-old African-American woman, began her career with
Cardinal in 2006 as a Collection Coordinator, then moved to a role as a Senior Inventory
Coordinator in 2009. (Doc. 56, Pl.’s Dep. at 30). After a period in the Senior Inventory

Coordinator role, Plaintiff sought a promotion to the Senior Analyst position within the same
division. Plaintiff met with her supervisors, and former defendants, Jansen Plesich (“Plesich”)
and Raul Amado (“Amado”) to discuss how she could advance her career.1 (Id. at 34–36).
Amado and Plesich told Plaintiff that she needed to work on her technical skills and that she
needed to make fewer errors. (Id.). As a result of this advice, Plaintiff took one class offered by
Cardinal on the use of Microsoft Excel. (Id.).
Plaintiff applied for the Senior Analyst position in both 2012 and 2013. (Id. at 38–39).
The position required a bachelor’s degree or equivalent experience. (Doc. 56-14, Senior Analyst
Job Description at PAGEID# 472–73). Plaintiff does not allege that she possesses either of those
requirements, but does note that she was a trainer in her department, that she had performed the
Senior Analyst duties while another employee was on maternity leave, and that Cardinal thanked
her for her work during that period. (Doc. 42, Mem. Opp. at 7–8). In 2012, Plesich sat down
with Plaintiff and told her that she did not receive an interview because she had errors in her
resume. (Id. at 39). Plesich helped Plaintiff re-format her resume but did not point out any
specific errors. (Id. at 39–40). The job was awarded to Honor O’Brien, a white Cardinal
employee. (Id. at 41). Plaintiff applied again in 2013 with the updated resume and received an
interview. (Id.). Plesich and two other Cardinal employees interviewed Plaintiff but did not
select her. (Id.). Plaintiff does not know who was selected instead of her. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that she was subject to a racial slur from Amado at some point during her
employment at Cardinal. (Doc. 42, Mem. Opp. at 4). A Cardinal employee told Amado he
looked different because Amado was growing a goatee. (Id.). Amado waited until he passed the
Plaintiff’s cubicle then told the other employee that he was “being ghetto this week.” (Id.).
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Plesich and Amado were dismissed from this action on November 23, 2015. (See Doc. 34, Op. and Order).

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Plaintiff called the Cardinal employee hotline to report Amado’s comment and sent an email to
Amado’s management and human resources. (Doc. 56, Pl.’s Dep. at 57–58). Amado apologized
to Plaintiff and told her that he did not mean anything by his comment. (Id. at 58). Plaintiff did
not believe his apology to be sincere. (Id.).
Plaintiff also had problems when she attempted to work from home when she had a foot
injury in March 2013.

(Id. at 65).

Plaintiff emailed Debbie Kincaid, a human resources

supervisor, indicating that Plaintiff had been trying to work from home for about a month. (Doc.
42-1, Ex. 16 to Pl.’s Mem. Opp. at PAGEID# 303). Plaintiff worked with the information
technology department (“IT”) to get her computer working on multiple occasions, which
ultimately resulted in IT rebuilding her computer. (Doc. 56, Pl.’s Dep. at 62–63). In June 2013,
Plaintiff noted that she was able to access Cardinal’s system from home. (Doc. 42-1, Ex. 16 to
Pl.’s Mem. Opp. at PAGEID# 306). Plaintiff did not attempt to work from home once she was
able to access Cardinal’s system. (Doc. 56, Pl.’s Dep. at 64).
Last, Plaintiff argues that she did not have the opportunity to work on a special Cardinal
project called the Zupo Query Project (“Zupo Project”). (Id. at 66). Plaintiff was interested in
the Zupo Project because it concerned supply planning and involved Cardinal employees from
out of state. (Id.). Plaintiff does not know how Cardinal selected employees for the Zupo
Project, but Melissa DiMaria, one of Plaintiff’s less-tenured co-workers, was selected and
expressed confusion to Plaintiff as to why she was selected. (Id. at 67). Plaintiff did not recall
the duration of the Zupo Project or if participants received additional compensation, but she
noted that DiMaria did not enjoy her participation. (Id. at 68–69).
Plaintiff gave notice of her resignation on July 31, 2013, because she was upset about not
being promoted and felt that she was being micromanaged. (Id. at 70–72). Plaintiff worked for

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two more days before leaving permanently on August 2, 2013. (Id. at 72). Plaintiff alleges that
she was receiving dirty looks from the managers and felt that she just could not stay at Cardinal.
(Id. at 72–73). Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC and received a right-to-sue letter dated
January 27, 2015. (Doc. 3, Compl. at 5). Plaintiff then brought this action on April 17, 2015,
alleging race discrimination. (Id.).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court’s purpose in considering a summary judgment motion is
not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter” but to “determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). A
genuine issue for trial exists if the Court finds a jury could return a verdict, based on “sufficient
evidence,” in favor of the nonmoving party; evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not
significantly probative,” however, is not enough to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 249–50.
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of presenting the court
with law and argument in support of its motion as well as identifying the relevant portions of
“‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). If this initial
burden is satisfied, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Cox v.
Kentucky Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995) (after burden shifts, nonmovant

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must “produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be resolved by a jury”). In
considering the factual allegations and evidence presented in a motion for summary judgment,
the Court must “afford all reasonable inferences, and construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.
III.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings claims of racial discrimination based on three discrete acts: (1) Cardinal
failed to promote Plaintiff to the Senior Inventory Analyst position; (2) Cardinal would not allow
Plaintiff to access its systems to work from home; and (3) Cardinal did not select Plaintiff for the
Zupo Project. Plaintiff also notes that Amado made a racially based comment to her when he
stated that he “was being ghetto” when he had more facial hair than he normally did.
Plaintiff may prove that she was subject to racial discrimination in violation of Title VII
using either direct or circumstantial evidence. Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th
Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s evidence of Amado’s comment does not constitute evidence of direct
discrimination. Direct evidence of employment discrimination is evidence “‘which, if believed,
requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the
employer’s actions.’” Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 584 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 522 (6th Cir. 2000)). “For example, a facially
discriminatory employment policy or a corporate decision maker’s express statement of a desire
to remove employees in the protected group is direct evidence of discriminatory intent.” Nguyen
v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985); LaPointe v. UAW Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 379–80 (6th Cir.
1993)). Amado’s single comment—that is not alleged to have been stated around or near the

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time of any alleged adverse action—is insufficient to give rise to the conclusion that race was “at
least a motivating factor” in Cardinal’s decisions regarding Plaintiff’s employment.
When there is no direct evidence of discrimination, claims of race discrimination can be
proven under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964
F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1972)); Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2003). It is a plaintiff’s burden
“to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” Id. If a plaintiff succeeds in establishing a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to “to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s [termination].” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
802. If the defendant articulates such a reason, “plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant . . . were
a pretext for discrimination.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
(citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804). The Court will examine each of Plaintiff’s three
claims of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
A.

Failure to Promote
The prima facie case for a claim of failure to promote due to race discrimination consists

of four elements: (1) Plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) she applied for and was
qualified for promotion; (3) she was considered for and denied the promotion; and (4) an
individual of similar qualifications outside of the protected class received the job. Grizzell v.
City of Columbus Div. of Police, 461 F.3d 711, 719 (6th Cir. 2006); White v. Columbus Metro.
Hous. Auth., 429 F.3d 232, 240 (6th Cir. 2005). Where a plaintiff “cannot adduce any evidence
establishing that [she] possessed qualifications similar to those of the people identified by them
as being promoted at their expense,” the district court does “not err in granting summary

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judgment to the defendants on the plaintiff[’s] failure-to-promote claims.” Woods v. Facility
Source, LLC, 640 F. App’x 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2016).
In Woods, one of the plaintiffs sought a more senior position which required a bachelor’s
degree and two to three years of relevant experience. Id. at 487. The plaintiff did not have a
have a high school diploma. Id. Rather, the plaintiff pointed to two other employees who he
claimed did not have bachelor’s degrees. Id. The Sixth Circuit found that plaintiff could not
provide evidence that the other employees lacked the necessary credentials for the positions they
achieved, and thus, that summary judgment on the plaintiff’s failure-to-promote claim was
appropriate. Id. The instant case shares numerous similarities.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff was not qualified for the Senior Inventory Analyst
position because she did not have a bachelor’s degree or equivalent experience. Plaintiff argues
that she met the requirements to “at least . . . get an interview.” Defendant provided a job
description of the “Sr Analyst, Inventory Management” position, noting the following
qualifications: “Bachelor degree, or equivalent experience; 2 - 3 years experience; Proficient in
Microsoft Office; Excellent communication and interpersonal skill.”

(Doc. 56-14, Senior

Analyst Job Description at PAGEID# 472–73). Plaintiff directs the Court to a printout of a
“Cardinal Health Career Opportunities” policy that states three requirements for promotion: (1)
discussion with a supervisor; (2) one year of experience in the employee’s current job; and (3)
meeting a certain standard for performance evaluations and avoiding performance improvement
plans. (Doc. 42-1, Ex. 13 to Mem. Opp. at PAGEID# 298). Plaintiff’s exhibit is clearly
incomplete as it does not include the first page of the document. (Id. (noting “Page 2 of 2”)).
Further, the printout contains general requirements for Cardinal career advancement as the
document makes no reference to the specific job sought by Plaintiff. (Id.). Last, while Plaintiff

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may meet these general requirements, she does not allege that these were the sole requirements
for the job, nor does she deny that a bachelor’s degree or equivalent experience were required for
the position she sought.
Next, Plaintiff points to two other Cardinal employees, Tammy Castle and Kristin
Randles, who received promotions but did not have college degrees. (Doc. 42, Mem. Opp. at 7).
While this may be evidence that a college degree is not required to obtain any promotion at
Cardinal, there is no proof that Castle and Randles received promotions to jobs which required
college degrees.

Further, even assuming the promotions obtained by Castle and Randles

required college degrees or equivalent experience, Plaintiff makes no allegation that Castle or
Randles lacked equivalent experience. Last, Plaintiff admits she had no college degree and
submits no evidence or argument that she had experience equivalent to a college degree.
Plaintiff’s Certificate of Thanks, her experience as a temporary fill-in for the Senior Analyst job,
and her time as a trainer do not establish that she had experience equivalent to a college degree
as a matter of law. Plaintiff does not argue that she met the minimum qualifications for the
position and thus cannot set forth a prima facie case of failure to promote for the Senior Analyst
positions. Thus, based on Woods, summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Defendants on
Plaintiff’s failure to promote claim. Woods, 640 F. App’x at 488.
B.

Inability to Work from Home
Next, Plaintiff claims that Cardinal would not allow her to work from home but allowed

other employees outside of the protected class to do so. Cardinal alleges that this does not
constitute an adverse action, and that even if it does, Plaintiff’s inability to work from home was
due to technical difficulties, not discrimination.
An adverse employment action is “a materially adverse change in the terms of her
employment.” Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885 (6th Cir. 1996). Although a
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reassignment without salary or work hour changes is not normally an adverse action, it may be if
it “constitutes a demotion evidenced by ‘a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits,
significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a
particular situation.’” White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir.
2004), aff’d sub nom. 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (citing Kocsis, 97 F.3d at 886); but see Wade v.
Automation Pers. Servs., Inc., 612 F. App’x 291, 300 (6th Cir. 2015) (shift change by one hour is
not materially adverse).
District courts have consistently held that the inability to work from home generally does
not constitute an adverse action. See, e.g., Byrd v. Vilsack, 931 F. Supp. 2d 27, 41 (D.D.C. 2013)
(no adverse action where refusal of work-from-home request resulted in plaintiff losing seven
and a half hours of pay); Bright v. Copps, 828 F. Supp. 2d 130, 148–49 (D.D.C. 2011) (no
adverse action where employee’s contract required employee to come to the office); Beckham v.
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 736 F. Supp. 2d 130, 149 (D.D.C. 2010) (no adverse action where
plaintiff was denied work-from-home request three times); Homburg v. UPS, No. 05–2144, 2006
WL 2092457, at *9 (D. Kan. July 27, 2006) (requiring a plaintiff to come into the office does not
constitute an adverse employment action and collecting cases); Daniels v. Fed. Reserve Bank of
Chi., No. 98–C–1186, 2006 WL 861969, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2006) (denial of employee’s
request to work from home while recuperating from surgery was not an adverse action under
Title VII even where employees outside of the protected class were able to do so).
Plaintiff first emailed Kincaid on March 21, 2013, explaining that Plaintiff had been
trying to work from home for about a month. (Doc. 42-1, Ex. 16 to Pl.’s Mem. Opp. at
PAGEID# 303). Plaintiff told Kincaid that she had worked with Cardinal IT but that a computer
rebuild and a new computer purchase did not solve her problem. (Id.). Plaintiff also provided an

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email dated June 25, 2013, showing that she had access to Cardinal’s servers from home. (Id. at
PAGEID# 306). The evidence presented is similar to that in Daniels. Here, Plaintiff had a foot
injury and wished to work from home but her attempts to do so were unsuccessful. Although
other employees worked from home, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show an adverse
action. Plaintiff had never worked from home before she attempted to do so in 2013, meaning
this was not a right that was taken away or consistently denied. Simply, denial of Plaintiff’s
ability to work from home, even if intentional, is not an adverse action sufficient to support a
prima facie case of race-based discrimination.
C.

Zupo Query Project
Last, Plaintiff argues that Cardinal’s choice of Melissa DiMaria for the Zupo Project

instead of Plaintiff was discriminatory. Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot make out a prima
facie case of discrimination because Plaintiff has no evidence that she was qualified for the Zupo
Project or that a person outside of her protected class was selected despite having similar or
qualifications.
The Sixth Circuit has no set standard for evaluating alleged discrimination from an
employer’s choice of another employee for a special project. Some courts have used a disparate
treatment analysis, finding that a plaintiff must show that the failure to obtain the assignment is
an adverse action. See, e.g., Hall v. FMR Corp., 667 F. Supp. 2d 185, 199 (D. Mass. 2009)
(noting that assignment brought no additional compensation, changes of title, or
promotions . . . .”). Other courts have found that failure to obtain a special assignment should be
analyzed under a failure to promote framework, requiring the plaintiff to show she applied for
and was qualified for the project, she was considered for and denied the opportunity, and an
individual of similar qualifications outside of the protected class received the opportunity.
Belton v. City of Charlotte, 175 F. App’x 641, 655 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding plaintiff could not
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establish a prima facie case because he provided no evidence that he was qualified for the
opportunity or that employees outside of his class in similar circumstances were given such
opportunities); Haney v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 15-CV-00474, 2016 WL 80554, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 7, 2016) (using failure-to-promote framework in analyzing a plaintiff’s inability to
obtain special assignments); Baltzer v. City of Sun Prairie/Police Dep’t, 725 F. Supp. 1008, 1027
(W.D. Wis. 1989) (“the considerations in promotion cases are sufficiently similar to those in
plaintiffs’ assignment claim to make it appropriate to use for this case the prima facie elements
courts have developed in promotion cases.”).
However, under either framework, Plaintiff’s claim fails due to a lack of evidence.
Plaintiff’s argument and evidence in this section consists of an allegation that she emailed
Kincaid regarding her non-participation once the Zupo Project had already ended. Plaintiff
presents no evidence that she knew of the Zupo Project in order to apply for it, that she was
qualified for the Zupo Project, or that a less-qualified individual was selected instead of her. In
fact, Plaintiff does not provide any evidence regarding the requirements, benefits, or purposes of
the Zupo Project. Although Plaintiff does note that Melissa DiMaria worked on the Zupo Project
and had less experience than Plaintiff, there is no evidence that DiMaria was unqualified or less
qualified for the specific needs of the Zupo Project. Additionally, Plaintiff has presented no
evidence that non-participation on the Zupo Project constituted an adverse action. There is no
evidence that participation in the Zupo Project brought extra compensation, prestige, or
advancement opportunity. For these reasons, the allegations regarding the Zupo Project cannot
form the basis of a claim of discrimination.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Cardinal’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The
Clerk shall REMOVE Document 41 from the Court’s pending motions list. The Clerk shall
ENTER final judgment in favor of Cardinal and REMOVE this case from the Court’s pending
cases list.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
__/s/ George C. Smith
___
GEORGE C. SMITH, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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