Crumrine-Husseini v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 21

OPINION and ORDER affirming and adopting 18 Report and Recommendations. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 3/30/2017. (ew) Modified text on 3/30/2017 (ew).

FILED

RICHARD W. NAGEL
CLERK np COURT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT CQimTo

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OH™'^
EASTERN DIVISION

^ on

Ph 3 39

us.Di2TRiCf COURT

SOUTHERN DiST.OHIO

Christine A. Crumrine-Husseini,

COf-OMBUS

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:15-^v-3103

Judge Michael H. Watson
Magistrate Judge Deavers

V.
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation

("R&R") dated February 17, 2017, EOF No. 19.^ In the R&R, EOF No. 18,
Magistrate Judge Deavers recommended that the Court overrule Plaintiffs

Statement of Specific Errors, in which Plaintiff challenged the Commissioner of
Social Security's (the "Commissioner") decision to deny Plaintiffs application for
social security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income.
For the reasons that follow, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs objections,
AFFIRMS and ADOPTS the R&R, and DISMISSES Plaintiffs complaint.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for benefits on October 17,2012, alleging that she became
disabled on July 15, 2007. Plaintiff specifically alleged that she experienced a

head Injury at that time and has since suffered from amnesia.
^ The Court notes that the docket reflects a "Joint Consent of the Parties to Proceed
Before the Magistrate Judge," ECF No. 9, but the document is not signed by both
parties.

After Plaintiffs initial application was denied, an administrative law judge
("ALJ") tield a hearing on Plaintiffs application. The ALJ found that Plaintiff was
not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (the "Act"). That

decision became final on November 5, 2015, when the Appeals Council denied
review.

Plaintiff subsequently filed suit for judicial review of the Commissioner's

decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Magistrate Judge Deavers analyzed
Plaintiffs Statement of Specific Errors and recommended that the Court overrule
the same. Plaintiff now objects to Magistrate Judge Deavers' conclusions in the
R&R.
il.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

When a party objects to an R&R within the allotted time, the Court "shall
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1): see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court "may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by
the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
It is well settled that, when objecting to an R&R, a party must make
"specific written objections" to the magistrate judge's proposed findings and

recommendations. Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A general statement that the

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magistrate judge erred does not aid judicial efficiency, the purpose "for which the
use of magistrates [was] authorized." Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human
Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Holl v. Potter, No. C-1-09-

618, 2011 WL 4337038, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 2011). afTd, 506 F. App'x 438
(2012) ("Objections that merely restate arguments raised in the memoranda
considered by the Magistrate Judge are not proper, and the Court may consider

such repetitive arguments waived.").
The Court must analyze PiaintifTs objections in light of the standard of

review in social security cases, which Magistrate Judge Deavers correctly set
forth in the R&R:

When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the Court
"must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it 'is supported by
substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal
standards.'"

Rabbers v. Comm'r of See. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651

(6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d
234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("[tjhe findings
of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . ."). Under this
standard, "substantial evidence is defined as 'more than a scintilla of
evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.'" Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutllp v. Sec'y of
Health & Hum. Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). Although
the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. The

Court must "'take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts
from [the] weight'" of the Commissioner's decision. TNS, Inc. v.
NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Universal Camera
Corp. V. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). Nevertheless, "if
substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, this Court defers
to that finding 'even if there is substantial evidence in the record that
would have supported an opposite conclusion.'" Blakley v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d
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270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). Finally, even If the ALJ's decision meets
the substantial evidence standard, "'a decision of the Commissioner

will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations
and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives
the claimant of a substantial right.'" Rabbers, 582 F.Sd at 651
(quoting Bowen v. Comm'rofSoc. Sec., 478 F.Sd 742, 746 (6th Cir.
2007)).
R&R 15-16, ECF No. 18.

B. Plaintiffs' Objections

Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge Deavers erred in two ways: (1) by
finding that the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff did not suffer from a severe

impairment was supported by substantial evidence; and (2) by rejecting Plaintiffs
request to remand this case for consideration of new medical evidence obtained

after the ALJ issued his decision. The Court addresses each objection in turn.
1.

First Objection

The ALJ found that the medical evidence did not sufficiently establish a
medically determinable Impairment or combination of impairments that is severe

as contemplated under the applicable regulations. As Magistrate Judge Deavers
noted,

A severe impairment is defined as "any impairment or combination of
impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities," 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c),
and which lasts or can be expected to last "for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). "A severe
mental impairment is 'established by medical evidence consisting of
signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by [a plaintiffs]
statement of symptoms.'" Griffith v. Comm'r, 582 F. App'x 555, 559
(6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.908).

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R&R17, ECF No. 18.

Magistrate Judge Deavers concluded that substantial evidence supports
the ALU's finding that Plaintiff does not suffer from a severe impairment. First,

Magistrate Judge Deavers noted that Plaintiff does not challenge the ALU's
finding that Plaintiff's allegations of symptoms and their causes lack credibility.
Second, Magistrate Judge Deavers discussed the medical evidence in the
record. Evidence that Magistrate Judge Deavers found sufficient to support the
ALU's conclusion includes, but is not limited to: PlaintifTs statement to her primary

care physician in 2012 that her only medical concern was eczema, the change in
Plaintiffs reporting after she discovered that she could qualify for disability

benefits (as Plaintifftold her primary care physician), the lack of treatment for the
alleged amnesia between 2007 and 2012 (when she apparently learned that she
could apply for disability benefits), the significant number of physical,
neurological, and psychiatric examinations that all revealed normal findings,

Plaintiffs ability to perform her activities of daily living, the absence of any
objective findings in the record that would suggest a severe impairment, multiple
reports from treating physicians stating that Plaintiff was exaggerating her

symptoms and that her responses to testing were internally inconsistent and not
indicative of the type of head injury Plaintiff claimed she had suffered, and the
state-agency physicians' ultimate determination that Plaintiff did not have a

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severe impairment as contemplated by the applicable regulations, among other
evidence.

The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Deavers that this evidence easily
satisfies the "substantial evidence" standard by which the Court reviews the
ALJ's decision. Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Deavers' conclusion on the

ground that one of PiaintlfTs consulting examiners, Dr. Deardorff, diagnosed
Plaintiff with an anxiety disorder and dissociative disorder and offered rule-out

diagnoses of cognitive disorder and a personality disorder. Dr. Deardorff also

opined that, "given [Plaintiffs] description of her inability to recall various things,

she may have difficulty managing funds prudently." R&R 6, ECF No. 18 (citing
R. at 488). But the totality of Dr. Deardorffs opinion supports the ALJ's
conclusion, as Dr. Deardorff also opined that Plaintiff was not credible, that her

reported symptoms were inconsistent with her daily routine and her behavior
during the examination, and that Plaintiff showed signs of having "bright-average

to superior intelligence." Id. (citing R. at 485). These opinions are consistent
with the record as a whole. At best. Plaintiffs argument regarding Dr. Deardorff

supports a finding that the ALJ could have reached a different conclusion (which
is questionable given the evidence restated above), which is insufficient to
overrule the ALJ's ultimate conclusion. See Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406. The Court
accordingly finds no error by Magistrate Judge Deavers in this regard.

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Plaintiffs argument that the ALJ misinterpreted the state-agency
physicians' opinions likewise fails. The state-agency physicians all opined that
Plaintiff did not suffer from a severe impairment. In rejecting Plaintiffs contention

of error on this issue, Magistrate Judge Deavers reviewed in detaii the stateagency physicians' opinions that Piaintiffs reported symptoms were inconsistent
with her test results and daily living activities, that Plaintiff had credibiiity issues,
and that the objective testing and examinations returned normai results.

Plaintiffs objection fails to identify any specific findings by the state-agency
physicians that, viewed in context of the findings noted above, contradict the

ALU's ultimate conclusion that Plaintiff does not suffer from a severe impairment.
The Court accordingly finds no error by the Magistrate Judge on this issue.

For these reasons, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs first objection to the
R&R.

2. Second Objection
Plaintiff next objects on the ground that Magistrate Judge Deavers shouid

have recommended remand, pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to
allow the ALJ to consider medical opinions obtained after he issued his written
decision. Magistrate Judge Deavers set forth the appiicable standard:

Sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides in relevant part as
follows:

The Court may, on motion of the Secretary made for
good cause shown before he files his answer, remand
the case to the Secretary for further action by the
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Secretary, and it may at any time order additionai
evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but oniy
upon a showing that there is new evidence which is
materiai and that there is good cause for the faiiure to
incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior
proceeding....
42. U.S.C. § 405(g). "Sentence-six remands may be ordered in oniy
two situations: where the Secretary requests a remand before
answering the compiaint, or where new, material evidence is
adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency."
Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 297 n.2 (1993) (citations
omitted).
The requirements that the evidence be "new" and
"material," and that "good cause" be shown for the faiiure to present
the evidence to the ALJ have been defined by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit as follows:

For the purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) remand,
evidence is new oniy if it was 'not in existence or
available to the claimant at the time of the administrative

proceeding.'... Such evidence is 'material' oniy if there
is 'a reasonable probability that the Secretary would
have reached a different disposition of the disability
claim if presented with the new evidence.' . . . A
claimant shows 'good cause' by demonstrating a
reasonable justification for the faiiure to acquire and
present the evidence for inclusion in the hearing before
the ALJ .... [Tjhe burden of showing that a remand is
appropriate is on the claimant.

Ferguson v. Comm'rofSoc. Sec., 628 F.3d 269, 276 (6th CIr. 2010)
(quoting Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3cl 346, 357 (6th Cir. 2001)).
R&R 25, ECF No. 18.

The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Deavers' conclusion that Plainitff
failed to carry her burden in demonstrating that a sentence six remand is

appropriate. Regarding materiality, the R&R summarizes eight other medical

opinions, ail of which echo a similar theme that Plaintiff was not credible, that her
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statements about her symptoms were inconsistent, and that the objective

medical evidence revealed normal test results. The two new medical opinions—
which are dated almost eight years after the alleged onset of disability and three
years after the date Plaintiff was last insured—are not material to Plaintiffs claim.

And even if they were, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Deavers that
Plaintiff failed to show good cause for the delay in obtaining and presenting such
evidence. On these facts. Plaintiffs argument that a delay in obtaining treatment
can be indicative of the alleged disability is not compelling.

The Court accordingly OVERRULES Plaintiffs second objection to the
R&R.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs objections to
the R&R, ECF No. 19, AFFIRMS AND ADOPTS the R&R, ECF No. 18, and

DISMISSES Plaintiffs complaint. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in
the Commissioner's favor and terminate this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

MICHAEL H. WATSON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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