Rogers v. The State of Ohio et al

Filing 41

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 24 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Alterik Rogers. It is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion be DENIED. Objections to R&R due by 3/18/2016. Signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King on 3/1/2016. (pes)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

ALTERIK ROGERS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action 2:15-cv-1877
Chief Judge Sargus
Magistrate Judge King

THE STATE OF OHIO, et al.,
Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for
“Judgment on the Pleadings” Against “Defendant Seam (Shawn) Scott”
Pursuant to {Fed.Civ.R.12(C)}, ECF No. 26 (“Plaintiff’s Motion”).

For

the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion be
DENIED.
I.

Factual Allegations and Procedural Background
Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding without the assistance of

counsel, alleges that he was in the custody of the Jefferson County
Jail, Steubenville, Ohio on January 14, 2014.
PAGEID#:30.1

Complaint, ECF No. 3,

Plaintiff alleges that he was handcuffed and not wearing

a seat belt while riding in the back of the patrol car operated by
defendant police officer Sean Scott.

Id.

According to plaintiff,

defendant Scott, who was transporting plaintiff from a court
appearance, was driving erratically and at high speeds.

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The Complaint is verified.

Id. at PAGEID#:32.

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Id.

As he

approached the Jefferson County Jail’s garage, defendant Scott
allegedly accelerated and crashed into the back of a parked bus inside
the garage (“the incident”).
not taken to a hospital.

Id.

Id.

Despite his requests, plaintiff was

After he returned to his cell in the

Jefferson County Jail, plaintiff complained of injuries and again
asked to be taken “to medical.”

Id.

Plaintiff was “escorted to

medical to see a Nurse (Name Unknown), she stated ‘there is nothing we
can do for you, I agree with the officer’s [sic] your bond is to [sic]
high to escort you to the hospital.’”

Id.

According to plaintiff, he

still suffers from injuries caused by the incident.

Id. at

PAGEID#:30-31.
Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 13,
2015.

He alleges that he suffered injury during the course of the

incident and was thereafter denied medical care by personnel at the
Jefferson County Jail.

See generally Complaint.

Plaintiff names as a

defendant, inter alios, defendant Scott in his “Official/or Individual
Capacity.”

See id.; Order, ECF No. 2 (granting leave to proceed in

forma pauperis); Report and Recommendation on Initial Screen of the
Complaint, ECF No. 4 (recommending that the State of Ohio be dismissed
from the action); Order, ECF No. 8 (adopting and affirming report and
recommendation).

Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, monetary damages from

defendant Scott “for pain and suffering and mental anguish do [sic] to
the neglect and disregard to my personal safety, and denial of medical
treatment with deliberate indifference.”

Complaint, PAGEID#:31.

Defendant Scott has responded to the Complaint, raising several

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defenses.

ECF No. 10, p. 3 (“Answer”).

Plaintiff now moves for judgment on the pleadings, see
Plaintiff’s Motion, which defendant Scott opposes.
(“Opposition”).

ECF No. 31

Plaintiff has not filed a reply in support of

Plaintiff’s Motion.
II.

Standard
A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attacks the sufficiency of the
pleadings and is reviewed under the same standard applicable to a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
F.3d 509, 511–12 (6th Cir. 2001).

Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., 249

See also Gascho v. Glob. Fitness

Holdings, LLC, 918 F. Supp.2d 708, 716 (S.D. Ohio 2013).

“‘For

purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded
material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be
taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party
is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.’”

Fritz v. Charter Tp.

of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007)).

When a

“plaintiff moves for judgment on the pleadings, the motion should be
granted if, ‘on the undenied facts alleged in the complaint and
assuming as true all the material allegations of fact in the answer,
the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”

Lowden v.

Cty. of Clare, 709 F. Supp. 2d 540, 546 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting
United States v. Blumenthal, 315 F.2d 351, 352 (3d Cir. 1963)).

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The Court also notes that plaintiff is proceeding in this case
without the assistance of counsel.

Generally, pleadings by pro se

plaintiffs are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.”

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

Nevertheless, courts should not interpret procedural rules “so as to
excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

McNeil v.

See also Wells v. Brown, 891

F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989) (“Neither this Court nor other courts,
however, have been willing to abrogate basic pleading essentials in
pro se suits.”).
III. Discussion
Plaintiff sues defendant Scott in both his individual and
official capacities.

Complaint, PAGEID#27, 31.

A claim brought

against a government employee in his individual capacity seeks to hold
the employee personally liable for actions taken under color of state
law.

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985).

However, a claim

brought against a government employee in his or her official capacity
is the equivalent of a claim brought against the governmental entity
itself.

Id. at 165 66.

The Court will first turn to the individual

capacity claim.
A.

Individual Capacity

Plaintiff alleges that he was handcuffed and not wearing a seat
belt while riding in the back of the patrol car operated by defendant
Scott. PAGEID#:30.

According to plaintiff, defendant Scott, who was

transporting plaintiff from a court appearance, was driving

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erratically and at high speeds.

Id.

As he approached the Jefferson

County Jail’s garage, defendant Scott allegedly accelerated and
crashed into the back of a parked bus inside the garage.

According to

plaintiff, defendant Scott never took him to a hospital despite
plaintiff’s requests to do so.

Id.

Plaintiff goes on to allege that

he suffered injuries arising from the incident.

Id. at PAGEID#30-31.

Defendant Scott admits that he transported plaintiff from a court
appearance and that plaintiff was handcuffed in the backseat of a
cruiser without wearing a seatbelt.

Answer, ¶ 2.

He also admits that

“there was a very small impact between his vehicle” and another
vehicle already in the sally port.

Id.

However, defendant Scott

specifically denies that he was driving erratically or at high speeds.
Id.

Defendant Scott also maintains that the impact “caused no damage

to either vehicle nor did it cause any injury to Defendant or
Plaintiff.”

Id.

Defendant Scott further denies that plaintiff

complained of injury or asked to be taken to the hospital.

Id.

See

also id. at ¶ 4 (denying, inter alia, averments that plaintiff
requested medical care after the incident).

In short, defendant Scott

disputes the allegations contained in the Complaint, offering his own
version of the events.

Taking defendant Scott’s allegations as true,

the Court cannot say that plaintiff is entitled to judgment on the
pleadings based on the present record.

See, e.g., Fritz, 592 F.3d at

722; Lowden, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
Accordingly, as it relates to the claims against defendant Scott
in his individual capacity, Plaintiff’s Motion is not well-taken.
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B.

Official Capacity

Plaintiff also sues defendant Scott in his official capacity.

As

noted earlier, a claim brought against a government employee in his or
her official capacity is the equivalent of a claim brought against the
governmental entity itself, in this case Jefferson County.

A

governmental entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory simply because its employees engaged in
unconstitutional conduct.
U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436

Rather, a plaintiff seeking to prevail in a §

1983 suit against a governmental entity must first prove, of course,
that a constitutional violation actually occurred, and then prove that
a policy or custom of the governmental entity was the “moving force”
behind the alleged constitutional violation.

Id. at 694.

Such a

policy or custom may consist of: “(1) the [governmental entity’s]
legislative enactments or official agency policies; (2) actions taken
by officials with final decision making authority; (3) a policy of
inadequate training or supervision; or (4) a custom of tolerance of or
acquiescence of federal rights violations.”

Thomas v. City of

Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005).

Under Monell, a

custom is defined as a practice “so permanent and well settled as to
constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Monell, 436 U.S.
at 691 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“In turn, the

notion of ‘law’ must include deeply embedded traditional ways of
carrying out [governmental] policy.”

Cash v. Hamilton County Dep’t of

Adult Prob., 388 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir.2004)(internal quotation marks

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omitted).

“It must reflect a course of action deliberately chosen

from among various alternatives. In short, a ‘custom’ is a ‘legal
institution’ not memorialized by written law.”

Id.

A “plaintiff

bears a heavy burden in proving municipal liability, and he cannot
rely solely on a single instance to infer a policy of deliberate
indifference.”

Thomas, 398 F.3d at 433.

In the case presently before the Court, plaintiff does not allege
the existence of an improper county policy or custom.
Complaint.

See generally

Moreover, although plaintiff had the opportunity to amend

the Complaint in order to assert such allegations, see Report and
Recommendation, ECF No. 35, p. 7; Order, ECF No. 37, he has not filed
an amended complaint.

Accordingly, as it relates to his claims

against defendant Scott in his official capacity, Plaintiff’s Motion
is not well-taken.
WHEREUPON, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion for
“Judgment on the Pleadings” Against “Defendant Sean (Shawn) Scott”
Pursuant to {Fed.Civ.R.12(C)}, ECF No. 26, be DENIED.
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report
and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file
and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation,
specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part
thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto.
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

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Response to objections

must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy
thereof.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
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The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to
the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to
de novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the
decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation.
See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of
Teachers, Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

March 1, 2016

s/Norah McCann King
Norah McCann King
United States Magistrate Judge

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