Doe v. The Ohio State University et al
Filing
94
OPINION and ORDER granting in part and denying in part 72 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's 3/10/17 Opinion and Order in that Plaintiffs equal protection claim that was previously dismissed is reinstated against Defendants OSU, Smith, and Page. All other claims that were dismissed remain so. Signed by Judge George C. Smith on 8/20/18. (sem)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff,
Case No.: 2:16-cv-171
JUDGE GEORGE C. SMITH
Magistrate Judge Vascura
-v-
THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff John Doe’s Motion to Reconsider this Court’s
March 10, 2017 Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in party Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss. (See Doc. 72). Defendants have responded in opposition and Plaintiff has replied.
(Docs. 83 and 84). The matter is now ripe for review. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s
Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I.
BACKGROUND
The full background of this case is set forth in detail in the Court’s March 10, 2017
Opinion and Order. (See Doc. 50). For purposes of this Motion, the Court will briefly
summarize the facts and procedural history of the case. Plaintiff John Doe was a student at The
Ohio State University (“OSU”) and also worked as an RN at OSU’s Wexner Medical Center
(“OSUWMC”). John Doe initially met Jane Doe in 2012, when she was brought in to
OSUWMC. The couple dated and were involved in a sexual relationship through 2014. Seven
months after the couple’s last encounter, Jane Doe filed a complaint with OSUWMC alleging
that John Doe had sexually assaulted her on or about November 20, 2014. (Doc. 36, Am.
Compl. at ¶ 69).
As a result of the Complaint filed, an investigation was conducted and a hearing was
held. John Doe was found to have violated OSU’s Code of Student Conduct Sections 3335-2304(C), (C1), (B1) & (C2); and (b) and was permanently dismissed from OSU and barred from
ever being present on any OSU campus or property in the future. John Doe was also forced to
resign from his position at OSUWMC. John Doe’s subsequent appeals were unsuccessful.
Plaintiff then initiated this case against Defendants OSU, Javaune Adams-Gaston, Kelly
B. Smith, J.D., Matthew Page, and Natalie Spiert, (collectively “Individual Defendants”), on
February 24, 2016, seeking declaratory judgment and damages on his claims for violations of
Title IX, including hostile environment sexual harassment and/or discrimination, deliberate
indifference, and erroneous outcome; violation of the procedural and substantive component of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as violation of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff has filed three amended complaints.
(See Docs. 3, 20, and 36).
Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them. This Court granted in part
and denied in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Only Plaintiff’s claim for erroneous outcome
in violation of Title IX against Defendant OSU remains pending. All of Plaintiff’s other claims
were dismissed.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff John Doe moves this Court for reconsideration of its March 10, 2017 Opinion
and Order in light of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Doe v.
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Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff does not provide any basis or rule of law as
grounds for reconsideration of the decision, just generally argues for reconsideration.
As a general principle, motions for reconsideration are granted if the moving party
demonstrates: (1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence that was not previously
available to the parties; or (3) an intervening change in controlling law. GenCorp., Inc. v. Am.
Int'l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999). Motions for reconsideration do not allow
the losing party to “repeat arguments previously considered and rejected, or to raise new legal
theories that should have been raised earlier.” Nat'l Metal Finishing Co. v.
BarclaysAmerican/Commercial, Inc., 899 F.2d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Am. Marietta
Corp. v. Essroc Cement Corp., Case No. 01-3752, 59 Fed. Appx. 668, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis
3211, at *9 (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2003) (motion for reconsideration “should not be used to re-litigate
issues previously considered”).
Interlocutory orders “may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment
adjudicating all the claims.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). “District courts have authority both under
common law and Rule 54(b) to reconsider interlocutory orders and to reopen any part of a case
before entry of final judgment.” Harrington v. Ohio Wesleyan Univ., No. 2:05-CV-249, 2008
WL 163614, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 16, 2008) (Holschuh, J.) (quoting Rodriguez v. Tenn.
Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 Fed. App’x 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004)). “The Court has
‘significant discretion’ in considering a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order.” Harrington,
2008 WL 163614, at *2 (quoting Rodriguez, 89 Fed. App’x at 959 n. 7).
Typically, however, courts will reconsider previous interlocutory orders only “when there
is (1) an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or (3) a need to correct
a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t v. Hotels.com,
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L.P., 590 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2009). “Generally, a manifest injustice or a clear error of law
requires unique circumstances, such as injunctive relief scenarios or superseding factual
scenarios.” McWhorter v. ELSEA, Inc., No. 2:00CV473, 2006 WL 3483964, at *2 (S.D. Ohio
Nov. 30, 2006) (Kemp, M.J.). Motions for reconsideration are not intended to be utilized to relitigate issues previously considered. Macdermid Inc. v. Electrochemicals Inc., Nos. 96-3995, 964072, 142 F.3d 435 (Table), 1998 WL 165137, * 6 n. 7 (6th Cir. 1998).
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff John Doe moves for reconsideration of this Court’s March 10, 2017 Opinion and
Order dismissing his Title IX selective enforcement and deliberate indifference claims and the
Section 1983 due process and equal protection claims in light of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit opinion in Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018).
Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s Motion. The Court will consider the arguments in turn.
A.
Title IX Claims
Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of this Court’s Opinion and Order dismissing his Title IX
causes of action for selective enforcement and deliberate indifference. Plaintiff’s Title IX claim
for erroneous outcome remains pending, therefore the Court need not consider it and Plaintiff
does not seek reconsideration of the hostile work environment sexual harassment and/or
discrimination claim.
As set forth in detail in the Court’s March 10, 2017 Opinion and Order, Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 is a federal statute designed to prevent sexual discrimination
and harassment in educational institutions receiving federal funding. “Title IX bars the
imposition of university discipline where gender is a motivating factor in the decision to
discipline.” Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).
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1.
Selective Enforcement Claim
Although Plaintiff did not specifically plead a selective enforcement claim, the Court’s
Opinion and Order did contain a brief footnote analyzing a potential selective enforcement claim.
In that footnote, the Court stated:
To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a claim of selective enforcement pursuant to
Title IX, that claim fails. “To prevail on a ‘selective enforcement’ claim, the
plaintiff must show that a similarly-situated member of the opposite sex was
treated more favorably than the plaintiff due to his or her gender.” Cummins, 662
F. App’x at 452 (citations omitted). Plaintiff, here, has failed to assert any
allegations that a female student was not disciplined by OSU after a complaint
was filed for violation of the Code of Conduct similar to the allegations made
against Plaintiff in this case. Plaintiff’s allegations that Jane Doe was treated
more favorably during the disciplinary action against him are insufficient to
maintain a selective enforcement claim because Jane Doe was not similarly
situated to Plaintiff. See Doe v. Case Western Reserve Univ., No. 1:14-CV-2044,
2015 WL 5522001, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 2015) (“Jane Roe, the complainant
against Plaintiff in the disciplinary proceedings, is not a counterpart for the
purposes of a selective enforcement claim.” (citation omitted)). To state a
selective enforcement claim, a plaintiff must “identif[y] . . . a comparator of the
opposite sex who was treated more favorably by the educational institution when
facing similar disciplinary charges.” Id. (citing Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 716) (emphasis
added). Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are therefore insufficient to maintain a
claim for selective enforcement under Title IX.
(Doc. 50, March 10, 2017 Opinion and Order at 19).
Plaintiff now asks the Court to reconsider that decision in light of the holding of the Sixth
Circuit in Miami Univ. in the deliberate-indifference context. The Miami Univ. court held:
The district court was incorrect to suggest that John needed to have made a formal
complaint about Jane in order to plead a deliberate-indifference claim. We
require only that “the funding recipient had actual knowledge of the sexual
harassment,” and not that the plaintiff followed a formal procedure to put the
funding recipient on notice. Patterson, 551 F.3d at 445.
Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 591.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to bring a claim for selective enforcement and
cannot do so now through briefing. Defendants further argue that like the Plaintiff in Miami
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Univ., he has forfeited his right to bring such a claim. Additionally, Defendants argue Plaintiff
should not be allowed to maintain a claim for selective enforcement because it was not pled and
would be time barred.
This Court did find that Plaintiff had alleged some facts to suggest he was bringing a
selective enforcement claim and thus properly considered that as a potential claim. Plaintiff has
alleged that “Jane Doe consented to and/or initiated all relevant physical contact with John Doe
when she knew or should known John Doe lacked the capacity to consent because he was
incapacitated by alcohol.” (Doc. 36, Am. Compl. ¶ 10). Plaintiff further alleges that “John Doe
and Jane Doe were similarly situated in part because they were both students at OSU who
consumed alcohol prior to engaging in physical contact with another student who consumed
alcohol.” (Id. at ¶ 111).
As set forth above, to prevail on a selective enforcement claim, a plaintiff must establish
that a “similarly-situated member of the opposite sex was treated more favorably than the
plaintiff due to his or her gender.” Cummins, 662 F. App’x at 452. Although the Sixth Circuit’s
decision in Miami Univ. suggests that the Court can consider Jane Doe a similarly-situated
member of the opposite sex and that John Doe did not have to file a formal complaint against her
to be similarly situated, this discussion is still in the context of deliberate indifference and not
selective enforcement. In Miami, the Sixth Circuit did not analyze the selective enforcement
claim because plaintiff had not pled that claim. Therefore, the Court does not find that there has
been a change in controlling law regarding selective enforcement claims to justify
reconsideration of dismissal of that claim.
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2.
Deliberate Indifference
Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of this Court’s dismissal of his Title IX deliberate
indifference claim. Plaintiff again relies on the analysis of the Sixth Circuit in Miami Univ. as
set forth above and argues that Defendants had knowledge that Jane Doe had sex with Plaintiff
when he was too intoxicated to consent but took no action against her. (Doc. 72 at 3).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff still cannot maintain a claim for deliberate indifference because
he has not alleged “harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it bars
the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.” Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 590
(citing Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999)). Defendants further assert
that like the Plaintiff in Miami Univ., Plaintiff here cannot establish that he was sexually
harassed in a “severe, extensive and pervasive” manner as he only alleges that Jane Doe had sex
with him when he was too intoxicated to consent. (Doc. 83 at 5).
Plaintiff’s allegations and claim of deliberate indifference are similar to those of the
plaintiff in Miami Univ. and should be dismissed for the same reasoning. The Sixth Circuit
found that the plaintiff in Miami Univ. had alleged one incident of non-consensual kissing which
does not rise to the level of “sexual harassment [that is] so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive.” Plaintiff has not alleged that he complained to OSU that he was being sexually
harassed, nor is there any allegation that OSU ignored his complaints of sexual harassment. As
this Court previously held, actual notice of the alleged discrimination is an essential element of a
deliberate indifference claim, therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference fails. See
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290; see also, Williams ex rel Hart v. Paint Valley Local Sch. Dist., 400 F.
3d 360, 366 (6th Cir. 2005).
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B.
Section 1983 Claims
Plaintiff brought claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of both procedural
and substantive due process and equal protection. To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege
two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and (2) that the defendant deprived plaintiff of this federal right under color of law. Jones
v. Duncan, 840 F.2d 359, 360–61 (6th Cir. 1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff seeks reconsideration based on the Sixth Circuit’s discussion of the deprivation
of a constitutional guarantee element:
‘As an initial matter, we note that the Supreme Court never has held that the
interest in continued education at a public university constitutes a fundamental
property or liberty interest that finds refuge in the substantive protections of the
Due Process Clause.’ Martinson v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 562 F. App'x 365,
375 (6th Cir. 2014). ‘[O]ur own precedent suggests that the opposite is true,’
although this court has not definitively decided the issue. Id. A consensus on this
issue does not appear to have emerged among our sister circuits either. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that a suspension
from a public university is not a deprivation of constitutional property); Butler v.
Rector & Bd. of Visitors of Coll. of William & Mary, 121 F. App’x 515, 518-19
(4th Cir. 2005) (assuming, without deciding, that a student had ‘a property interest
in continued enrollment’ in a master’s program ‘that is protected by the Due
Process Clause’).
Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 598. The Sixth Circuit in Miami Univ. ultimately concluded that
Plaintiff’s suspension “implicates a constitutionally protected interest” and then stated that “the
question remains what process is due.” Id. at 559–600. Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of this
Court’s finding that “Plaintiff’s interest in continuing his education is not, as a matter of law, a
fundamental right protected by due process.” (Doc. 50 at 35-37). However, the Court need not
reconsider its entire Opinion and Order. Despite the initial finding, the Court provided
alternative analysis of both of Plaintiff’s procedural and substantive due process claims assuming
that Plaintiff was deprived a fundamental right.
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1. Substantive Due Process
In the alternative analysis, this Court assumed that John Doe’s right to continue his
education was a fundamental right protected by substantive due process, but then concluded that
Plaintiff’s allegations against the individual defendants did not meet the “shocks the conscience”
test, even when all inferences were drawn in Plaintiff’s favor.
The Sixth Circuit in Miami Univ. discussed:
‘Where government action does not deprive a plaintiff of a particular
constitutional guarantee or shock the conscience, that action survives the scythe of
substantive due process so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.’ Valot, 107 F.3d at 1228. Here, the defendants’ imposition of sanctions
on John is rationally related to Miami University’s legitimate interest in
investigating alleged violations of its student code of conduct and disciplining
those found responsible. Consequently, we affirm the district court’s grant of the
defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to John’s § 1983 substantive-dueprocess claim.
Miami Univ., 882, F.3d at 599.
Nothing in the Miami Univ. holding changes the law to justify this Court’s reversal of the
dismissal of this claim. Like Miami University, Defendants’ imposition of sanctions was
rationally related to OSU’s legitimate interest in investigating alleged violations of student code
of conduct and disciplining those found responsible.
2. Procedural Due Process
Plaintiff also seeks reconsideration of the dismissal of his § 1983 claim for violation of
his procedural due process rights. To establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff
must establish a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest and show that the state
deprived the plaintiff of such interest without appropriate procedures. See Rogers, 273 F. App’x
at 462 (citing Midkiff v. Adams Cty. Reg’l Water Dist., 409 F.3d 758, 762 (6th 2005)).
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Again, for purposes of the analysis of this claim, the Court assumed that Plaintiff had a
constitutionally protected property or liberty interest but ultimately concluded that the Amended
Complaint did not sufficiently allege that Plaintiff received insufficient due process.
Despite this Court previously finding that Plaintiff failed to allege that he did not receive
sufficient notice of the hearing, or that the investigation and hearing were not adequate, Plaintiff
is not in his motion for reconsideration attempting to argue just that. He is asserting that he was
not provided notice of the charges against him, the evidence was not explained to him and that he
was not provided an unbiased decision maker to hear his case. Defendants argue, and the Court
agrees that the Miami Univ. case is factually different from the case at bar. The investigators on
the claims against Plaintiff were not also on the hearing panel that adjudicated the claims. There
was no change in law to serve as a basis for reconsideration of Plaintiff’s claims. Further,
although this Court noted that Plaintiff’s allegations about the hearing process were concerning,
it ultimately concluded that the hearing panel’s procedures and deviations from the proper
procedures did not rise to the level of a deprivation of due process. Thus, the Court’s prior
decision on this claim stands.
3.
Equal Protection Clause
Plaintiff also seeks reconsideration of the dismissal of his Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection claim. To state a claim for an equal protection violation based upon gender
discrimination, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he was treated differently—under the same facts
and circumstances—than a member of the opposite gender. Kuhn v. Washtenaw Cty., 709 F. 3d
612, 624 (6th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff alleged that “gender discrimination caused the Individual
Defendants to unlawfully find John Doe responsible for engaging in sexual misconduct with Jane
Doe” and “female OSU students suffer no historical disadvantage regarding the discernment of
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consent to intimate physical relationships with male students which would allow Individual
Defendants to validly discriminate against male students like John Doe.” (Doc. 36, Am. Compl.
¶ 212—213). This Court held that Plaintiff failed to include an example of a female student who
was accused by another student of sexual misconduct under the same facts yet was either found
not responsible or was not dismissed from OSU. Based on that reasoning, the Court dismissed
Plaintiff’s equal protection claim.
The Sixth Circuit in Miami University provided the following analysis on the plaintiff’s
equal protection claim:
These alleged facts sufficiently show at the motion-to-dismiss stage that
John and Jane were similarly situated. Vaughn had credible information that both
students had potentially violated the University's sexual misconduct policy.
Vaughn, however, chose not to pursue disciplinary action against the female
student, but only against the male student. We note that the exact alleged sexual
misconduct of each student is not the same. John, while extraordinarily inebriated,
apparently engaged in non-consensual digital penetration and oral sex. Jane,
apparently mostly sober, purportedly kissed John when he was incapacitated and
unable to consent. But we have not previously required a plaintiff to allege that
the misconduct giving rise to an allegedly discriminatory disciplinary outcome be
of the same type and degree. See Heyne, 655 F.3d at 571 (holding that the plaintiff
sufficiently pleaded an equal-protection claim when he alleged that he was
punished more harshly for running over another student’s foot with his vehicle
than the other student was for threatening the plaintiff's life because of the
different races of the two students).
The instance of unequal treatment that John sufficiently pleads arises out
of Vaughn’s failure to initiate the University’s disciplinary process with respect to
Jane after receiving credible information that Jane may have violated the sexualmisconduct policy. Cf. Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736 (9th
Cir. 2000) (affirming the grant of summary judgment for the defendants on
plaintiffs’ § 1983 equal-protection claim when the asserted disparate treatment
was that the female plaintiffs were suspended after being caught violating the
school rules, whereas the male students were not punished because the school had
no notice of misconduct on their part). But equal protection does not require John
and Jane to have received the same sanctions when the underlying alleged
misconduct of the two was different; if Miami University had initiated
disciplinary proceedings against Jane, this process may have led to a finding of
not responsible or the imposition of a lesser sanction. None of these hypotheticals,
unless impermissibly motivated by gender, would establish an equal-protection
violation.
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John must also allege that the different treatment he received was based on
“purposeful or intentional” gender discrimination. Smith v. City of Salem, 378
F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2004). John asserts the same facts that undergirded his
Title IX claims of gender discrimination to buttress his § 1983 claim. Appellant
Br. at 40. For the same reasons that we held that John had sufficiently pleaded
facts demonstrating discriminatory intent under his Title IX erroneous-outcome
claim, John has alleged sufficient facts to show circumstantial evidence of gender
discrimination with respect to his equal-protection claim. See Section III.C supra.
‘[C]onstru[ing] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,’ Keys,
684 F.3d at 608, John has sufficiently pleaded an equal-protection claim. Of
course this case is before us at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and discovery may
disprove John’s allegation that the reason he was treated differently than Jane was
because of his gender and not because of other, legitimate reasons. But given the
procedural posture in which the case currently stands, however, we must presume
John’s allegations to be true.
Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 596-597.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s equal protection claim still fails despite the
aforementioned analysis. Defendants assert that, like Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim, he
has not alleged that he was severely or pervasively sexually harassed. Specifically, Plaintiff
never stated that Jane Doe’s touching was unwelcome or amounted to harassment.
The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s allegations in this case, and specifically with respect to
the equal protection claim, could have been more specific. Plaintiff is now arguing that the
Defendants, OSU, as well as individual Defendants Smith and Page, violated the equal protection
clause when they initiated and disciplined Plaintiff, but not Jane Doe despite receiving
information from Plaintiff that she may have also violated OSU’s sexual misconduct policy.
However, these allegations are not contained in the equal protection section of Plaintiff’s Third
Amended Complaint.
Nonetheless, Plaintiff has generally included these allegations and like the Sixth Circuit
noted, this is before us at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Out of an abundance of caution and based
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on the analysis of the Sixth Circuit in Miami Univ., the Court reverses its’ finding on Plaintiff’s
equal protection claim and reinstates that claim as to Defendants OSU, Smith, and Page.
3.
Qualified and Eleventh Amendment Immunity for the Individual Defendants
In this Court’s March 10, 2017 Opinion and Order, the Court did not consider the
Individual Defendants’ arguments on qualified and Eleventh Amendment immunity because all
the claims against them were dismissed. Having reinstated Plaintiff’s equal protection claim
against Individual Defendants Smith and Page, the Court must now consider those arguments.
The individual Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s claims
against them in their individual capacities, and to Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims
against them in their official capacities.
There is “a two-part test [that] determines whether qualified immunity applies: ‘(1)
whether, considering the allegations in a light most favorable to the party injured, a constitutional
right has been violated, and (2) whether that right was clearly established.’” Miami Univ., 882
F.3d at 604 (quoting Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 290 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim under § 1983 that Individual Defendants Smith
and Page violated his equal protection rights and that those same rights were clearly established
during the relevant time frame in this case, from 2014 through 2016. This was confirmed in
Miami Univ., where the Sixth Circuit specifically held that this right was clearly established:
“John’s ‘right to freedom from invidious [gender] discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause was certainly clearly established at all times pertinent to this action . . . .’ Rondigo,
L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 681 (6th Cir. 2011).” Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 604.
Thus, Individual Defendants Smith and Page are not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s
equal-protection claim.
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Further, the Individual Defendants Smith and Page are not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity because Plaintiff has sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The United
States Supreme Court decision in Ex parte Young determined Eleventh Amendment immunity
does not apply to a plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief and/or declaratory judgment. See
generally, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150-156 (1908); see also, Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S.
64, 106 (1985)(determining declaratory relief is within ex parte Young’s purview when
violations of federal law are threatened or ongoing).
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s equal protection claim that was previously
dismissed is reinstated against Defendants OSU, Smith, and Page. All other claims that were
dismissed remain so.
The Clerk of this Court shall remove Document 72 from the Court’s pending motions list.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ George C. Smith__________________
GEORGE C. SMITH, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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