Brient v. Calendine et al
ORDER AND INITIAL SCREEN AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 1 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis: Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. It is RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims in th is action against Defendant Albany Police Department, Defendant Judge Grim, Defendant Blackburn, and Defendant John Doe pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2). Objections to R&R due by 11/30/2015. Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Preston Deavers on 11/13/2015. (mas)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Civil Action 2:15-cv-2965
Judge Algenon L. Marbley
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers
KYLE CALENDINE, et al.,
ORDER AND INITIAL SCREEN REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Matthew Brient, an Ohio resident who is proceeding without the assistance of
counsel, brings this federal civil rights action against the Albany Police Department, Officer
Kyle Calendine, Officer Robert Deardorf, Prosecutor Keller Blackburn, Judge William Grim,
and at least one John Doe (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma
pauperis is GRANTED. All judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if
the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). This matter is before the United States
Magistrate Judge for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to
identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion
of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the
Court DISMISS this Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Albany Police Department, Defendant
Blackburn, Defendant Judge Grim, and Defendant John Doe for failure to assert any claim over
which this Court has subject matter jurisdiction.
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).
In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)1 as part of the
statute, which provides in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-*
(B) the action or appeal-(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or
upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the
basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule
Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual
demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,
727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on
a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for
the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court
holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”
Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April
1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however,
has limits; “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v.
Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591,
594 (6th Cir. 1989)).
According to the Complaint, Defendants were involved in the arrest and prosecution of
Plaintiff for at least two separate traffic violations. (ECF No. 2 at 5-6.) Plaintiff, however,
appears to assert claims arising only from his arrest on September 9, 2015 by Defendants
Deardorf and Calendine and his subsequent prosecution. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that, in the course
of the arrest, Defendant Calendine placed him in handcuffs, which resulted in physical injury,
including localized swelling and “deep welts.” (ECF No. 2 at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that his arrest
was unlawful, resulting in his unlawful restraint by Defendant Deardorf and Defendant
Calending and theft of his car by Defendant John Doe, who is an unknown employee of
McDonald Towing Company. (ECF No. 2 at 5-6.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant
Deardorf filed a false criminal complaint against him at an unspecified prior date, which,
according to Plaintiff resulted in an unlawful warrant issued by Defendant Judge Grim. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges unspecified “blatant Human rights violations” on the part of Defendant
Blackburn in the course of his criminal prosecution. (ECF No. 2 at 6.)
It appears that Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ actions constitute false arrest, unlawful
restraint, malicious prosecution, theft, and excessive force and, therefore, violate 42 U.S.C. §
1983. (ECF No. 2 at 3.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of $500,000 from each
Defendant. (ECF No. 2 at 7.) The Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint cannot
support a cause of action under § 1983 against Defendant Albany Police Department, Defendant
Blackburn, Defendant Judge Grim, and Defendant John Doe.
Plaintiff brings his claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides as
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.
In order to proceed under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead both that (1) the perpetrator acted under
color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the complainant of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527, 535 (1981); Brandon v. Allen, 719 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1983), rev’d and remanded sub
nom, Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985).
A. Judge Grim’s Judicial Immunity
As an initial matter, the Undersigned finds Judge Grim is immune from liability as a
matter of law. Judicial officers are generally absolutely immune from civil suits for money
damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614, 617 (6th
Cir.). This far-reaching protection is necessary to ensure that exposure to potential damages
does not impair the independent and impartial exercise of the Court’s judgment. Barnes v.
Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). For this reason, absolute immunity is overcome
only in two situations: (1) when the conduct alleged is not performed in the judge’s judicial
capacity; or (2) when the conduct alleged, although judicial in nature, is taken in complete
absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; Leech v. DeWeese, 689 F.3d 538, 542
(6th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff cannot overcome the presumption of immunity under the first criterion. The
determination of whether an action is performed in the defendant’s judicial capacity depends
upon the “nature” and “function” of the act, rather than the act itself. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13;
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). Looking first to the “nature” of the act, the Court
must determine whether the conduct giving rise to the claim is a function generally performed by
a judge. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. This inquiry requires only an examination of the judge’s
alleged conduct in relation to the general functions normally performed by judges. Mireles, 502
U.S. at 13. Second, an examination of the “function” of the act alleged requires the Court to
assess whether the plaintiff dealt with the judge in his judicial role. Id.
In applying these principles, the Undersigned finds that Judge Grim was acting in his
judicial capacity at all times that the conduct alleged in the Complaint occurred. Issuing
warrants is an action normally performed by trial court judges. Furthermore, to the extent
Plaintiff interacted with Judge Grim at all, the interaction occurred only when Judge Grim was
performing his judicial duties. Plaintiff, therefore cannot overcome the presumption of judicial
immunity under the first criterion.
Judicial immunity can also be defeated when the conduct alleged, although judicial in
nature, is taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id. at 11-12; Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1116.
When judicial immunity is at issue, the scope of the judge’s jurisdiction is broadly construed.
Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-357. A judge does not forfeit immunity because a judicial action is taken
in error, done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority. Id. Actions taken in complete
absence of all jurisdiction are those acts which are clearly outside fo the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court over which the judge presides. King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.
1985). Conversely, merely acting in excess of authority does not preclude immunity. Sevier v.
Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 271 (6th Cir. 1984).
In the present matter, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not raise any allegations that suggest
Judge Grim acted outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the Athens County Municipal Court.
Plaintiff contends that Judge Grim “falsified a warrant.” (ECF No. 2 at 6.) As the Sixth Circuit
has recognized, however, “the judicial nature of the act of issuing an arrest warrant cannot
seriously be challenged.” Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1441 (6th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff,
therefore, does not have recourse against Judge Grim for damages in a civil rights action under §
1983. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted against Judge
B. Defendant Blackburn’s Prosecutorial Immunity
The Undersigned also finds the Complaint fails to assert a claim for which relief may be
granted against Defendant Blackburn. Defendant Blackburn is the Athens County Prosecutor
and is being sued for unspecified conduct in prosecuting Plaintiff. (ECF No. 2 at 6.)
Prosecutors, however, are entitled to absolute immunity from damages for both initiating and
prosecuting a criminal case. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Pusey v.
Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 1993). A prosecutor must exercise his or her best
professional judgment both in deciding which suits to bring and in prosecuting them in court.
Skinner v. Govorchin, 463 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2006). Prosecutors could not properly
perform this duty if every decision carried the potential consequences of personal liability in a
suit for damages. Id. Prosecutors, therefore, are extended absolute immunity when the
challenged actions are those of an advocate. Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 798 (6th Cir.
2003). Immunity is granted not only for actions directly related to initiating and prosecuting a
criminal case, but also for activities undertaken “in connection with [the] duties in functioning as
a prosecutor.” Id. at 431; Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2002).
In the present case, Plaintiff challenges unspecified actions Defendant Blackburn took
during the judicial phase of Plaintiff’s prosecution. Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no facts that
suggest Defendant Blackburn engaged in any activity outside his role as an advocate in
prosecuting Plaintiff. The Undersigned finds, therefore, that Defendant Blackburn is entitled to
absolute immunity in this matter. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted against Defendant Blackburn.
C. Albany Police Department’s Municipal Liability
The Undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted against the Albany Police Department because it is not an entity that is capable of being
sued. Davis v. Bexley Police Dept’t, No. 2:08-cv-750, 2009 WL 414269 at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb.
17, 2009) (citing Jones v. Marcum, 197 F. Supp. 2d 991, 997 (S.D. Ohio 2002)); see Schaffner v.
Pell, No. 2:10-cv-374, 2010 WL 2572777 at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 21, 2010) (citing Tysinger v.
Police Dep’t of City of Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2006)) (“A police department is
not a juridical entity subject to suit under Ohio law.”). As the this Court explained in Davis,
“Police departments are not independent government entities. They are only the vehicles
through which municipalities fulfill their policing functions. Thus, police departments are not
proper § 1983 defendants as they are merely sub-units of the municipalities they serve.” Davis,
2009 WL 414269 at *2 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
Even if the Court were to liberally construe the pro se Complaint as alleging claims
against the municipality of Albany, Plaintiff’s claim would nevertheless fail. Municipalities
cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 based on the theory of respondeat superior for
injuries inflicted solely by their employees or agents. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New
York City Dep’t of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978); Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn.,
220 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2000); see Davis, 2009 WL 414269 at *2 (“A plaintiff may not rely
on the doctrine of respondeat superior to find a government entity liable under § 1983 when the
claim is founded solely on an allegation that its agent caused the injury.”). To state a claim for
relief under § 1983 against a municipality, a plaintiff must allege that his “injuries were the
result of an unconstitutional policy or custom” of the municipality. Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d
1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994); see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (municipal
policy must be “moving force” behind constitutional deprivation). Municipalities cannot be held
responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a policy
or custom and the alleged deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Deaton v. Montgomery Cnty.,
Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). In the instant case, Plaintiff has alleged no facts
indicating that Defendants violated his constitutional rights pursuant to a policy or custom of
Albany. In the absence of such allegations, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief
may be granted based on the theory of municipal liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 693-694.
Accordingly, the Undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief may
be granted against Defendant Albany Police Department, or, to the extend he intended to assert a
claim, against the municipality of Albany.
D. Claims against Defendant Deardorf and Defendant Calendine
1. False Arrest
In order for a wrongful arrest claim to succeed under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that
the police lacked probable cause. Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 569 (6th Cir. 1999). A
police officer has probable cause if there is a “‘fair probability’” that the individual to be arrested
has either committed or intends to commit a crime. Northrop v. Trippett, 265 F.3d 372, 379 (6th
Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 955
(2002)). A police officer determines the existence of probable cause by examining the facts and
circumstances within his knowledge that are sufficient to inform “a prudent person, or one of
reasonable caution,” that the suspect “has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an
offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). “In general, the existence of
probable cause in a § 1983 action presents a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable
determination possible.” Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff states that he was arrested on September 9, 2015 by Defendant Deardorf and
Defendant Calendine. (ECF No. 2 at 5.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants told him he was
being detained for having a “burnt out light for the license plate.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that
Defendants illegally seized him because having a burnt out license plate light is not a violation of
law. (Id.) However, Ohio law requires that “[e]ither a tail light or a separate light shall be so
constructed and placed as to illuminate with a white light the rear registration plate, when such
registration plate is required, and render it legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear.” Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 4513.05(A) (West 2015). Ohio law makes violation of this provision a minor
misdemeanor. Rev. Code Ann. § 4513.05(B) (West 2015). Defendants, therefore, had probable
cause to arrest Plaintiff. Although in most cases a full custodial arrest for a minor misdemeanor
violates the Ohio Constitution, State v. Brown, 2003-Ohio-3931, ¶ 25, 99 Ohio St. 3d 323, 327,
792 N.E.2d 175 (Ohio 2003), the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a full custodial arrest for a
traffic offense punishable only by a fine does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Atwater v. City
of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). The Undersigned, therefore, finds that Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted against Defendant Deardorf and Defendant
Calendine for false arrest.
2. Excessive Force
It is axiomatic that individuals have a constitutional right not to be subjected to excessive
force during an arrest. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). Claims of excessive force
in the context of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's “objective reasonableness
standard.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 204 (2001)(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 388). If the
amount of force used to accomplish the arrest is objectively reasonable based on Fourth
Amendment seizure principles, then no constitutional violation occurred.
In Graham, the Supreme Court established the test for determining objective
unreasonableness. Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. While individuals clearly have a
right to be free from excessive force, police officers have an essential duty to arrest suspects and,
necessarily, “the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect [the
arrest].” Id. Courts evaluate whether the arresting officer's use of force is reasonable on a case
by case basis, from the perspective of an officer on the scene, and in light of the “difficulties of
modern police work.” Baker v. City of Hamilton, Ohio, 471 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotations and citation omitted). Although the ultimate inquiry is whether the totality
of the circumstances justifies the force used to accomplish the arrest, the Supreme Court has
identified three factors for the district court to consider in determining reasonableness:
(1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat
to the police officers or others; and (3) whether the suspect actively resisted arrest or
attempted to evade arrest by flight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
As explained above, Ohio law does not permit the full custodial arrest for a minor
misdemeanor. The use of any force, therefore, in making a custodial arrest raises the
question of reasonableness. As with Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claims, the Court has no
additional facts at this step of the proceedings with which to evaluate Plaintiff’s
allegations of excessive force. The Undersigned finds, therefore, that Plaintiff's claims
against Defendant Deardorf and Defendant Calendine for excessive force should proceed.
E. Theft Claims against Defendant Deardorf, Defendant Calendine, and Defendant John
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Deardorf and Defendant Calendine, in the course the
September 9, 2015 arrest, “took a car belonging to me.” (ECF No. 2 at 5.) Plaintiff also alleges
that “McDonald Towing Co. located in McArthur, Ohio was Complicit [sic] in the theft of my
car.” The Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint to allege that Defendants unlawfully impounded
his vehicle following his arrest on September 9, 2015.
To properly state a claim for unreasonable seizure of property under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege that (1) the defendant's alleged actions constituted a search or seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) defendant's actions were unreasonable in light of the
surrounding circumstances. Collins v. Nagle, 892 F.2d 489, 493–4 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that,
to determine whether seizure of plaintiff's vehicle was reasonable, court must determine
“whether the . . . decision to impound was reasonable under the circumstances”). Assuming that
Defendants’ impounding of Plaintiff’s vehicle constituted both a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment and state action on the part of Defendant John Doe, the Undersigned
finds that impounding Plaintiff’s vehicle in conjunction with a lawful custodial arrest is
reasonable under all the circumstances. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976).
Plaintiff has alleged no facts that would suggest Defendants acted unreasonably or committed a
theft offense by impounding Plaintiff’s vehicle in conjunction with a lawful custodial arrest. The
Undersigned, therefore, finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief may be
granted against Defendant Deardorf, Defendant Calendine, and Defendant John Doe for theft.
For the reasons stated above, the Undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint, at this
preliminary stage of the proceedings, survives an initial screen as against Defendant Deardorf
and Defendant Calendine as to his claims for excessive force. The Undersigned also finds that
Plaintiff has not made out viable claims upon which relief may be granted against Defendant
Albany Police Department, Defendant Judge Grim, Defendant Blackburn, and Defendant John
Doe. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims in this action
against Defendant Albany Police Department, Defendant Judge Grim, Defendant Blackburn, and
Defendant John Doe pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2).
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that
party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and
Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in
question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge
and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l
Latex Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the
magistrate judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [th defendant’s] ability to appeal the
district court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding
that defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely
object to magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed,
appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d
981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to
specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .” (citation
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: November 13, 2015
/s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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