Ganci v. MBF Inspection Services, Inc.
OPINION and ORDER granting 60 Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification. Signed by Judge George C. Smith on 10/27/17. (sem)
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 1 of 26 PAGEID #: 893
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Case No.: 2:15-cv-2959
JUDGE GEORGE C. SMITH
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
MBF INSPECTION SERVICES, INC.,
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff Thomas Ganci’s Motion for Class
Certification of claims brought under the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, Ohio
Revised Code Chapter 4111, et seq. for unpaid overtime wages. (Doc. 60). The motion is fully
briefed and ripe for disposition. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED.
Defendant MBF Inspection Services, Inc. (“MBF”) is a New Mexico corporation that
provides inspection services to its customers in the oil and gas industries in various states across
the country. (Doc. 6, Ans. ¶¶ 10–12). Plaintiff worked for MBF as a welding inspector from
approximately June 2015 to October 2015. (Doc. 60-5, Ganci Decl. ¶ 4). He is a Texas resident
but lived and worked in Ohio while under the employment of MBF. (Id. ¶ 2). During his time of
employment, he provided inspection services for MBF’s customers and routinely worked in
excess of forty hours per week. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 10). Plaintiff was paid on a day-rate basis and did not
receive overtime compensation for time worked in excess of forty hours per week. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 10).
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 2 of 26 PAGEID #: 894
On October 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed the present action seeking class relief under both the
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage
Standards Act, Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4111, et seq. (“Fair Wage Act”).
Complaint). On November 24, 2015, MBF filed its Answer asserting as affirmative defenses
that MBF inspectors like Plaintiff were exempt from federal and state overtime laws under the
executive, administrative, professional, and highly compensated exemptions.
(Doc. 6, 25th
This Court previously conditionally certified a collective action under the FLSA
encompassing the following class:
All inspection personnel and those similarly situated who were paid a day rate and
who worked for Defendant at any time since three years prior to this Court’s order
granting conditional certification.
(Doc. 26 at 2). MBF did not contest the conditional certification of the collective action. (Id.).
Plaintiff then distributed Court-approved notice of the FLSA collective action to potential
members of the collective action class. The FLSA notice period has closed, and a total of 56
inspectors who worked for MBF around the country have filed consent forms to join the FLSA
collective action. (Doc. 60-2, Baggio Decl. ¶ 2).
Plaintiff now seeks to certify as a class action under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
23(a) and (b)(3) the following class of individuals who allegedly have claims against MBF under
Ohio’s Fair Wage Act:
All inspection personnel, other than chief inspectors and lead inspectors, who
were paid a day rate and who worked for Defendant under a Spectra contract at
any time since three years prior to filing of this Complaint.
(Doc. 60, Mot. for Class Certification). During discovery, MBF produced a list of inspection
personnel who worked in Ohio during the proposed class period. (Doc. 60-8, Class List). The
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 3 of 26 PAGEID #: 895
list identifies 67 1 personnel falling within Plaintiff’s proposed Rule 23 class definition. (Doc.
60-2, Baggio Decl. ¶ 3). Of those 67 individuals, five consented to join the FLSA collective
action. (Id. ¶ 4).
CLASS CERTIFICATION STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) provides that class action lawsuits may be certified
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). In addition to the four requirements set forth in Rule 23(a), the
party seeking certification must also demonstrate that it satisfies at least one of the subcategories
of Rule 23(b). Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013); In re Am. Med. Sys.,
Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996). Here, Plaintiff has moved for certification pursuant to
Rule 23(b)(3), which dictates that a class action may proceed when “the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
District courts have broad discretion in certifying class actions so as long as they exercise
such discretion within the framework of Rule 23. Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.,
Doc. 60-8 appears to be a list of all MBF personnel who worked in Ohio during the relevant time period and
includes 97 unique individuals. Not all of these individuals appear to have worked as inspectors, and many appear
to have worked as chief or lead inspectors who are excluded from the proposed Rule 23 class. Neither party has
clarified for the Court exactly which individuals listed in Doc. 60-8 would fall within the class, and the briefing
variously refers to the proposed class as comprising 66, 67, or 68 members. Nonetheless, for the purposes of the
present motion, the Court is satisfied that the proposed class consists of no more than 68 individuals.
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 4 of 26 PAGEID #: 896
296 F.3d 443, 446 (6th Cir. 2002). However, a class “may only be certified if the trial court is
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.” Gen.
Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982); Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d
388, 397 (6th Cir. 1998). While the plaintiff’s likelihood of ultimate success of his or her claims
on the merits is not one of the elements of the “rigorous analysis,” “[m]erits questions may be
considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether
the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret.
Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013).
Plaintiff seeks class certification under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and
23(b)(3) of his Ohio Fair Wage Act claims for unpaid overtime wages. The Court will briefly
address the proposed class definition and then analyze each of the requirements of Rule 23(a)
and Rule 23(b)(3).
The class definition proposed by Plaintiff (“All inspection personnel, other than chief
inspectors and lead inspectors, who were paid a day rate and who worked for Defendant under a
Spectra contract at any time since three years prior to filing of this Complaint”) does not on its
face limit the class to those inspectors who worked in Ohio. However, Plaintiff seeks to certify
this class only for his Ohio Fair Wage Act claims, and the Complaint specifies that Plaintiff
brings the putative Rule 23 class action “on behalf of all similarly situated individuals within the
State of Ohio.” (Doc. 1, Complaint ¶ 26). Moreover, both parties in their briefing refer to the
proposed class as comprising only those inspectors who worked in Ohio. (Doc. 60-1, Pl.’s Mem.
in Supp. at 1; Doc. 69, Def.’s Mem. in Opp. at 10; Doc. 60-8, Class List). The Court therefore
construes Plaintiff’s motion to seek certification of the following amended class definition:
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 5 of 26 PAGEID #: 897
All inspection personnel, other than chief inspectors and lead inspectors, who
were paid a day rate and who worked for Defendant in Ohio under a Spectra
contract at any time since three years prior to filing of this Complaint.
Rule 23(a) Requirements
Class certification is not appropriate unless the class is so numerous as to render joinder
of all members impracticable. Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 541 (6th Cir.
2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
“There is no strict numerical test for determining
impracticability of joinder,” Am. Med. Sys, 75 F.3d at 1079, but courts routinely hold that “a
class of 40 or more members is sufficient to meet the numerosity requirement.” Castillo v.
Morales, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 480, 487 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (Marbley, J.).
Beyond sheer numbers, Rule 23(a)(1) requires that joinder be “impracticable,” an inquiry
that “requires examination of the specific facts of each case and imposes no absolute
limitations.” General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980). The plaintiff is not required
to “establish that it is impossible to join all members of the proposed class[,]” but simply that
joinder “would be difficult and inconvenient.” Swigart v. Fifth Third Bank, 288 F.R.D. 177, 182
(S.D. Ohio 2012) (Black, J.) (quoting Day v. NLO, 144 F.R.D. 330, 333 (S.D. Ohio 1992)
Practicability of joinder is informed by “ease of identifying members and
determining addresses, ease of service on members if joined, and geographical dispersion among
other things.” Turnage v. Norfolk S. Corp., 307 F. App’x 918, 921 (6th Cir. 2009).
Here, the parties are in agreement that the proposed class numbers approximately 67
individuals. While this number is larger than the 40-member rule of thumb, MBF argues that
joinder would nevertheless be easily accomplished because MBF has produced the names and
contact information of all 67 members of the class.
Class members are therefore already
identified and could easily be served if joined as named plaintiffs. MBF also asserts that, based
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 6 of 26 PAGEID #: 898
on the wages it paid potential class members, inspectors do not lack resources to bring their own
individual suits. Finally, MBF argues that judicial economy concerns are not implicated when
there is no indication that a multiplicity of suits is imminent.
Ease of identifying and serving class members
While MBF is inarguably correct that that “where class members may be easily
identified, joinder is…more practicable,” Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 182 F.R.D. 523, 530 n.15 (N.D. Ohio 1998), this does not end the Court’s inquiry.
None of the cases (save one) relied on by MBF in making this argument address an important
mitigating factor raised by Plaintiff: employees’ fear of their employer’s retaliation for pursuing
wage and hour claims individually.
This District has recognized that litigating against one’s employer is an inherently fraught
proposition that may discourage class members from either opting in to an FLSA collective
action or asserting their state law wage and hour claims on an individual basis. Thus, even when
class member identities are easily determined from employee rosters, joinder is often
nevertheless impracticable. Swigart, 288 F.R.D. at 183 (“In employment class actions like this
one, a class member’s potential fear of retaliation is an important consideration in deciding
whether joinder is impracticable and thus whether the numerosity requirement is satisfied.”);
Castillo, 302 F.R.D. at 487 (finding joinder impracticable in an employment class action where
“the non-trivial fear of reprisal and posture of economic dependency . . . would likely repress the
willingness of the class members to bring suit individually”); Myers v. Marietta Mem’l Hosp.,
No. 2:15-CV-2956, 2017 WL 3977956, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2017) (Marbley, J.) (finding
joinder impracticable due to retaliation concerns).
These decisions have cited with approval similar cases from outside this Circuit. See,
e.g., Ladegaard v. Hard Rock Concrete Cutters, Inc., 2000 WL 1774091, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1,
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 7 of 26 PAGEID #: 899
2000) (finding in an employment class action that joinder was impracticable due to “[t]he
possibility of retaliation” and the “economic dependency involved in the employment
relationship [which] is inherently inhibiting” and which is not cured by “the availability of the
FLSA action”); Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 152, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Indeed,
it may be that in the wage claim context, the opt-out nature of a class action is a valuable feature
lacking in an FLSA collective action, insofar as many employees will be reluctant to participate
in the action due to fears of retaliation.”); Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659
F.3d 234, 244 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[A]n employee fearful of retaliation or of being ‘blackballed’ in
his or her industry may choose not to assert his or her FLSA rights.”). See also Sanft v.
Winnebago Indus., Inc., 214 F.R.D. 514, 524 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (compiling cases holding Rule
23’s numerosity requirement satisfied because, where some class members are still employed by
the defendant, “concern regarding employer retaliation or reprisal renders individual joinder less
In Kennedy v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., cited by MBF, the court
dismissed fear of retaliation as a significant factor because the plaintiff had not offered any
evidence that potential class members would join but for the potential for employer reprisal.
(No. 7-08-CV-00579, 2010 WL 3743642, at *4 (W.D. Va. Sept. 23, 2010)). However, this
District has not required a showing of actual fear of reprisal in order to find joinder
impracticable. Swigart, 288 F.R.D. at 183; Castillo, 302 F.R.D. at 487. Rather, as recognized by
the Ladegaard court, the employment relationship is “inherently inhibiting.” 2000 WL 1774091
at *4. The low opt-in rate among putative class members (5 out of 67) is itself consistent with
fear of reprisal.
Moreover, in reply, Plaintiff offered evidence that at least one MBF
management employee had suggested to inspectors that MBF should not hire for future
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 8 of 26 PAGEID #: 900
assignments any inspectors who joined the FLSA collective action. (Doc. 75-2, Cease and
Desist Letter). 2 The Court therefore finds that the ease of identifying and serving class members
is outweighed by inspectors’ concerns for their job security.
Class members’ financial resources
Fear of retaliation also informs analysis of the class members’ financial resources to
bring individual suits. That is, even assuming arguendo that their wages are sufficient to absorb
the cost of litigation itself, their present resources will often be insufficient to absorb a loss of
future employment, making inspectors unlikely to assert their claims on an individual basis.
Thus, this factor also does not weigh against the impracticability of joinder.
Finally, MBF is correct that there is no apparent threat of a multiplicity of suits, and
therefore class treatment is not necessary to safeguard judicial economy. However, judicial
economy alone is not dispositive of the numerosity analysis. The Court finds that, as a whole,
Plaintiff has shown that joinder of individual claims is sufficiently impracticable to satisfy Rule
23(a)’s numerosity criterion.
Under Rule 23(a)(2), a plaintiff must show that “there are questions of law or fact
common to the class.” Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 487 (6th Cir. 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(2). “Although Rule 23(a)(2) speaks of ‘questions’ in the plural, [the Sixth Circuit has] said
that there need only be one question common to the class.” Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133
F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 1998). But not just any common question will suffice; the common
Although this letter contains more than one level of hearsay, MBF has not moved to strike it and has therefore
waived any objection to the Court’s consideration of the letter at the class certification stage. And “[i]n any event,
courts have held that on a motion for class certification, the evidentiary rules are not strictly applied and courts can
consider evidence that may not be admissible at trial.” Rockey v. Courtesy Motors, Inc., 199 F.R.D. 578, 582 (W.D.
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 9 of 26 PAGEID #: 901
questions must be capable of “generat[ing] common answers that are likely to drive resolution of
the lawsuit.” In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prod. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 852
(6th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff has met this requirement. Plaintiff’s proposed Rule 23 class litigation centers on
his claim that MBF failed to pay overtime wages to its inspectors in violation of the Fair Wage
Act and the FLSA. MBF asserts as affirmative defenses that the inspectors are exempt from
statutory overtime requirements under the executive, professional, administrative, and highly
(Doc. 6, Ans.).
As explained below, Plaintiff has sufficiently
demonstrated that the inspectors’ duties relevant to these exemptions were common to all
putative class members, and therefore, that questions as to the exemptions’ applicability can be
resolved in “in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).
Employees who work in a bona fide executive capacity are exempt from overtime
provisions under the FLSA and the Fair Wage Act. 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a)(1); Ohio Rev. Code
§ 4111.03. Federal regulations further explain that the executive exemption covers those (1) who
are compensated on a salary basis of not less than $455 per week, and (2) whose primary duty is
management of the enterprise in which the employee is employed or of a customarily recognized
department or subdivision thereof; (3) who customarily and regularly directs the work of two or
more other employees; and (4) who has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose
suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other
change of status of other employees are given particular weight. 29 C.F.R. § 541.100.
MBF’s corporate representative testified at deposition that none of MBF’s inspectors
supervise other MBF employees or provide advice as to hiring, firing, or other employee status
changes. (Doc. 60-4, Daniels Dep., PAGEID #438). Nor did MBF’s representative indicate that
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 10 of 26 PAGEID #: 902
these duties vary by inspector discipline or any other variable. (Id.). The Court therefore finds
that the question of whether the putative class members’ job duties fall within the FLSA’s
executive exemption is a common question susceptible of classwide proof.
The FLSA and the Fair Wage Act also exempt employees who work in a bona fide
professional capacity from overtime protections. 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a)(1); Ohio Rev. Code
§ 4111.03. Federal regulations further explain that the professional exemption covers those
(1) who are compensated on a salary basis of not less than $455 per week, and (2) whose primary
duty is the performance of work requiring advanced knowledge in a field of science or learning
customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialize knowledge or instruction. 29 C.F.R.
§§ 541.300, 541.301(a).
The advanced knowledge required by the second prong of the professional exemption test
is knowledge which is “customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual
instruction.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.300. “Specialized academic training is a standard prerequisite” for
professional positions and “possession of the appropriate academic degree” is “the best prima
facie evidence” that the employee meets this criterion. Id. The requirement that the employee’s
knowledge be from a field of science or learning serves to distinguish professions such as “law,
medicine, theology, accounting, actuarial computation, engineering, architecture, teaching,
various types of physical, chemical and biological sciences, pharmacy and other similar
occupations that have a recognized professional status” from “the mechanical arts or skilled
trades where in some instances the knowledge is of a fairly advanced type, but is not in a field of
science or learning.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(c). The professional exemption is also inapplicable to
“occupations in which most employees have acquired their skill by experience rather than by
advanced specialized intellectual instruction.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(d).
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 11 of 26 PAGEID #: 903
In this case, when questioned at deposition about any advanced knowledge required of
the inspectors making up the putative class, MBF’s corporate representative testified that no
specific level of education is required. (Doc. 60-3, Robertson Dep., PAGEID #422). Nor did
MBF’s representative indicate that educational requirements vary by inspector discipline or any
This is borne out by the job descriptions of Welding Inspector,
Utility/Craft Inspector, Electrical Inspector, and EHS (Environmental Health and Safety)
Inspector submitted with the parties’ briefing, each of which require certain levels of relevant
“experience” but contain no advanced academic requirements. 3 (Docs. 60-13, 60-15, 69-3).
The Court therefore finds that MBF treated its inspectors uniformly as to factors relevant
to the professional exemption.
The question of whether the putative class members’
qualifications fall within the FLSA’s professional exemption is thus a common question
susceptible of classwide proof.
The FLSA and Fair Wage Act provide a third exemption from their overtime provisions
for administrative employees.
29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a)(1); Ohio Rev. Code § 4111.03.
exemption is available for employees (1) who are compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate
of not less than $455 per week, and (2) whose primary duty is “the performance of work directly
related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s
customers.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.200(a), 541.201(a). To meet the second prong of this test, “an
employee must perform work directly related to assisting with the running or servicing of the
EHS Inspectors are required to hold “an Associate Degree (US) or College Diploma (Canada) in EHS or related
field” in addition to four years of relevant EHS work experience. (Doc. 69-3, PAGEID #698). However, an
associate degree is insufficient to qualify for the professional exemption. See Fair Labor Standards Act Opinion
Letter 2007-17, 2008 WL 5483057, at *2 (“Occupations that require only a four-year degree in any field or a twoyear degree as a standard prerequisite for entrance into the field . . . do not qualify for the learned professional
exemption.”); 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(e)(7) (stating that paralegals holding only two-year associate degrees do not
qualify for the professional exemption).
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 12 of 26 PAGEID #: 904
business, as distinguished, for example, from working on a manufacturing production line or
selling a product in a retail or service establishment.” Id. The Sixth Circuit has stated that “the
focus is on whether an employee helps run or service a business—not whether that employee’s
duties merely touch on a production activity.” Lutz v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc., 815 F.3d
988, 995 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 96 (2016).
Here, MBF’s business is the provision of inspection services.
representative testified at deposition that the inspectors making up the putative class typically
spend approximately 98 percent of their working time in the field, performing those inspection
services, as opposed to office work. (Doc. 60-3, Robertson Dep., PAGEID #428). MBF’s
corporate representative also stated that the division of time between field and office work varies
from project to project, and that there would be no way to tell from the inspectors’ time sheets
whether a particular hour was spent in the field or in the office. (Id., PAGEID #427-28).
However, the Court is satisfied that if 98 percent of inspector work is typically spent in the field
providing the inspection services that make up MBF’s business, the inspectors’ primary duties
with regard to the applicability of the administrative exemption is a common question that can be
determined with classwide proof.
Highly compensated exemption
The highly compensated employee exemption applies where (1) an employee makes at
least $100,000 annually, 4 including at least $455 per week on a salary basis, and (2) the
employee customarily and regularly performs any one or more of the exempt duties or
responsibilities of an executive, administrative or professional employee.
As of December 1, 2016, the annual compensation amount was increased to $134,004; however, the earlier version
of the regulation is applicable to this case filed in 2015. 29 C.F.R. § 541.601(b).
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 13 of 26 PAGEID #: 905
The exemption “applies only to employees whose primary duty includes
performing office or non-manual work.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.601(d).
As stated above, MBF’s corporate representative testified that typically only two percent
of inspector work is office or non-field work. (Doc. 60-3, Robertson Dep., PAGEID #428). And
again, although MBF stated this percentage could vary from project to project, MBF’s testimony
makes clear that inspectors perform the overwhelming majority of their work in the field. The
Court is therefore satisfied at this juncture that the primary duties of the inspectors in regard to
the highly compensated exemption pose a common question susceptible to classwide proof.
Differences in job duties do not automatically defeat commonality
MBF spends several pages of its opposition brief listing job duties that are unshared
among the various discipline-specific inspectors, arguing that these differences require
individualized inquiries that preclude the Court from resolving exemption issues with classwide
proof. (Doc. 69, Def.’s Mem. in Opp. at 17–20). See also Hughes v. Gulf Interstate Field Servs.,
Inc. (“Hughes I”), No. 2:14-CV-000432, 2015 WL 4112312, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 7, 2015)
(Sargus, C.J.) (holding that “individualized factual inquiries into whether each putative class
member is exempt from overtime compensation requirements forecloses commonality.”);
Hendricks v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC, 292 F.R.D. 529, 541 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (Dlott, C.J.)
(“With all three exemptions in play, each requiring different facts to be proved, it will be
impossible for the Court to resolve the exemption defenses in one stroke.”).
But it was not differences in job duties alone that prevented the Hughes I and Hendricks
plaintiffs from establishing commonality; it was differences in job duties with respect to the
factors relevant to the exemption analyses.
In Hendricks, the defendant “submitted
evidence demonstrating that the answers to these questions [as to various FLSA exemptions]
may vary from one [class member] to the next, especially with regard to how [class members]
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 14 of 26 PAGEID #: 906
spend their time in relation to the exemptions at issue, how and when they exercise discretion in
carrying out their duties, their authority to hire or fire, and whether they direct the work of other
employees.” 292 F.R.D. at 540-41. Similarly, in Hughes I, the plaintiffs submitted employee
affidavits describing their job duties from only a small number of the multiple employee
categories at issue. 2015 WL 4112312 at *5. While these affidavits “touch[ed] on the answers”
to some of the questions relevant to various FLSA exemptions “as they pertain to the individual
affiants,” the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that “all individuals in the proposed class
would have common answers.” Id. at *6.
Here, MBF has not explained how the unshared job duties it lists would affect the
Court’s analysis of the FLSA exemptions as applied to the putative class, or how they rebut the
evidence of uniformity in relevant job duties offered by Plaintiff. Variations in job duties are of
no moment to commonality if they are unrelated to the elements of the parties’ claims and
defenses. As MBF has not identified any relevant factors that vary meaningfully from class
member to class member, the Court will be able to determine whether the inspectors’ job duties
fall within any of the exemptions on a classwide basis without resorting to individual inquiries.
Thus, these questions as to the inspectors’ exemption status are common questions capable of
“generat[ing] common answers that are likely to drive resolution of the lawsuit.” In re Whirlpool
Corp., 722 F.3d at 852.
Finally, the Court notes for clarity that it is not at this time determining whether any of
the FLSA exemptions apply to any particular member of the putative class or the class as a
whole. Rather, on the record now before it, the Court concludes only that Plaintiff has offered
sufficient evidence that MBF treated the putative class of inspectors uniformly with regard to
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 15 of 26 PAGEID #: 907
certain elements of those exemptions, such that applicability of the exemptions can later be
determined at least in part through classwide proof.
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims . . . of the representative parties be typical of the
claims . . . of the class.” “A claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course
of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the other class members, and if his or her claims are
based on the same legal theory.” Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 561 (6th Cir. 2007).
In other words, typicality is satisfied if the class members’ claims are “fairly encompassed by the
named plaintiffs’ claims.” Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 399 (6th Cir.1998) (en
banc) (quoting Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d at 1082).
“This requirement insures that the
representatives’ interests are aligned with the interests of the represented class members so that,
by pursuing their own interests, the class representatives also advocate the interests of the class
members.” Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 852–53.
The concepts of commonality and typicality “tend to merge” in practice because they
both “serve as guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances
maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the
class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and
adequately protected in their absence.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349 n.5 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-58 n. 13 (1982)).
Consistent with this merging, both parties support their typicality arguments by
incorporating their submissions on commonality. (Doc. 75, Reply at 12; Doc. 69, Mem. in Opp.
at 23). The Court agrees with Plaintiff that he and the putative class have suffered the same
alleged injury (misclassification as exempt employees, resulting in unpaid overtime wages).
Plaintiff’s showing of questions common to the class (i.e., the applicability of the FLSA
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 16 of 26 PAGEID #: 908
exemptions that go to the heart of Plaintiff’s claims and MBF’s defenses) therefore satisfies
Plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating that the class’s claims are “fairly encompassed by the named
plaintiffs’ claims.” Sprague, 133 F.3d at 399.
Rule 23(a)(4) allows certification only if “the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.” “This prerequisite is essential to due process,
because a final judgment in a class action is binding on all class members.” Am. Med. Sys., 75
F.3d at 1083.
Class representatives must meet two criteria to satisfy adequacy: “(1) the
representative must have common interests with unnamed members of the class, and (2) it must
appear that the representatives will vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through
qualified counsel.” Id.
MBF does not contest that Plaintiff and his legal counsel are adequate representatives of
the putative class. (Doc. 69, Mem. in Opp. at 23). The Court also finds that Plaintiff’s interests,
in seeking unpaid overtime wages resulting from alleged misclassification as an exempt
employee in violation of the FLSA and the Fair Wage Act, align with those of the class, who
seek the same remedy arising from the same alleged statutory violation. There is no evidence of
any conflict of interest that would prevent Plaintiff from fairly and adequately representing the
interests of the class.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel has submitted a “firm resume”
documenting extensive experience as class counsel in wage and hour litigation, demonstrating
that Plaintiff’s counsel is able to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. (Doc.
60-16). The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has satisfied Rule 23’s adequacy requirement.
Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements
To certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court must find both that (1) questions of law
or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 17 of 26 PAGEID #: 909
members and (2) class treatment is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). As the Advisory Committee’s Notes of
1966 indicate, the purpose of Rule 23(b)(3) is to “achieve economies of time, effort, and
expense, and promote, uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing
procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results” where other provisions of Rule
23(b) are not applicable.
Predominance of common questions
The predominance requirement “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive
to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 594
(1997). “To meet the predominance requirement, a plaintiff must establish that issues subject to
generalized proof and applicable to the class as a whole predominate over those issues that are
subject to only individualized proof.” Young, 693 F.3d at 544 (quoting Randleman v. Fid. Nat.
Title Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 347, 352–53 (6th Cir. 2011)). “Plaintiffs need not prove that every
element can be established by classwide proof.” Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. ASD Specialty
Healthcare, Inc., 863 F.3d 460, 468 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Bridging Communities Inc. v. Top
Flite Fin. Inc., 843 F.3d 1119, 1124 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-1336, 2017 WL
1807143 (Oct. 2, 2017)). But the key is to “identify[ ] the substantive issues that will control the
outcome,” in other words, courts should “consider how a trial on the merits would be conducted
if a class were certified.” Sandusky Wellness Ctr., 863 F.3d at 468, (quoting Gene & Gene, LLC
v. BioPay, LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2008)). “[T]he fact that a defense may arise and
may affect different class members differently does not compel a finding that individual issues
predominate over common ones.” Young, 693 F.3d at 544 (quoting Beattie, 511 F.3d at 564 (6th
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 18 of 26 PAGEID #: 910
As discussed in regard to commonality, Plaintiff has identified multiple questions whose
answers will be common to all class members (i.e., whether inspectors’ duties fall within the
bounds of various FLSA exemptions). The one issue raised by MBF for which individual
inquiries may plausibly be required relates to an element common to all of the relevant FLSA
exemptions: the salary basis requirement.
In addition to the duties outlined supra, the executive, administrative, professional, and
highly compensated exemptions from the FLSA and Fair Wage Act overtime provisions each
require that the employee in question be compensated “on a salary basis of not less than $455 per
29 C.F.R. §§ 541.100 (executive exemption), 541.200, (administrative exemption),
541.300 (professional exemption), 541.601 (highly compensated exemption). The “salary basis”
requirement is met if the employee “regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or less
frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all or part of the employee’s compensation,
which amount is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the
work performed.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a). “An employee is not paid on a salary basis if
deductions from the employee’s predetermined compensation are made for absences occasioned
by the employer or by the operating requirements of the business.” Id.
The parties dispute whether individual inquiries will be necessary to determine whether
MBF paid each inspector on a salary basis. Plaintiff argues that MBF’s deposition testimony
establishes the MBF uniformly paid its inspectors on a “day rate” basis for each day worked,
which is inconsistent with the “weekly or less frequent basis” aspect of the salary basis
requirement. Therefore, according to Plaintiff, the salary basis issue can be determined through
classwide proof. (Doc. 60-1, Pl.’s Mem. in Support at 18–19). In support of this argument,
Plaintiff cites a case from the Western District of Texas. Keen v. DXP Enterprises, Inc., 2016
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 19 of 26 PAGEID #: 911
WL 3253895, at *4 (W.D. Tex. June 6, 2016). The Keen court determined that an individual
plaintiff’s day rate compensation did not satisfy the FLSA’s salary basis requirement where the
plaintiff worked only on an as-needed basis. Id.
However, as pointed out by MBF, this District has recently held that day rate
compensation can satisfy the salary basis test if the employee in fact received weekly
compensation of at least $455, regardless of whether the compensation was calculated per day or
per week. Hughes v. Gulf Interstate Filed Servs., Inc. (“Hughes II”), 2016 WL 4197596, at *1
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2016) (Sargus, C.J.). As noted by the Hughes II court, the Sixth Circuit has
“squarely held that ‘employment agreements are no longer the relevant starting point for whether
an employee is paid on a salary basis. The question is therefore not what [a plaintiff] was owed
under his employment agreement; rather, the question is what compensation [the plaintiff]
actually received.’” Id. (quoting Orton v. Johnny’s Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 848
(6th Cir. 2012)). 5
The Court need not decide at this juncture whether MBF’s policy of paying its inspectors
on a day rate meets the salary basis requirement of the FLSA exemptions. The Court need only
determine whether making such a decision would necessitate individual inquiries that would
predominate over the common questions identified by Plaintiff. In this regard, Plaintiff has
overstated Keen’s holding.
While it is true that the Western District of Texas ultimately
concluded that Mr. Keen’s compensation was inconsistent with the salary basis requirement, it
did so after a careful analysis of how much and how often Mr. Keen was actually paid. 2016
WL 3253895 at *4. Indeed, during several pay periods, Mr. Keen received less than $455 per
week. Id. Moreover, Keen was not a collective or class action, and thus the court did not need to
consider whether the salary basis issue could be resolved on a classwide basis. Keen does not,
The Hughes II decision is currently on appeal to the Sixth Circuit.
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 20 of 26 PAGEID #: 912
therefore, stand for the proposition that an employer policy of paying employees on a day rate
can never meet the FLSA’s salary basis test.
Because the Sixth Circuit has provided clear guidance that an employee’s actual
compensation is the starting point for analyzing the salary basis requirement (a point which
Plaintiff has not cogently refuted), individual inquiries will be necessary to determine whether
each inspector meets the salary basis requirement. However, these individual inquiries will not
be so intensive as to predominate over the multiple common questions that Plaintiff has
identified. It is evident from the pay statements submitted by MBF (Doc. 69-2) that MBF
maintains electronic payroll records, and therefore the parties can calculate each inspector’s
weekly compensation in a fairly automated fashion that will not require lengthy examination of
witnesses. Moreover, the relatively small size of the class (approximately 67 individuals) means
that the individual compensation analyses will not take up an inordinate amount of time or
resources in comparison to evaluation of the common questions.
The Court is therefore
persuaded that the necessary individual inquiries will not result in the “myriad mini-trials that
Rule 23(b)(3) seeks to prevent.” Sandusky Wellness Ctr., 863 F.3d at 470.
Superiority of the class action mechanism
Class treatment is superior to other methods of adjudication when it “will promote
economy, expediency, and efficiency.” Salvagne v. Fairfield Ford, Inc., 264 F.R.D. 321, 330
(S.D. Ohio 2009) (Spiegel, J.). “[W]here many individual inquiries are necessary, a class action
is not a superior form of adjudication. However, where a threshold issue is common to all class
members, class litigation is greatly preferred.” Vassalle v. Midland Funding LLC, 708 F.3d 747,
758 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Young, 693 F.3d at 545).
Rule 23 sets forth four non-exhaustive factors to consider in determining superiority:
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 21 of 26 PAGEID #: 913
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Plaintiff argues, and the Court agrees, that these four factors weigh in
favor of class treatment in this case. First, individual class members likely have little interest in
commencing or controlling separate actions due to the retaliation concerns discussed supra.
Second, there are no other currently pending actions related to MBF’s failure to pay overtime
wages to its inspectors. Third, all putative class members worked in Ohio, making this District
an appropriate forum. Fourth, the class action will be manageable given the relatively small
class size and limited necessary individual inquiries.
MBF declines to analyze these four enumerated factors beyond characterizing them as
not “weigh[ing] heavily—or hardly at all—toward or against certification.” (Doc. 69, Mem. in
Opp. at 24). While the Court disagrees with this characterization, MBF is correct that the four
factors listed in Rule 23(b)(3) are non-exhaustive. MBF argues that class treatment is not
superior in this case because the inspectors’ claims are not “negative value” claims; attorney’s
fees are available to successful plaintiffs; a Rule 23 opt-out class action is in conflict with the
FLSA’s opt-in collective action scheme; and a Rule 23 class judgment on the Fair Wage Act
claims may preclude class members from pursuing their individual FLSA claims. All of these
arguments lack merit.
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 22 of 26 PAGEID #: 914
Lack of negative value claims and availability of attorney’s fees
The crux of both the “negative value” and attorney’s fees arguments is that the expense
of litigation would not preclude inspectors from prosecuting their Fair Wage Act claims
individually, and therefore class treatment is not superior to adjudication of individual claims. In
many class actions, the likely recovery for each individual class member is so small as to create a
net loss for any individual who chooses to pursue an individual lawsuit. “A class action solves
this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth
someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
Here, MBF argues, the claims of individual class members are large enough to create
positive value for the successful plaintiff even without the aggregation of class claims. (Doc. 69,
Mem. in Opp. at 27). This is because “the putative class members seek one and one-half times
their standard pay for every hour over 40 worked in a week. Many worked at MBF for months
or even years.” (Id. (citing Doc. 60-8, Class List)). But the Class List also demonstrates that 21
of the putative class members (that is, nearly one third of the putative class) worked for MBF in
Ohio for fewer than 100 days during the class period, and for some inspectors as few as 5 or 8
days. (Doc. 60-8). Therefore, while those class members who worked in Ohio for multiple years
may have large enough claims to prevent an individual lawsuit from being cost-prohibitive,
many of the class members would still be left with negligible positive, or even negative, value
after receiving judgment in their favor.
MBF further asserts that the availability of attorney’s fees for successful plaintiffs under
Ohio Revised Code § 4111.10(A) should negate any concern over the size of individual claims.
See, e.g., Coleman, 296 F.3d at 449 (“[T]he primary justification for class treatment of these
claims is largely absent in this case because the [Equal Credit Opportunity Act]’s provision for
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 23 of 26 PAGEID #: 915
the award of attorney’s fees and costs to successful plaintiffs eliminates any potential financial
bar to pursuing individual claims.”). But again, the cases relied on by MBF in arguing that
individual suits are a feasible alternative to class treatment fail to address the inherent fear of
employer reprisal. See Molina v. Roskam Baking Co., No. 1:09-CV-475, 2011 WL 5979087, at
*6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 29, 2011) (collecting cases within the Sixth Circuit, primarily in the
consumer context, in which the presence of a fee shifting provision weighed against superiority
of class treatment).
While the fee shifting provision of the Fair Wage Act may “eliminate any potential
financial bar to pursuing individual claims,” it does not eliminate the reasonable apprehension of
inspectors, in an employment-at-will context, that their employer may decide not to assign them
further work after losing a suit for unpaid overtime wages. Therefore, the Court finds that the
Fair Wage Act’s fee shifting provision does not preclude a finding of superiority in this case.
Interplay of Rule 23 class actions and FLSA collective actions
MBF argues that certifying the Fair Wage Act claims for “opt out” class treatment under
Rule 23 conflicts with the FLSA’s “opt in” collective action scheme created by Congress. (Doc.
69, Mem. in Opp. at 27). For this proposition, MBF relies primarily on a case from the Northern
District of Illinois holding that
once employees who receive notice have decided whether to opt into the FLSA
class, we will have before the Court as plaintiffs all of the present and former
employees who wish to pursue a claim for unpaid wages. Each of those persons
then will be able to pursue on his or her own behalf state law claims, which cover
the very same conduct as the FLSA claim . . . . Because all of the companies’
present and former employees will have the chance to decide whether to join the
case, and because those who wish to do so will be before the Court, it makes no
real sense to the Court to certify a class that will automatically include all of the
employees unless they opt out.
Muecke v. A-Reliable Auto Parts & Wreckers, Inc., No. 01 C 2361, 2002 WL 1359411, at *2
(N.D. Ill. June 25, 2002).
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 24 of 26 PAGEID #: 916
But this District has rejected this view of the relationship between Rule 23 and the FLSA
several times. “It is well-settled that employees in Ohio can maintain a Rule 23 class relating to
their Ohio claims while simultaneously representing a 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) collective action
relating to their FLSA claims.” Dillow v. Home Care Network, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-612, 2017 WL
2418738, at *5 (S.D. Ohio June 5, 2017) (Black, J.). See also, e.g., Swigart, 288 F.R.D. at 181
(“[T]here is no inherent incompatibility between an opt-in FLSA collective action and an opt-out
Rule 23 class action.”); Wade v. Werner Trucking Co., No. 2:10-cv-270, 2011 WL 320233, at *2
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2011) (Sargus, J.) (there is “nothing inherently incompatible between an
FLSA opt-in suit and Ohio Act Rule 23 class action and…they are able to coexist within the
same litigation.”); Myers, 2017 WL 3977956 at *3 (same, quoting Wade); Laichev v. JBM, Inc.,
269 F.R.D. 633, 642 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (Barrett, J.) (certifying both collective action under FLSA
and class action under Rule 23 for failure to pay overtime under Ohio state statute).
The Court agrees with the analysis of these previous decisions within this District. Given
the inherent fear of employer retaliation involved in wage and hour claims, it is not reasonable to
assume, as did the Muecke court, that “once employees who receive notice have decided whether
to opt into the FLSA class, we will have before the Court as plaintiffs all of the present and
former employees who wish to pursue a claim for unpaid wages.” 2002 WL 1359411 at *2. As
stated above, many employees may choose not to join the FLSA collective action not because
they believe they are not aggrieved, but because they wish to preserve the relationship with their
employer. A Rule 23 class action is an important tool for those who wish to continue working
for their employer while avoiding the reprisal that may arise from affirmatively joining a
collective action or commencing an individual action. This factor therefore weighs in favor of
the superiority of class treatment.
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 25 of 26 PAGEID #: 917
Preclusion of FLSA claims
Finally, MBF argues that the Court should not certify a Rule 23 class action because, if
the Fair Wage Act claims are certified for class treatment, “employees, who neither opt in to the
FLSA collective action nor opt out of the state law class action, will be collaterally estopped
from asserting FLSA claims in their own right.” (Doc. 69, Mem in Opp. at 31 (quoting Woodard
v. FedEx Freight East, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 178, 186 (M.D. Pa. 2008))).
MBF’s statement of the law is correct: a Rule 23 judgment or settlement will generally
preclude later FLSA claims by class members based on the same set of facts. See Lucas v. JBS
Plainwell, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-302, 2012 WL 12854880, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 8, 2012)
(finding the plaintiff’s FLSA claims precluded by the settlement of a prior Rule 23 wage and
hour class action). Plaintiff cites a handful of cases purporting to reject the preclusive effect of
Rule 23 class actions. E.g., Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d 781, 792
(W.D. Wis. 2010); Guzman v. VLM, Inc., 2008 WL 597186, at *10 n.11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,
Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, these cases actually conclude that Rule 23 class actions
have the preclusive effect described by MBF. But what Plaintiff’s cases also correctly recognize
is that preclusion of claims that were or could have been asserted in a class action is not unique
to hybrid FLSA actions. Rule 23 class actions always have a preclusive effect on later claims
that were or could have been brought in conjunction with the class action, so long as the other
requirements of claim or issue preclusion are met. Thus, the argument that MBF is asserting is
an argument not only against hybrid FLSA collective/class actions, but an argument against all
Rule 23 class actions.
Obviously, the federal courts are unconvinced that claim or issue preclusion is a
sufficient reason to find class treatment inferior to other methods of adjudication, and the Court
Case: 2:15-cv-02959-GCS-CMV Doc #: 95 Filed: 10/27/17 Page: 26 of 26 PAGEID #: 918
will not now withhold class certification on this basis. In class actions such as this one brought
under Rule 23(b)(3), the preclusive effect of a judgment or settlement is addressed through the
“opt out” mechanism: before being bound by any judgment or settlement, class members will
receive notice of the class action, their right to exclude themselves from the class action, and, if
they decline to do so, their inability to bring their own individual claims for unpaid overtime.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Here, the parties can also categorize class members by whether they
have opted in to the FLSA collective action and craft different notices for each category. This
will ensure that each class member fully understands his or her rights as a consequence of
remaining in or opting out of the class. The preclusive effect of a Rule 23 judgment therefore
does not render class treatment inferior to other methods of adjudication.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a) and the predominance and
superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for
Class Certification and certifies Plaintiff’s Fair Wage Act claims for the following class:
All inspection personnel, other than chief inspectors and lead inspectors, who
were paid a day rate and who worked for Defendant in Ohio under a Spectra
contract at any time since three years prior to filing of this Complaint.
The Clerk shall remove Document 60 from the Court’s pending motions list.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ George C. Smith
GEORGE C. SMITH, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?