Castile v. Franklin County Sheriff

Filing 3

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER: Magistrate Judge grants 1 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, RECOMMENDS dismissing 2 Complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson on 3/29/2018. (ew)(This document has been forwarded to the Court's finance office in Columbus and sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification, the prison cashier's office, and the Ohio Attorney General.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ISAAC J. CASTILE, III,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action 2:18-cv-226
Judge George C. Smith
Magistrate Judge Jolson

FRANKLIN COUNTY
SHERIFF, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AND ORDER
Plaintiff Isaac J. Castile, III, a pro se prisoner, brings this action against the Franklin
County Sheriff and “unknown agents/officers.” (See Doc. 1-1).

This matter is before the

undersigned for consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis
(Doc. 1) and the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is
GRANTED. Furthermore, having performed an initial screen and for the reasons that follow, it
is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.
I.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2) (Doc. 1), Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is required
to pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff’s

certified trust fund statement reveals that he has an insufficient amount to pay the full filing fee.
(Id.).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account at the
Chillicothe Correctional Institution is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial partial payment, 20% of the greater
of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust account or the average monthly balance
in the inmate trust account, for the six-months immediately preceding the filing of the
Complaint. After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of
the inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the
account exceeds $10.00 until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). Checks
should be made payable to Clerk, United States District Court and should be sent to:
Prisoner Accounts Receivable
260 U.S. Courthouse
85 Marconi Boulevard
Columbus, Ohio 43215
The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.
Consequently, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute his action without
prepayment of fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do
so as if the costs had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this
Order to Plaintiff and the prison cashier’s office. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a
copy of this Order to the Court’s financial office in Columbus.

2

II.

INITIAL SCREEN
a. Relevant Standard
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss the Complaint,

or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to set
forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In
reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe it in Plaintiff’s favor, accept all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). On the other hand, a
complaint that consists of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action” is insufficient. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Although pro se
complaints are to be construed liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “basic
pleading essentials” are still required. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
b. Plaintiff’s Complaint
Plaintiff alleges that he was taken from Chillicothe Correctional Institution (“CCI”) to
Franklin County Correctional Center (“FCCC”) on February 26, 2016. (Doc. 1-1 at PAGEID #:
12). Plaintiff asserts that his entire tank was punished on March 1, 2016, after a single individual
opted to “put his shirt over the light fixture to block the light.” (Id.). Plaintiff claims that, as a

3

result of the individual’s actions, “[t]he lieutenant put the whole tank on phone restriction and
television restriction for 24 hours.” (Id.).
Plaintiff states that, on March 2, 2016, he asked if he could call his lawyers concerning an
upcoming court hearing. (Id.). He also completed two inmate call cards that day—one to call
his lawyers and the other for a Bible. (Id. at PAGEID #: 13). Plaintiff asserts that he was not
permitted to make either call. (Id.).
The following day, on March 3, 2016, Plaintiff observed the phone was not in use, so he
called his brother “to handle some business for [him]” and to ask him to call his attorneys in
advance of a hearing scheduled for March 7, 2016. (Id.). Four inmates were playing cards
nearby. (Id.) One of these inmates allegedly had multiple interactions with Plaintiff in an effort
to use the phone. (Id. at PAGEID #: 13–14).
Plaintiff asserts that, although he agreed to (and indeed did) end his call, the inmate
nevertheless attacked him. (Id. at PAGEID #: 14). Plaintiff claims that he “never threw a single
punch,” but the inmate beat him until he was bloody and unconscious. (Id.). Plaintiff claims that
he suffered injuries to his head, face, teeth, and eyes, and was sent for inpatient treatment at
Grant Medical Center for approximately two days. (Id. at PAGEID #: 14–15).
Plaintiff asserts that, on March 4, 2016, he was released from Grant Medical Center back
to the FCCC, where he received inadequate medical treatment. (Id. at PAGEID #: 15). Plaintiff
states that he “sat in severe pain for at least a full week untreated, disoriented, and fading in and
out of consciousness.” (Id.). According to Plaintiff, FCCC administered him just three Motrin
(three times per day) for ten days. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that he questioned nurses repeatedly
concerning what he felt was inadequate medication, and he was told, to no avail, that they would
check into it. (Id. at PAGEID #: 17).

4

Plaintiff was taken to a follow-up appointment at Grant Medical Center on March 16,
2016. (Id. at PAGEID #: 15). Plaintiff alleges that his doctor continued his prescription for
Narco 1 but also “added ibuprofen to the prescription since FCCC doesn’t administer Narco.”
(Id. at PAGEID #: 17). Plaintiff states that “upon returning from Grant,” the FCCC doctor did
not see him despite being aware that he “still had severe headaches, head and facial swelling, and
Grant [had] continued his prescription.” (Id.). Plaintiff was returned to CCI on March 23, 2016.
(Id. at PAGEID #: 18).
The Complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and raises, inter alia, claims of
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health and safety in violation of his Eight Amendment rights
and unfair discipline in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. (See Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID
#: 23; see also generally Doc. 1-1). More specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the Franklin County
Sheriff and/or the FCCC (including their medical and other staff) “were derelict and negligent
from February 26–March 23, 2016” in the following ways:
a) In failing to hold a state prisoner safely upon return to court from a state
institution;
b) In operating an arbitrary policy, practice, or procedure of housing a state
prisoner who is returning to court with known, violent, recently sentenced
street culture thugs, or inmates with exceptionally dissimilar offenses;
c) In operating an arbitrary policy, practice, or procedure of executing mass
punishment, when there is a known singular offender;
d) In publishing a policy which states substantially that despite the punishment
of an inmate, calls to attorneys and clergy are allowable, yet having no
definitive policy, practice, or procedure for ensuring the effective operation of
the published policy;

1

Norco is a combination of acetaminophen and hydrocodone, an opioid pain reliever. See
http://www.drugs.com/norco.html (visited Mar. 29, 2018).

5

e) In failing to administer medication and treatment that was prescribed to me by
Grant Medical Center, and failing to at least administer reasonably similar
medication and treatment;
f) In failing to offer medically professional treatment and counseling after
physically seeing that the whole right side of my head and face were swollen
by more than an inch and seeing that my right eye was swollen shut over a
long period of time, and as such, showing deliberate indifference to my
serious and observable medical needs, even denying medication and treatment
that I continually asked for three times per day.
g) In operating a practice, policy, or procedure of using medical call cards to
document inmate medical needs and requests, yet having no definite practice,
policy, or procedure for ensuring that documented requests and needs are
timely and effectively executed on, which resulted in my attempts to resolve
these matters being taken as frivolous and ignorable;
h) In operating a practice, policy, or procedure that created and perpetuated an
environment without reasonable security, that led to unanswered violence and
deficient medical treatment, which resulted in … negative effects and
injuries…..
(Id. at PAGEID #: 19–20). Plaintiff makes clear that he is not pursuing any claims against the
Corrections Reception Center (“CRC”) or CCI. (Id. at PAGEID #: 21).
c. Discussion
“The statute of limitations applicable to a § 1983 action is determined by reference to
state law, while the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run is governed by federal
law.” Wheeler v. Dayton Police Dep’t, No. 12-4029, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 26373, *3 (6th Cir.
Mar. 15, 2013) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)); Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’t of
Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007)). The statute of limitations for a § 1983
civil action arising in Ohio is contained in Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.10, “which requires that
actions for bodily injury be filed within two years after their accrual.” Browning v. Pendleton,
869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989). “Ordinarily, such a period begins to run when the plaintiff
knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action.” See Wheeler, 2013

6

U.S. App. LEXIS 26373, *3–4 (citing Eidson, 510 F.3d at 635). In making this determination,
courts look to “what event should have alerted the typical lay person to protect his or her rights.”
Eidson, 510 F.3d at 635 (quotations and citations omitted).
Here, the Complaint was signed on March 12, 2018. (Doc. 1-1 at PAGEID #: 22). Thus,
events alleged to have occurred before March 12, 2016 would be untimely. See Boddie v.
Higginbotham, No. 2:14-CV-2395, 2016 WL 552696, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2016). The
present case arises from the alleged beating by an inmate on March 3, 2016. (Doc. 1-1 at
PAGEID #: 14). Consequently, Defendants’ alleged failure to keep Plaintiff safe, maintain a
safe environment, or properly house Plaintiff on that day are untimely.

Plaintiff’s claims

concerning “mass punishment when there is a known singular offender” and the alleged policy
concerning inmate calls are also untimely.
Plaintiff’s claims for deliberate indifference to his medical serious needs warrant separate
consideration. For these claims, the cause of action accrues when the prisoner is denied medical
care. Brookes v. Shank, No. 2:13-cv-516, 2014 WL 32306, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 6, 2014).
However, “[a]ctual actions ... of refusing medical care represent discrete unlawful actions
(beyond passive inaction) that trigger the statute of limitations.” Bruce v. Corr. Med. Servs.,
Inc., 389 F. App’x 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2010). As explained, claims based on alleged deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs that occurred before March 12, 2016, are
untimely.
The remaining question is, therefore, whether Plaintiff states a viable claim for alleged
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs between March 13, 2016 and March 23, 2016
(the end date for Plaintiff’s claims set forth in his Complaint). (Doc. 1-1 at PAGEID #: 19)
(stating that Defendants unlawful actions occurred between February 26, 2016 and March 23,

7

2016). Plaintiff complains that, although FCCC administered him some medication during this
timeframe, he did not receive the “Narco” prescribed to him at Grant Medical Center. (Id. at
PAGEID #: 15). Plaintiff also claims that he was not seen by the FCCC doctor and received
“[n]o ice, no real medicine, and no professional medical attention … at FCCC.” (Id. at PAGEID
#: 17–18).
To the extent that Plaintiff allegations are timely, Plaintiff’s claims are based on his
requests for a specific form of medical treatment. That is, he disagreed with FCCC providing
him with medication other than Narco. It is well established that a disagreement between prison
officials and an inmate as to a particular form of medical treatment will not give rise to a claim
under federal law. Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860, n.5 (6th Cir. 1976) (stating that where
a prisoner has received medical attention and the dispute is over the particular form of treatment
received, “federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to
constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law”). Thus, there is no constitutional violation
when an institution’s doctor changes a prescription from one pain medication to another. See,
e.g., Carter v. Troutt, 175 F. App’x 950, 950–51 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding a difference of opinion
and no constitutional violation where prison doctor changed prescription from one pain
medication to another); Lazarus v. Abilittif, No. 1:12-cv-1279, 2013 WL 1500658, at *4 (W.D.
Mich. Apr. 10, 2013) (“To the extent Plaintiff complains that he should have received Norco
instead of Ultram, he alleges only a ‘difference[ ] of opinion among medical personnel regarding
a patient’s appropriate treatment [that] do[es] not give rise to deliberate indifference.’”) (quoting
Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 261 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Further, Plaintiff’s complaint that an FCCC doctor should have provided him additional
treatment also constitutes a disagreement with a particular form of treatment. See, e.g., Kendrick

8

v. Collins, No. 2:09-CV-177, 2009 WL 1010636, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2009) (“The fact that
plaintiff’s demand for a particular procedure was not met is insufficient to give rise to a
constitutional violation.”). At bottom, Plaintiff does not allege facts to demonstrate that his
treatment was “so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.” Westlake, 537 F.2d
at 860, n. 5; see also Miller v. Calhoun, 408 F.3d 803, 820 (6th Cir. 2005) (“‘When the need for
treatment is obvious, medical care which is so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all may
amount to deliberate indifference.’”). Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged a viable Eighth Amendment
claim.
III.

CONCLUSION
“Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, when it appears clear on

initial screening of the complaint that action is time-barred, the complaint may be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Lowe v. Ohio, No. 1:18-cv-92, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27850, *5–6 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2018). Because it is clear on the face of the
Complaint that the claims alleged to have occurred before March 12, 2016 are untimely, the
Court RECOMMENDS that those claims be DISMISSED. Further, to the extent that Plaintiff
sets forth timely claims, the Court also RECOMMENDS that those claims be DISMISSED for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In sum, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED (Doc
1); however, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint in its
entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and the prison
cashier’s office. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Order to the Court’s

9

financial office in Columbus. Finally, the Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to
the Ohio Attorney General’s Office, 150 E. Gay St., 16th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215.
Procedure on Objections
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those
specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with
supporting authority for the objection(s).

A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further
evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: March 29, 2018

/s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

10