Hammer v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 15

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS overruling Plaintiff's Statement of Errors and affirming the Commissioner's decision. Objections to R&R due by 12/5/2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson on 11/21/2018. (ew)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
GREG A. HAMMER,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action 2:18-cv-223
Judge George C. Smith
Magistrate Judge Jolson

COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Greg A. Hammer, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of
a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his
Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance Benefits. For the reasons that follow, it
is RECOMMENDED that the Court OVERRULE Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors and AFFIRM
the Commissioner’s decision.
I.

BACKGROUND
A. Prior Proceedings
Plaintiff applied for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and Disability Insurance

Benefits (“DIB”) in December 2014, alleging disability due to a number of physical and mental
impairments. (Doc. 8-5, Tr. 372, PAGEID #: 415). Plaintiff alleged an onset date of August 6,
2014. (Id.).
After initial administrative denials of Plaintiff’s claims, Administrative Law Judge
Timothy G. Keller (“the ALJ”) heard the case on March 16, 2017. (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 238–56, PAGEID

#: 278–96). On June 12, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 218–28, PAGEID #: 258–68).
Plaintiff requested a review of the Hearing and the Appeals Council denied review, making the
ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 1–4, PAGEID #: 41–44).
Plaintiff filed this case on March 16, 2018, and the Commissioner filed the administrative
record on June 12, 2018. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff filed a Statement of Specific Errors on August 6, 2018
(Doc. 10), the Commissioner responded on September 20, 2018 (Doc. 13), and Plaintiff filed a
reply (Doc. 14). Thus, this matter is now ripe for review.
B.

Relevant Hearing Testimony

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified about his physical and mental issues. Plaintiff testified
that he passes out “three or four times a week, if not more.” (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 243, PAGEID #: 283).
He stated this does not happen when he is sitting, but when he is doing something like washing
dishes or sweeping his floor, he’s prone to losing consciousness. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that he
has a pacemaker and that he takes medication for his heart and for blood pressure but that the
medication has not been able to regulate his blood pressure to keep him from passing out. (Tr.
244, PAGEID #: 284). Plaintiff also testified that he has neck, shoulder, and lower back pain.
(Tr. 244–46, PAGEID #: 284–86).
Regarding mental health, Plaintiff testified that he takes medication for depression and
anxiety. (Tr. 246–47, PAGEID #: 286–87). He stated that he has received counseling at Six
County. (Tr. 247, PAGEID #: 287). Plaintiff testified that during the day he gets up, tries to eat,
and watches television. He does not visit people or drive much. (Tr. 250, PAGEID #: 290).

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As to work history, plaintiff testified that he worked for 15 years as a machine operator.
(Tr. 248, PAGEID #: 288). He stated he would stand and walk all day, and lift between 10 and 30
pounds. (Tr. 249, PAGEID #: 289).
During the hearing, a vocational expert (“VE”) testified that Plaintiff could perform the
unskilled and light positions of housekeeping cleaner, cashier, and sales attendant. (Tr. 253–54,
PAGEID #: 293–94).
C. Relevant Medical Background
The medical records relevant to the disposition of this case are summarized below.
D. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ found that Plaintiff remained insured for disability insurance benefits through
December 31, 2019, and that he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged
onset date of August 6, 2014. (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 221, PAGEID #: 261). The ALJ determined that
Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: heart condition, syncope, back and neck
issues, and left shoulder problems. (Id.). Additionally, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered
from non-severe impairments, including headaches, depression, and anxiety. (Id.).
Upon consideration of the record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the following
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work … and meaning that the claimant can lift, carry, push, and pull
20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; able to sit, stand, and walk for 6
hours each in an 8-hour workday; can frequently climb ramps and stairs; can never
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can frequently balance and stoop; can
occasionally crawl; and can have no exposure to moving machinery or unprotected
heights.
(Id., Tr. 223, PAGEID #: 263).

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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “[S]ubstantial
evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). The Commissioner’s findings of fact must also
be based upon the record as a whole. Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1985). To
this end, the Court must “take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight”
of the Commissioner’s decision. Rhodes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:13-cv-1147, 2015 WL
4881574, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2015).
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff assigns one error: that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed because he violated

the treating source rule in his evaluation of Dr. Keith Brantley’s medical source statements. More
specifically, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Brantley’s opinion concerning
Plaintiff’s syncope and mental health.
Two related rules govern how the ALJ was required to analyze Dr. Brantley’s opinion. See
Dixon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:14-cv-478, 2016 WL 860695, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2016).
The first is the “treating physician rule.” Id. The rule requires an ALJ to “give controlling weight
to a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of the claimant’s
impairment(s) if the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case

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record.” LaRiccia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 549 F. App’x 377, 384 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Closely associated is “the good reasons rule,” which requires an ALJ always to give “good
reasons . . . for the weight given to the claimant’s treating source opinion.” Dixon, 2016 WL
860695, at *4 (quoting Blakely, 581 F.3d at 406 (alterations in original)); see also 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2). The goal underlying the good reasons rule is two-fold. First, it allows a plaintiff
to understand her case, particularly where a plaintiff knows her physician deemed her disabled and
thus “might be especially bewildered when told by an administrative bureaucracy that she is not,
unless some reason for the agency’s decision is supplied.” Blakely, 581 F.3d at 407 (quoting
Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004)). Second, “it ensures that the
ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s application of
the rule.” Id.
The good reasons rule requires an ALJ’s determination to be supported by the evidence in
the case record and “sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the
[ALJ] gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Cole v.
Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011). Under the good reasons rule, if an ALJ:
declines to give a treating source’s opinion controlling weight, he must then balance
the following factors to determine what weight to give it: “the length of the
treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of
the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion
with the record as a whole, and specialization of the treating source.”
Fletcher v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 9 F. Supp. 3d 817, 828 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (quoting Wilson,
378 F.3d at 544); see also 20 C.F.R. § 406.1527(c)(2)–(6) (setting forth the relevant
factors). The treating physician rule and the good reasons rule together create what has
been referred to as the “two-step analysis created by the Sixth Circuit.” Allums v. Comm’r

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of Soc. Sec., 975 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832 (N.D. Ohio 2013); see also Gayheart v. Comm. of
Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013) (“If the Commissioner does not give a treatingsource opinion controlling weight, then the opinion is weighed based the length, frequency,
nature, and the extent of the treatment relationship, as well as the treating source’s area of
specialty and the degree to which the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole and
is supported by relevant evidence.”). Defendant argues that the ALJ satisfied the treating
physician rule here.
In addition, the Sixth Circuit has held that an ALJ’s failure to give good reasons for
rejecting the opinion of a treating source may constitute de minimis or harmless error in certain
circumstances. Wilson, 378 F.3d at 547. De minimis or harmless error occurs: (1) if a treating
source’s opinion is so patently deficient that the Commissioner could not possibly credit it; (2) if
the Commissioner adopts the opinion of the treating source or makes findings consistent with the
opinion; or (3) if the Commissioner has met the goal of the procedural safeguard of the good
reasons rule even though an ALJ has not complied with the express terms of the regulation. Id. at
547. Defendant alternatively argues that the third exception applies here.
A. SYNCOPE
On July 16, 2015, Dr. Brantley saw Plaintiff and noted he had a history of palpitations and
syncope:
The patient stated he has been “blacking out” 3-4xs a day and more often if he is
doing something strenuous when this happens. He gets lightheaded or dizzy before
this occurs before he actually loses consciousness. He also has been having
palpitations and chest tightness. He states its worse at night when he is laying down
and it usually lasts about 5 mins when it occurs. He stated that the symptoms
become more frequent after he was started on a medication the last time he was
here (probably florinef). He is always tired and this happens many times right after
the stands up. The interrogation of a loop recorder previously paced by Dr. Megeed
demonstrated several episodes of bradycardia with heart rates demonstrated in the
30’s. . . .
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(Doc. 8-2, Tr. 955, PAGEID #: 1001). Dr. Brantley recommended the placement of a pacemaker.
Plaintiff took the recommendation, and a pacemaker was implanted during the summer of 2015.
(Id.).
Later that year, in September of 2015, Dr. Brantley completed a Perry County
Employability Form. (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 572, PAGEID #: 617). The portion of the form entitled workrelated activities was left blank. Dr Brantley noted, however, that Plaintiff “continues to pass out
despite getting a pacemaker.” Along with that form, Dr. Brantley drafted a one-sentence letter,
stating: “Mr. Hammer is still passing out since the pacemaker placement and is unable to work.”
(Doc. 8-2, Tr. 571, PAGEID #: 616). Roughly three months later, Dr. Brantley completed a
Medical Source Statement, dated December 18, 2015. (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 573–75, PAGEID #: 618–
20). That form states that Plaintiff frequently can lift and carry 1–5 pounds, but never more;
frequently can reach and handle with both right and left extremities; occasionally bend, frequently
crouch/squat, frequently crawl, and never climb steps or ladders. (Doc. 8-2, Tr., PAGEID #: 618–
19). The form also notes that Plaintiff is able to reach above shoulder level, his condition is likely
to deteriorate if placed under stress, and he is likely to have more than five unscheduled absences
from work per month. (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 574–75, PAGEID #: 619–20). Dr. Brantley premised his
conclusions on his diagnosis of “[r]ecurrent syncope” and “symptomatic orthostatic hypotension.”
Along with that assessment, Dr. Brantley again included a brief letter, stating” “Mr. Hammer is
unable to perform any job that will require standing, due to the possibility that he could pass out
at any time.” (Tr. 576, PAGEID #: 621).
In deciding this matter, the ALJ assigned no weight to Dr. Brantley’s work-preclusive
opinions:

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The undersigned assigns no weight to the treating physician’s opinion, as it does
not merit controlling weight (Keith Brantley, M.D., 9/8/2015, Exhibit 7, and
12/18/2015, Exhibit 8F). [Dr. Brantley] opined that the claimant cannot work due
to the possibility that he could pass out at any time following the placement of the
pacemaker, but this is a determination that is reserved for the Commissioner. Also,
the record shows that he has had syncope since childhood, yet has had a good work
history ever since becoming an adult. Additionally, Dr. Brantley did not limit the
claimant from being able to drive or carry hunting weapons.
(Doc. 8-2, Tr. 225–26, PAGEID #: 265–66).
Immediately thereafter, the ALJ assigned great weight to the opinion of treating physician,
Dr. Paul Mumma:
On April 16, 2016, [Dr. Mumma] opined that, “This patient is very comfortable
with the sick role. I have essentially confronted him with this and also told him
that there is no medicine or procedure that is going to deal with his complaints has
they are in today. He needs to adapt to his body And become more functional. I
strongly advising counseling. Regardless, this patient is capable of sedentary M
physical work. His neck problem remains in question He does have a reversal of
the cervical lordotic curve and significant tenderness in the occipital area. I will
be requesting an MRI. I see no reason to send the pain management at this time”
(Exhibit 24F/22). On May 26, 2016, he opined that, “I have told this patient.
Equivocal relief that I am unable to come up with an explanation that would
account for all of his various complaints. He is clearly doctor shopping. He has
been to chiropractors and numerous other practitioners in an attempt to diagnose
and/or treat chronic neck pain, headaches, left arm pain, low back pain numbness
and tingling in both upper extremities, numbness and tingling in his thighs as well
as fatigue and Insomnia. I have told this patient that he is fully employable
capable of just about any job duties and has no physical restrictions. I am aware
of other than heavy aerobic activity which may cause problems with his paced
rhythm. He should do no heavy lifting, pushing or pulling because of his
pacemaker module I will be stopping all of his controlled medications.” These
opinions are consistent with the mostly normal physical examinations throughout
the record and the claimant ’s actions on a daily basis.
(Doc. 8-2, Tr. 226, PAGEID #: 266).
Dr. Mumma’s notes, which the ALJ cited, state that Dr. Mumma reviewed Dr. Brantley’s
notes and that they “reveal no medical cause” for Plaintiff’s syncope. (Tr. 897, PAGEID #: 943).
Dr. Mumma additionally concluded that Plaintiff’s dizzy spells “are probably a consequence of
polypharmacy,” and consequently stopped Plaintiff’s medications. (Tr. 900, PAGEID #: 946).
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The undersigned reads the ALJ’s opinion as assigning no weight to Dr. Brantley’s opinions
because they were inconsistent with the record and great weight to Dr. Mumma’s opinion because
of record support. Specifically, Dr. Brantley’s opinion that Plaintiff could pass out at any moment
and thus could not work did not comport with other expected limitations of someone who was
prone to lose consciousness at any time. In particular, Dr. Brantley expressed no concern about
Plaintiff driving or hunting. Similarly, the ALJ appears to have expressed skepticism regarding
how limiting syncope is because Plaintiff was diagnosed as a child but since has had a good work
history. In contrast, the ALJ stated that Dr. Mumma’s opinions were “consistent with the mostly
normal physical examinations throughout the record and the claimant ’s actions on a daily basis.”
(Doc. 8-2, Tr. 226, PAGEID #: 266).
Considering these factors, the undersigned concludes that the ALJ’s rejection of Dr.
Brantley’s opinion with regard to Plaintiff’s syncope was procedurally adequate. Indeed, the Sixth
Circuit simply requires that the explanation be enough for the Court to understand the basis for the
ALJ’s decision. See Allen v. Com’r of Soc. Sec., 561 F.3d 646, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming after
concluding that ALJ’s one-sentence rejection of treating physician’s opinion satisfied the “good
reasons” requirement). In sum, the ALJ gave sufficient reasons for assigning no weight to Dr.
Brantley’s opinions.
Moreover, elsewhere in the opinion, the ALJ provided additional analysis of Plaintiff’s
syncope:
In regards to his syncope, the record shows there is no apparent medical cause for
his syncope (Exhibit 24F/ 19). Yet, he reported that sometimes when he stands up
too fast, he will black out (Exhibit 3E). However, the results of a tilt table test
performed on November 26, 2012 were normal (Exhibit 15F/ l). Also, the results
of a CT Scan of the brain taken on December 1, 2014 showed no radiographic
evidence for acute intracranial process (Exhibit 16F/73). Yet, on July 16, 2015,
he was seen in consultation for follow-up of palpitations and syncope. He stated
he had been “blacking out” 3-4 times a day and more often if he was doing
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something strenuous. He also had been having palpitations and chest tightness.
The integration of the loop recorder previously placed inside of him had
demonstrated several episodes of bradycardia with heart rates in the 30’s. A
pacemaker placement was recommended (Exhibit 25F/45). However, the record
shows that he admitted he has had syncope several times since childhood (Exhibit
15F/1). Also, the record shows that he has only positional syncope (Exhibit
25F/14), as vasovagal syncope was ruled out (Exhibit 15F/ l).
(Doc. 8-2, Tr. 224, PAGEID #: 264).
Adding this explanation to the equation, the undersigned additionally concludes that even
if the discussion of Dr. Brantley’s opinion was too light, any error was harmless. The Sixth
Circuit’s opinion in Nelson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 F. App’x 462 (6th Cir. 2006), supports
this conclusion. There, the ALJ failed to explain the weight given to two treating physicians. Id.
at 468. Despite this absence, the Sixth Circuit found that the ALJ’s treatment of Plaintiff’s
impairment “indirectly attack[ed] both the supportability of [the treating sources’] opinions and
the consistency of those opinions with the rest of the record evidence.” The same is true here. By
discussing activities and medical assessments that were inconsistent with Dr. Brantley’s opinion,
the ALJ adequately discussed reasons why Plaintiff was not as limited as Dr. Brantley opined.
Plaintiff also argues that Dr. Mumma “limited” Plaintiff to sedentary work, referring to the
following record:
[Plaintiff] needs to adapt to his body [a]nd become more functional. I strongly
advis[e] counseling. Regardless, this patient is capable of sedentary M[sic] physical
work.
(Tr. 900, PAGEID #: 946). Because elsewhere Dr. Mumma opined that Plaintiff could perform
any work other than heavy aerobic activity, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Mumma’s opinions were
internally inconsistent and thus unreliable. (Doc. 14 at 3). First, Plaintiff is overreading Dr.
Mumma’s opinion regarding sedentary work. To be clear, Dr. Mumma did not expressly limit
Plaintiff to sedentary work; he simply noted that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work. Second,

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a review of all of Dr. Mumma’s records shows that he believes Plaintiff has the ability to perform
most jobs. Dr. Mumma reviewed Plaintiff’s medical history since 2011, found that he was “doctor
shopping,” and concluded that Plaintiff was “fully employable[,] capable of just about any job
duties and has no physical restrictions[] I am aware of[ o]ther than heavy aerobic activity which
may cause problems with his paced rhythm” and “no heavy lifting, pushing or pulling because of
his pacemaker module.” (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 893, PAGEID #: 939). Indeed, Dr. Mumma directed
Plaintiff to “begin progressive daily aerobic exercise.” (PAGEID #: 887, Tr. 933). Accordingly,
the undersigned finds Plaintiff’s argument unpersuasive.
In sum, the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Brantley’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s syncope was
sufficient. And, in any event, any alleged error was harmless because the ALJ’s opinion makes
clear why Dr. Brantley’s opined limitations were rejected, and substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s conclusion.
B. MENTAL HEALTH
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to give good reasons for rejecting Dr. Brantley’s
opined mental limitations. The Perry County Employability Form, described above, is relevant
here. In that form, Dr. Brantley checked boxes finding Plaintiff “Not Limited” in his ability to:
Remember work location and procedures, Carry out instructions, and Interact with the general
public; but “Extremely Limited in his ability to: Maintain attention and concentration; Perform
activities within a schedule; and Sustain an ordinary routine.” (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 572, PAGEID #:
617). Here is the relevant potion of the form in its entirety:

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(Id.). The form contains no narrative explanation of why Plaintiff would be mentally limited in
these ways. The other check-box form that Dr. Brantley completed, the Medical Statement Form
described above, contains no mental limitations.
Two starting observations. First, it is the undersigned’s understanding that Dr. Brantley
has no mental health training, and Plaintiff has not told the Court otherwise. Second, besides the
check-box form, Plaintiff has not identified any mental health records from Dr. Brantley that would
support the opined limitations. To the contrary, Dr. Brantley’s notes state that Plaintiff “has a
normal mood and affect,” his “behavior is normal,” “patient is not nervous/anxious,” and he is
“oriented to person, place, and time.” (Tr. 957, PAGEID #: 1003).
The undersigned is reluctant to require an ALJ to articulate reasons beyond what the ALJ
did in this case under such circumstances.

But regardless, any failure to reject Dr. Brantley’s

mental health opinions expressly was harmless. This is so because the ALJ elsewhere made clear
why Dr. Brantley’s expressed mental limitations were too extreme. First, the ALJ explained why
he found Plaintiff’s mental limitations nonsevere:
In 2009, [Plaintiff] reported that he became depressed when his biological father
passed away (Exhibit 6F/2). His depressive symptoms continued, and in 2015, he
reported having crying spells a few times a week (Exhibit 3E) as well as lacking
energy and feeling as if he is stuck in tar (Exhibit 2F/5). He also reported of being
anxious (Exhibit 6F/3). By 2016, he had gone through a divorce, lost a custody
battle for his two children, went through cardiac issues that resulted in pacemaker
placement , and felt depressed and traumatized and had problems sleeping due to
having nightmares of performing CPR on a neighbor/friend after she passed and
seeing images of the corpse (Exhibits 9F/1, 17F/ 1, and 5, and 24F/7). The record
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shows he was prescribed medications in 2013, and has taken medications that
include Prozac, Zoloft, Remeron, and Xanax (Exhibits 16F/45, and 24F/ 10). Yet,
the record shows that the results of mental status examinations routinely revealed
normal results regarding his mood and affect, and the results of the consultative
examination revealed he has no mental limitations that prevent him from working
(Exhibits 6F, 21F/4, and 25F/47). Also, in 2015, he reported he was not receiving
medication or counseling for his mental issues (Exhibit 3E). For these reasons,
these impairments are slight abnormalities, and considered singly and in
combination, do not have more than a minimal effect on the claimant’s ability to
perform basic physical/mental work activities. Therefore, these are non-severe
impairments.
In making this finding, the undersigned has considered the four broad areas of
mental functioning set out in the disability regulations for evaluating mental
disorders and in the Listing of Impairments (20 CFR, Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1). These four areas of mental functioning are known as the
“paragraph B” criteria.
The first functional area is understanding, remembering, or applying information.
In this area, the claimant has mild limitation. The next functional area is
interacting with others. In this area, the claimant has mild limitation. The third
functional area is concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. In this area, the
claimant has mild limitation. The fourth functional area is adapting or managing
oneself. In this area, the claimant has mild limitation. He reported he is able to
lift 5 pounds, such as a gallon of milk or a sack of potatoes, walk 200 feet at a
time, stand and/or walk for 1hour at a time, has no issues with sitting and can sit
for 2 hours at a time, and is able to live in a 2nd -floor apartment, which require use
of stairs. He also reported he is able to take care of his personal needs. He reported
when he was married that he occasionally cooked and cleaned and performed
others tasks, but had to take breaks and his wife had mainly completed the chores
when they were still married. Now that he is divorced, he admitted that he is able
to perform the tasks and take care of his sons on the weekends when he has them.
He continues to drive and use public transportation. He will attend church services,
but is prone to withdraw and does not like crowds. He has a few friends. He
spends time with his sons and takes them hunting, which is his hobby of his. He
will also watch television, read, and use the computer, and has read numerous
medical resources to obtain diagnoses for his chronic/minor medical complains
(Exhibits 3E, lOE, 3F, 6F, and 24F).
Again, because the claimant’s medically determinable mental impairments cause
no more than “mild” limitation in any of the functional areas, they are nonsevere
(20 CFR 404. l520a(d)(l) and 416.920a(d)(l)).
(Tr. 221–22, PAGEID #: 261–62).

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Then, the ALJ explained why he found highly restrictive mental opinions, like Dr.
Brantley’s opinion, unpersuasive.

Specifically, the ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s consultative

examination with Floyd Sours, MA, which “revealed [Plaintiff] ha[d] no mental limitations that
prevent[ed] him from working.” (Tr. 221, PAGEID #: 261). The ALJ additionally noted that
Plaintiff’s mental status examinations “routinely revealed normal results regarding his mood and
affect. “

(Id.). The ALJ also explained that he gave “great weight” to the state agency

psychological consultants’ opinions. Those consultants concluded that Plaintiff did not have a
severe mental impairment and assessed Plaintiff’s mental functioning in the four areas as only
mildly limited. (See Tr. 222, PAGEID #: 262; Tr. 225, PAGEID #: 265). Finally, the ALJ relied
on Plaintiff’s daily activities. (Tr. 221–22, PAGEID #: 261–62).
In sum, the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Brantley’s opinion was sufficient, and substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s mental health conclusions.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court OVERRULE Plaintiff’s

Statement of Errors and AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision.
V.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific
proposed finding or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting
authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the Report or specific proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made. Upon proper objection, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further

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evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: November 21, 2018

/s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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