Whetsel v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 20

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION that Plaintiff's statement of errors be sustained to the extent that this case be remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g), sentence four. Objections to R&R due by 2/16/2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Terence P. Kemp on 2/2/2017. (agm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Sheila Whetsel,

:

Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

:
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

Case No.

2:15-cv-3015

JUDGE MICHAEL H. WATSON
Magistrate Judge Kemp

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I.

Introduction

Plaintiff, Sheila Whetsel, filed this action seeking review
of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her
applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income.

Those applications were filed on March 1, 2012,

and alleged that Plaintiff became disabled on August 19, 2011.
That date was later amended to April 1, 2012.
After initial administrative denials of her claim,
Plaintiff was given a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
on March 26, 2014.
denied benefits.

In a decision dated June 20, 2014, the ALJ

That became the Commissioner’s final decision

on October 29, 2015, when the Appeals Council denied review.
After Plaintiff filed this case, the Commissioner filed the
administrative record on January 25, 2016.

Plaintiff filed a

statement of specific errors on March 17, 2016, to which the
Commissioner responded on June 28, 2016.

Plaintiff filed a reply

brief on July 18, 2016, and the case is now ready to decide.
II.

Plaintiff’s Testimony at the Administrative Hearing

Plaintiff, who was 48 years old as of the date of the
hearing and who has a high school education, testified as
follows.

Her testimony appears at pages 50-64 of the

administrative record.

Plaintiff said that she had once worked as an engine
bearings inspector, a job which required lifting 25 to 30 pounds.
She alternated between sitting and standing on that job, and
missed work due to back pain.

She had been treated with hot

packs, traction, and physical therapy, but nothing had helped.
Medications did not help either.
hallucinations.

She was also on medication for

Plaintiff testified to a shoulder problem as

well.
When asked about her physical capabilities, Plaintiff said
that she could stand for five to ten minutes and lift five to
eight pounds.

She had difficulty holding on to objects with her

left hand.
On a typical day, Plaintiff said that “we stay in bed, all
of us we stay in bed because we don’t like, we got to change
scenery when people ... are around.”

(Tr. 59).

She explained

that Linda and Sherry came to see her and talk to her but that
her husband could not see them.

Linda and Sherry had been “with

her” since she was raped when she was younger.
crisis line often during the day.

She called the

She had not driven in months

but did go to church with her husband.

She also had daily crying

spells.
III.

The Medical Records

The pertinent medical records are found beginning at page
425 of the record and can be summarized as follows.

Since the

statement of errors focuses on Plaintiff’s psychological
impairments, the Court’s summary of the records will be limited
to those which are relevant to the issues Plaintiff has raised.
There are a number of records about mental health treatment
which predate Plaintiff’s alleged onset date.

She was seen at

Consolidated Care for substance abuse addiction beginning on
October 10, 2010.

She was treated through group therapy and

mental health counseling, during which she was described as, at
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times, hopeful and participating well in her treatment plan, and,
at other times, crying, in pain, and sad and distressed.

She was

also diagnosed with PTSD during that time. (Tr. 540-83, 598).

A

mental status evaluation done on November 1, 2010, indicated no
delusions or hallucinations and logical thought processes.
611).

(Tr.

She continued with her substance abuse counseling through

June 15, 2011.
On September 21, 2011, Dr. Schulz, a psychologist, performed
a consultative psychological evaluation.

Plaintiff said the

basis of her disability application was low back pain and
rheumatoid arthritis.

She was taking no medication at that time.

She said that the substance abuse program had helped to maintain
sobriety.

Plaintiff said that learning job duties had always

been hard for her but she had never taken time off work due to
mental difficulties and always got along well with others in the
work setting.

She had driven herself to the appointment, a

distance of forty miles.

Plaintiff reported that watching

television and reading the Bible were her primary daily
activities and that she could wash dishes, clean, cook, and go
shopping.

Her affect and mood were congruent, but she reported

feeling sad most days.

Dr. Schulz diagnosed depressive and

anxiety disorders as well as a substance-related disorder and
rated her GAF at 60.

He thought that she could deal with job

instructions consistent with her borderline intelligence, could
do routine and repetitive tasks, could get along well with
others, and would likely have some difficulty responding to work
pressure. (Tr. 673-82).
In contrast to that assessment, Plaintiff’s counselor at
Consolidated Care, Debbie Brownlee, filled out a form on April
17, 2012, indicating that Plaintiff said she could not work due
to depression and stress and that she felt threatened by
supervisors and coworkers.

She also reported being angry when
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she did work and feeling overwhelmed by chaos in the workplace,
and said she had been accused of creating a hostile work
environment for others and disciplined for not showing up for
work.

She also demonstrated unreliability in keeping her

counseling appointments.

(Tr. 684-85).

The accompanying

treatment notes indicated that Plaintiff was making some (and
often good) progress and that she was usually pleasant and
cooperative.

Her mood was frequently described as depressed but

hopeful, and her diagnoses included major depressive disorder.
Plaintiff ended treatment at Consolidated Care on September 4,
2012, having last been seen there on July 28, 2012.

Ms. Brownlee

then wrote a letter dated March 25, 2014, in which she again
recapped her treatment of Plaintiff, indicating that Plaintiff
had a GAF of 43, that her depression worsened during the
treatment period, and that she was having increased identity
disturbances and psychotic episodes.

Ms. Brownlee said that when

Plaintiff lost her job in October, 2011, Plaintiff retreated to
her bedroom and suffered a decrease in normal functioning.
Plaintiff moved to Dayton in 2012 but still called Ms. Brownlee
occasionally, sounding “distressed, fearful, anxious, and removed
from reality.”

Ms. Brownlee concluded that Plaintiff could not

tolerate work pressure or meet quality standards required by
employers.

(Tr. 955-56).

Dr. LaTurner completed a mental functional capacity
assessment report indicating that he had seen Plaintiff on May
22, 2012.

It is not clear when he completed the form.

On it, he

indicated that Plaintiff was not employable, and he described her
as markedly or extremely limited in almost every area of
functioning.

The only exception to that assessment was a

moderate limitation in the area of being able to ask simple
questions or request assistance.

(Tr. 952-53).

The form he

completed refers to a report which does not appear in the record.
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After Plaintiff moved to Dayton, she received treatment from
Day-Mont Behavioral Healthcare.

Progress notes from that

organization reflect treatment from November 19, 2013 through
April 3, 2014.

Those notes (Tr. 967-1041) show generally that

Plaintiff was depressed but cooperative, that she reported being
pressured by everyday life, and that she heard voices, suffered
from racing thoughts, and had nightmares.

She was also

constantly afraid, and her symptoms had worsened in the past two
years.

The diagnoses included a psychotic disorder.

Both

auditory and visual hallucinations were noted and her perception
was also described at times as paranoid and psychotic.

Treatment

notes after that date show some improvement in her symptoms with
medication.

(Tr. 1055-1108).

Plaintiff’s more recent treating psychiatrist, Dr. Tasnin,
completed an evaluation form on April 9, 2014, indicating that
Plaintiff had been seen monthly since January 9, 2014, that she
suffered from schizophrenia, a mood disorder, and PTSD, that her
current GAF was 45, that she had a host of psychological symptoms
including delusions or hallucinations and oddities of thought,
perception, speech, and behavior, that her attention and
concentration were poor, that her memory was impaired, that her
response to treatment had been poor, that she would be absent
from work more than three times per month, and that she had
extreme restrictions in every area of functioning.

(Tr. 1042-

45).
Finally, some of the records were reviewed by state agency
psychologists.

First, Dr. Dietz concluded, on September 29,

2011, that Plaintiff could work in an environment with flexible
production standards and schedules and could perform 3-4 step
tasks, even though she had some moderate psychological
limitations.

(Tr. 82-84).

On May 5, 2012, Dr. Warren found

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Plaintiff somewhat more limited, concluding that she could adapt
to a work setting where duties were routine and predictable and
that she was also limited to occasional interaction with others.
Dr. Warren also said that Plaintiff “could complete a workday
with an occasional extra break and can keep up a consistent, but
not rapid, pace.”

(Tr. 109-111).

The reviewers did not have the

benefit of any of the treating source opinions or of any
treatment notes from Day-Mont.
IV.

The Vocational Testimony

Teresa Trent was called to testify as a vocational expert at
the administrative hearing.

Her testimony begins at page 65 of

the administrative record.
Ms. Trent first testified about Plaintiff’s past relevant
work.

She said that the inspector job which Plaintiff had done

was a light, semi-skilled job.
Next, Ms. Trent was asked some questions about someone with
Plaintiff’s background and who could work at the light exertional
level and who could occasionally push or pull with the left upper
extremity, but was right-hand dominant.

The person could not

climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, could stoop and crouch
frequently, could occasionally reach in all directions with the
left arm, and had to avoid all exposure to hazards including
moving machinery and unprotected heights.

That person was also

limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, could tolerate only
occasional changes in the work setting, could not be subjected to
strict production rates or fast-paced work, and could interact
only occasionally with the public and coworkers.

Ms. Trent said

that someone with those restrictions could not do Plaintiff’s
past work, but that the person could perform 20,000 jobs in the
regional economy and one million jobs in the national economy, in
positions like hand bander, weigher, and silver wrapper.

If the

person could not lift more than ten pounds, he or she could do

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jobs like lens inserter, table worker, or sorter.

Being off task

for more than ten percent of the day in addition to regularly
scheduled breaks would preclude competitive employment, however.
V.

The Administrative Law Judge’s Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision appears at pages 2138 of the administrative record.

The important findings in that

decision are as follows.
The Administrative Law Judge found, first, that Plaintiff
met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through June 30, 2016.

Second, she found that Plaintiff had not

engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset
date.

Going to the next step of the sequential evaluation

process, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had severe impairments
including mild degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine,
mild degenerative joint disease of the left hip, osteoarthritis
of the left shoulder with impingement, obesity, borderline
intellectual functioning, affective disorder, psychotic disorder,
anxiety disorder, personality disorder, and episodic cannabis
abuse.

The ALJ also found that these impairments did not, at any

time, meet or equal the requirements of any section of the
Listing of Impairments (20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1).
Moving to the next step of the sequential evaluation
process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional
capacity to perform work at the light exertional level and,
although she could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, she
could stoop and crouch frequently and could occasionally reach,
reach overhead, push, and pull with her left upper extremity.
Also, she had to avoid all exposure to hazards including
operational control of moving machinery and work at unprotected
heights.

Plaintiff was also limited to simple, routine,

repetitive tasks involving no production rate or pace work and

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could tolerate only occasional changes in the work setting and
only occasional interaction with coworkers and the general
public.
With these restrictions, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
could not do her past relevant work, but she could perform the
light jobs identified by the vocational expert, including hand
bander, weigher, and silver wrapper.

The ALJ further determined

that these jobs existed in significant numbers in the regional
and the national economy, and that Plaintiff could also perform a
significant number of sedentary jobs.

Consequently, the ALJ

decided that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits.
VI.

Plaintiff’s Statement of Specific Errors

In her statement of specific errors, Plaintiff raises these
issues: (1) the ALJ did not give proper weight to the opinions of
Plaintiff’s treating doctors; and (2) the ALJ did not properly
assess Plaintiff’s credibility.

These issues are evaluated under

the following legal standard.
Standard of Review.

Under the provisions of 42 U.S.C.

Section 405(g), "[t]he findings of the Secretary [now the
Commissioner] as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ."

Substantial evidence is

"'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
Richardson v. Perales, 402

adequate to support a conclusion'"

U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Company v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
scintilla.'" Id.
Cir. 1976).

It is "'more than a mere

LeMaster v. Weinberger, 533 F.2d 337, 339 (6th

The Commissioner's findings of fact must be based

upon the record as a whole.

Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435

(6th Cir. 1985); Houston v. Secretary, 736 F.2d 365, 366 (6th
Cir. 1984); Fraley v. Secretary, 733 F.2d 437, 439-440 (6th Cir.
1984).

In determining whether the Commissioner's decision is

supported by substantial evidence, the Court must "'take into

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account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.'"
Beavers v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 577 F.2d
383, 387 (6th Cir. 1978) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)); Wages v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 755 F.2d 495, 497 (6th Cir. 1985).

Even if this Court

would reach contrary conclusions of fact, the Commissioner's
decision must be affirmed so long as that determination is
supported by substantial evidence.

Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708

F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983).
A.

The Treating Source Opinions

As noted in the Court’s summary of the medical records, two
different treating sources - Dr. LaTurner and Dr. Tasnin - both
concluded that Plaintiff had work-preclusive mental limitations.
The ALJ did not accept their views, instead finding that her
limitations were essentially those expressed by a non-examining
psychologist, Dr. Warren.

The first question presented is

whether the ALJ’s decision on this issue is supported by
substantial evidence, a question requiring an analysis both of
the basis of her decision and the appropriate legal framework.
The Court begins with the administrative decision.
The ALJ started this portion of the decision by recounting
Plaintiff’s history of treatment prior to her onset date.

She

noted that during Plaintiff’s time in substance abuse treatment,
her GAF was recorded as between 51 and 56, and pointed out that
Plaintiff successfully completed the program in June, 2011.
Next, she reviewed Dr. Schulz’s evaluation report, which
indicated that Plaintiff’s functioning was adequate.

That report

was, as described above, prepared in 2011, and had been requested
as part of a prior application for benefits.
The ALJ did acknowledge that Plaintiff’s mental condition
worsened in late 2011 when she lost her job and her home and her
sister died.

Although her GAF was rated at 43, the ALJ viewed

this rating as inconsistent with the counselor’s report about
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Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, and also observed that
Plaintiff progressed with treatment and missed a number of
appointments, something which “suggest[ed] tolerable
symptomatology.”

(Tr. 32).

Next, the ALJ considered Dr. LaTurner’s report.

She said

that this report did not include, nor was it accompanied by, a
written narrative of any examination, and there were “no progress
notes or any other indication of a treating relationship.”

Id.

As a result, she gave it no weight, finding it inconsistent with
the objective evidence in the treatment notes which predated it.
After noting that Plaintiff transferred her treatment to
Consolidated Care, the ALJ discussed Ms. Brownlee’s letter.

She

first gave significance to the fact that Plaintiff had not
pursued treatment for mental health issues between July, 2012,
and November, 2013.

After summarizing Ms. Brownlee’s

conclusions, which also supported disability, the ALJ gave this
opinion no weight as well, reasoning that it was inconsistent
with Ms. Brownlee’s treatment notes and relied too heavily on
Plaintiff’s self-report of symptoms, which the ALJ determined not
to be fully credible.

(Tr. 33).

Lastly, the ALJ considered the course of Plaintiff’s
treatment at Day-Mont.

The ALJ seemed to associate Plaintiff’s

self-referral to that facility with Plaintiff’s receipt of a
reminder about her disability hearing.

The initial intake

evaluation showed a GAF of 55 and described Plaintiff as having
average demeanor and eye contact, no abnormal activity, logical
thought processes, cooperative behavior, and a full affect with
depressed mood.

At her initial meeting with Dr. Tasnin in

January of 2014, Plaintiff had a GAF of 50 and was prescribed
medications.

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had reported psychotic

symptoms at that time, and that she continued to report the
presence of “imaginary friends” or shadow people in follow-up
sessions.

Turning to Dr. Tasnin’s evaluation, the ALJ concluded
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that it was done after only two treatment sessions, totaling one
and one-half hours, and that the opinion “depart[ed]
substantially from the rest of the evidence.”

(Tr. 34).

According to the ALJ, the “totality of the medical evidence”
(including notes from physicians who treated Plaintiff for
physical ailments, and who did not mention any abnormal behavior)
supported much less severe limitations.

Given this inconsistency

and the short duration of the treating relationship, the ALJ
assigned little weight to Dr. Tasnin’s evaluation as well.

(Tr.

35).
In her statement of errors, Plaintiff focuses on the reports
from Dr. LaTurner and Dr. Tasnin.

As to the former, she disputes

that Ms. Brownlee’s notes, fairly read, are at all inconsistent
with Dr. LaTurner’s indication of marked or extreme limitations,
noting that Ms. Brownlee reported that Plaintiff had been
isolating herself, needed encouragement to maintain basic
hygiene, and was in need of assistance with resources; the
observation that she was also “pleasant and cooperative” was not,
in Plaintiff’s view, a reason to discount this other evidence of
serious limitations.

For much the same reasons, Plaintiff

contends that the ALJ lacked a substantial basis for disregarding
Dr. Tasnin’s opinion.

As part of her argument, she also notes

that the opinions of the state agency psychologists, which the
ALJ adopted, were based on a very limited review of the evidence
- neither had seen any treatment notes beyond May 5, 2012, which
is only a month after Plaintiff’s alleged onset date - and were
not subjected to the same level of scrutiny as were the opinions
of the treating sources.

She argues that these opinions do not

provide substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s decision.
The Commissioner argues, in response, that Dr. LaTurner was
not a treating source because the record shows that he examined
Plaintiff only once, and there is no evidence that it was for the
purposes of treatment.

Additionally, Dr. Tasnin should not be
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regarded as a treating source, either, because although she did
treat Plaintiff, she had seen her only twice before expressing
her opinion.

Finally, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ

correctly interpreted the various treatment notes as inconsistent
with and not supportive of either doctor’s opinion that Plaintiff
had marked or extreme limitations in functioning.
It has long been the law in social security disability cases
that a treating physician's opinion is entitled to weight
substantially greater than that of a nonexamining medical
advisor or a physician who saw plaintiff only once.

20 C.F.R.

§404.1527(c); see also Lashley v. Secretary of H.H.S., 708 F.2d
1048, 1054 (6th Cir. 1983); Estes v. Harris, 512 F.Supp. 1106,
1113 (S.D. Ohio 1981).

However, in evaluating a treating

physician’s opinion, the Commissioner may consider the extent to
which that physician’s own objective findings support or
contradict that opinion.

Moon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175 (6th

Cir. 1990); Loy v. Secretary of HHS, 901 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir.
1990).

The Commissioner may also evaluate other objective

medical evidence, including the results of tests or examinations
performed by non-treating medical sources, and may consider the
claimant’s activities of daily living.
HHS, 25 F.3d 284 (6th Cir. 1994).

Cutlip v. Secretary of

No matter how the issue of the

weight to be given to a treating physician’s opinion is finally
resolved, the ALJ is required to provide a reasoned explanation
so that both the claimant and a reviewing Court can determine why
the opinion was rejected (if it was) and whether the ALJ
considered only appropriate factors in making that decision.
Wilson v. Comm’r of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir.
2004).
The first issue is whether the ALJ was legally correct in
failing to give the opinions of either Dr. LaTurner or Dr. Tasnin
the deference due to treating sources.
has said,
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As the Court of Appeals

A physician qualifies as a treating source if the
claimant sees her “with a frequency consistent with
accepted medical practice for the type of treatment
and/or evaluation required for [the] medical
condition.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. A physician seen
infrequently can be a treating source “if the nature
and frequency of the treatment or evaluation is typical
for [the] condition.” Id.
Smith v. Comm’r of Social Security, 482 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir.
2007).

The courts review the classification of doctors as

treating sources on a de novo basis.

Id.

Any facts underlying

that determination which are supported by substantial evidence in
the record must be accepted by a reviewing court, however.

Id.

The ALJ appears to be correct about the absence of any
evidence of a treatment relationship between Plaintiff and Dr.
LaTurner.

There are no treatment or progress notes involving Dr.

LaTurner, and the form he completed shows that he is from Van
Wert, Ohio, which is not where Plaintiff was living or receiving
treatment.

It is not clear which, if any, records he reviewed

before formulating his opinion.

The ALJ’s factual finding that

there was no treating relationship between Plaintiff and Dr.
LaTurner is therefore supported by substantial evidence, and
while that does not justify disregarding the opinion entirely, it
does relieve the ALJ of the duty to articulate the basis of her
decision in the way that 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c) requires.

Given

that, the ALJ’s rationale, including the lack of a report and the
lack of support for the “check the box” form, is sufficient to
permit the Court to uphold her rejection of Dr. LaTurner’s
opinions.
Dr. Tasnin, however, is clearly a treating source.

It is

not unusual that in the first two months of a treating
relationship, a psychiatrist would see a patient who is also
undergoing counseling with others only twice.

The ALJ did not

rely exclusively on the short duration of the treating

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relationship, however, but also pointed out inconsistencies in
the notes made by Dr. Tasnin and her report, some of which are
valid bases for discounting it to some extent.

The Court cannot

say, in the abstract, that the ALJ erred in giving somewhat less
than controlling weight to Dr. Tasnin’s conclusions, but it is
problematic that the ALJ gave them only little weight, especially
when one of the reasons for doing so - that Plaintiff did not
exhibit unusual behavior when she went for physical examinations
- is not particularly compelling.
This problem is compounded by the stale nature of the
opinions which the ALJ did accept.

As noted, the consultative

and state reviewer opinions are based only on examinations or
treatment notes from 2010 to early 2012.

They did not factor in

the views of Ms. Brownlee, who had a long-term counseling
relationship with Plaintiff, or the notes from 2013 and 2014,
many of which, as Plaintiff points out, demonstrate severe
symptoms and serious issues of functioning.

Dr. Tasnin, although

she had just begun to see Plaintiff in 2014, did have the benefit
of both these records and of personally examining Plaintiff, and
it is not clear why the outdated state agency reviews should have
been given more weight than her opinion.

While the ALJ may have

been on sound footing in determining that, as of 2012, Plaintiff
had the functional capacity described by the ALJ, there is a
substantial question about whether it had decreased over time.
Consequently, the Court believes that a remand is needed in order
to address the significance of the post-2012 treatment, including
a re-evaluation of Dr. Tasnin’s opinions and, if appropriate,
obtaining additional medical opinions about Plaintiff’s
functional capacity from 2013 forward.
B.

The Credibility Assessment

As noted, the ALJ also discounted Plaintiff’s self-report of
disabling psychological symptoms.

The ALJ concluded that

Plaintiff had made inconsistent statements to treating sources,
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including how long she had been sober, why she stopped working
(she provided four different versions of that event), and whether
she had actually been maintaining sobriety, and also found her
first report of psychotic symptoms to have been timed to coincide
with the disability hearing.

The ALJ also contrasted her

statements with the absence of any evidence in the reports from
medical doctors that she had psychological abnormalities.
statements were therefore given “limited weight.”

Her

(Tr. 36).

Plaintiff argues, in her second statement of error, that the
ALJ’s credibility finding was based on a misreading or
mischaracterization of the evidence.

She points out that her

hearing testimony was not, as the ALJ said, consistent with
statements which would have been given by a rational person, and
that the ALJ herself noted Plaintiff’s unusual behavior while the
vocational expert was testifying.

Plaintiff further contends

that her activities of daily living after her onset date are
fully supportive of her claim of disability and the ALJ did not
evaluate those activities properly.
A social security ALJ is not permitted to reject allegations
of disabling symptoms, including pain, solely because objective
medical evidence is lacking.

Rather, the ALJ must consider other

evidence, including the claimant's daily activities, the
duration, frequency, and intensity of the symptoms, precipitating
and aggravating factors, medication (including side effects),
treatment or therapy, and any other pertinent factors.
§404.1529(c)(3).

20 C.F.R.

Although the ALJ is given wide latitude to make

determinations about a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ is still
required to provide an explanation of the reasons why a claimant
is not considered to be entirely credible, and the Court may
overturn the ALJ’s credibility determination if the reasons given
do not have substantial support in the record.

See, e.g. Felisky

v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027 (6th Cir. 1994).
Here, the Court concludes that the ALJ made a credibility
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finding which was in the zone of reasonableness.

The ALJ

provided a number of sound reasons for finding Plaintiff less
than fully credible, and those reasons, noted above, find support
in the record.

As the Commissioner points out, it is not this

Court’s job to reweigh the evidence, but only to determine if the
ALJ has evaluated it in a reasonable fashion.

It is important to

keep in mind that “[i]t is ... for the ALJ, and not the reviewing
court, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including that
of the claimant.”

Rogers v. Comm'r of Social Security, 486 F.3d

234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007). A claimant may “ask[ ] the Court to
reweigh the evidence, give her the benefit of the doubt to the
extent that these facts may weigh in her favor and then advance a
different view;” but that would not be proper because “the Court
is charged with determining the sufficiency of the evidence, not
its weight.” Thomas v. Comm'r of Social Security, 2014 WL
2114567, *16 (N.D. Ohio May 20, 2014).

Under these deferential

standards, the Court finds no error in the way in which the ALJ
evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility.
VII.

Recommended Decision

Based on the above discussion, it is recommended that the
Plaintiff’s statement of errors be sustained to the extent that
this case be remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§405(g), sentence four.
VIII.

Procedure on Objections

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation,
that party may, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this
Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those
specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection
is made, together with supporting authority for the objection(s).
A judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions

of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.

Upon proper

objections, a judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify,
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in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein,
may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.

28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to
object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a
waiver of the right to have the district judge review the
Report and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a
waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the District
Court adopting the Report and Recommendation.

See Thomas v.

Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d
947 (6th Cir. 1981).
/s/ Terence P. Kemp
United States Magistrate Judge

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