McCort v. Warden, Belmont Correctional Institution
Filing
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS granting 8 Motion to Dismiss. Objections to R&R due by 5/2/2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson on 4/18/2018. (ew)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DEANO McCORT,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, BELMONT
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,
Case No. 2:17-cv-828
Judge Michael H. Watson
Magistrate Judge Jolson
Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner, a state prisoner, brings the instant Petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the Court on the Petition (Doc. 3), Respondent’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8), Petitioner’s Opposition (Doc. 9), and the exhibits of the parties.
Respondent did not file a Reply. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS
that Respondent’s Motion be GRANTED and this action be DISMISSED.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The state appellate court summarized the facts and procedural history of this case as
follows:
On December 3, 2015, the Muskingum County Grand Jury indicted appellant on
one count of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(3), a felony of the third
degree, one count of theft (less than $1,000.00) of an elderly victim in violation of
R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a felony of the fifth degree, and one count of possession of
criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A), a felony of the fifth degree. The
burglary charge related to a burglary at the home of Wilma Good, who was at all
relevant times living in a nursing home. At his arraignment on December 9, 2015,
appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all of the charges.
Subsequently, a jury trial commenced on February 23, 2016. The jury, on the
same date, found appellant guilty of all of the charges. As memorialized in an
Entry filed on April 5, 2016, appellant was sentenced to thirty-six (36) months in
prison.
State v. McCort, 85 N.E.3d 214, 215 (Ohio 2017). On February 6, 2014, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. To correct a typographical error, the appellate court
issued a nunc pro tunc opinion and judgment entry on March 24, 2017. (Doc. 8-1, PAGEID #:
81–87).
On March 31, 2017, Petitioner filed a pro se application to reopen his direct appeal,
alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, due to his counsel’s failure assert the
following assignment of error:
The trial court erred when it failed to dismiss this case due to lack of evidence.
The Prosecution failed to meet the “burden of proof” required when establishing
the elements of the case. A violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
(Doc. 8-1, PAGEID #: 91). The State opposed Petitioner’s application for reopening. (Id.,
PAGEID #: 94). On May 4, 2017, the Court of Appeals denied the application for reopening but
did not reach the merits because Petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements of App. R.
26(B)(2)(e). (Id., PAGEID #: 98). The Court of Appeals noted, however, that on direct appeal,
“a sufficiency argument was made by appellate counsel, although unsuccessfully.”
(Id.).
Petitioner did not appeal the denial of his application to reopen his direct appeal.
Petitioner likewise did not file a timely appeal of the appellate court’s underlying
decision to the Ohio Supreme Court. Instead, Petitioner filed a pro se notice of appeal and
motion for delayed appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court on June 6, 2017. (Id., PAGEID #: 99–
121).
Petitioner argued that his delayed appeal should be permitted because his appellate
counsel failed to provide him with a copy of the Court of Appeals’ March 24, 2017 nunc pro
tunc opinion and judgment entry. (Id., PAGEID #: 104–05). The Ohio Supreme Court denied
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Petitioner’s motion for delayed appeal and dismissed the case on July 26, 2017. State v. McCort,
78 N.E.3d 908 (Ohio 2017).
On September 22, 2017, Petitioner filed his pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
(Doc. 3). Petitioner’s single ground for relief is lengthy but is captured in the following quote
from the Petition:
Ground One: The Petitioner, Deano McCort (hereinafter “McCort”) was
convicted of burglary in violation of an Ohio Revised Code, specifically R.C.
2911.12(A)(3). This conviction stems from an allegation that McCort entered a
building or house. The home itself was unoccupied and was known to be an
unoccupied structure for well over three years. The owner of the home was no
longer a resident of the structure, but was now residing at a nursing home facility.
McCort’s conviction is against the legal sufficiency of the statute.
(Id. at 6).
II.
DISCUSSION
Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. (See generally Doc.
8). For the reasons that follow, this Court agrees.
A. Procedural Default
1. Standard
Congress has provided that state prisoners who are in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States may apply to the federal courts for a writ of
habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). In recognition of the equal obligation of the state courts to
protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, and in order to prevent needless friction
between the state and federal courts, a state criminal defendant with federal constitutional claims
must first present those claims to the state courts for consideration. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). If
he fails to do so but still has an avenue open to him by which he may present his claims, then his
petition is subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies. Id.; Anderson v. Harless,
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459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 (1982) (per curiam) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275–78 (1971)).
However, where a petitioner has failed to exhaust his claims but would find those claims barred
if later presented to the state courts, “there is a procedural default for purposes of federal
habeas[.]” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1 (1991).
The term “procedural default” describes the situation where a person convicted of a crime
in a state court fails (for whatever reason) to present a particular claim to the highest court of the
State—such that the State has not had a fair chance to correct any errors made in the course of
the trial or the appeal—before a federal court intervenes in the state criminal process. One
aspect of “fairly presenting” a claim to the state courts is that a habeas petitioner must do so in a
way that gives the state courts a fair opportunity to rule on the federal law claims being asserted.
See McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 681 (6th Cir. 2000) (“The federal courts do not have
jurisdiction to consider a claim in a habeas petition that was not “fairly presented” to the state
courts.”) (citing Franklin v. Rose, 811 F.2d 322, 324–25 (6th Cir. 1987)). In the Sixth Circuit, a
petitioner can satisfy the fair presentment requirement in any one of four ways: (1) reliance upon
federal cases employing constitutional analysis; (2) reliance upon state cases employing federal
constitutional analysis; (3) phrasing the claim in terms of constitutional law or in terms
sufficiently particular to allege a denial of a specific constitutional right; or (4) alleging facts
well within the mainstream of constitutional law. Id.
Further, a claim is considered “fairly presented” only if the petitioner asserted both the
factual and legal basis for his claim to the state courts. Id. If a petitioner fails to fairly present
his claims through the requisite of levels of state appellate review to the state’s highest court and
no avenue of relief remains open, or if it would otherwise be futile for a petitioner to continue to
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pursue his claims in the state courts, the claims are subject to dismissal with prejudice as
procedurally defaulted. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 847–48 (1999).
A petitioner can overcome procedural default, however, by showing (1) there was cause
for him not to follow the procedural rule and that he was actually prejudiced by the alleged
constitutional error or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a bar on federal
habeas review. See Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Hodges v.
Colson, 727 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that if a claim is procedurally default o, it
must not be considered unless “review is needed to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice,
such as when the petitioner submits new evidence showing that a constitutional violation has
probably resulted in a conviction of one who is actually innocent.”) (citing Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478, 495–96 (1986)). Of note, the “cause and prejudice” analysis applies to failures to
raise or preserve issues for review at the appellate level. Leroy v. Marshall, 757 F.2d 94 (6th
Cir. 1985).
2.
Application
In his sole claim, Petitioner asserts that the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of
burglary because the home at issue was unoccupied. Petitioner did not file a timely appeal of
this claim to the Ohio Supreme Court. Instead, Petitioner filed a pro se notice of appeal and
motion for delayed appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court (Doc. 8-1, PAGEID #: 99–121), which
denied his motion and dismissed the case. McCort, 78 N.E.3d 908. Consequently, Respondent
argues that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted this claim.
Petitioner’s appeal to the state appellate court challenged the sufficiency of the evidence,
asserting that “the structure in question was not an occupied structure….” (Doc. 8-1, PAGEID #:
65–68). Although Plaintiff generally claimed a violation of the Fourth Amendment, his claim
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was based solely on state law. (See id.). That is, he never identified any federal constitutional
issues, nor did he refer to any federal case or state court case employing federal constitutional
analysis in support of his claim. He now has no state remedies to pursue. The claim he asserts in
his Petition would have to have been asserted on direct appeal. Because he did not do so, his
claim was not fairly presented and is now foreclosed by procedural default.
As explained above, when a claim is procedurally defaulted, federal habeas review is
barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result
of the alleged violation, or can demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. In order to establish cause, a
petitioner must show that “some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s
efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. “Such factors may
include ‘interference by officials,’ attorney error rising to the level of ineffective assistance of
counsel, and ‘a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available.’”
Hargrave-Thomas v. Yukins, 374 F.3d 383, 388 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499
U.S. 467, 493–94 (1991)).
Here, Petitioner claims a delayed appeal was necessary because he did not receive a
timely copy of the Court of Appeals’ nunc pro tunc decision. As Respondent explains:
the Court of Appeals issued its nunc pro tunc opinion on March 24. McCort, pro
se, filed an Application for Reopening pursuant to Ohio App.R. 26(B) on March
31. So McCort was clearly aware of the conclusion of his appeal less than a week
after the opinion’s issuance. Even if he did not receive a copy from his attorney,
he had more than enough time to request one from the court, for an appeal to the
Ohio Supreme Court that is not due until 45 days after the lower court’s decision.
(Doc. 8 at 8). Because Petitioner was aware of the Court of Appeals’ nunc pro tunc decision, he
fails to sufficiently allege any factor external to the defense that precluded him from raising this
claim in a state-court filing.
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Further, to the extent Petitioner relies on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to
constitute cause to excuse his procedural default, see Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453
(2000), it generally must “‘be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may
be used to establish cause for a procedural default.’” Id. at 452 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at
479).
That is because, before counsel’s ineffectiveness will constitute cause, “that
ineffectiveness must itself amount to a violation of the Sixth Amendment, and therefore must be
both exhausted and not procedurally defaulted.” Burroughs v. Makowski, 411 F.3d 665, 668 (6th
Cir. 2005). Or, if procedurally defaulted, petitioner must be able to “satisfy the ‘cause and
prejudice’ standard with respect to the ineffective-assistance claim itself.” Edwards, 529 U.S. at
450–51. Here, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not found by the state
court to have amounted to a violation of the Sixth Amendment, and thus it does not constitute
cause to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default.
Although Petitioner does not meet the cause-and-prejudice standard, because that
standard is not a perfect safeguard against fundamental miscarriages of justice, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized a narrow exception to the cause requirement where a
constitutional violation has “probably resulted” in the conviction of one who is “actually
innocent” of the substantive offense. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 (2004) (citing Murray,
477 U.S. at 495–96). Upon review of the record, the undersigned concludes that is not the case
here because the state appellate court has already considered and rejected Petitioner’s argument.
McCort, 85 N.E.3d at 214–17. That court found:
In the case sub judice, although Wilma Good was no longer living in her house,
the house was not abandoned and all of her belongings, clothing and furniture
remained in the house. There was testimony that she intended to move back into
the house. As noted by appellee”[r]egardless of whether her health made her
moving back likely or not, she did not abandon her home, was in a nursing home
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for long-term care, and her son testified that he had intentions of preparing the
house for sale.” We find that the house maintained its residential purpose.
Based on the foregoing, we find that there was sufficient evidence that the house
was an “occupied structure” and that appellant’s conviction for burglary is not
against the sufficiency of the evidence.
Id. at 216. Thus, the appellate court overruled Petitioner’s sole assignment or error and affirmed
the judgment of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas. Id. For the same reasons,
Petitioner’s argument that he is “actually innocent” of the substantive offense fails.
III.
RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) be GRANTED and this action be DISMISSED.
Procedure on Objections
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting
authority for the objection(s). A judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made. Upon proper objections, a judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may
recommit this matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. 636(B)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
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the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
The parties are further advised that, if they intend to file an appeal of any adverse
decision, they may submit arguments in any objections filed, regarding whether a certificate of
appealability should issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: April 18, 2018
/s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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