Holmes v. Warden, Lebanon Correctional Insititution
Filing
13
OPINION AND ORDER adopting Report and Recommendations re 11 Report and Recommendations.. Signed by Judge James L. Graham on 10/7/2016. (ds)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
SCOTT HOLMES,
Petitioner,
Case No. 2:15-cv-02605
JUDGE GRAHAM
Magistrate Judge King
v.
WARDEN, LEBANON
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
On August 26, 2016, the United States Magistrate Judge recommended that this action
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be dismissed as barred by the one-year
statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 11).
Petitioner has objected to that recommendation. Objection (ECF No. 12). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b), this Court has conducted a de novo review. For the reasons that follow, Petitioner’s
Objection (ECF No. 12) is OVERRULED. The Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 11) is
ADOPTED and AFFIRMED. This action is hereby DISMISSED as barred by the one-year
statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
On September 10, 2010, Petitioner pleaded guilty to five counts of rape. On October 28,
2010, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate term of 45 years in prison, and
Petitioner did not file a timely appeal from his conviction. The Petition appears to have been
executed by Petitioner on July 2, 2015.
Petition (PageID# 15). The Petition alleges that
Petitioner was denied his right to counsel in connection with his appeal as of right (claim one);
that he was denied equal protection and due process (claim two); and that he did not knowingly,
intelligently, or voluntarily enter his guilty pleas and the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion to withdraw those pleas (claim three).
As noted, the Magistrate Judge
recommended dismissal of Petitioner’s claims as untimely.
In objecting to that recommendation, Petitioner asserts that he is actually innocent, and
contends that he was forced or threatened into pleading guilty while under duress. Petitioner
specifically represents that the trial court did not advise him of his right to appeal. In addition,
Petitioner complains that the state courts refused to provide him a copy of his guilty pleas and
the sentencing transcript. He goes on to complain that, on October 23, 2012, i.e., almost two
years after judgment was entered against him, the state appellate court appointed Attorney
Jeffrey Mullens, of the Coshocton County Public Defender’s Office, to represent him on appeal,
but that Mullens thereafter withdrew without having filed an appellate brief. Objection (ECF
No. 12-1, PageID# 284). Petitioner also argues that his judgment is void under Ohio law and
that his criminal case should be dismissed because of a conflict of interest on the part of the trial
judge. Id. Recognizing the delay in the filing of the Petition, Petitioner contends that equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations should be applied because he has diligently pursued relief, and
has tried to exercise his right to appeal his conviction since October 28, 2010. Finally, Petitioner
argues that to apply the statute of limitations would amount to the unconstitutional suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus.
In support of his objections, Petitioner attaches certain documents, including a copy of
what appears to be a portion of the docket in his criminal case. On October 23, 2012, one Judge
Rinfret appointed the Coshocton County Public Defender to serve as counsel for Petitioner “for
purposes of appeal.” Objection (ECF No. 12-1, PageID# 289). On October 29, 2012, Jeffrey A.
Mullen, an attorney with the Coshocton County Public Defender, filed a motion to withdraw
from Petitioner’s appeal, indicating that he had been Petitioner’s trial counsel and Petitioner had
2
alleged the denial of the effective assistance of trial counsel. Id. (PageID# 291). It appears that
the motion to withdraw was granted by the state court of appeals. Id. (PageID# 290).1 Petitioner
also includes a copy of his motion for a delayed appeal, filed on January 2, 2014, pursuant to
Ohio Appellate Rule 5. Id. (PageID# 289); see also Return of Writ (ECF No. 7-1, PageID# 13133). Petitioner also submits a copy of his January 23, 2014, motion for the preparation of a
transcript of proceedings at state expense, which was denied on February 12, 2014, by one Judge
Batchelor. Objection (ECF No. 12-1, PageID# 289). 2
At the outset, the Court summarily addresses certain of Petitioner’s objections. “The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected arguments that a void state court sentence renders the
judgment not final for AEDPA statute of limitations purposes.” Gregley v. Bradshaw, No.
1:14CV50, 2014 WL 4699409, at *14 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2014)(citing Mackey v. Warden,
Lebanon Correctional Institution, 525 Fed. Appx. 357, 361 (6th Cir. 2013)).
Moreover,
Petitioner’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea raises only an issue of state law and does not provide a basis for federal habeas corpus
relief. See Field v. Turner, No. 1:13CV1415, 2015 WL 10552255, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 19,
2015)(citing Akemon v. Brunsman, No. C-1-06-166, 2007 WL 2891012, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
28, 2007)). Finally, Petitioner argues in his objections that to apply the statute of limitations
would amount to the unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. “Like every other
court of appeals to address the issue,” however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has held that application of the one-year statute of limitations in habeas corpus cases does
not constitute an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Hill v. Dailey, 557
F.3d 437, 438 (6th Cir. 2009)(citations omitted).
1
There is no indication that substitute appellate counsel was appointed.
The state court of appeals denied Petitioner’s motion for a delayed appeal on March 3, 2014. Return of Writ (ECF
No. 7-1, PageID# 135).
2
3
Considering the issue of the timeliness of the filing of the Petition, the Court agrees with
the Magistrate Judge that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), Petitioner’s judgment of conviction
became final on November 26, 2010, i.e., when the time for filing a timely appeal of the trial
court’s October 28, 2010, judgment of conviction expired. The statute of limitations began to
run the following day and expired one year later, on November 27, 2011. Petitioner waited more
than three years and seven months later, until July 2, 2015, to execute the Petition. Further, his
state court filings did not toll the running of the statute of limitations, because he filed all such
actions after the statute of limitations had already expired. See Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d
598, 602 (6th Cir. 2003).
However, the one-year limitations period is not jurisdictional and may be subject to
equitable tolling, although equitable tolling is granted only sparingly in habeas cases. Hall v.
Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., 662 F.3d 745, 749 (6th Cir. 2011). A petitioner who invokes
equitable tolling must establish that (1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented him from filing in a timely fashion.
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 641, 649 (2010)(citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418
(2005)). That petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to equitable tolling.
Ata v. Scutt, 662 F.3d 736, 741 (6th Cir. 2011).
The Supreme Court has allowed equitable tolling where a claimant actively pursued
judicial remedies by filing a timely, but defective, pleading or where he was induced or tricked
by his opponent's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass. Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). Where the party failed to exercise due diligence in preserving
his legal rights, courts are much less forgiving. Id.; Jurado v. Burt, 337 F.3d 638, 642–13 (6th
Cir. 2003). A prisoner's pro se incarcerated status, lack of knowledge regarding the law, and
4
limited access to the prison's law library or to legal materials do not provide a sufficient
justification to apply equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Hall, 662 F.3d at 751 (citation
omitted). These are conditions typical for many prisoners and do not rise to the level of
exceptional circumstances. Allen v. Yukins, 366 F.3d 396, 403 (6th Cir. 2004). Similarly, bad
advice from a fellow inmate or other non-lawyers does not constitute grounds for equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations. Allison v. Smith, No. 2:14–cv–10423, 2014 WL 2217238, at
*5 (E.D. Mich. May 29, 2014) (citing Smith v. Beightler, 49 Fed.Appx. 579, 580–81 (6th Cir.
2002); United States v. Cicero, 14 F.3d 199, 204–05 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Henderson v. Johnson, 1
F.Supp.2d 650, 655 (N.D. Tex. 1998)). A “[p]etitioner's reliance on jailhouse lawyers is not an
extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” Arriaga v. Gonzales, No. 13–1372–
AG (JPR), 2014 WL 5661023, at 12 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2014) (citations omitted). “Generally, a
habeas petitioner's reliance on unreasonable or incorrect legal advice from his attorney is not a
valid ground for equitable tolling of the statute of limitation.” Brown v. Bauman, No. 2:10–cv–
264, 2012 WL 1229397, at *9 (W.D. Mich. April 12, 2012) (citations omitted). “The fact that
Petitioner may be ignorant of the law and instead chose to rely on counsel, in itself, does not
provide a basis for equitable tolling. Neither a prisoner's pro se status nor his lack of knowledge
of the law constitute[s] extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling.” Taylor v.
Palmer, No. 2:14–cv–14107, 2014 WL 6669474, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 11, 2014) (citing
Rodriguez v. Elo, 195 F.Supp.2d 934, 936 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S.
295, 311 (2005) (“[W]e have never accepted pro se representation alone or procedural ignorance
as an excuse for prolonged inattention when a statute's clear policy calls for promptness”)).
“Attorney miscalculation is simply not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling, particularly in the
5
postconviction context where prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel.” Lawrence v.
Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007) (citation omitted).
In Holland, 560 U.S. 631, the Supreme Court held that egregious misconduct by an
attorney might constitute an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations, but the Court also noted that a “garden variety claim of excusable neglect,”
such as a miscalculation that leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline, would not justify the
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Id. at 651-52 (citations omitted). The record in this
action fails to reflect any egregious misconduct by defense counsel that would justify equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations.
Petitioner claims that he did not know about, and was not advised of, his right to appeal.
In DiCenzi v. Rose, 452 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2006), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that, where a criminal defendant is not advised of and does not know of his
right to appeal, claims relating to events that occurred at the time of sentencing may be timely
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) if the petitioner acted reasonably diligently in learning about
his right to appeal:
The proper task in a case such as this one is to determine when a
duly diligent person in petitioner's circumstances would have
discovered [his right to an appeal]. After that date, petitioner was
entitled to further delay (whether in actually making the discovery,
or in acting on a previously made discovery, or for any other
reason whatsoever), so long as he filed his petition within one
year of the date in which the discovery would have been made
in the exercise of due diligence.
****
[T]he date on which the limitations clock began to tick is a factspecific issue the resolution of which depends, among other things,
on the details of [a defendant's] post-sentence conversation with
his lawyer and on the conditions of his confinement in the period
after [sentencing].
6
Wims [. United States], 225 F.3d [186,] 190–91 [(2nd Cir. 2000)]
(citing Easterwood v. Champion, 213 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.
2000) (taking into account “the realities of the prison system” in
determining due diligence)).
Id. at 470–471 (emphasis added). “[P]etitioner bears the burden of proving that he exercised due
diligence, in order for the statute of limitations to begin running from the date he discovered the
factual predicate of his claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).” Id., at 471 (citing Lott v.
Coyle, 261 F.3d 594, 605–06 (6th Cir. 2001)). The Court also applies DiCenzi v. Rose, in
conjunction with Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (2005), which requires consideration of
a petitioner's exercise of diligence. Thus, a petition will not be deemed timely where the
petitioner fails to act with reasonable diligence. See Neu v. Brunsman, No. 2:09-cv-257, 2010
WL 5600902, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 12, 2010) (same) (citing Pierce v. Banks, No. 2:09-cv00590, 2009 WL 2579202 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2009); Korbel v. Jeffries, No. 2:06-cv-625, 2008
WL 269626 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 2008); Ward v. Timmerman–Cooper, No. 2:07-cv-41, 2008 WL
214411 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 23, 2008)).
“Applying DiCenzi and Johnson, Petitioner must
demonstrate either that he exercised due diligence in discovering the lack of notice of his right to
appeal, the fact on which his conviction-based claims are predicated, or that he filed for habeas
within one-year from the time a person exercising due diligence in Petitioner's position would
have discovered that fact.” McIntosh v. Hudson, 632 F. Supp. 2d 725, 734 (N.D. Ohio July 10,
2009) (“A person in Petitioner's position exercising due diligence would have acted much
sooner, seeking out his rights and remedies rather than waiting [more than two and one half years
after his conviction] for a law clerk . . . to ‘[notice] that [he] was never informed of his right to
appeal[.]’”) Moreover, lack of actual notice and “ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated
pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse [late] filing.” Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714–
7
15 (5th Cir. 1999). See also United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 218 (6th Cir. 1999); Rose v.
Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1991).
In Petitioner’s state court proceedings, Judge Richard I. Evans issued a Judgment Entry
on Sentencing on October 28, 2010. Return of Writ (ECF No. 7-1, PageID# 59-62). Petitioner
filed a “Motion in Support of Concurrent Sentencing” with the state trial court on June 20, 2012.
The trial court deemed that motion as a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to O.R.C. §
2953.21(A), and denied that motion on July 31, 2012. Id. (PageID# 76-78). Petitioner filed a
notice of appeal from that decision on October 19, 2012, id. (PageID# 79), and the state court of
appeals dismissed that appeal as untimely. Id. (PageID# 90). On November 15, 2012, Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the state court of appeals, in which he expressly stated
that he was challenging the sentencing in his original case pursuant to Ohio Appellate Rule 5(A).
Return of Writ (ECF No. 7-1, PageID# 91.) On January 17, 2013, the appellate court denied the
Motion for Reconsideration. Id. (PageID# 93). Petitioner filed a timely appeal to the Ohio
Supreme Court. Id. (PageID# 94). On May 22, 2013, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to
accept jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 7.08(B)(4). Id. (PageID# 117). On
November 18, 2013, the United States Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for a writ of
certiorari. Id. (PageID# 125).
Meanwhile, on October 19, 2012, Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to Resentence. Id.
(PageID# 83). According to the documents submitted by Petitioner in connection with his
objection, on October 23, 2012, the trial court appointed Petitioner’s trial counsel to represent
Petitioner for the purpose of filing of an appeal. The record does not indicate that counsel filed
an appeal and it appears that the state court of appeals may have granted that counsel’s October
8
29, 2012, motion for leave to withdraw, although it is unclear when that action was taken.
Objection (ECF No. 12-1, PageID# 290).
On January 2, 2014, [Petitioner] filed a motion of delay of appeal
pursuant to App.R. 5. [See Return of Writ (ECF No. 7-1, PageID#
131-33).] We dismissed [Petitioner’s]appeal on March 3, 2014 for
failure to file a docketing statement and the judgment entry being
appealed. See State of Ohio v. Scott A. Holmes, 5th Dist.
Coshocton No.2014CA0001.3 [See Return of Writ (ECF No. 7-1,
PageID# 135-36)].
On March 6, 2014, [Petitioner] filed a notice of appeal and motion
for delayed appeal. On April 18, 2014, this court denied his motion
for appeal. See State of Ohio v. Scott A. Holmes, 5th Dist.
Coshocton No.2014CA0005. [See Return of Writ (ECF No. 7-1,
(PageID# 139-44)].
On April 7, 2014, [Petitioner] filed a Petition for Writ of
Mandamus requesting this court grant [Petitioner] the right to
appeal his sentence in his criminal case. [See Return of Writ (ECF
No. 7-1, PageID# 147-51)]. On October 20, 2014, this court denied
the petition for writ of mandamus. See State ex rel. Holmes v.
State, 5th Dist. Coshocton No.2014CA0010, 2014–Ohio–4642.
[See Return of Writ (ECF No. 7-1, PageID# 161-66)].
On July 24, 2014, [Petitioner] filed in the trial court a pro se
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. [See Return of Writ (ECF No.
7-1, PageID# 179-80)]. He also filed a motion for counsel. The
trial court denied his motion to withdraw guilty plea and motion
for counsel by judgment entry on August 21, 2014. [See Return of
Writ (ECF No. 7-1, PageID# 181)].
State v. Holmes, No. 2014CA0020, 2015 WL 628336, at *1 (Ohio App. 5th Dist. Feb. 10, 2015).
On February 10, 2015, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. On June 24, 2015, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept
jurisdiction of the appeal from that decision. State v. Holmes, 142 Ohio St.3d 1519 (2015).
Neither Petitioner’s plea agreement nor the transcript of his guilty plea or sentencing
hearing have been made a part of the record before this Court, and this Court is unable to
3
On March 27, 2014, the appellate court denied Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of that decision. Return of
Writ (ECF No. 701, PageID# 138.)
9
determine from the record whether either the trial court or defense counsel advised Petitioner of
his right to appeal or of the time in which to file a notice of appeal. Still, even accepting as true
Petitioner’s allegation that he did not know about and was not advised of his right to appeal in
October 2010, when the trial court imposed sentence, Petitioner fails to explain what action, if
any, he took, to learn about his right to appeal.
Petitioner does not identify any factor that prevented him from learning about his right to
appeal. See Baker v. Wilson, No. 5:06-cv-1547, 2009 WL 313325, at *12 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 6,
2009) (concluding that petitioner failed to act diligently in waiting three years to learn about his
right to appeal, noting that “[c]ourts in this Circuit have recognized that when a petitioner has
access to retained counsel, due diligence requires that he ask his counsel about his appellate
rights” and “[a] period not greater than 90 days is a reasonable amount of time in which to
inquire of counsel.”) (citing Ramos v. Wilson, No. 1:06CV901, 2008 WL 2556725 (N.D. Ohio
2008)); see also Ward v. Timmerman-Cooper, No. 2:07-cv-41, 2008 WL 214411, at *5 (S.D.
Ohio Jan. 23, 2008) (no due diligence where the petitioner “apparently made no effort to learn
about his right to appeal for more than seven years from the date of his sentencing[.]”) “Due
diligence requires the petitioner to pursue his rights [.]” Steward v. Moore, 555 F. Supp. 2d 858,
869 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (no due diligence where the petitioner “had free access to law libraries,
the public defender's office, and the court for over six years prior to the date he says he
discovered his ability to challenge the conviction”).
Even those not versed in the law recognize the centuries-old
maxim that “ignorance of the law is no excuse.” This maxim,
deeply embedded in our American legal tradition, reflects a
presumption that citizens know the requirements of the law. The
benefits of such a presumption are manifest. To allow an ignorance
of the law excuse would encourage and reward indifference to the
law. Further, the difficulty in proving a defendant's subjective
knowledge of the law would hamper criminal prosecutions.
10
United States v. Baker, 197 F. 3d at 218.
As the Court has already noted, Petitioner does not identify any factor that prevented him
from learning of his right to appeal during the approximate 1 ½ years between his sentencing in
October 2010 and June 2012, when he filed his Motion in Support of Concurrent Sentencing.
Moreover, the record reflects that Petitioner must have known about his right to appeal at least as
of June 20, 2012, when he filed his Motion in Support of Concurrent Sentencing, because that
filing was based, at least in part, on the fact that an “appeal as a matter of right” had not been
filed in his case. Return of Writ (ECF No. 7-1, PageID# 72)(“‘. . . a defendant who is convicted
of or pleads guilty to a felony may appeal as a matter of right the sentence imposed upon the
defendant . . .’ Furthermore this defendant challenges that if the case has not been appealed[,] the
trial court maintains sentencing jurisdiction. . . .”). The fact that Petitioner was aware of his right
to an appeal is also evident in his November 15, 2012, motion to reconsider the dismissal of his
appeal, as untimely, from the trial court’s dismissal of the Motion in Support of Concurrent
Sentencing. Id. (PageID# 91)(“This Appellant has never appealed his case and the appeal is
presented in accordance with App. R. 5(A). . . . This Appellant is challenging sentencing in the
original case.”). As noted supra, Petitioner failed to file a timely appeal from the trial court’s
dismissal of his Motion in Support of Concurrent Sentencing.
State v. Holmes, No.
2014CA0020, 2015 WL 628336, at *1 (Ohio App. 5th Dist. Feb. 10, 2015).
Moreover, it is clear that Petitioner knew about his right to appeal at the time he filed that
motion in June 2012, yet he did not act diligently in pursuing his rights. He failed to timely
appeal the trial court’s July 31, 2012, denial of his Motion in Support of Concurrent Sentencing.
It was not until January 2014 that Petitioner filed a motion for a delayed appeal, Return of Writ
(ECF N0. 7-1, PageID# 131-33), which the state court of appeals denied on April 18, 2014. Id.
11
(PageID# 145-46). It does not appear that Petitioner filed an appeal from that denial. The
Petition was executed on July 2, 2015 - more than one year and seven months after the United
States Supreme Court’s November 18, 2013, denial of his petition for a writ of certiorari, in
which Petitioner claimed to be pursuing his right to appeal, and more than one year and two
months after the appellate court’s April 18, 2014, denial of his motion for a delayed appeal.
Petitioner offers no explanation, or justification, for such delay.
Thus, this Court is not
persuaded that the record reflects either that Petitioner acted diligently or that this action is
timely under DiCenzi v. Rose, 452 F.3d at 465.
The one-year statute of limitations may also be equitably tolled upon a “credible showing
of actual innocence.” Souter v. James, 395 F.3d 577, 602 (6th Cir. 2005). “[A] petitioner whose
claim is otherwise time-barred may have the claim heard on the merits if he can demonstrate
through new, reliable evidence not available at trial, that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Yates v. Kelly, No.
1:11–cv–1271, 2012 WL 487991 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2012) (citing Souter, 395 F.3d at 590).
Actual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. See Bousely v. United
States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). Without “new evidence” that makes it “more likely than not
that no reasonable juror would have convicted him,” a petitioner may not make use of the actualinnocence gateway and escape the statute of limitations. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924,
1928 (2013) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Petitioner has not met this “demanding” actual-innocence standard. See Perkins, 133
S. Ct. at 1935.
For all these reasons and for the reasons detailed in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation, Petitioner’s Objection (ECF No. 12) is OVERRULED. The Report and
12
Recommendation (ECF No. 11) is ADOPTED and AFFIRMED.
This action is hereby
DISMISSED as barred by the one-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter FINAL JUDGMENT.
Date: October 7, 2016
______s/James L. Graham ____
JAMES L. GRAHAM
United States District Judge
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?