Williams v. Carper et al

Filing 21

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 16 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Michael Yates, Daren Hall and Jennifer Carper in that it is RECOMMENDED that the motion be GRANTED and this action be dismissed for failure to sta te a claim upon which relief can be granted. Objections to R&R due by 8/22/2016. Signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King on 8/5/16. (sem)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

SHAWN LAMAR WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action 2:16-cv-0013
Judge Graham
Magistrate Judge King

JENNIFER CARPER, et al.,
Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which
plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding without the assistance of
counsel, claims a violation of his constitutional rights while at the
Ross Correctional Institution (“RCI”). This matter is now before the
Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint,
ECF No. 16. Plaintiff opposes the motion, Plaintiff’s Response to
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 17, and defendants have replied in support
of the motion, Defendants’ Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiff’s Response
(Doc#17) to Defendant’s [sic] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint, ECF No. 19. For the following reasons, it is recommended
that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint be
granted.

STANDARD
A complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails to “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and

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the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47(1957)). Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).
The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Although “the plausibility standard is not
[equivalent] to a ‘probability requirement,’ ... it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ –
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a) (2)).
Although pro se complaints are held “to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972), even a pro se complaint “must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

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plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or
federal law and must show that the deprivation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th
Cir.1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights,
not itself a source of substantive rights, the first step in an action
under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right
allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, imposes a limitation on the State’s
ability to punish those convicted of crimes.
Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene
society's “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1981). The Eighth Amendment,
therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that
involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir.1987) (per
curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation
alleged must result in the denial of “the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347;
see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600–01 (6th
Cir.1998). The Eighth Amendment is concerned only with
“deprivations of essential food, medical care, or
sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison
confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348. Moreover, “[n]ot
every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while
incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment

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within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d
at 954.
Richmond v. Settles, 450 F. App'x 448, 454–55 (6th Cir. 2011).
An Eighth Amendment claim entails both an objective and a
subjective component.

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).

The defendant must have acted with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind and the alleged wrongdoing must have been objectively harmful
enough to establish a constitutional violation.

Hudson v. McMillian,

503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). A plaintiff-inmate must show that the defendant
acted “‘maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm,’” rather than “‘in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline.’” Id. at 6 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. at 32021).

Specifically, a plaintiff-inmate must demonstrate, inter alia,

actual injury that is more than de minimis.

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 –

10; Richmond, 450 Fed. Appx. 448.
AMENDED COMPLAINT
The Amended Complaint, ECF No. 13, names as defendants two
captains at RCI (defendants Carper and Yates) and Daren Hall, who is
not otherwise identified but who was served with process at RCI. The
factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are as follows: On
October 17, 2015, at approximately 6:00 p.m., plaintiff had “words”
with a corrections officer (who is otherwise unidentified) and was
handcuffed and placed in a “‘Cell Block’ cage.” Id. at ¶ 8. His
request to be placed on suicide watch, “because he felt like hurting
himself,” was denied by defendant Carper. Id. Defendant Carper told
defendant Yates

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to leave Plaintiff inside the cage until 9:15 a.m. October
18, 2015. Where plaintiff had to stand up all day. Then
[plaintiff] was placed on constant watch by Capt. Yates.
Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff asks that defendants’ employment be terminated,
that the Court declare that plaintiff’s rights were violated, and that
he be awarded compensatory and punitive damages from each of the three
defendants. Id. at PAGEID# 51.
The Amended Complaint utterly fails to allege any wrongdoing on
the part of defendant Hall. As it relates to defendants Carper and
Yates, the Amended Complaint alleges no facts that would support a
claim of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The facts alleged by plaintiff simply do not
entail “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation,”
or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” See Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 348. The Amended Complaint fails to state a claim under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments upon which relief can be granted.
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ECF No. 16, be granted and that this
action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report
and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file
and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation,
specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part
thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto.
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

5

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Response to objections

must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy
thereof.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object
to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right
to de novo review by the District Judge and waiver of the right to
appeal the judgment of the District Court.

See, e.g., Pfahler v.

Nat’l Latex Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that
“failure

to

constituted

object
a

waiver

to

the

of

[the

magistrate
defendant’s]

judge’s

recommendations

ability

to

appeal

the

district court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976,
984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant waived appeal of district
court’s

denial

magistrate

of

judge’s

pretrial
report

motion
and

by

failing

to

recommendation).

timely
Even

object

when

to

timely

objections are filed, appellate review of issues not raised in those
objections is waived.

Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir.

2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which
fails

to

specify

the

issues

of

contention,

does

not

suffice

preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation omitted)).

August 5, 2016

s/Norah McCann King
Norah McCann King
United States Magistrate Judge

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to