Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 15

OPINION and ORDER adopting and affirming 12 the Report and Recommendation. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 9/13/18. (jk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

Denise K. Jones,

Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:17-cv-339

V.

Commissioner of Social Security,

Judge Michael H. Watson

Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P.

Defendant.

Deavers
OPINION AND ORDER

On July 6,2018, Magistrate Judge Deavers issued a Report and
Recommendation ("R&R") recommending the Court overrule Denise K. Jones's
("PiaintifT) Statement of Specific Errors and affirm the Commissioner's decision in

this social security case. R&R, ECF No. 12. Plaintiff objects to the R&R. Obj., ECF
No. 13. For the following reasons. Plaintiffs objections are OVERRULED.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income on September 3,2013, with an alleged onset date of June 1,2009. Her
applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. She then sought a de

novo hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), who, after holding the
hearing, determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied
Plaintiffs request for review and adopted the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's
final decision. Plaintiff thereafter filed suit In this Court.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a party objects to an R&R within the ailotted time, the Court "shall make
a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed

findings or recommendations to which Objection is made." 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); see a/so Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court "may accept,
reject, or modify, in whoie or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
it is weii settled that, when objecting to an R&R, a party must make "specific
written objections" to the magistrate judge's proposed findings and

recommendations. Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A general statement that the magistrate
judge erred does not aid judicial efficiency, the purpose "for which the use of
magistrates [was] authorized." Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932
F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Holl v. Potter, No. C-1-09-618, 2011 WL
4337038, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 2011), affd, 506 F. App'x 438 (2012)

("Objections that merely restate arguments raised in the memoranda considered by
the Magistrate Judge are not proper, and the Court may consider such repetitive
arguments waived.").
Furthermore, in Social Security cases, the Court's review "is limited to

determining whether the Commissioner's decision 'is supported by substantial
evidence and was made pursuant to the proper legal standards.'" Ealy v. Comm'r of

Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)). In this context, "[sjubstantial evidence is
defined as 'more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance...."
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Rogers, 486 F.3d at 421 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health &Human Serve., 25 F.3d
284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). Put another way, "[s]ubstantial evidence exists when a
'reasonable mind might accept' the relevant evidence 'as adequate to support a
conclusion.'" Warner v. Comm'rofSoc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Kirk v. Sec'y of Health &Human Serve., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1997)).
ill.

ANALYSIS

As a threshold matter, the Court construes PiaintifFs objection as two distinct
objections. Plaintiff appears to object to the ALJ's failure to provide good reasons
for rejecting Dr. Iben's opinion regarding the amount of weight that Piaintiff couid iift
or carry. Separately, she appears to object to the ALJ's residual functional capacity
("RFC") determination regarding Plaintiffs ability to reach.
First, Plaintiff contends that the R&R incorrectly determined that the ALJ

offered good reasons for rejecting Dr. Iben's opinion as to the weight Plaintiff could
lift or carry. Plaintiff contends that the only justification the ALJ offered for giving Dr.

Iben's opinion little weight is that, despite Plaintiffs decreased range of motion in the
spine, she had a normal gait and no neurological problems. Plaintiff contends that
those facts do not support giving little weight to the specific portion of Dr. Iben's
opinion that Plaintiff could lift and carry no more than ten pounds and could do so
only occasionally. Plaintiff argues that the fact that she had no problems with her
gait has nothing to do with her abiiity to lift or carry weight and therefore is not a
good reason for rejecting this specific opinion.

Plaintiffs objection lacks merit. First, the ALJ did not offer Plaintiffs normal
gait and lack of neurological problems as the only reasons for giving Dr. Iben's
Case No. 2:17-cv-339

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opinion little weight. He also noted that the objective medical evidence showed that
Plaintiff had "full range of motion in ail extremities with no motor or sensory deficits."
ECF No. 9-2, at PAGEiD # 64. Further, the ALJ found that Dr. iben's own treatment

notes did not support the limitations contained in his opinion. Moreover, the ALJ
considered the medical record from Adena Health that Plaintiff contends supports

the weight restriction and correctly found that the instruction was a temporary
limitation "and not intended to be representative of [PlaintifTs] baseline of
functioning." Id. at PAGEID # 65 (citing Ex. 6F, at PAGEID # 536). The Court finds
that the ALJ therefore offered sufficient reasons for giving little weight to Dr. Iben's

opinion as a whole, including the limitation that Plaintiff could lift or carry no more

than ten pounds.^
The Court next considers PlaintifTs ability to reach. Dr. Iben opined that
Plaintiff could never reach in any direction. Ex. 9F, ECF No. 9-7, at PAGEID # 552.
The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Iben's entire opinion and included a lesser

"reaching" limitation in the RFC, finding that Plaintiff could frequently reach in all
directions. ECF No. 9-2, at PAGEID # 63. Plaintiffargues that the ALJ, however,
failed to explain why he imposed the lesser limitation as opposed to a limitation of no
reaching.

Plaintiffs objection fails because the ALJ adequately explained the basis for
the limitation in reaching—namely, PlaintifTs normal range of motion. Specifically,

The Court also notes that, although the form that comprises Dr. Iben's opinion provides a
space for Dr. Iben to identify the medical or clinicalfindings that support his weight
limitation, he faiied to identify any support for that limitation. Ex. 9F, at PAGEID # 550.

Case No. 2:17-cv-339

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Dr. Iben's opinion on the matter was based on Plaintiffs subjective report of
shoulder pain and a supposed reduced range of motion. Ex. 9F, ECF No. 9-7, at
PAGEID # 552. As the ALJ notes, however, the record evidence regarding range of

motion of her extremities repeatedly documented a normal range of motion in all of
Plaintiffs extremities except for one instance when Plaintiff injured her shoulder due
to a fall. See Exs. 2F, at PAGEID ## 477-78; 3F, at PAGEID # 514; 6F, at PAGEID

## 531, 534; 24F, at 27. The multiple findings of normai range of motion, and the
iack of any treatment notes indicating a sustained reduced range of motion in the
extremities, constitute substantial evidence supporting the ALU's RFC determination
that Plaintiff couid frequently reach in all directions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons addressed above. Plaintiffs objections are OVERRULED.
The R&R is ADOPTED and AFFIRMED. The Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner's
decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

MICHAEL H. WATSON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. 2:17-cv-339

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