Byrd v. Gwin

Filing 19

ORDER denying 18 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Algenon L. Marbley on 3/18/2019. (cw)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
HOUSTON BYRD, JR.,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Plaintiff,
v.
JUDGE W. SCOTT GWIN,
Defendant.

Case No. 2:17-CV-981
JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY
Magistrate Judge Deavers

OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 18).
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a civil case in Licking County, Ohio and appealed the matter to the Fifth
District Court of Appeals. (ECF No. 1 at 1). Plaintiff alleged that the Fifth District did not follow
applicable rules and law when deciding his appeal. (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff alleged the state
court’s entries were “against the manifest weight of the evidence.” (Id. at 3). Plaintiff also
alleged “fraud upon the court” consisting of “fraud perpetrated by officers of the court.” (Id. at
4). Plaintiff then filed a Motion in this Court to “[r]emand this matter back to the Appellate
Court,” offering vague claims that the Fifth District Court of Appeal violated his constitutional
rights and due process of law. (Id. at 3, 9). Plaintiff did not explain exactly how the Fifth District
Court of Appeals violated his rights, yet asserts that his rights were indeed violated. (ECF No. 15
at 2).
On November 6, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). (ECF No. 3 at 2, 5). On June 25, 2018, this Court granted that

motion and dismissed the action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). (ECF No. 15 at 4). Because
this Court found a lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), it did
not evaluate the merits of Defendant’s 12(b)(6) arguments. (Id.). Following dismissal, Plaintiff
filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration. (ECF No. 18).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a court will reconsider its own prior
decision “if the moving party demonstrates: (1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered
evidence that was not previously available to the parties; or (3) an intervening change in
controlling law.” Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Arctic Express, Inc., 288
F.Supp.2d 895, 900 (S.D. Ohio 2003). Courts may also alter or amend a judgment when
necessary “to prevent manifest injustice.” GenCorp., Inc. v. Am. Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d
804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999). Reconsideration due to a finding of manifest injustice or a clear error of
law requires “unique circumstances,” such as complete failure to address an issue or claim.
McWhorter v. ELSEA, Inc., 2006 WL 3483964, at *2 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (citing Collison v. Int’l
Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 34 F.3d 233, 236 (4th Cir. 1994)). Even for motions to
reconsider interlocutory orders, courts respect the importance of “grant[ing] some measure of
finality ... and [of] discourag[ing] the filing of endless motions for reconsideration” in applying
the relevant criteria. Id. A motion under Rule 59(e) may not be brought to relitigate issues
previously considered by the Court or to present evidence that could have been raised earlier. See
J.P. v. Taft, 2006 WL 689091, at *3 (S.D. Ohio 2006).
III.

LAW & ANALYSIS

A party requesting this Court reconsider a prior order must argue one of the enumerated
reasons as the basis for the motion. It is unclear which basis Plaintiff alleges. However, it does

2

not appear he is offering newly discovered evidence, or citing to an intervening change in
controlling law, or alleging manifest injustice. By process of elimination, this Court will
understand Plaintiff to be arguing there has been clear error.
A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In this Court’s prior Order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, this Court agreed with
Defendant that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars jurisdiction here. (ECF No. 15 at 3-4).
Generally speaking, “[f]ederal courts are of limited jurisdiction; they are empowered to hear only
those cases which are within the judicial power of the United States Constitution and as further
granted to them by Acts of Congress.” Mullins v. Pennymac Loan Services, LLC, No. 3:16-cv137, 2016 WL 6080286, at*1 (S. D. Ohio Oct. 18, 2016). As noted by this Court, “there is a
presumption that a federal court lacks jurisdiction until it has been demonstrated.” Id. Facts
“supporting subject matter jurisdiction must be affirmatively pleaded by the person seeking to
show it.” Id. Accordingly, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that a court has subject
matter jurisdiction. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F. 3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir.
1996).
Functionally, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal District and Circuit Courts
from conducting appellate review of state court judgments. This doctrine is based on two United
States Supreme Court decisions interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). See District of Columbia Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “is based on the negative inference that if appellate court review
of such state judgments is vested in the Supreme Court [per § 1257(a)], then it follows that such
review may not be had in the lower federal courts.” Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 368 (6th
Cir. 2008). Therefore, if a plaintiff bases his or her federal claim on a state court judgement in

3

federal courts other than the Supreme Court of the United States, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
applies, barring the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. McCormick v. Braverman, 451
F. 3d 382, 394 (6th Cir. 2006). Specifically, a plaintiff is barred from “complaining of an injury
caused by the state judgment and seeking its reversal. This he [plaintiff] may not do, regardless
of whether he raised any constitutional claims in state court.” Id.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff asks this Court to conduct appellate review of
a state court decision. (ECF No. 18 at 1). Per the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court will not
do so. Plaintiff seeks appellate review from this Court for the state appellate court’s alleged
“failure to perform.” (ECF No. 1 at 1, 9). As Defendant previously noted, “federal appellate
jurisdiction over a state court decision lies exclusively with the Supreme Court, and not lower
federal courts.” Durham v. Haslam, 528 F. App’x 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2013). Therefore, only the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over state court decisions whereas the United States Circuit
Courts and United States District Courts do not. Accordingly, this Court, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
In addition, Plaintiff offers little to no explanation as to why this Court has jurisdiction
over this matter. Plaintiff reiterates statutes relevant to subject matter jurisdiction but fails to
explain how they apply to the present issue. Likewise, Plaintiff reiterates allegations of “fraud
upon the court” and requests review because the “Court’s reliance on the [D]efendant’s blatantly
unsupported response [is] incredulous[ly] flawed.” (ECF No. 18 at 1-2). However, Plaintiff
makes these allegations yet fails to mention why this reasoning is flawed. Plaintiff also fails to
explain how these allegations confer subject matter jurisdiction upon this Court. Plaintiff quotes
28 U.S.C. § 1331, but his motion is otherwise lacking any legal basis to permit this Court to
exercise jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not met the burden established by RMI Titanium Co., which

4

requires that a plaintiff prove that the court in question has subject matter jurisdiction. By failing
to meet this burden, Plaintiff has not established or demonstrated a clear error of law in these
proceedings.
B. Failure to State a Claim for Relief
This Court did not previously decide whether Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff appears to argue that treatment of his complaint
was done improperly. However, in his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff merely alleges that
“the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is fraudulent [sic] and disingenuous due to: Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8: General Rules of Pleading.” (ECF No. 18 at 2-3). Plaintiff proceeds to
quote Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and (b) but does not indicate how his complaint states a claim for
relief. In any event, without subject matter jurisdiction, the question of whether Plaintiff’s
pleadings are proper would be moot. Plaintiff has not identified any reason under Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e) that would persuade this Court to grant his Motion for Reconsideration.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Plaintiff has failed to identify a clear error of law in this Court’s
prior Order dismissing this case. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Algenon L. Marbley
ALGENON L. MARBLEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 18, 2019

5