Webber v. J-W Wireline Company et al
Filing
42
OPINION AND ORDER granting in part 29 Motion to Stay or Transfer. This case is hereby STAYED until the 1/21/2016 status conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King on 10/20/2015. (pes)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
RONALD WEBBER,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:15-cv-02084
Judge Marbley
Magistrate Judge King
v.
J-W WIRELINE COMPANY,
et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a collective and class action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”), and under the state
wage and hour laws of Ohio and Pennsylvania in connection with
defendants’ alleged failure to pay overtime compensation. See Amended
Complaint, ECF No. 34. This matter is now before the Court on
defendants’ Motion to Stay or Transfer to the Western District of
Texas, ECF No. 29 (“Motion to Stay or Transfer”). The Motion to Stay
or Transfer is unopposed.
Facts
The Complaint in this action was filed in this Court on May 19,
2015. Plaintiff, a wireline operator and wireline service supervisor,
Amended Complaint, ¶ 24, brings this action on behalf of himself and
other similarly-situated “wireline employees.” Id. at ¶¶ 25, 46. Named
as defendants are J-W Wireline Company, J-W Admin Company, and J-W
1
Energy Company.1
The Motion to Stay or Transfer refers to an action filed in the
Western District of Texas, Parrott v. J-W Wireline Co., et al., Case
No. 5:15-cv-329 (W.D. Tex.)(“Parrott”).2 Parrott, which was filed on
April 24, 2015, names as defendant J-W Wireline Company3 and also
asserts claims for overtime compensation under the FLSA on behalf of
“all oilfield personnel employed by J-W Wireline Company. . . who held
. . . the job titles: TCP Specialist, Pipe Recovery Engineer, and/or
Pipe Recovery Specialist.” Parrott, Amended Complaint, ¶ 6. A
nationwide collective class has been conditionally certified in
Parrott. Id., Order, ECF No. 23. A scheduling order, which establishes
a discovery completion date of January 13, 2016, and a trial date of
May 16, 2016, has been entered. Parrott, Scheduling and Docket Control
Order, ECF No. 19.
Defendants in this action represent that their principal place of
business is located in Texas, as are their documents and the witnesses
who are familiar with defendants’ compensation policies and practices.
Affidavit of Julie Walker, attached to Motion to Stay or Transfer.
1
FTS International, Inc., was also originally named as a defendant but has
since been dismissed from the action. Stipulation of Dismissal, ECF No. 27.
2
Although the Motion to Stay or Transfer states that a copy of the Parrott
Complaint is attached as an exhibit to the Motion to Stay or Transfer, see
id. at PageID# 119, no such exhibit is in fact attached to the motion.
However, this Court has reviewed the public docket and records filed in
Parrott. See https://ecf.txwd.uscourts.gov.
3
J-W Energy Company was also named as an original defendant, but has since
been dismissed from Parrott. Parrott, Oral Order Granting Oral Motion to
Dismiss ((Sept. 24, 2015).
2
Standards
Stay
A district court’s power to stay proceedings is “incidental
to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition
of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for
itself, for counsel and for litigants.” Landis v. North American
Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). The party seeking a stay of
proceedings has the burden of establishing both the “pressing
need for delay” and “that neither the other party nor the public
will suffer harm from entry of the order.” Ohio Envtl. Council
v. United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, 565 F.2d 393, 396 (6th Cir. 1977). See also
Landis, 299 U.S. at 255 (stating that the movant “must make out
a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go
forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for
which he prays will work damage to someone else”).
In determining whether or not to grant a stay of
proceedings, a court may consider the following factors: “[1]
the potentiality of another case having a dispositive effect on
the case to be stayed, [2] the judicial economy to be saved by
waiting on a dispositive decision, [3] the public welfare, and
[4] the hardship/prejudice to the party opposing the stay, given
its duration.” Michael v. Ghee, 325 F. Supp.2d 829, 831 (N.D.
Ohio 2004) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 255). See also Ferrell v.
3
Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., Inc., No. 1:01-cv-447, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25358, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2005) (“There is no precise
test in this Circuit for when a stay is appropriate. However,
district courts often consider the following factors: the need
for a stay, the balance of potential hardship to the parties and
the public, and the promotion of judicial economy.”).
Transfer
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “[f]or the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all
parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2015). An action “might
have been brought” in a court when (1) the court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the action; (2) venue is proper in the court; and
(3) the defendant is amenable to process issuing out of the transferee
court. See Kay v. Nat’l City Mortg. Co., 494 F.Supp.2d 845, 849 (S.D.
Ohio 2007). Venue is proper in a district in which a “substantial part
of the events giving rise to the claim arose,” and venue may be proper
in multiple districts. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2015); see also First of
Michigan Corp. v. Bramlet, 141 F.3d 260, 263 (6th Cir. 1998).
Once it is determined that the case might have been brought
before the proposed transferee court, “the issue becomes whether
transfer is justified under the balance of the language of § 1404(a),
which analyzes whether transfer is justified for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.” See Kay, 494
4
F.Supp.2d at 850 (quotations omitted). Factors to consider include
access to sources of proof, cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses,
docket congestion, convenience to both the parties, and systemic
integrity and fairness. See id. (citations omitted); Cherokee Export
Co. v. Chrysler Int’l Corp., No. 96-1745, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1683,
at *7-8 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1998). The moving party bears the burden of
establishing the need to transfer the case; however, the decision to
transfer falls within the court’s discretion. See id.
Discussion
The Motion to Stay or Transfer asks that this litigation be
stayed pending resolution of Parrott because this action “involve[es]
two of the same defendants, similar putative collective action
members,4 the same FLSA claims, and the same core operative facts. . .
. Discovery in the two actions will certainly be duplicative.” Id. at
PAGEID# 119. Because Parrott is more advanced, defendants argue, “the
interests of federal comity and judicial economy strongly weigh in
favor of staying Plaintiff Webber’s collective action claim, or this
entire case, pending resolution of” Parrott. Id. at PAGEID 120.
Alternatively, the Motion to Stay or Transfer asks that this
litigation be transferred to the Western District of Texas in light of
the pendency of the more-advanced Parrott, and because the presence of
defendants, their documents and their witnesses in that district would
serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and would relieve
4
Although it is not entirely clear to this Court that the “wireline employees”
referred to in the Amended Complaint filed in this case are coextensive with
the categories of employees referred to in Parrott, defendants represent that
Parrott includes “all of the collective action members sought to be covered
by the Complaint in this case.” Motion to Stay or Transfer, PAGEID# 121.
5
defendants’ financial burden in defending against the claims asserted
in this action. Id. at PAGEID# 125-26. To require this Court “to
handle virtually the same case, involving similar parties and issues,
would unnecessarily burden the judicial system.” Id. at PAGEID# 12627.
Although this action “might have been brought” in the Western
District of Texas, see 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),5 the Court concludes that,
because this action includes claims not included in Parrott (i.e.,
claims under the wage and hour laws of Ohio and Pennsylvania),
transfer of the action to the Western District of Texas is
unwarranted.
However, to actively litigate the claims in this action at this
juncture would be a waste of judicial resources and would subject
defendants to an unreasonable risk of duplication of effort.
Considering that plaintiff does not oppose the Motion to Stay or
Transfer, it does not appear that at least a temporary stay of this
action in deference to Parrott would work to plaintiff’s prejudice.
Under all these circumstances, the Court therefore concludes that a
stay of this action is warranted.
The discovery completion period in Parrott is scheduled to close
on January 13, 2016. Parrott, Scheduling and Docket Control Order, ECF
5
The Western District of Texas would have subject matter jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s FLSA claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental
jurisdiction over the related state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Venue would also be proper in the Western District of Texas by virtue of
defendants’ presence in that district and because a significant part of the
events giving rise to the claims occurred within the Western District of
Texas. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Finally, defendants do not disagree that they
are amenable to service of process in the Western District of Texas.
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No. 19. The Court concludes that a stay of this action, at least until
that time, is appropriate. This Court will conduct a status conference
with counsel for the parties, on January 21, 2016, at 2:00 p.m.
At
that conference, the parties will address a continuance of the stay,
and the extent to which discovery conducted in Parrott may be used in
this action.
Accordingly, the unopposed Motion to Stay or Transfer to the
Western District of Texas, ECF No. 29, is GRANTED in part. This case
is hereby STAYED until the January 21, 2016 status conference.
October 20, 2015
s/ Norah McCann King___
Norah McCann King
United States Magistrate Judge
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