Harris v. Sowers et al

Filing 210

OPINION AND ORDER granting 206 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge James L. Graham on 5/24/22. (ds)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
LIONEL HARRIS,
Case No. 2:16-cv-888
Plaintiff,
v.

Judge James L. Graham

AARON SOWERS, et al.,

Magistrate Judge
Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers

Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on two separate issues: 1) whether Plaintiff’s First and
Seventh Causes of Action against Defendants Michelle Lovette, Cynthia Ricker, and Melanie Fultz
should be dismissed on the pleadings pursuant to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Leaman v. Ohio
Dep’t of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 825 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc) and 2)
whether the Court should amend its November 20, 2020 Order (ECF No. 169) pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. 54(b) to grant summary judgment to Defendants Jacob Hays and Aaron Sowers on Plaintiff’s
equal protection claims. These issues are fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.
For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant
to Order [Doc #204] (ECF No. 206) is GRANTED. The Court also amends its November 20,
2020 Order (ECF No. 169) to GRANT summary judgment to Hays on the equal protection portion
of Plaintiff’s Second Legal Claim (Am. Compl. ¶ 75) and to GRANT summary judgment to
Sowers on the equal protection portions of Plaintiff’s Seventh and Eighth Legal Claims (Id. at ¶¶
80–81).

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I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lionel Harris, an Ohio inmate formerly incarcerated at the Madison Correctional

Institution (“MaCI”), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several MaCI
employees: Mailroom Screeners Aaron Sowers, Jacob Hays, and Mary McCrary; Melanie Futz, a
secretary/notary public; Lieutenant Julia Chamberlin; Financial Associate Supervisor Cynthia
Ricker; and Cashier Michelle Lovette (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges Defendants
violated his constitutional rights in connection with their handling of and alleged destruction or
theft of his mail and that they retaliated against him for his use and attempted use of the prison
grievance system.
II.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“After the pleadings are closed – but early enough not to delay trial – a party may move

for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The standard applied to motions for
judgment on the pleadings is the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). See Hindel v. Husted, 875 F.3d 344, 346 (6th Cir. 2017). “For purposes of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing
party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless
clearly entitled to judgment.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 582 (6th Cir.
2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). However, the court need not accept as true
legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. Id. (citing Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 400
(6th Cir. 1999)).
To withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “a complaint must contain direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements under some viable legal theory.”
Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007). “The

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factual allegations in the complaint need to be sufficient to give notice to the defendant as to what
claims are alleged, and the plaintiff must plead ‘sufficient factual matter’ to render the legal claim
plausible, i.e., more than merely possible.” Fritz v. Charter Township of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718,
722 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), “any order or other decision, however
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time
before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.”
III.

DISCUSSION
A. The Leaman Doctrine
Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings arguing that Plaintiff’s claims against

Lovette, Ricker, and Fultz are barred under the Leaman doctrine, because Plaintiff waived his right
to file federal claims against these defendants when he filed suit against the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Corrections (“ODRC”) in the Ohio Court of Claims alleging the same facts and
occurrences.
Under Ohio Rev. Code § 2743.02(A)(1), “filing a civil action in the court of claims results
in a complete waiver of any cause of action, based on the same act or omission, that the filing party
has against any officer or employee.” The Ohio legislature intended for this waiver to extend to
federal causes of action. Leaman, 825 F.2d at 952. Section 2743.02’s waiver of suits “‘against
any state officer or employee,’ provides a quid pro quo for plaintiffs []: ‘The state consents to be
sued in exchange for a plaintiff’s waiver of claims against the state’s employees.’” Portis v. Ohio,
141 F.3d 632, 634 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Thomson v. Harmony, 65 F.3d 1314, 1318 (6th Cir.
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1995)). “The Sixth Circuit has consistently applied Leaman to bar plaintiffs from bringing suit in
federal court against a state employee after bringing suit against the state in the Court of Claims
based on the same claim.” Plinton v. Cty. of Summit, 540 F.3d 459, 463 (6th Cir. 2008); Turker v.
Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 157 F.3d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 1998) (“where a federal court plaintiff
files a related action in the Court of Claims, she has waived her right to sue state officials for
monetary damages[.]”)
On July 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against the ODRC in the Ohio Court of
Claims alleging that MaCI employees failed to properly process two pieces of his legal mail on
two separate occasions.1 Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that on August 4, 2015 he gave his Ohio
Supreme Court merit brief to the MaCI mailroom. Plaintiff further alleged that instead of mailing
his merit brief within forty-eight hours per ODRC policy, defendants carelessly withheld his legal
mail for six days, which caused him to miss the Ohio Supreme Court’s filing deadline. Plaintiff
also alleged that on February 8, 2016, his federal civil rights lawsuit against MaCI employees was
lost and never mailed out.
Here, Plaintiff’s First and Seventh Causes of Action against Lovette, Ricker, and Fultz are
virtually identical. In the case at bar, Plaintiff alleges that he submitted his Ohio Supreme Court
merit brief to the MaCI mailroom on August 4, 2015 (Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff further alleges
that Lovette and Ricker intentionally withheld his merit brief to the Ohio Supreme Court for six
days, and as a result, caused his brief to arrive late. (Id. at ¶¶ 18–19.) Plaintiff also alleges that on
February 8, 2016, he gave Fultz his civil rights lawsuit against several MaCI employees for

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Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, this Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff’s Ohio Court of Claims case, Case
No. 2016-00534. “[F]ederal courts, in appropriate circumstances, may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both
within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” St.
Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979) (collecting cases).

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notarization and mailing. (Id. at ¶¶ 50–51.) Plaintiff claims that Fultz took his lawsuit to the
administration building where she allegedly placed it in a lockbox for pick up. (Id. at ¶ 53.)
Plaintiff further claims that MaCI mailroom employees never received the lawsuit, and that the
missing piece of legal mail was never found. (Id.)
Plaintiff, now proceeding with the assistance of counsel, does not contest Defendants’
assertion that his Ohio Court of Claims suit and his federal lawsuit are based on the same acts or
omissions. Plaintiff instead takes issue with the Court’s consideration of the Leaman doctrine’s
application to Plaintiff’s claims against Lovette, Ricker, and Fultz since Defendants did not brief
this issue at the summary judgment stage. After acknowledging that Defendants raised this
affirmative defense in their Answer, the Court invited briefing on this threshold issue. See
Malenda v. Gray, No. 2:19-cv-167, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188719, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 31,
2019) (noting that the Leaman doctrine constitutes a threshold issue).
Plaintiff argues that his Court of Claims filing cannot result in a complete waiver of his
claims against Lovette, Ricker, and Fultz, because constitutional claims are not actionable in the
Court of Claims. But whether Plaintiff’s claims against the ODRC survived post-filing is
immaterial—it is the act of bringing a claim in the Court of Claims, regardless of its success, that
triggers the Leaman doctrine’s complete waiver. Thomson, 65 F.3d at 1319; Thomas v. Ohio Dep’t
of Rehab. & Corr., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1008, n.3 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (“The language of the statute,
as well as that of the Sixth Circuit cases of Leaman, Thomson and Turker indicate that filing, alone,
is sufficient to trigger the waiver.”)
Plaintiff also argues that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to
file suit here. For Leaman to apply, a plaintiff’s choice to pursue relief in the Ohio Court of Claims
must be “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Leaman, 825 F.2d at 956. In Leaman, the Sixth

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Circuit determined that Leaman made a “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary” waiver of her right
to bring claims against state employees, because she was represented by competent counsel when
she filed suit in the Ohio Court of Claims, and her counsel was therefore presumed to know what
the Court of Claims Act said. Id. Such a presumption does not automatically extend to pro se
litigants. See Kajfasz v. Haviland, 55 F. App’x 719, 722 (6th Cir. 2003) (determining that “there
can be no presumptive finding” that a pro se litigant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of “his § 1983 claim in federal court when he filed suit in the Ohio Court of Claims.”)
Instead, district courts must make a factual determination that the pro se litigant  “knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his [or her] right to proceed in federal court by filing in the
Ohio Court of Claims.” Id.
In making this determination, courts consider “the pro se plaintiff’s prior litigation
experience, the coherency of his filings in both the federal and Court of Claims matters, and
whether the litigant referenced the statutory waiver provision in the filings.” Troche v. Crabtree,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72626, 2014 WL 2211012, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May 28, 2014). A pro se
litigant knowingly waives any cause of action in federal court if he has “an above-average
understanding of the law for a pro se litigant.” Williams v. Smith, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52864,
2006 WL 2192470, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2006).
The Court has considered these factors and finds that Plaintiff made a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary waiver of his right to proceed in federal court by filing an action in the Ohio Court
of Claims. Prior to filing in the Court of Claims and here, Plaintiff filed a mandamus action in
state court. State ex rel. Harris v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2014-Ohio-1612, 139
OhioSt.3d 149, 9 N.E.3d 1057. Plaintiff also filed a habeas petition on March 20, 2015 in the
Twelfth District Court of Appeals, Case No. CA2015-03-012. (ECF No. 139-1.) Plaintiff’s

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complaints in both the instant case and the Court of Claims are typewritten, intelligible, and
coherently organized and involve nearly identical allegations concerning acts or omissions that
transpired on August 4, 2015 and February 8, 2016.
In the instant case, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is well organized with numerous
headings and detailed factual allegations and cites to the relevant statutes for his constitutional
claims and the Court’s jurisdiction. Brooks v. McCoy, 1:15-CV-39, 2015 WL 4538512, at *4 (S.D.
Ohio July 27, 2015) (discussing plaintiff’s identification of “the proper federal jurisdictional
statutes, as well as the relevant federal statute for his constitutional claims” as indicating an
experienced litigator).

Though Plaintiff did not specifically reference Ohio Rev. Code §

2743.02(A)(1) in his Court of Claims complaint, he only sued the ODRC, rather than the individual
MaCI employees, even though he was aware of their identities as evidenced by the exhibits
attached to his complaint. This “evinces a knowledge that the waiver statute only permits actions
against the state.”2 Jones v. Ohio, No. 1:19-CV-1913, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9004, at *6 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 17, 2020); Brooks, 2015 WL 4538512, at *4, n.2 (“Plaintiff’s naming only a state agency,
rather than an individual, pursuant to the Court of Claims Act further demonstrates his familiarity
with that statute.”). 
Furthermore, while litigating his Court of Claims case, Plaintiff filed a well-organized,
intelligible, and coherent memorandum in opposition to the ODRC’s motion to dismiss. There,
Plaintiff discussed a federal case from this circuit where another prisoner’s legal mail was not
processed in accordance with the applicable policy directive, and as a result, his application for
leave to appeal was rejected as untimely. Plaintiff reasoned “since the federal court in that case
found that the circumstances described do not rise to the level of the constitutional violation of

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“The only defendant in original actions in the court of claims is the state.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2743.02(E).

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denial of access to court and is a ‘negligence claim’, Plaintiff relied on that decision when he
decided to file a negligence claim in the Court of Claims instead of the federal courts.” Pl.’s Mot.
in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 3, Ohio Court of Claims Case No. 2016-00534 (Aug. 29, 2016).
This statement not only evinces a “an above-average understanding of the law for a pro se litigant,”
it also demonstrates that Plaintiff intelligently evaluated the facts and circumstances of his case
and voluntarily chose to file in the Court of Claims rather than federal court.
The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver
of his federal claims against Lovette, Ricker, and Fultz when he filed suit against the ODRC in the
Ohio Court of Claims based on the same acts or omissions. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has not pled any facts showing that he is entitled to relief against these defendants, and
Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted.
B. Equal Protection Claims
Also before the Court is the issue of whether to grant summary judgment to Defendants
Jacob Hays and Aaron Sowers on Plaintiff’s equal protection claims.
At the parties’ final pretrial conference, the Court proposed amending its previous
summary judgment Order to grant summary judgment on the equal protection portion of Plaintiff’s
claims against Hays and Sowers, because Plaintiff’s equal protection claims are based on the same
alleged harm as his retaliation claims. Plaintiff requested to brief this issue, and the Court granted
Plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff opposes an amendment granting summary judgment to Hays and
Sowers on his equal protection claims arguing that: 1) the State has waived its right to de novo
review of the equal protection claims and 2) dismissal of the retaliation claims should have no
bearing on the dismissal of the equal protection claims. The Court addresses each argument in
turn.

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First, Rule 54(b) affords the Court the discretion to revise its previous summary judgment
order, as “any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of
the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating
all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Where, as here, a
grant of partial summary judgment is not a final judgment, a court is well within its discretion to
revise its earlier decision. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976). (“[A] grant
of partial summary judgment limited to the issue of [] liability [is] by [its] terms interlocutory . . .
and where assessment of damages or awarding of other relief remains to be resolved have never
been considered to be ‘final’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”)
The Court next turns to the issue of whether dismissal of Plaintiff’s equal protection claims
is appropriate. Upon further review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has asserted four
equal protection claims, not three. The Court will therefore analyze Plaintiff’s four equal
protection claims and the corresponding allegations for each.
1. Plaintiff’s First Equal Protection Claim
Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action alleges that on September 29, 2015, Hays retaliated
against Plaintiff for using the prison grievance system by opening Plaintiff’s legal mail outside of
his presence and stealing the enclosed grievance filing brochure pertaining to Plaintiff’s attempt
to challenge his prison conditions. (Am. Compl. ¶ 32.) In its November 20, 2020 Order, the Court
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Hays was the person responsible
for opening Plaintiff’s legal mail and removing the grievance brochure from it and granted
summary judgment to Hays on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. (ECF No. 169 at 2020–23.)
Plaintiff’s Second Legal Claim similarly alleges that Hays retaliated against Plaintiff for
using the prison grievance system but adds that Hays violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment
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rights when he opened Plaintiff’s legal mail outside of his presence and stole the grievance
brochure out of it. (Am. Compl. ¶ 75.) Plaintiff further alleges that Hays’s conduct was unlawful
and discriminatory, injured his First Amendment rights and interfered with Plaintiff’s ability to
challenge the conditions of his confinement. (Id.)
“To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must adequately plead that the government
treated the plaintiff ‘disparately as compared to similarly situated persons and that such disparate
treatment either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis.’” Ctr.
for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Club Italia
Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, Mich., 470 F.3d 286, 299 (6th Cir. 2006)).
But “the threshold element of an equal protection claim is disparate treatment.” Id. As Plaintiff
points out, to prevail on his equal protection claim, he must demonstrate that Hays’s actions
constitute disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals. Robinson v. Jackson, 615 F. App’x
310, 314 (6th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Hays’s actions constituted disparate
treatment of similarly situated individuals, because this Court has already determined, as a matter
of law, that there is insufficient evidence that Hays took the alleged discriminatory action of
opening Plaintiff’s mail and stealing his grievance brochure. Plaintiff’s equal protection claim
therefore fails and warrants summary judgment.
2. Plaintiff’s Second Equal Protection Claim
Plaintiff’s next equal protection claim is listed as: Seventh Legal Claim: Retaliation &
Equal Potection [sic] & Denial of Access. (Am. Compl. ¶ 80.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that Sowers
retaliated against him, as an African American using the prison grievance system, by opening
Plaintiff’s legal mail outside of his presence and stealing legal materials out of the letter, thereby
causing injury to Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id.) This alleged conduct is

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similar to Plaintiff’s earlier pled Sixth Cause of Action where he alleges that on January 14, 2016,
Sowers opened his legal mail outside of his presence and stole his letter to his attorneys and copies
of four disposition of grievance forms. (Id. at ¶ 48.) Plaintiff contends that Sowers opened his
legal mail in retaliation for Plaintiff’s use of the grievance process. (Id. at ¶ 49.)
In its November 20, 2020 Order, the Court found that there was no competent evidence
that Sowers opened or inspected Plaintiff’s legal mail on January 14, 2016, or that he was aware
of its contents, and granted summary judgment in favor of Sowers on this claim. (ECF No. 169 at
2031.) It therefore follows that Sowers could not have denied Plaintiff equal protection under the
law, because the Court has already determined, as a matter of law, that Sowers did not commit the
alleged discriminatory conduct. Thus, the equal protection portion of Plaintiff’s Seventh Legal
Claim fails and warrants summary judgment.
3. Plaintiff’s Third Equal Protection Claim
Plaintiff’s third equal protection claim is listed as: Eighth Legal Claim: Access to
Courts/Retaliation/Equal Protection where he alleges that Sowers retaliated against him and denied
him access to the courts when he destroyed Plaintiff’s § 1983 lawsuit and that Sowers’s racially
motivated retaliation also denied Plaintiff’s right to equal protection under the law. (Am. Compl.
¶ 80.) This is similar to Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action where he alleges that Sowers retaliated
against him by picking up his § 1983 civil rights lawsuit from the administration building on
February 8, 2016 and destroying it. (Id. at ¶¶ 50–55.) In its November 20, 2020 Order, the Court
found, as a matter of law, that “there is no evidence that Defendant Sowers picked up or destroyed
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 lawsuit” and granted summary judgment to Sowers on this claim. (ECF
No. 162 at 1950, adopted by ECF No. 169 at 2031.)

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As an initial matter, any claim regarding the alleged destruction of Plaintiff’s § 1983 civil
rights lawsuit by ODRC employees on February 8, 2016 is barred by the Leaman doctrine.
Furthermore, the Court previously determined, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff’s speculation that
Sowers removed and later destroyed his § 1983 lawsuit is insufficient to establish that Sowers took
the alleged action. Therefore, absent sufficient evidence to establish any retaliatory action,
Plaintiff also cannot establish that Sowers’s actions constituted disparate treatment, and his equal
protection claim also fails for this reason.
4. Plaintiff’s Fourth Equal Protection Claim
Plaintiff fourth equal protection claim is listed as: “Ninth Legal Claim: Denied Access to
Court, Retaliation, and Equal Protection.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 82.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that Sowers
retaliated against him and denied his First Amendment right to access the courts by refusing to
mail out Plaintiff’s request for legal counsel and implementing a “Jim Crow” rule barring
Plaintiff’s access to the courts while incarcerated at MaCI. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that
Sowers’s racially motivated actions denied Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection. (Id.) This legal claim is similar to Plaintiff’s Eighth Cause of Action where he alleges
that Sowers retaliated against him and denied him access to the courts when Sowers withheld his
outgoing legal mail for eight days and returned it with a note stating a fictious rule for mailing
legal documents. (Id. at ¶¶ 56–61.)
After reviewing the record evidence, the Court determined that a genuine dispute of
material fact remains concerning whether Sowers retaliated against Plaintiff due to the temporal
proximity of Plaintiff’s complaints against the MaCI mailroom and the totality of circumstances
presented in the record, including evidence that Plaintiff’s outgoing mail should not have been
returned to him. (ECF No. 162 at 1953.) The Court further determined, however, that it could not

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conclude that Sowers denied Plaintiff access to the courts by withholding his legal mail containing
a request for appointment of counsel. (Id. at 1955.)
Here, Plaintiff claims that Sowers’s actions were racially motivated, and that he was a
known white supremacist who did not apply the fictitious “Jim Crow-style” mailing rule to any
white inmates. (See Am. Compl.) Plaintiff has therefore adequately alleged that the government
treated him “disparately as compared to similarly situated persons” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform,
648 F.3d at 379, and “that the disparate treatment in question is the result of intentional and
purposeful discrimination.” Robinson, 615 F. App’x at 314 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
Additionally, the Court previously found at summary judgment that there was sufficient evidence
that Plaintiff’s legal mail should not have been withheld and returned to him. Thus, a genuine
dispute of material fact remains as to whether Sowers intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff
by withholding his mail and returning it to him with the alleged new rule. As such, the Court
cannot grant summary judgment to Sowers on this claim, and it remains for trial.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant

to Order [Doc #204] (ECF No. 206) is GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First and Seventh
Causes of Action against Defendants Michelle Lovette, Cynthia Ricker, and Melanie Fultz are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court also amends its November 20, 2020 Order (ECF
No. 169) to GRANT summary judgment to Defendant Jacob Hays on the equal protection portion
of Plaintiff’s Second Legal Claim (Am. Compl. ¶ 75) and to Defendant Aaron Sowers on the equal
protection portions of Plaintiff’s Seventh and Eighth Legal Claims (Id. at ¶¶ 80–81). These claims
are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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Plaintiff’s remaining claims are his retaliation claim against Defendant Julia Chamberlin
(Third Cause of Action), his retaliation claim against Sowers (Eighth Cause of Action), and his
equal protection claim against Sowers (Ninth Legal Claim).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ James L. Graham
JAMES L. GRAHAM
United States District Judge
DATE: May 24, 2022

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