Tolliver v. Noble et al

Filing 172

ORDER REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: It is RECOMMENDED that the Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 154 , 156 ) be GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Doc. 160 ) be DENIED and that the Investigators' Motion to Strike (Doc. 169 ) be GRANTED. Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to STRIKE Plaintiff's Motion Instanter: Plaintiff's Request for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 164 ); Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amende d Complaint (Doc. 165 ); Notice and Re-Filing of Plaintiff's Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 166 ); and Plaintiff's Motion for Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 167 ). Objections to R&R due by 1/28/2022. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson on 1/14/2022. (kk2)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
KEVIN A. TOLLIVER,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action 2:16-cv-1020
Judge Edmund A. Sargus
Magistrate Judge Jolson

WARDEN NOBLE, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant
Investigators Sean Sabulsky and Matthew Crisler (the “Investigators”) (Doc. 154), Motion for
Summary Judgment by Defendant Sunni-Ali Islam (Doc. 156), Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc.
160), and the Investigators’ Motion to Strike (Doc. 169). For the following reasons, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 154, 156) be GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 160) be DENIED and that the
Investigators’ Motion to Strike (Doc. 169) be GRANTED. Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED
to STRIKE Plaintiff’s Motion Instanter: Plaintiff’s Request for Leave to File Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. 164); Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc.
165); Notice and Re-Filing of Plaintiff’s Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 166); and Plaintiff’s Motion
for Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 167).
I.

BACKGROUND
The Court previously summarized the allegations from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint:
Plaintiff is an inmate at Grafton Correctional Institution, who has previously been
incarcerated at London Correction Institution (“LoCI”), Madison Correctional
Institution (“MaCI”), Belmont Correctional Institution (“BeCI”), Ross Correctional
Institution (“RCI”), and Pickaway Correctional Institution (“PCI”). (Doc. 30, ¶ 7).

Defendants are numerous Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections
(“ODRC”) employees and contractors. (Id., ¶¶ 8–11).
In 2012, ODRC transferred Plaintiff to MaCI. (Id., ¶ 16). While at MaCI,
Defendant Abdul Rahman Shahid was an ODRC contractor who served as an
Islamic Services Provider. (Id., ¶ 19). Defendant Sunni[-]Ali Islam served in the
same role at PCI. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Shahid and Islam (the
“Defendant Contractors”) generally discriminated against Muslim inmates that
were not supporters of the Nation of Islam. (See, e.g., id., ¶¶ 19–30). While at
MaCI, Plaintiff allegedly complained to unidentified ODRC administrators and
staff about the Defendant Contractors’ behavior, which he asserts resulted in
retaliation in the form of denied grievances, denied medical treatment, and limited
program opportunities. (Id., ¶ 35).
After several years at MaCI, in 2016, ODRC transferred Plaintiff to LoCI “for
programming consistent with his parole board and re-entry plan.” (Id., ¶ 40).
Defendant Shahid served as the Islamic Services Provider at LoCI as well. (Id., ¶
43). According to Plaintiff, unidentified ODRC administrators and employees
employed Defendant Contractors knowing that it would suppress Muslim inmates’
religious exercise and conserve resources for Christian inmates. (Id., ¶ 50). And
Plaintiff takes issue with ODRC’s policies which he maintains do not adequately
distinguish between different sects of Islam, resulting in the discriminatory actions
of Defendant Contractors. (Id., ¶¶ 54–57).
In September 2016, Defendants [Chrisler] and [Sabulsky] “shook down Plaintiff”
and conducted a search of Plaintiff’s belongings. (Id., ¶ 88). Plaintiff subsequently
reported to the investigators who placed him in segregated housing. (Id., ¶ 90).
After two weeks in “maximum security isolation,” Defendant [Sabulsky] informed
Plaintiff of the results of his investigation. (Id., ¶ 90). The investigation began
based on Defendant Shahid’s allegation that Plaintiff was trying to radicalize other
Muslim inmates; Defendant [Sabulsky] found no evidence to support that
allegation. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that unidentified Defendants subjected him to
more than 50 days “in isolation as punishment for his use of the grievance process.”
(Id., ¶ 94). Defendant Jefferies allegedly “personally approved this retaliatory
action.” (Id.).
The next month, unidentified Defendants allegedly arranged Plaintiff’s transfer to
PCI to impose “additional hardships” on Plaintiff, knowing that Defendant Islam
worked at PCI and would continue to harass Plaintiff as Defendant Shahid had.
(Id., ¶ 99). Defendants Jefferies, Noble, and Taylor “and others had great sway
over” Defendant Contractor’s false reports and their effect on Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 102).
Unidentified Defendants have allegedly denied him a reduction in his security level
due to his history of successful grievances challenging his conditions of
confinement and violations of civil rights. (Id., ¶ 107).

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As part of their alleged retaliation against him, unidentified Defendants confiscated
Plaintiff’s legal materials and limited his access to other legal materials. (Id., ¶¶
115–19). Unidentified Defendants also failed to process his theft reports after
Plaintiff lost other personal property. (Id., ¶ 120). Further, unidentified Defendants
disrupted his completion of various prison programming by transferring him
between facilities. (Id., ¶¶ 126–30).
(Doc. 86 at 1–3).
The Court previously adopted (Doc. 117) the Undersigned’s recommendation (Doc. 86)
that judgment on the pleadings be granted in favor of several ODRC Defendants. Accordingly,
there are only four remaining Defendants in this action: Investigators Chrisler and Sabulsky, and
Contractors Sunni-Ali Islam and Abdul Rahman Shahid. (Doc. 117 at 6). Three of those
Defendants, the two Investigators and Defendant Islam, have moved for summary judgment.
(Docs. 154, 156). Plaintiff has responded in opposition to each motion (Docs. 160, 161), and the
Investigators replied (Doc. 168). In addition, Plaintiff has brought renewed motions to amend his
complaint (Docs. 164, 165) and for declaratory judgment (Docs. 166, 167), which the Investigators
have moved to strike (Doc. 169). These matters are briefed and ripe for consideration.
II.

STANDARD
Summary judgment is granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary
judgment is appropriately entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When a
defendant shows there is insufficient evidence to support any element of the plaintiff’s claim and
moves for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a genuine issue for
trial on which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
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250 (1986). Evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, meaning that
“any direct evidence offered by the [nonmovant] in response to a summary judgment motion must
be accepted as true.” Muhammad v. Close, 379 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 2004), citing Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. at 251–52, and Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 382 (6th Cir. 1994). Ultimately, the Court
asks “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.
at 251–52.
III.

DISCUSSION
A. Investigators’ Motion for Summary Judgment
The Investigators have moved for summary judgment with the understanding that the only

remaining claim against them is retaliation. (Doc. 154 at 5–6). Indeed, the District Judge stated
in a recent Opinion and Order that, “Plaintiff has remaining in this case a claim of retaliation
against Defendant.”

(Doc. 149 at 1).

And the Undersigned’s previous Report and

Recommendation (Doc. 86), adopted in full by the District Judge (Doc. 117), reasoned that
Plaintiff’s federal claims for monetary damages and state tort claims against the ODRC Defendants
were barred by sovereign immunity (Doc. 86 at 5–6). It further reasoned that Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint contained unspecific allegations about Defendants as a group—with one noted
exception. The Amended Complaint did allege the personal involvement of Defendants Sabulsky
and Crisler in retaliation against Plaintiff for his use of the grievance process. (Doc. 86 at 7; Doc.
30, ¶¶ 88–90).
Defendants argue that the Court should grant summary judgment in their favor because
Plaintiff has failed to present evidence sufficient to establish a retaliation claim. (Doc. 154 at 13).
Retaliation against a prisoner for exercising his First Amendment rights violates the Constitution.

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Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 2005), citing Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d
378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). A First Amendment retaliation claim has three elements: “(1)
the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that
would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there
is a causal connection between elements one and two—that is, the adverse action was motivated
at least in part by the plaintiff’s protected conduct.” Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 394.
First, “[t]he [Investigators] concede that [Plaintiff] engaged in protected conduct by filing
grievances against the Imams and regarding ODRC’s services to Muslim inmates.” (Doc. 154 at
15). As Defendants recognize, “a prisoner has a First Amendment right to file grievances against
prison officials,” so long as he is not utilizing the grievance system to violate a legitimate prison
regulation. Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001). Defendants instead argue
that there is insufficient evidence to establish the remaining two elements of the retaliation claim.
Plaintiff alleges two adverse actions that the Investigators took against him: first, they
placed him in segregated housing while they investigated Imam Shahid’s report; and next, they
transferred him to a new prison following the investigation. (Doc. 30, ¶¶ 89, 91, 94, 98–99). While
not disputing those actions, Defendants argue neither constitutes an adverse action in the prison
context. (Doc. 154 at 15–18). The Undersigned agrees with regard to the prison transfer, but not
with regard to segregated housing.
The prison transfer, because it involved no change in Plaintiff’s security status, is
presumptively not adverse. “As a general matter, a prison official’s decision to transfer a prisoner
from the general population of one prison to the general population of another is not considered
adverse.” LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 948 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Smith v. Yarrow, 78 Fed.
App’x 529, 543 (6th Cir. 2003)). Beyond a bare allegation that the transfer disrupted some of his

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educational programming, Plaintiff has offered no support that this prison transfer was unusually
adverse.
However, “[i]n the prison context, an action comparable to transfer to administrative
segregation would certainly be adverse.” Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396. The record demonstrates
that Plaintiff went into segregated housing when the investigation began, on September 6, 2016.
(Doc. 154-1, ¶¶ 9, 12; Doc. 154-2, ¶¶ 12; Doc. 154-3 at 1). Plaintiff remained in segregated
housing until his transfer to PCI, on October 25, 2016. (Doc. 154-1, ¶ 14; Doc. 154-2, ¶ 16; Doc.
154-5 at 13–14). Because the evidence supports that Plaintiff was transferred to administrative
segregation, and it is presumptively adverse, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the
adverse action element.
Briefly, Plaintiff also says his belongings were returned to him following the investigation,
without some of his legal materials and evidence for litigation, and this constitutes an adverse
action. See, e.g., (Doc. 161 at 3–4). Importantly, the record contradicts Plaintiff’s allegation.
Plaintiff signed an inmate property record upon his transfer to PCI and affirmed that the inventory
of his belongings was “complete and accurate” and that “[a]ll of [his] personal property that is
listed on th[e] inventory form [was] returned to [him] and [he] was offered the opportunity to
inspect it before leaving the vault.” (Doc. 154-4 at 1).
The Undersigned must now consider whether Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to
establish the final element of retaliation—that the adverse action (confining Plaintiff in segregated
housing) was motivated, at least in part, by retaliation for his filing of grievances. Defendants
maintain that Plaintiff “cannot even establish an inference that the Defendants were motivated by
his complaints against an Imam that were made at another correctional institution more than two
years prior.” (Doc. 154 at 18–19). Further, they say they would have taken the same actions they

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did in the absence of any filed grievances. (Id. at 20). The Undersigned agrees.
In establishing a causal connection, Plaintiff bears the initial burden “of establishing that
his protected conduct was a motivating factor behind any harm[.]” Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399.
“Circumstantial evidence, like the timing of events or the disparate treatment of similarly situated
individuals, is appropriate.” Id. However, even if the Plaintiff carries this initial burden, “[i]f the
defendant can show he would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity,
he is entitled to prevail on summary judgment.” Id.
Plaintiff has not submitted evidence to reasonably establish that his filing of grievances
was a motivating factor behind his placement in segregated housing. Plaintiff offers only a bare
allegation that the ORDC Defendants acted in retaliation and a timeline: Plaintiff filed grievances
against Imams Shahid and Islam; Imam Shahid subsequently filed an incident report regarding
Plaintiff; and the Investigators then investigated Imam Shahid’s report and confined Plaintiff.
While temporal proximity can provide some circumstantial support for a causal connection, see,
e.g., Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1038 (6th Cir. 2001), Plaintiff’s grievances are not
proximate to the alleged retaliation. The grievance which resulted in Imam Shahid being removed
from services at MaCI was filed in January 2014 (Doc. 30, ¶ 36; Doc. 161 at 30–32), and when
Plaintiff was allegedly retaliated against, in September 2016, it had been a year since he had filed
any grievance (Doc. 154-6 at 5).
Plaintiff offers affidavits from other prisoners as supporting evidence, but those only repeat
a general belief that Plaintiff experienced retaliation for his use of the grievance process, and that
other Muslim prisoners have experienced negative consequences as a result of their use of the
grievance process, without specific factual allegations. (Doc. 161 at 27–28). While the affidavit
prepared by Romel Williams, a formerly incarcerated person, alleges similar retaliation

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experienced firsthand, that affidavit only identifies Imam Shahid and “Defendant Taylor” (a
dismissed Defendant) as responsible for retaliation—it makes no allegations about the
Investigators. (Id. at 29).
Put simply, Plaintiff has not submitted sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find a
causal connection between his use of the grievance process and his confinement in segregated
housing. Even if he could carry that initial burden, Defendants have submitted evidence that they
would have taken the same action regardless of whether Plaintiff had filed grievances. Defendant
Sabulsky attests in his affidavit that he was following ODRC policy related to active investigations
and staff-prisoner conflicts:
As is standard procedure, [Plaintiff] was placed in a segregated “TPU” cell while
the investigation on him was conducted and due to the staff/inmate conflict
involving Imam Shahid. It is standard procedure for an inmate to remain in
segregated housing when a nexus is completed due to a staff/inmate conflict until
either the conflict is resolved or the inmate is transferred to another institution.
(Doc. 154-1, ¶ 12). Similarly, Defendant Crisler attests:
As is standard procedure when there is a staff/inmate conflict, on September 6,
2016 [Plaintiff] was placed in a segregated cell while the investigation on him was
conducted and due to the staff/inmate conflict involving Imam Shahid. It is
standard procedure for an inmate to remain in segregated housing when a nexus
transfer is completed due to a staff/inmate conflict until either the conflict is
resolved or the inmate is transferred to another institution.
(Doc. 154-2, ¶12). Plaintiff has not meaningfully rebutted this testimony with his own evidence.
Instead, the evidence shows that the Investigators were complying with their policy to investigate
a report and manage staff-prisoner conflict. To the extent that Plaintiff maintains that Imam
Shahid’s report itself was made in retaliation for grievances, that is a claim against Imam Shahid
and not the Investigators.
At base, there is insufficient evidence for Plaintiff to demonstrate a causal connection
between his grievances and his assignment to segregated housing, which is an essential element of
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a First Amendment retaliation claim. A reasonable jury could not therefore return a verdict for
Plaintiff on the claim, and the Investigators are entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 154) be GRANTED.
Insofar as Plaintiff maintains that claims for denial of religious rights and access to the
courts should persist against the Investigators (Doc. 161 at 3–4), that is inconsistent with the
District Judge’s statement that only the retaliation claim remains. (Doc. 149 at 1). Further,
Plaintiff has not submitted sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the Investigators
had any personal involvement in the alleged “statewide systematic denial of services and
programming to Muslim inmates” (Doc. 161 at 2), nor that they acted with knowledge of his
pending litigation for declaratory judgment and with motivation to deny his access to the courts.
B. Defendant Sunni-Ali Islam’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant Islam filed his Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 156) on October 6, 2021.
The Court had previously extended the dispositive motion deadline to September 20, 2021 (Doc.
149), so the motion was filed out of time. So, in addition to responding in opposition to the motion,
Plaintiff has moved to strike it. (Doc. 160).
In essence, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, filed out of time, is also a request
for modification of the scheduling order. Pursuant to Rule 16, a scheduling order “may be
modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); see also
Kirby v. Diversified Fabrications, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-83, 2010 WL 11520004 (E.D. Tenn. Mar.
26, 2010). The Court finds that good cause supports the modification of the scheduling order here.
Namely, modification allows the claim for summary judgment to be resolved on its merits, and
because Plaintiff has had the opportunity to substantively respond to the motion for summary
judgment, he will not be prejudiced by such modification. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to

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Strike (Doc. 160) is DENIED, and the Court will consider Defendant Islam’s Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Defendant Islam moves for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff has not alleged
his personal involvement in any of the alleged constitutional harms. (Doc. 156 at 2). Plaintiff
makes clear that he has a vastly disparate view from Defendant regarding appropriate Islamic
services. (Doc. 160 at 2–3). But that does not make Defendant responsible for what Plaintiff
identifies as the crux of his claim for denial of religious rights: ODRC’s policies and procedures,
which fail to properly differentiate between different sects of Islam and furnish services
accordingly. (Doc. 30, ¶¶ 54–57).
Further, the District Judge has indicated that Plaintiff’s only remaining cognizable claim is
for retaliation, and Plaintiff offers no evidence that Defendant Islam was involved in the alleged
instance of retaliation. As discussed above, it is Defendant Shahid whom Plaintiff claims made a
retaliatory report against him, which in turn lead to his assignment to segregated housing. Though
Plaintiff has filed grievances against Defendant Islam in the past—as he did with Defendant
Shahid—this alone does not serve as a basis to implicate Defendant Islam in the retaliation. In
other words, Plaintiff has not put forth sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict
against Defendant Islam for retaliation, or any other claims. Defendant Islam is therefore entitled
to summary judgment and it is RECOMMENDED that his Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
156) be GRANTED.
C. Investigators’ Motion to Strike
The Investigators move to strike four of Plaintiff’s recent filings. (Doc. 169). Two of those
filings (Docs. 164, 165) concern Plaintiff’s renewed attempts to amend his complaint; the other
two filings (Docs. 166, 167) concern Plaintiff’s renewed attempts to obtain declaratory judgment.

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Defendants argue that, because nothing substantive has changed since the Court’s earlier refusals
of these motions, the filings are redundant and should be stricken from the record. (Doc. 169 at
4–6). The Undersigned agrees.
The Undersigned has already considered, and denied, two requests by Plaintiff to file a
second amended complaint. (Doc. 86 at 7–8; Doc. 112 at 3–5). In addition to finding the proposed
amendments futile, the Undersigned noted that amendment would prejudice Defendants because
the case was over four years old, and Plaintiff had a previous opportunity to amend. The District
Judge agreed with the reasoning for both denials. (Doc. 117 at 6). Now, the case is over five years
old, and three of the remaining four Defendants have brought motions for summary judgment.
Amendment would unnecessarily delay this case and prejudice Defendants. Further, Plaintiff’s
proposed amendment does not meaningfully clarify his claims against the remaining Defendants
and would therefore be futile. (See Doc. 165-1).
Plaintiff also previously moved for declaratory judgment. (Doc. 110). The Undersigned
recommended denying such motion, on the grounds that the motion primarily concerned ODRC
Defendants, whose dismissal was also being recommended. (Doc. 112 at 5). To the extent that
the judgment concerned the Investigators, the Undersigned found the request premature, because
there were issues of fact to be resolved at summary judgment or trial before such judgment was
proper. (Id.). Now that summary judgment in favor of the Investigators is recommended, the
Undersigned again finds that it would be improper to grant declaratory judgment concerning
ODRC’s practices and policies concerning religion without ODRC Defendants in this action.
Because these filings only seek to renew requests previously denied by the Court, without
any substantive change in circumstances, the Undersigned ORDERS that the Investigators’
Motion to Strike (Doc. 169) be GRANTED. Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to STRIKE

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Plaintiff’s Motion Instanter: Plaintiff’s Request for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint
(Doc. 164); Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 165); Notice
and Re-Filing of Plaintiff’s Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 166); and Plaintiff’s Motion for
Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 167).
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motions for Summary

Judgment (Docs. 154, 156) be GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to
Strike (Doc. 160) be DENIED and that the Investigators’ Motion to Strike (Doc. 169) be
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to STRIKE Plaintiff’s Motion Instanter:
Plaintiff’s Request for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 164); Plaintiff’s Motion
for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 165); Notice and Re-Filing of Plaintiff’s
Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 166); and Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 167).
V.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific
proposed finding or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting
authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the Report or specific proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made. Upon proper objection, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further
evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).

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The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: January 14, 2022

/s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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