Rider v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
17
OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by Judge James L. Graham on 3/12/2018. (ds)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Kimberly Lynn Rider,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No 2:17-cv-41
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Kimberly Lynn Rider, brings this action under 42
U.S.C. §405(g) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for
disability insurance benefits.
Plaintiff applied for disability
insurance benefits in May, 2013, asserting disability from back
pain, depression, fibromyalgia, anxiety, arthritis, poor memory,
asthma, degenerative disc disease, and leg, knee, and ankle pain.
(R. at 237-238).
A hearing was held on December 9, 2015, at
which plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified.
(R. at 137-161).
A vocational expert also testified at the
hearing, stating that based on plaintiff’s age, education, and
work
experience
and
the
residual
functional
capacity
(“RFC”)
determined by the administrative law judge (“ALJ”), plaintiff
could perform jobs available in the national economy.
154-159).
(R. at
On January 19, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision finding
that plaintiff was not disabled at any time through December 31,
2015, the date last insured.
(R. at 117-132).
On September 22,
2016, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review
and
adopted
decision.
the
ALJ’s
decision
as
the
Commissioner’s
final
(R. at 1-3).
This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s statement of
errors (Doc. 10), the Commissioner’s memorandum in opposition
(Doc. 15), plaintiff’s reply (Doc. 16), and the administrative
record
(Doc.
statements
9).
of
For
error
the
are
reasons
that
overruled,
follow,
and
the
plaintiff’s
Commissioner’s
decision is affirmed.
I. Administrative Record
A. Plaintiff’s Hearing Testimony
At the December, 2015, administrative hearing, plaintiff
testified that she stopped working in 2010 because of pain.
at 141-142).
(R.
Plaintiff stated that she cannot lift, reach above
her head, or put her dishes away in a cupboard with her right arm
because
of
pain
in
her
shoulder,
daughter-in-law clean her house.
testified
that
she
shoulder,
and
that
periods of time.
suffers
she
from
cannot
and
her
daughter
(R. at 142-43).
pain
stand,
(R. at 144-145).
that
in
her
sit,
or
and
Plaintiff
back,
leg,
and
walk
for
long
Plaintiff further testified
that after her recent back surgery, her pain “is like 20 times
worse now.”
(R. at 146).
Plaintiff opined that she is able to
sit, stand, or walk for up to fifteen minutes at a time.
146).
(R. at
Plaintiff further testified that she is no longer able to
read or play games because her pain affects her concentration and
memory, and that she no longer attends church, drives, or walks
2
around
the
grocery
store.
(R.
at
147-48).
She
received
injections in her knees that helped “a little” and gave her pain
relief for approximately one month.
(R. at 150).
B. Medical Records
1. Shelly Dunmyer, M.D.
On
September
13,
2012,
plaintiff
visited
practice and was seen by Janell Potts, CRNP.
that “she just hurt everywhere.”
determined
that
a
previous
Dr.
Plaintiff reported
(R. at 427).
spinal
MRI
Dunmyer’s
did
Nurse Potts
not
show
disc
protrusion or nerve entrapment, and concluded that plaintiff’s
back problem was improving in some respects.
September
17,
2012,
and
October
reported back pain to Nurse Potts.
29,
2013,
(R. at 427).
plaintiff
On
again
(R. at 398, 423).
On three occasions in 2013, Dr. Dunmyer examined plaintiff
and found tenderness over the musculature in the lumbosacral
spine, with limited range of motion in flexion and extension
secondary to pain, but with a lower extremity strength of 5/5 and
a straight leg raise which was negative bilaterally in a seated
position.
(R. at 402, 405, 416).
On March 6, 2014, plaintiff
complained of continuing pain and bruising of the coccyx after a
fall in February, 2014.
(R. at 543-544).
Dr. Dunmyer found that
plaintiff’s lumbar disk condition was stable and recommended the
use of a hemorrhoid ring.
(R. at 544).
2. Genesis Healthcare System
Shane Backus, M.D., looked at the results of plaintiff’s
September
13,
2013,
MRI
of
the
3
lumbar
spine,
and
reported:
vertebrae heights within normal limits, expected marrow signal,
and hemangioma at S1, alignment with normal limits, and preserved
disk space; four small disk bulges in other vertebrae, with
minimal central canal stenosis but no neural foramina and minimal
or no central canal stenosis; and a small annular tear at L5-S1.
(R. at 462).
On
October
8,
2013,
plaintiff
therapy evaluation for back pain.
therapist
reported
decreased
was
seen
for
(R. at 375.)
range
of
a
physical
The physical
motion,
decreased
flexibility, decreased muscular strength, pain between 2-9 on a
10-point scale, and palpable tenderness between the L3 and L5
vertebrae.
(R. at 375).
On October 15, 2013, plaintiff reported
her pain at 4-5 out of 10, and on December 2, 2013, and December
5, 2013, plaintiff reported that her lumbar back pain was 7.5 out
of 10.
(R. at 380).
On October 10, 2013, plaintiff underwent a knee x-ray that
showed
preserved
medial
and
lateral
joint
compartments
bilaterally in both knees, a small enthesopathic spur superior
pole of right patella, and a tiny rounded density in the anterior
joint space of the right knee on lateral view.
(R. at 464).
Andrew Guglielmi, D.O., reported the results of an October 19,
2013,
MRI
of
plaintiff’s
right
knee,
which
showed
minimal
degenerative change of the patellofemoral compartment, and no
acute
osseous
abnormality,
internal
ligamentous
derangement,
discrete meniscal tear, or loose intra-articular body.
466).
4
(R. at
James Neuenschwander, M.D., reported on the results of a
February 15, 2014, non-contrast CT scan of plaintiff’s lumbar
spine following plaintiff’s fall that month.
He found: normal
height and alignment of the lumbar vertebrae; no evidence of
acute fracture or focal subluxation; intact posterior elements;
mild disk space narrowing at L5-S1; unremarkable paraspinal soft
tissues, and no acute osseous abnormality.
(R. at 519, 521).
3. Genesis Pain Management Clinic
On December 4, 2013, plaintiff saw Yahya Bakdalieh, M.D.,
for
management
of
her
lower
back
pain.
(R.
at
387-88).
Plaintiff reported that lifting and standing or sitting for long
periods of time exacerbate her lower back pain, and that heat and
ice treatment give her some relief but physical therapy does not.
(R. at 387).
Dr. Bakdalieh reported a good active range of
motion, and lower extremity muscle strength at 5/5.
(R. at 387).
He diagnosed lumbar spondylosis without myelopathy, chronic low
back pain, and lumbar degenerative disc disease.
505-506).
(R. at 388,
On December 10, 2013, plaintiff underwent a bilateral
medial branch block of her lumbar spine without complications.
(R. at 511).
4.
Orthopaedic Associates of Zanesville
On November 29, 2013, plaintiff saw Robert J. Thompson,
M.D., complaining of right knee pain, upper thigh pain, and right
ankle pain.
“aching
and
(R. at 384).
dull
throbbing
Plaintiff described the pain as
pain,”
which
she
notices
“with
activity, sleeping and walking” but which does not disturb her
5
gait.
(R. at 384).
Dr. Thompson found crepitus and trace
effusion of the right knee and moderate tenderness over the right
medial joint line, but no tenderness over the right lateral joint
line and a full range of motion with no discomfort.
(R. at 384).
Christopher C. Bernett, PA-C, interpreted plaintiff’s x-rays
and found moderate arthritis of the medial compartment of the
right knee.
(R. at 386).
Plaintiff’s MRI of the same knee was
normal and she received an injection of Kenalog and Lidocaine.
(R.
at
385).
On
December
18,
2014,
plaintiff
requested
a
cortisone injection in her right knee, stating that a cortisone
treatment from November, 2014, gave her “good relief.”
572).
(R. at
Plaintiff returned on July 1, 2015, with pain in both
knees and in her right shoulder.
examination
revealed:
no
(R. at 574).
atrophy,
Mr. Bernett’s
crepitation,
deformity,
ecchymosis or scapula winging of the shoulders bilaterally; no
obvious instability of the right shoulder; normal muscle tone;
limited passive abduction and passive forward flexion; limited
passive external rotation at ninety degrees with pain, and pain
when reaching behind her back.
(R. at 575). Plaintiff received a
Kenalog injection in her shoulder.
plaintiff’s shoulder were normal.
(r. at 575).
X-rays of
(R. at 577.)
On October 5, 2015, a non-contrast MRI of plaintiff’s right
shoulder
revealed
no
acute
osseous
abnormality,
a
mild
degenerative change of the acromioclavicular joint with inferior
spurring, mild patchy areas of tendinopathy without evidence of a
retracted
full-thickness
rotator
6
cuff
tear,
and
near
circumferential fluid signal suggesting tenosynovitis.
578).
from
On October 7, 2015, plaintiff reported “minimal relief”
Kenalog
injections
in
prescribed physical therapy.
5.
(R. at
her
shoulder,
and
her
doctors
(R. at 581).
2015 Back Surgery
On October 22, 2015, plaintiff underwent a contrast MRI of
her lumbar spine.
Jane M. Burk, M.D., found a right paracentral
disc
superior
protrusion,
migration,
ventral dural sac at L1-2.
and
(R. at 699).
a
deforming
right
On November 10, 2015,
Michael Shannon, M.D., diagnosed a herniated lumbar disc with
stenosis
at
L1-L2
and
recommended surgery.
bilateral
lumbar
(R. at 701-02).
radiculopathy
and
On November 17, 2015,
plaintiff underwent a decompressive laminectomy and microdisc,
interlaminar fixation with a Coflex at L1-2.
(R. at 708-710).
Dr. Shannon’s note of November 23, 2015, reflects that plaintiff
was out of bed walking around with no leg pain and that the pain
in her back was “improving.”
6.
(R. at 708).
State Agency Review
On January 8, 2014, Maureen Gallagher, D.O., M.P.H., a state
agency medical consultant, reviewed plaintiff’s records and found
that
plaintiff
had
severe
impairments
consisting
of
osteoarthrosis, discogenic and degenerative back disorders, and
fibromyalgia.
plaintiff
had
(R.
mild
at
243).
Dr.
restrictions
in
Gallagher
her
also
activities
found
that
of
daily
living, and that she had the ability to occasionally lift and/or
carry ten pounds; frequently lift and/or carry less than ten
7
pounds; stand and/or walk six hours in an eight-hour workday; and
sit more than six hours in an eight-hour workday.
Dr.
Gallagher
limitations
concluded
were
not
that
plaintiff’s
supported
by
plaintiff was partially credible.
the
(R. at 245).
alleged
functional
evidence,
(R. at 244).
and
that
Dr. Gallagher
concluded that plaintiff retained the physical ability to perform
some types of work, and that she was not disabled.
(R. at 248).
On April 1, 2014, Teresita Cruz, M.D., a state agency consultant,
reviewed
findings.
plaintiff’s
records
and
affirmed
Dr.
Gallagher’s
(R. at 257-259).
C. ALJ’s Decision
On January 19, 2016, the ALJ issued his decision.
117-132.)
(R. at
The ALJ found that plaintiff has the following severe
impairments:
lumbar
spine
degenerate
disc
disease,
stenosis,
radiculopathy, and degenerative joint disease; obesity; allergic
rhinitis; asthma; right knee arthritis; right shoulder bursitis;
fibromyalgia; anxiety; and depression.
(R. at 123).
The ALJ set
forth plaintiff’s RFC as follows:
[C]laimant
has
the
residual
functional
capacity to perform light work as defined in
20 CFR 404.1567(a) except for the following
additional limitations. The claimant is able
to lift and carry 10 pounds occasionally and
five pounds frequently; stand and/or walk for
six hours of an eight-hour workday; sit for
six hours of an eight-hour workday; foot
control
operation
is
limited
to
the
occasional level; and push and pull is
limited as per the exertional weight limits.
The claimant is able to climb ramps and
stairs occasionally; never climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally stoop;
8
never kneel at the right; never crawl; never
overhead
reach
with
the
right
upper
extremity; unlimited in overhead reaching
with the left upper extremity; and unlimited
in regular reaching forward and to the sides.
She is limited to occasional exposure to
temperatures under 40 degrees Fahrenheit.
She can perform goal-based production/work
measured by end result, not pace work;
limited to simple routine repetitive tasks;
allowed off task five percent of the workday;
and can have occasional and superficial
interaction with the public, coworkers, and
supervisors.
(R. at 126).
The ALJ determined that plaintiff was unable to perform her
past work, but that there were jobs in the local and national
economy that she could perform, and that she was not disabled
under the Social Security Act at any time from October 14, 2010,
through December 31, 2015, the last insured date.
(R. at 131-
132).
II. Standard of Review
When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the
Court
“must
affirm
the
Commissioner’s
decision
if
it
‘is
supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper
legal standards.’”
Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647,
651 (6th Cir. 2009)(quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486
F.3d
234,
241
(6th
Cir.
2007));
see
also
42
U.S.C.
§405(g)
(“[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive .
. . .”).
Under this standard, “substantial evidence is defined
9
as
‘more
than
a
scintilla
of
evidence
but
less
than
a
preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Rogers, 486
F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25
F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential,
it is not trivial.
in
the
record
The Court must “‘take into account whatever
fairly
detracts
Commissioner’s decision.
from
[the]
weight’”
of
the
TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395
(6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474,
487
(1951)).
Nevertheless,
“if
substantial
evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision, this Court defers to that finding
‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would
have supported an opposite conclusion.’”
Blakley v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d
270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Finally, even if the ALJ’s decision meets the substantial
evidence standard, “‘a decision of the Commissioner will not be
upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and
where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives
the claimant of a substantial right.’”
Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651
(quoting Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th
Cir.
2007)).
10
III. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Statements of Error
A. RFC Determination
1. Formulation of an RFC
Plaintiff’s first and second statements of error challenge
the ALJ’s RFC findings.
A claimant’s RFC is the most that a
claimant
his
can
do
§404.1545(a)(1).
despite
or
her
limitations.
20
U.S.C.
Plaintiff bears the burden of providing the
necessary medical evidence to demonstrate her impairments cause
functional
limitations
§404.1512(c).
resulting
in
disability.
20
The ALJ determines a claimant’s RFC.
§§404.1527(e)(2) and 404.1546(c).
20 C.F.R.
The ALJ must evaluate all the
medical evidence as well as the claimant’s testimony.
Comm’r
of
Soc.
Sec.,
368
F.3d
C.F.R.
629,
633
(6th
Cir.
Webb v.
2004).
“Discretion is vested in the ALJ to weigh all the evidence.”
Collins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 357 F. App’x 663, 668 (6th Cir.
2009).
Where
the
ALJ
has
properly
considered
plaintiff’s
evidence and substantial evidence supports his conclusion, “this
Court will defer to that finding even if there is substantial
evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite
conclusion.”
Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595
(6th Cir. 2005); see also Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710
F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013).
The
RFC
describing
how
assessment
the
must
evidence
include
supports
a
narrative
each
discussion
conclusion,
citing
specific medical facts and nonmedical evidence.
SSR 96-8p, 1996
WL 374184 at *7 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2, 2006).
However, an ALJ
11
need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record for his
decision to stand.
Thacker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 99 F.App’x
661, 665 (6th Cir. 2004).
2. Work at Light Exertional Level
In her first statement of error, plaintiff argues that it
was error for the ALJ to determine that her impairments allow her
to walk and stand enough in an eight-hour day to perform work at
the light exertional level.
(Doc. 10, pp. 6-10).
Plaintiff
contends that her combination of physical impairments, including
back
pain,
arthritis,
decreased
require
the
sedentary level of work.
range
of
conclusion
motion,
that
radiculopathy,
she
(Doc. 10, pp. 7-8).
is
limited
and
to
a
The Commissioner
responds that plaintiff failed to present evidence of physical
limitations greater than those incorporated into the ALJ’s RFC,
and that the ALJ gave appropriate consideration to the evidence
of record, including post-operative treatment notes following
plaintiff’s November, 2015, spinal surgery.
(Doc. 15, pp. 6-7).
The applicable regulation provides:
Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a
time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects
weighing up to 10 pounds.
Even though the weight
lifted may be very little, a job is in this category
when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or
when it involves sitting most of the time with some
pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.
To be
considered capable of performing a full or wide range
of light work, you must have the ability to do
substantially all of these activities. If someone can
do light work, we determine that he or she can also do
sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting
factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to
sit for long periods of time.
12
20 C.F.R. §404.1567.
In
formulating
plaintiff’s
RFC,
the
ALJ
thoroughly
considered plaintiff’s long history of back problems.
127-128).
(R. at
The ALJ noted treatment records which showed some
decreased range of motion of the lumbar spine and tenderness,
including the October, 2015, MRI scan showing some central disc
protrusion at L1-L2, which led to plaintiff’s spinal surgery in
November, 2015.
relied
on:
(R. at 127-28).
Dr.
Dunmyer’s
On the other hand, he also
September,
2012,
notes
showing
improvement in a previously seen disc protrusion and no nerve
entrapment;
changes
a
and
2013
a
MRI
small
showing
annular
mild
tear,
multilevel
but
no
degenerative
radiculopathy;
a
February, 2014, CT scan of the lumbar spine which showed normal
height and alignment of the lumbar vertebrae, no evidence of
acute fracture or focal subluxation, intact posterior elements,
mild disk space narrowing at L5-S1, and mild disc bulges.
127-128).
(R. at
The ALJ stated that although plaintiff testified that
the November, 2015, back surgery made her impairment worse, this
claim
was
uncorroborated
by
medical
evidence;
in
fact,
Dr.
Shannon reported post-surgery that plaintiff was released two
days later and was ambulating and stable, with improving pain and
no leg pain.
“has
been
(R. at 127-29). The ALJ also noted that plaintiff
able
to
heel
and
toe
walk,
had
normal
reflexes,
sensation, and strength, and mostly negative straight leg raising
tests.”
(R. at 127).
13
In regard to plaintiff’s knee problems, the ALJ concluded
that the objective medical evidence did not completely support
plaintiff’s subjective allegations.
ray
taken
in
October,
2013,
The ALJ noted that a knee x-
revealed
only
a
possible
small
suprapatellar bursal effusion bilaterally, and that an October,
2013,
MRI
showed
no
acute
osseous
abnormality,
no
internal
ligamentous derangement or discrete meniscal tear, no evidence of
a
loose
intra-articular
body,
and
only
changes of the patellofemoral compartment.
minimal
degenerative
(R. 128, 464, 466).
The ALJ noted that upon examination on October 17, 2013,
plaintiff had decreased range of motion in her right knee with
tenderness, but full strength in her lower extremities.
128, 402).
(R. at
In November, 2013, Dr. Thompson diagnosed moderate
arthritis, finding that plaintiff had full range of motion in her
knees with no discomfort and normal MRI results.
He
(R. at 385-386).
(R. at 384-86).
In December 2013, Dr. Bakdalieh found that
plaintiff had “[g]ood range of motion,” and muscle strength of
5/5 in her lower extremities.
(R. at 387.)
The ALJ observed
that plaintiff had several cortisone injections to her right knee
which were reportedly effective for several months in treating
her pain.
(R. 128, 572).
The ALJ also acknowledged that plaintiff suffers from right
shoulder
bursitis,
but
concluded
that
the
objective
medical
evidence did not completely support her subjective allegations.
(R. at 128).
Upon examination in July of 2015, plaintiff had
moderate tenderness and limited range of motion in her right
14
shoulder, but did not have any obvious instability, had normal
muscle tone, and had a normal x-ray.
(R. at 128, 575).
An
October, 2015, MRI showed no acute osseous abnormality and only
mild
degenerative
change
of
the
acromioclavicular
joint
with
inferior spurring and mild positive rotator cuff tendinopathy
without a tear.
(R. at 128, 578, 580).
On examination in
October 7, 2015, plaintiff rated her shoulder pain as one in ten.
(R. 128, 580).
The
ALJ
further
concluded
that
complaints were not entirely credible.
plaintiff’s
subjective
At the time of the ALJ’s
decision, SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2,
1996) directed the ALJ to assess the credibility of plaintiff’s
statements
concerning
her
symptoms.
That
ruling
was
later
superseded by SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *7 (Soc. Sec. Admin.
Mar. 16, 2016), which directs the ALJ to look at whether the
claimant’s
statements
about
the
intensity,
persistence
and
limiting effects of symptoms are consistent with the objective
medical
evidence
and
other
evidence
of
record.
The
ALJ’s
analysis in this case passes muster under either ruling, as both
rulings permit the ALJ to consider evidence showing that the
claimant is not following the prescribed treatment in weighing
the claimant’s claims of allegedly disabling symptoms.
See SSR
96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 at *7; SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 at *8.
The ALJ observed that most of the treatment for plaintiff’s
physical
impairments
plaintiff
completed
has
only
been
conservative.
twelve
15
out
of
He
noted
twenty-four
that
physical
therapy sessions, and did not use her TENS unit daily.
(R. at
129).
The ALJ’s findings are supported by the evaluations of the
state
agency
physicians,
who
found
even
fewer
limitations
regarding plaintiff’s physical capabilities than those the ALJ
incorporated into the RFC.
(R. at 245-46; 259-60).
The record
before the ALJ includes no expert opinion that plaintiff is
unable to walk or stand for the periods of time required for
light work.
In addition, although the RFC limits plaintiff to “light
work,” the ALJ cited 20 C.F.R. §404.1567(a), which is actually
the
section
defining
“sedentary
work.”
Because
the
RFC
incorporates several additional physical limitations, it can be
viewed as describing a level of work somewhere between light and
sedentary work.
lifting
and
For example, the RFC restricts plaintiff to
carrying
10
pounds
occasionally
and
5
pounds
frequently, which is less than the 20-pound and 10-pound lift and
carry limits applicable to light work, and slightly more than the
“lifting
no
more
than
10
pounds
at
a
time
and
occasionally
lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and
small tools” applicable to sedentary work.
(b).
See §404.1567(a) and
The RFC restricts plaintiff to no more that six hours of
standing, walking or sitting and requires that she be permitted
to be off task five percent of the workday.
mandates
only
occasional
foot
control
The RFC further
operation,
pushing
and
pulling only at the specified weight limits, no climbing ladders,
16
ropes or scaffolds, never kneeling to the right (to accommodate
her right knee problems), and never reaching overhead with the
right
upper
extremity
(to
accommodate
her
right
shoulder
problems).
The ALJ posed these limitations to the vocational
expert
relied
and
limitations
on
included
his
in
testimony
the
that
RFC
could
the
ALJ
a
person
perform
with
jobs
in
the
the
national economy.
The
court
plaintiff’s
finds
that
impairments
with
respect
sufficiently
to
her
addressed
limitations
of
standing and walking, and that substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s
finding
that
plaintiff
can
perform
work
at
exertional level, as further restricted in the RFC.
the
light
Plaintiff’s
first statement of error is without merit.
3. Fibromyalgia
In her second statement of error, plaintiff argues that the
ALJ failed to account for her fibromyalgia-related limitations in
making his RFC determination.
(Doc. 10 at 18-19).
Plaintiff’s
alleged fibromyalgia limitations stem from her pain symptoms,
including
back,
leg
and
shoulder
pain.
The
ALJ’s
decision
indicates that he adequately considered plaintiff’s fibromyalgia
in crafting the RFC.
The ALJ clearly recognized that plaintiff
suffers from fibromyalgia, as he found fibromyalgia to be one of
plaintiff’s severe impairments.
(R. at 123).
The medical records before the ALJ contain few references to
fibromyalgia.
Some
records
simply
plaintiff’s diagnostic history.
17
include
fibromyalgia
in
(R. at 426, 529, 592, 595,
598,600, and 603).
13,
2012,
plaintiff’s
The most detailed records are the September
treatment
notes
complaints
of
of
Nurse
pain
and
Potts,
indicate
which
a
document
diagnosis
of
fibromyalgia and a referral for physical therapy, and the October
29, 2013, treatment notes of Nurse Potts stating that plaintiff
had all positive trigger points and vertebral point tenderness,
and that plaintiff would be referred for a pain program.
398-99, 428).
(R. at
The fact that the ALJ did not specifically refer
to these records does not mean that he did not consider them.
Thacker, 99 F.App’x 661 at 665.
In formulating the RFC, the ALJ adequately considered and
addressed the impact of plaintiff’s pain on her ability to work.
The ALJ specifically acknowledged that “the claimant’s back pain
is complicated by her fibromyalgia and obesity.”
(R. at 127).
Citing plaintiff’s hearing testimony, the ALJ stated that her
“alleged difficulties with activities of daily living seemed to
be due to her physical impairments and pain[.]”
(R. at 125).
The ALJ referred to plaintiff’s reports of pain or lack thereof
in
plaintiff’s
plaintiff’s
shoulder
testimony
hearing
pain;
back
and
testimony
medical
concerning
treatment
notes
records,
her
back,
reporting
including:
leg
lumbar
and
spine
tenderness; Dr. Shannon’s post-surgery report that plaintiff’s
pain was improving and she was having no leg pain; plaintiff’s
complaints of pain in her right knee, which was improved with
cortisone injections; and an October 7, 2015, report in which she
rated her shoulder pain as one out of ten.
18
(R. at 127-28).
As
indicated above, the ALJ accommodated plaintiff’s back, knee and
shoulder pain by incorporating time limits for walking, standing,
and sitting, weight limits and overhead reaching limits in the
RFC.
The ALJ’s assessment of plaintiff’s work capabilities is
supported by the opinions of the state agency physicians, who
also
considered
plaintiff’s
fibromyalgia,
plaintiff was not disabled.
before
the
ALJ
did
not
yet
concluded
(R. 237-248; 251-262).
include
any
expert
that
The record
opinion
that
plaintiff’s physical ability to work was limited or precluded by
her pain or by any other fibromyalgia symptoms.1
The court finds that the ALJ properly considered plaintiff’s
fibromyalgia in formulating plaintiff’s RFC, and that substantial
evidence
supports
the
ALJ’s
RFC
determination.
Plaintiff’s
second statement of error is without merit.
B. Additional Evidence Submitted to Appeals Counsel
Plaintiff submitted certain evidence to the Appeals Council
that was not before the ALJ when he rendered his January 19,
2016, decision.
See 20 C.F.R. §§404.970(b), 416.1470(b)(claimant
can submit new and material evidence to the Appeals Council).
This
evidence
includes
the
November
12,
2015,
notes
of
plaintiff’s surgical consultation with Samuel A. Finck, D.O., who
recommended shoulder surgery, for a surgical consultation; the
1
Insofar as plaintiff’s severe impairments of anxiety and
depression may be viewed as symptoms of fibromyalgia, the court
notes that plaintiff raised no objections to the ALJ’s analysis
of the mental health evaluations and opinions of record or to his
accommodation of those conditions in the RFC.
19
December
8,
2015,
physical
medical
source
statement
of
Dr.
Dunmyer, expressing the opinion that plaintiff was likely to miss
more than four days of work per month and was incapable of even
low stress work, and a similar physical medical source statement
from Dr. Shannon dated March 21, 2016. (R. at 763-764; 788-791;
793-796).
The Appeals Council made plaintiff’s additional exhibits a
part of the record and considered that evidence, along with the
rest
of
findings
evidence.
the
or
record,
in
conclusions
deciding
were
whether
contrary
to
See §§404.970(b), 416.1470(b).
the
the
ALJ’s
weight
action,
of
the
The Appeals Council
concluded that the record did not provide a basis for changing
the ALJ’s decision, and declined plaintiff’s request for review.
(R. at 1-6).
Plaintiff argues that if the new evidence is considered, the
ALJ’s
decision
requires remand.
is
unsupported
by
(Doc. 10 at 11-14.)
substantial
evidence
and
Plaintiff also argues that
the Appeals Council erred by giving an inadequate explanation of
its decision to adopt the ALJ’s decision.
(Doc. 10 at 13-14.)
However, because the Appeals Council denied review, the ALJ’s
decision
became
the
§§404.981, 416.1481.
Secretary’s
final
decision.
20
C.F.R.
It is the ALJ’s decision, and the facts
which were before the ALJ, that are subject to judicial review,
not the decision of the Appeals Council.
42 U.S.C. §405(g);
Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695-96 (6th Cir. 1993).
This
court does not have jurisdiction to review the decision of the
20
Appeals Council.
Faucher v. Sec’y of H.H.S., 17 F.3d 171, 174
(6th Cir.1994).
Plaintiff
also
argues
that
the
new
evidence
remand under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
warrants
a
A court may
remand a case to the Commissioner for consideration of additional
evidence only if the party seeking remand demonstrates that 1)
there is good cause for the failure to incorporate this evidence
into the record at the prior hearing and 2) the evidence is new
and material.
42 U.S.C. §405(g); Melkonyan, 501 U.S. 89, 98
(1991); Willis v. Sec’y of H.H.S., 727 F.2d 551, 553–54 (6th
Cir.1984).
To show good cause, the moving party must present a valid
justification for the failure to have acquired and presented the
new evidence in the prior administrative proceeding.
Oliver v.
Sec’y of H.H.S., 804 F.2d 964, 966 (6th Cir. 1986); Willis, 727
F.2d at 554.
“Evidence is new only if it was not in existence or
available to the claimant at the time of the administrative
proceeding.”
Hollon ex rel. Hollon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 447
F.3d 477, 484 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d
348, 357 (6th Cir. 2001)).
To be “material” within the meaning of §405(g), the new
evidence
condition
1)
must
prior
to
be
relevant
the
and
probative
Commissioner's
to
decision
plaintiff’s
and
2)
must
establish a reasonable probability that the Commissioner would
have
reached
considered.
a
different
decision
if
the
evidence
had
been
Sizemore v. Sec’y of H.H.S., 865 F.2d 709, 711 (6th
21
Cir. 1988); Oliver, 804 F.2d at 966.
Further evidence on an
issue already fully considered by the Commissioner is cumulative,
and is not sufficient to warrant remand.
619 F.2d 1157, 1162 (6th Cir.1980).
Carroll v. Califano,
Evidence that plaintiff's
condition has deteriorated since the Commissioner's decision is
not material. Sizemore, 865 F.2d at 712; Oliver, 804 F.2d at 966.
If
plaintiff
has
experienced
serious
deterioration
since
the
Commissioner’s decision, the appropriate remedy is to file a new
application.
Dr.
Sizemore, 865 F.2d at 712.
Dunmyer’s
statement,
Dr.
December
Shannon’s
8,
2015,
physical
December
2,
medical
2015,
source
letter,
the
Orthopaedic Associates of Zanesville treatment notes dated from
October 20, 2015 to November 18, 2018, and the November 12, 2015,
notes of Dr. Finck all predate the ALJ’s decision by more than a
month.
(R. 739-767, 788-792).
“available
to
proceeding.”
[plaintiff]
at
They were “in existence” and
the
time
Hollon, 447 F.3d 477.
of
the
administrative
Accordingly, they are not
new evidence, and they do not support a remand under sentence
six.
Dr.
Shannon’s
March
21,
2016,
physical
statement appears at first blush to be new.
clear
to
evaluation
what
of
extent
Dr.
plaintiff’s
Shannon’s
condition
source
However, it is not
opinion
during
medical
relates
the
to
period
his
before
December 31, 2015, plaintiff’s last insured date, or to her
condition after that date.
relate
to
plaintiff’s
Insofar as the source statement may
condition
22
prior
to
December
31,
2015,
plaintiff has not shown good cause why she was unable to provide
Dr.
Shannon’s
decision.
opinion
evidence
before
the
ALJ
issued
his
Plaintiff provided Dr. Shannon’s late-November post-
surgery notes.
(R. at 708-710.)
At the December 9, 2015,
administrative hearing, plaintiff, only weeks after surgery and
represented by counsel, did not ask the ALJ keep the record open
to provide additional evidence from Dr. Shannon.
McMahon,
499
F.3d
506,
513
(6th
Cir.
2007)
See Bass v.
(“[P]laintiff’s
counsel did not seek to have the record remain open to submit the
evidence here provided, which in and of itself shows a lack of
good cause.”).
In his December 2, 2015, letter to Dr. Dunmyer, Dr. Shannon
stated
that
plaintiff
would
be
appointment in four to six weeks.
scheduled
(R. at 792).
for
a
follow-up
Thus, it appears
that his next opportunity to evaluate plaintiff was not until
after
December
31,
2015.
Insofar
as
Dr.
Shannon’s
source
statement is based on information obtained after December 31,
2015, that evidence is necessarily based on plaintiff’s condition
after the time period covered by the ALJ’s decision, which ended
on December 31, 2015.
Any medical opinion statement showing a
material change in plaintiff’s impairments or limitations after
that date would be evidence of a deterioration of plaintiff’s
condition since the ALJ’s decision.
Evidence of deterioration is
not sufficient to warrant remand and is properly addressed by the
filing of a new application for disability benefits.
865 F.2d at 712; Oliver, 804 F.2d at 966.
23
Sizemore,
For
the
reasons
explained
above,
the
court
finds
that
plaintiff’s additional evidence does not support remand under
sentence six, and plaintiff’s third statement of error is denied.
IV. Conclusion
Following a review of the record as a whole, the court
concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision
denying benefits.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s statements of error
are overruled, and the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
The clerk is directed to enter final judgment in this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: March 12, 2018
s/James L. Graham
James L. Graham
United States District Judge
24
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