Stein v. Mohr et al

Filing 16

ORDER 4 ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS. Signed by Judge Gregory L. Frost on 11/13/15. (kn)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
SAMUEL C. STEIN,
Case No. 2:15-cv-2681
JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

Plaintiff,
v.
GARY MOHR, et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) dated September 5, 2015. (ECF No. 4.) In that filing, the Magistrate
Judge performed an initial screen of Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for money damages
against all defendants in their official capacities. Regarding the claims against Defendants in
their individual capacities, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s
claims against CMC Warden Francisco Pineda, CMC Institutional Inspector John Doe, CMC
Deputy Warden of Medical Services John Doe, Chief Inspector Doe, Deputy Warden of
Operations Bradley, and Institutional Inspector Witten.
Plaintiff objected to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the Court dismiss the
claims against Warden Pineda, Institutional Inspector Doe (“II Doe”), and Chief Inspector John
Doe (“CI Doe”). For the reasons that follow, the Court OVERRULES the objection and
AFFIRMS AND ADOPTS the R&R.

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I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is an inmate at Ross Correctional Institution (“RCI”). On August 3, 2015,
Plaintiff filed a complaint against multiple defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violations of his constitutional rights. The claims against the three defendants at issue ( Warden
Pineda, II Doe, and CI Doe) are summarized below.
Plaintiff alleges that he is a diabetic and that, in August of 2013, two nurses at the
Corrections Medical Center (“CMC”) denied him his insulin. Plaintiff alleges that this denial of
medical treatment violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff further alleges that, in March of
2014, he informed Warden Pineda “of the fact that he had been regularly denied his insulin while
at CMC. . . . No response was ever received.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 4.) This is the only factual
allegation against Warden Pineda.
Plaintiff alleges that II Doe “is response for handling grievances at CMC.” (Id. at
PAGEID # 6.) Plaintiff does not make any allegations against II Doe directly, but states that he
claimed in a “legal notice” to Warden Pineda “that there existed a conspiracy between the CMC
deputy warden of medical operations, and CMC institutional inspector John Doe to prevent him
from using the grievance process, as well as to deny him medical care.” (Id. ¶ 4.)
Plaintiff makes a similar allegation against CI Doe, who allegedly “is legally responsible
for handling grievances at the [Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections] central
office.” (Id. at PAGEID # 4.) Plaintiff alleges that he informed Defendant Mohr that he
believed “there was an ongoing conspiracy between” CI Doe and other defendants. (Id. ¶ 28.)
II.

ANALYSIS

When a party objects within the allotted time to a report and recommendation, the Court
“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed

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findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Magistrate Judge correctly set forth the standard of review for the dismissal of claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). That is: “[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time
if the court determines that – . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.” (ECF No. 4, at PAGEID # 35.) The following standard applies in determining
whether a complaint fails to state a claim:
To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must
satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Rule 8(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.
2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Although this pleading standard does not
require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” is
insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Furthermore, a complaint will not
“suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . .
to 5 ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In considering whether this
facial plausibility standard is met, a Court must construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, accept all factual allegations as true, and
make reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits
Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434
(6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Additionally, the Court must construe pro se
complaints liberally. Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 362 (6th Cir.
2010). The Court is not required, however, to accept as true mere legal
conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.
(Id. at PAGEID # 35–36.)
The Magistrate Judge further set forth the standard for claims under § 1983:

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In order to plead a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead two
elements: ‘(1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States (2) caused by a person acting under color of state law.’ Hunt v.
Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 2006)). To
sufficiently plead the second element, a plaintiff must allege “personal
involvement.” Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted).
(Id. at PAGEID # 37.)
Applying that standard, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff failed to allege personal
involvement against Warden Pineda, II Doe, and/or CI Doe. The Magistrate Judge stated:
“Plaintiff’s Complaint provides insufficient factual content or context from which the Court could
reasonably infer that [these defendants] were personally involved in any violation of Plaintiff’s
rights.” (Id. at PAGEID # 38.) The Magistrate Judge further stated: “The Complaint also provides
insufficient factual content from which the Court could conclude that these Defendants implicitly
authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.” (Id.)
Plaintiff objects to these conclusions. In support of his position, Plaintiff essentially restates
the allegations involving Warden Pineda, II Doe, and CI Doe in his complaint. Plaintiff asserts that
CI Doe approved of the alleged misconduct because he has a duty to ensure that the corrections
center obeys all applicable laws, rules, and regulations.
Plaintiff’s objections are without merit. As the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded, vague
allegations that certain individuals engaged in a “conspiracy,” without more, are insufficient to
assert a constitutional claim against those defendants. The claims against II Doe and CI Doe
therefore fail to set forth sufficient factual content to satisfy Rule 8’s notice pleading requirements.
The claims against these defendants fail for the additional reason that they involve reporting alleged
violations after the fact; in other words, they do not sufficiently allege that these defendants’
inaction caused a constitutional violation.
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The claim against Warden Pineda fails for the same reason. Plaintiff alleges that he
reported the alleged constitutional violation to Warden Pineda several months after the fact and did
not receive a response. Plaintiff does not allege that Warden Pineda’s inaction caused a
constitutional violation. For these reasons, the Court finds no reason to modify or set aside the
R&R.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES the objection (ECF No. 5) and
AFFIRMS AND ADOPTS the R&R (ECF No. 4).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Gregory L. Frost
GREGORY L. FROST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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