Heid et al v. Mohr et al

Filing 223

OPINION and ORDER - granting in part and denying in part 184 Motion for Leave to File, filed by James E. Damron; and granting in part and denying in part 216 Motion for Leave to File, filed by James E. Damron, Ray Scott Heid. Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Preston Deavers on March 24, 2022. (jlk)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
RAY SCOTT HEID, et al.,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:18-cv-311
Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

v.
GARY MOHR, et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of the Motion by Leave of Court to
Compel Defendants to Provide Adequate Responses to Discovery Request (ECF No. 184 (the
“Second Motion to Compel”)) and the Motion by Leave of Court to Supplement Plaintiffs’
Motion to Compel Defendants to Provide Adequate Responses to Discovery Request (ECF No.
216 (the “Third Motion to Compel”)). For the reasons stated herein, the Second Motion to
Compel (ECF No. 184) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART and the Third Motion
to Compel (ECF No. 216) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I.
This case has been pending for nearly four years, and is one of several cases Plaintiffs
have filed in this Court over the past thirteen years. See Heid, et al. v. Aderholt, et al., Case No.
2:20-cv-901, ECF No. 62 at PAGEID ## 710-711 (summarizing Plaintiffs’ history of litigation).
Here, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on April 9, 2018, and soon thereafter filed an Amended
Complaint on June 15, 2018. (ECF Nos. 1, 19.) On November 30, 2018, the Court permitted
Plaintiffs to file a Second Amended Complaint, which to date serves as the operative Complaint.

(ECF No. 37.) On December 11, 2018, Plaintiffs filed an Application for Injunctive Relief and
Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 38.) The Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order on December 18, 2018. (ECF No. 42.) The Court held a two-day
preliminary injunction hearing on January 11, 2019 and January 14, 2019. (ECF Nos. 58, 59.)
During the hearing, Plaintiffs presented arguments, answered direct questioning from the Court,
answered cross-examination from Defendants’ counsel, and conducted extensive crossexamination of certain Defendants and various witnesses. (Id.) On March 4, 2019, the Court
denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 57.)
Beginning in January 2020, Plaintiffs started serving various discovery requests upon
Defendants. (See ECF No. 160 at PAGEID # 2483.) The parties met and conferred regarding
those discovery requests throughout the first half of 2020. (Id.) On May 29, 2020, the Court
ordered that discovery must be completed on or before July 30, 2020, but noted that “[i]f
Defendants need additional time to complete discovery, the Court will entertain a motion for
extension of time.” (ECF No. 130.) On July 28, 2020, the Court granted an extension of the
discovery deadline until October 31, 2020. (ECF No. 135.) Then, in August 2020, the parties
filed a number of discovery-related motions, including a motion for protective order (by
Defendants), a motion to compel (by Plaintiffs), and a proposed deposition protocol (by
Plaintiffs). (ECF Nos. 138, 140, 141.) The parties then briefed these issues (and others)
throughout the second half of 2020. (ECF Nos. 143-145, 151-152, 154, 156.) On October 29,
2020, the Court extended the discovery deadline until December 30, 2020. (ECF No. 155.)
Then, on November 25, 2020, the Court ordered that it would “first resolve the pending
discovery motions, and then will permit additional discovery if appropriate.” (ECF No. 158.)

2

On March 31, 2021, the Court issued an Opinion and Order on the discovery-related
filings. (ECF No. 160.) Of note, the Court found that many of Plaintiffs’ discovery requests
were impermissible, as they were: (a) “personal questions that are unrelated to Defendants[’]
positions as Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”) employees but rather
seek their personal opinions and perspectives” (hereafter, “Personal Belief Requests”); (b)
“generalized in a manner such that it is impossible to either admit or deny” or “do not have a
definitive answer and the varying responses are heavily context dependent” (hereafter,
“Generalized or Hypothetical Requests”); or (c) sought confidential or irrelevant information,
including but not limited to information that “is vital to the institutional security of all ODRC
facilities and their operations” (hereafter, “Miscellaneous Requests”).
The Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order and ordered that “discovery
is limited to matters directly related to Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the alleged withholding of
purported religious materials, any alleged discrimination based on ODRC policies and
regulations, and the specific actions performed by Defendants related to the allegations contained
in Plaintiffs’ complaint.” (Id. at PAGEID # 2503.) The Court also found, however, that
Defendants inexplicably failed to respond to Plaintiffs’ remaining discovery requests, so the
Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to compel in part and ordered Defendants to respond. (Id. at
PAGEID ## 2499-2502.)
On June 28, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the (132-page) Second Motion to Compel, challenging
Defendants’ responses to approximately 201 discovery requests. (ECF No. 184.) On July 21,
2021, Defendants responded to the Second Motion to Compel, but only responded to the first 44
pages, leaving the last 88 pages of the Second Motion to Compel without any opposition. (ECF
No. 192.) Accordingly, on October 18, 2021, the Court directed Defendants to respond to the

3

last 88 pages of the Second Motion to Compel. (ECF No. 209.) On October 20, 2021,
Defendants filed a supplemental response to the last 88 pages of the Second Motion to Compel.1
(ECF No. 211.) Then, on December 1, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the (86-page) Third Motion to
Compel, challenging Defendants’ responses to approximately 135 discovery requests. (ECF No.
216.)
The Second Motion to Compel and Third Motion to Compel, which together constitute
218 pages and address approximately 336 discovery requests, are both fully briefed and ripe for
judicial review. (ECF Nos. 184, 192, 208, 211, 216-218.) The Court will discuss each of the
motions in turn.

1

The Court notes that Defendants’ supplemental response to the last 88 pages of the Second
Motion to Compel, which was prepared and filed in only two days, provides no guideposts to
help orient a reader, and is instead a twenty (20) page list of responses, leaving it up to the Court
to figure out which responses correspond to which requests. (ECF No. 211 at PAGEID ## 30933112.) The Court is underwhelmed by Defendants’ unhelpful approach to their supplemental
response – which they were not entitled to file without the Court’s order directing them to do so
– especially given the Court’s prior comments regarding Defendants’ consistently insouciant
behavior throughout discovery in this case. This reaction is only heightened by the fact that
Defendants filed their supplemental response twelve (12) days before the Court-ordered
deadline, which suggests to the Court that Defendants had ample time to draft their supplemental
response in a more thoughtful manner, but they chose not to, prioritizing expediency over regard
for the Court’s time and resources.
Also, upon closer review, the Court notes Defendants’ near-universal disregard for Local
Rule 26.1, which states in relevant part that “[p]arties responding or objecting to discovery
requests shall quote each such interrogatory or request in full immediately preceding the
statement of any answer, response, or objection thereto.” S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 26.1(a). The Court
is mindful of the burden that this litigation imposes on Defendants and the oppressive discovery
it has occasioned. But, that does not excuse Defendants from participating in the discovery
process in compliance with the applicable rules. To this end, Plaintiffs seek sanctions associated
with the subject briefing. (See ECF Nos. 184, 216.) The Court finds that Defendants’ actions do
not rise to that extreme level at this juncture, but the Court nevertheless ADMONISHES
Defendants that any further incumbrance of the discovery process may result in sanctions.
4

II.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 permits a party to file a motion for an order
compelling discovery if another party fails to respond to discovery requests, provided that the
motion to compel includes a certification that the movant has, in good faith, conferred or
attempted to confer with the party failing to respond to the requests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).
Here, the Court is satisfied that this prerequisite has been satisfied, as Plaintiffs have attached
correspondence demonstrating their efforts to resolve the discovery disputes in lieu of the subject
briefing. (See ECF No. 184-6 at PAGEID ## 2860-2871.)
Determining the scope of discovery is within the Court’s discretion. Bush v. Dictaphone
Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1998). Unless the court orders otherwise, the scope of
discovery is that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(1). The Court can, and indeed must, limit the frequency or extent of discovery “if it
determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be
obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii)
the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in
the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).”
Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. Hodges, No. 1:15-CV-00568, 2019 WL 13044827, at
*2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2019) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)). The Court also has discretion
to limit the scope of discovery by issuing protective orders, for good cause shown, forbidding the
requested discovery “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).

5

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant parties the right to “obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(1); see also Siriano v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., No. 2:14-CV-1131, 2015 WL 8259548,
at *5 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2015). “Relevance is construed very broadly for discovery purposes.”
Doe v. Ohio State Univ., No. 2:16-CV-171, 2018 WL 1373868, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 2018)
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Despite being construed broadly, the concept of
relevance is not unlimited. Averett v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., No. 2:07-cv-1167, 2009 WL
799638, at *2 (S.D. Ohio March 24, 2009). Indeed, “[t]o satisfy the discoverability standard, the
information sought must have more than minimal relevance to the claims or defenses.” Doe,
2018 WL 1373868 at *2 (citations omitted). Furthermore, when information is “negligibly
relevant [or] minimally important in resolving the issues” this will not satisfy the standard. Id.
(citation omitted).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(6), the requesting party may challenge the
sufficiency of an answer or objection to a request for admission. Under the Rule, “[u]nless the
court finds an objection justified, it must order that an answer be served,” and “[o]n finding that
an answer does not comply with this rule, the court may order either that the matter is admitted
or that an amended answer be served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(6). The requesting party bears the
burden of demonstrating that the responding party’s answers or objections were insufficient. See
Snyder v. Fleetwood RV, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-1019, 2016 WL 339972, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 28,
2016).
“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instruct district courts to limit discovery where
its ‘burden or expense . . . outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case,
the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the

6

litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.’” Surles ex rel.
Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting former Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)). This Court has previously held that “[t]hese factors are retained in
revised Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), reflecting ‘their original place in defining the scope of
discovery’” because “‘restoring proportionality’ is the touchstone of revised Rule 26(b)(1)’s
scope of discovery provisions.” Siriano, 2015 WL 8259548, at *5 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1)). In analyzing the extent of the burden on the producing party, the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit “has held that limiting the scope of discovery is appropriate when compliance
‘would prove unduly burdensome,’ not merely expensive or time-consuming.” Id. (citing Surles,
575 F.3d at 305) (emphasis in original).
III.
Applying the foregoing authority, the Court now considers in turn the pending motions,
which as discussed above implicate approximately 336 discovery requests. As a preliminary
matter, the Court notes that an overwhelming majority of the discovery requests at issue are
plainly inappropriate or beyond the scope of permissible discovery which the Court previously
set forth in its March 31, 2021 Opinion and Order:
[D]iscovery is limited to matters directly related to Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the
alleged withholding of purported religious materials, any alleged discrimination
based on ODRC policies and regulations, and the specific actions performed by
Defendants related to the allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ complaint.
(ECF No. 160 at PAGEID # 2503.) Many discovery requests also improperly seek duplicative
evidence that was produced and discussed at great length during the two-day preliminary
injunction hearing. Accordingly, it is neither practical nor necessary for the Court to discuss
each of the 336 discovery requests at issue. While the Court will discuss all of Plaintiffs’
discovery requests in general terms, the Court will only address individual requests as necessary.
7

A.

Second Motion to Compel (ECF No. 184)
1.

Defendant Norris’ responses to Plaintiffs’ interrogatories

The first subject of Plaintiffs’ Second Motion to Compel is Defendant Norris, as
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Norris improperly answered seventeen (17) interrogatories. (ECF
No. 184 at PAGEID ## 2603-2618.) Generally speaking, the interrogatories at issue seek
information related to the ODRC’s STG department; the religious and gang affiliations of
inmates; “religious volunteer visitors” in ODRC institutions; and the incendiary nature of
swastikas. (Id.; see also ECF No. 184-3 at PAGEID ## 2743-2747.) Defendant Norris
responded with various boilerplate objections, including that the requests were “[v]ague,
ambiguous, unlimited in time, scope or subject, overly broad, unduly burdensome, oppressive,
and call[] for unbounded discovery,” but also answered every single request over his objections.
(See ECF No. 184-3 at PAGEID ## 2743-2747.)
The Court finds Defendant Norris’ responses to the subject interrogatories to be
sufficient, and his objections appropriate. First, the Court agrees with Defendant Norris that
most of Plaintiffs’ interrogatories were inappropriately vague and overly broad, and also agrees
with Defendant Norris that many interrogatories seek information beyond Defendant Norris’
professional background and experience and beyond the scope of discovery set forth in the
Court’s prior decision. (ECF No. 160 at PAGEID # 2503.) To this end, the Court rejects
Plaintiffs’ argument (echoed dozens of times throughout the subject briefing) that Defendants,
simply due to their status as ODRC employees, are required to produce information that is within
the ODRC’s control pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(b)(1). (See, e.g., ECF No.
184 at PAGEID ## 2606-2607 (“Defendant is required by law to furnish the information
available from sources under the [ODRC’s] control . . . Defendant could have contacted the
ODRC’s department of Mental Health and requested the information from any of the numerous
8

psychiatrists/psychologists employed by the ODRC.”), PAGEID # 2608 (“Defendant could have
contacted the ODRC’s interdepartmental Religious Services office and spoke to the Religious
Service Administrator, Mike Davis, to obtain the information.”).)
Such arguments are not well taken, because the ODRC is not a named Defendant in this
action, and Plaintiffs have not served any discovery requests on the ODRC. Under Rule
33(b)(1), interrogatories must be answered “by the party to whom they are directed” or “if that
party is a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, or a governmental agency,
by any officer or agent, who must furnish the information available to the party.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
33(b)(1). Here, the named Defendants are all individuals. The Court, therefore, rejects
Plaintiffs’ arguments that Defendants are “required by law to furnish the information available
from sources under the [ODRC’s] control.” (ECF No. 184 at PAGEID # 2606.) The ODRC is
not the party to whom the discovery requests are directed; Defendants do not have any duty to
produce discovery beyond that which is within their own individual custody or control.2 This is
especially true here, where Plaintiffs affirmatively acknowledge that they knew how to seek such
information for themselves, and from whom, but they chose not to use the discovery tools

2

The Court notes that in the two cases upon which Plaintiffs relied in support of their argument,
the parties responding to discovery were an association and a corporation, and were therefore
subject to Rule 33(b)(1)(B). See Int’l Assoc. of Machinists, Dist. 169 v. Amana Refrigeration,
Inc., 90 F.R.D. 1, 2 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 1978) (“Rule 33(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
requires the plaintiff, as an “ * * * association, * * * ” to answer “ * * * by any officer or agent,
who shall furnish such information as is available to the party (i. e., to the labor organization). *
* * ”) (emphasis added); Firemen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Erie-Lackawanna R. Co., 35 F.R.D. 297, 299
(N.D. Ohio 1964) (“Plaintiff is here standing in the shoes of the F. E. Myers & Bros.
Company and will require the testimony of its insured-assignor in order to prove its claim. It is
this Court's opinion that under such circumstances plaintiff is obliged to secure such information
from its assignor as it can, in order to make response to defendant's interrogatories.”) (emphasis
added). Here, by contrast, the individual Defendants to whom discovery was served are only
subject to Rule 33(b)(1)(A). Doe v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty., No. 3:20-CV01023, 2021 WL 5882653, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 13, 2021) (“Rule 33(b)(1)(B) extends only to
corporate or governmental defendants, not to individuals.”).
9

available to them to do so. Plaintiffs instead ask the Court to compel Defendants to dig up such
information for them, but the Court will not countenance Plaintiffs’ strategic use of
interrogatories to this end. Simply put, Plaintiffs are not permitted to force Defendants to
conduct fishing expeditions (on Plaintiffs’ behalf) into every nook and cranny of the ODRC.
The Court also has no patience for Plaintiffs’ transparent effort to relitigate the
preliminary injunction hearing from January 2019. To this end, the Court agrees with
Defendants that “Plaintiffs already had more than an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery
at the January 11, 2019 and January 14, 2019 preliminary injunction hearing of this matter
during which they exhaustively questioned Defendants Gillum and Graves, along with other
prison officials, about the limited issues remaining in this case[.]” (ECF No. 192 at PAGEID #
2928.) Specifically, the transcript from the two-day preliminary injunction hearing (which totals
more than 300 pages) confirms that Plaintiffs elicited testimony regarding, and extensively
discussed, the “incendiary” nature of the swastika, its use by (and, accordingly, association with)
white supremacists in the prison context, and the context-specific nature of symbols that may be
considered security threats by the ODRC. (See ECF Nos. 58, 59.)
Against that backdrop, Plaintiffs nevertheless asked Defendant Norris to “identify the
reasons” why “all the books in ODRC libraries . . . with the swastika symbol on their front
covers” are not considered security threats. (See ECF No. 184-3 at PAGEID # 2747.) In
response, Defendant Norris properly objected to Plaintiffs’ request, and nevertheless responded
that books permitted by the ODRC “neither espouse, endorse, support, promote, nor advocate
white supremacy, white separatism, and/or Nazi beliefs.” (Id.) Defendant Norris’ answers to
these interrogatories are entirely consistent with the evidence from the preliminary injunction
hearing. Accordingly, the Court will not entertain Plaintiffs’ attempts to compel further

10

duplicative responses. For these reasons, having considered all of the interrogatories at issue, the
Court finds that the requests are outside the scope of discovery for this case, duplicative, and
only serve to harass Defendant Norris. Accordingly, the Second Motion to Compel (ECF No.
184) is DENIED as to Defendant Norris’ responses to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories.
2.

Defendant Graves’ response to Plaintiffs’ request for admissions

Plaintiffs next challenge Defendant Graves’ response to a request for admission that reads
as follows: “You oppose Christianity.” (ECF No. 184 at PAGEID # 2618.) This is obviously an
impermissible Personal Belief Request, which this Court already has already found is irrelevant
to Plaintiffs’ claims and only serves to harass Defendant Graves. (See ECF No. 160 at PAGEID
# 2490.) Accordingly, the Second Motion to Compel (ECF No. 184) is DENIED as to
Defendant Graves’ response to Plaintiffs’ Request for Admissions, Request No. 6.
3.

Defendants Gobel, Gillum, Norris, Clark, and Dolan’s responses to Plaintiff’s
requests for admissions

Next, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants Gobel, Gillum, Norris, Clark, and Dolan provided
“evasive” and “insufficient” responses to approximately one hundred and seven (107) requests
for admissions. (ECF No. 184 at PAGEID ## 2619-2677.) The Court will analyze the requests
to Defendant Gobel first, and then will discuss the remaining requests together, as they all suffer
from the same deficiencies.
Generally speaking, Plaintiffs’ requests for admissions to Defendant Gobel seek: (i)
admissions related to the ODRC conduct report protocol as applied to Plaintiffs in October 2015,
(ii) legal interpretations of ODRC policies, and (iii) Defendant Gobel’s personal beliefs
regarding how the ODRC views “the Aryan ethnicity,” what symbols are, and regarding how the
ODRC views “racially conscious white inmates.” (Id. at PAGEID ## 2619-2615.) These
requests are improper, however, as they do not serve the purpose of Federal Rule of Civil
11

Procedure 36. See Hendricks v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., No. 2:11-CV-40, 2012 WL
2075317, at *5 (S.D. Ohio June 8, 2012) (“Rule 36 is not a discovery device, and its proper use
is as a means of avoiding the necessity of proving issues which the requesting party will
doubtless be able to prove.”) (quoting Misco, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 784 F.2d 198, 205
(6th Cir. 1986)); Cogent Sols. Grp., LLC v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-665, 2013 WL 12121522, at *3
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 4, 2013) (“Requests for admissions . . . differ from other discovery tools
contemplated under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 36 is not a discovery device, and
its proper use is as a means of avoiding the necessity of proving issues which the requesting
party will doubtless be able to prove.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). These
requests also are beyond the scope of discovery set forth in the Court’s prior decision. (ECF No.
160 at PAGEID # 2503.)
While certain of Plaintiffs’ requests qualify as Personal Belief Requests or Legal
Conclusion Requests which are plainly outside the realm of permissible discovery, Plaintiffs’
remaining requests are conspicuously crafted for purposes of discovery rather than to eliminate
the necessity of proving facts that are not in substantial dispute. Such requests are improper.
Cogent Sols. Grp., LLC, 2013 WL 12121522, at *3 (“Courts in this Circuit have also found that
‘[a]dmissions sought under Rule 36 should not be of such great number and broad scope as to
cover all the issues of a complex case.’ Nor are they an appropriate means by which to seek
admissions of legal conclusion or opinion.”) (quoting Lantz v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 37 F.R.D. 69,
69 (N.D. Ohio 1963)); see also Hendricks, 2012 WL 2075317, at *5 (denying a motion to
compel regarding a request for admission that “does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 36(a) and more closely resembles an attempt to utilize Rule 36 as a general discovery
device.”); Quicken Loans v. Jolly, No. 2:07-cv-13143, 2007 WL 3408551, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich.

12

Nov. 15, 2007) (“[R]equests for admissions as to central facts in dispute are beyond the proper
scope of the rule. Such requests have consistently been held improper.”) (quoting Pickens v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 413 F.2d 1390, 1393 (5th Cir. 1969) (collecting cases)).
The Court finds the same problems with the requests for admissions directed to
Defendants Gillum, Norris, Clark, and Dolan. (See ECF No. 184 at PAGEID ## 2625-2677.)
These other requests for admissions are also well outside the bounds of Rule 36, as Plaintiffs
continued to assert Personal Belief Requests,3 Generalized or Hypothetical Requests,4 and Legal
Conclusion Requests5 that serve no purpose other than to harass Defendants. Many of Plaintiffs’
other requests also plainly appear to be crafted to relitigate the preliminary injunction from
January 2019, which as discussed above is inappropriate insofar as Plaintiffs seek to relitigate the
“incendiary” nature of the swastika, its use by (and, accordingly, association with) white
supremacists in the prison context, and the context-specific nature of symbols that may be

3

For example, Plaintiffs asked Defendant Gillum to admit that “[y]ou believe that White people
who desire to remain racially pure are white supremacists or otherwise STG affiliates,”
Defendant Norris to admit that “[i]t is your opinion that the Swastika has an appeal to AryanAmericans,” Defendant Clark to admit that “[a]n opinion that advocates violence is not the same
as steeling a person to act out violence,” and Defendant Dolan to admit that “American was
founded by and intended to be a nation for White people.” (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 184, 184-1 at
PAGEID ## 2633, 2639, 2651, 2277.) The Court notes that this list of examples is not
exhaustive, as many of Plaintiffs’ requests constituted improper Personal Belief Requests.
4

For example, Plaintiffs asked Defendant Gillum to admit that “[t]he Rastafarian religion
appeals to black people,” Defendant Norris to admit that “[t]oday people recognize many
different forms of Christianity,” Defendant Clark to admit that "[s]ymbols that are considered
STG identifiers are so labelled because they pose a risk to the safety and security of the
institution(s),” and Defendant Dolan to admit that “[t]he publication Mein Kampf has incited
others to cause violence within ODRC.” (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 184, 184-1 at PAGEID ## 2628,
2634, 2653, 2658.) The Court again notes that this list of examples is not exhaustive.

5

For example, Plaintiffs asked Defendant Clark to admit that “the STG procedure governed by
policy 310-SEC-12 [can] be arbitrarily used to unconstitutionally target and suppress religious
groups that hold ideologies prison officials find contrary to their political left wing extremist
agenda of mongrelization.” (See, e.g., ECF No. 184-1 at PAGEID # 2655.) The Court again
notes that this example is not exhaustive.
13

considered security threats by the ODRC, including but not limited to the six-pointed star. (See
ECF Nos. 58, 59.) And again, these requests are outside the scope of discovery as set forth by
the Court’s prior decision. (ECF No. 160 at PAGEID # 2503.)
Beyond these deficiencies, the Court also finds that Plaintiffs’ requests are either
completely irrelevant or improperly drafted as vehicles for discovery, placing them outside the
bounds of Rule 36. Cogent Sols. Grp., LLC, 2013 WL 12121522, at *3. As a final deficiency,
several more of Defendants’ requests are improperly served on Defendants Gobel, Gillum,
Norris, Clark, and Dolan as the information sought is outside the scope of the Defendants’
employment with the ODRC – or in the case of Defendant Dolan, who no longer works for the
ODRC, beyond his personal knowledge. To this end, the Court is satisfied with Defendants’
attestations that they made reasonable efforts to respond to Plaintiffs’ requests where
appropriate. (See, e.g., ECF No. 184-5 at PAGEID ## 2798-2810 (Defendant Dolan’s response
that “he lacks knowledge and information sufficient to admit or deny [the requests] after making
a reasonable inquiry and the information he knows or can readily obtain is insufficient to enable
him to admit or deny.”).) See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4) (“The answering party may assert lack of
knowledge or information as a reason for failing to admit or deny only if the party states that it
has made reasonable inquiry and that the information it knows or can readily obtain is
insufficient to enable it to admit or deny.”).
As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Defendants’
responses were insufficient. Snyder, 2016 WL 339972, at *7 (“As the movant, Ms. Snyder bears
the burden of demonstrating that Fleetwood's answers or objections were insufficient.”).
Accordingly, the Second Motion to Compel (ECF No. 184) is DENIED as to Defendants Gobel,
Gillum, Norris, Clark, and Dolan’s responses to Plaintiffs’ Request for Admissions.

14

4.

Defendant Clark’s responses to Plaintiffs’ interrogatories

Plaintiffs’ next argument is that Defendant Clark provided “insufficient” responses to
twenty-five interrogatories. (ECF No. 184-1 at PAGEID ## 2677-2695.) Generally speaking,
the interrogatories at issue seek various definitions and statistical information, and seek
information to challenge that certain literature has resulted in violence. (Id.; see also ECF No.
184-5 at PAGEID ## 2817-2821.) In response to these interrogatories, Defendant Clark
provided a number of objections, but nevertheless provided answers where appropriate. (See
ECF No. ECF No. 184 at PAGEID ## 2824-2834.)
Upon review of Defendant Clark’s responses and objections, the Court will not compel
Defendant Clark to revisit any of the interrogatories. Defendant Clark noted that he “is no longer
employed by ODRC,” and thus was limited to his memory for purposes of responding to the
interrogatories. (Id.) That obstacle notwithstanding, Defendant Clark still appears to have made
reasonable inquiries in an attempt to respond to the interrogatories, and repeatedly invoked
Defendant Graves’ testimony from the preliminary injunction hearing, specifically that he had
seen “violence escalate, or potential violence escalate, from inmates having symbols such as
swastikas.” (Id.; see also ECF No. 58 at PAGEID # 1485.) Beyond the responses Defendant
Clark provided, the Court finds his objections to be well taken and will not compel him to
respond to irrelevant Plaintiffs’ Personal Belief Requests (including, for example, interrogatories
which ask him to define certain words) and Plaintiffs’ other interrogatories which only serve to
harass Defendant Clark. Accordingly, the Second Motion to Compel (ECF No. 184) is DENIED
as to Defendant Clark’s responses to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories.
5.

Defendants’ responses to Plaintiffs’ requests for the production of documents

Plaintiffs’ final argument in the Second Motion to Compel is that Defendants provided
“insufficient” responses to fifty-one (51) requests for the production of documents (“RFPs”).
15

(ECF No. 184 at PAGEID ## 2695-2725.) With limited exceptions, however, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs’ RFPs exceed the bounds of permissible discovery, as Plaintiffs again submitted
impermissible Generalized Requests6 and requests for information that is plainly protected by the
attorney-client privilege and/or the work product privileges.7
Beyond these facially impermissible requests, Plaintiffs also sought a litany of “statistical
data” regarding various racial and religious groups, to which Defendants responded that the
“ODRC maintains no such statistical records in its possession, custody or control.” (See ECF
No. 184-6 at PAGEID ## 2844-2848, 2851-2852 (Request Nos. 23, 26-27, 34-36, 38-39, 5055).) To this end, Defendants cannot produce documents which do not exist. Tolliver v. Liberty
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-00904, 2008 WL 4951792, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2008) (“A
party cannot be compelled to produce documents which do not exist or which it does not possess
or control.”) (collecting cases). But even where such statistical data may exist, the Court agrees
with Defendants that inmates’ personal information is confidential and it would be unduly
burdensome for Defendants to account for “every single inmate” over the relevant time period.
(See ECF No. 211 at PAGEID ## 3103-3107, 3110-3112 (Request Nos. 8-28, 43-44, 50, 52-55).)
The Court also notes that many of Plaintiffs’ requests are simply irrelevant, as they seek
the production of statistical information regarding groups of people or religions which have not
been classified as STGs, including (in no particular order) Judaism, Black Hebrew Israelites, the

6

For example, Plaintiffs sought “statistical data of percentage of White inmates vis-à-vis black
inmates who have ‘refused lock’ (check-in) in violation of rule 5120-9-06(C)(23) at RCI during
2015 to 2018 AD, as may be maintained under . . . .” (See, e.g., ECF No. 184-2 at PAGEID #
2703.) The Court notes that this is not exhaustive of Plaintiffs’ Generalized Requests.

7

For example, Plaintiffs requested “communications from legal services to RCI religious
personnel regarding the removal of Christian Separatist Church Society (CSCS) religious
materials from the chapel between April 2015 and September 2015 AD.” (See, e.g., ECF No.
184-2 at PAGEID # 2703.) The Court again notes that this example is not exhaustive.
16

Nation of Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Moorish Science Temple of American, Muslims,
Rastafarians, Spanish Catholics, the African Cultural Organization, the NAACP, white inmates,
black inmates, minority inmates. (See generally ECF No. 184-6 at PAGEID ## 2695-2725.)
Plaintiffs argue that such information is necessary to support thier RLUIPA claim, but the Court
disagrees. Plaintiffs do not seek evidence of alternative means of satisfying Plaintiffs’ request to
practice Christian Separatism. They seek a complete accounting of “violence occurring at all
level-3 institutions” in the State of Ohio and the conduct reports associated with such violence.
Such requests are too far astray from the factual or legal issues in this case, and are again beyond
the scope of discovery as set forth by the Court’s prior decision. (ECF No. 160 at PAGEID #
2503.)
This is not to say, however, that all of Plaintiffs’ RFPs are impermissible. Indeed,
Defendants concede that six RFPS – specifically, Request Nos. 4-7, 37, and 45 – are relevant and
seek information that may exist, and Defendants state over objections that they will produce the
requested documents to the extent they exist and are not protected by either the attorneyclient/work product privileges and/or the prison’s confidential security protocols. (See ECF No.
184-6 at PAGEID ## 2839-2840, 2847, 2850.) It is unclear to the Court whether Defendants
have produced any documents in response to these RFPs. Accordingly, for the sake of clarity,
the Third Motion to Compel (ECF No. 216) is GRANTED IN PART as to Request Nos. 4-7,
37, and 45 of Plaintiffs’ RFPs, and DENIED IN PART as to the remainder of Plaintiffs’ RFPs.
Accordingly, having considered all of the discovery requests at issue, the Second Motion
to Compel (ECF No. 184) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as to Defendants’
responses to Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents.

17

B.

Third Motion to Compel (ECF No. 216)
1.

Defendant Graves’ responses to Plaintiff Heid’s interrogatories

Plaintiffs’ first argument in the Third Motion to Compel is that Defendant Graves
provided “evasive” responses to twenty-three (23) interrogatories. (ECF No. 216 at PAGEID ##
3130-3149.) Generally speaking, the interrogatories at issue seek statistical information, legal
opinions, explanations regarding the ODRC’s view of certain symbols (including the swastika)
and certain types of people, and explanations regarding the motivating factors of actions related
to Plaintiffs’ claims. (Id.; see also ECF No. 216-1.) In response to these interrogatories,
Defendant Graves provided a number of objections, but nevertheless provided answers where
appropriate. (See ECF No. 216-1.)
Upon review of all of Defendant Graves’ responses and objections, the Court will not
compel Defendant Graves to revisit any of the interrogatories. The Court is satisfied with his
responses to nearly all of the interrogatories, and finds that although Defendant Graves was not
responsive to Request Nos. 19-21, those requests are duplicative of Plaintiffs’ cross-examination
of Defendant Graves during the January 11, 2021 preliminary injunction hearing. Specifically,
while Request Nos. 19-21 seek information regarding “the decision to ascribe Plaintiffs as an
STG affiliate,” Defendant Graves already provided extensive testimony, under oath, on these
issues. (See ECF No. 58 at PAGEID ## 1470-1478.) During the preliminary injunction hearing,
Defendant Graves explained the ODRC’s protocol for identifying STG affiliates, and testified
that Plaintiff Damron was identified as an STG affiliate following an interview, during which
Plaintiff Damron “probably told [Defendant Graves] he did believe in separatism,” and following
a tattoo check which identified STG symbols. (Id. at PAGEID # 1475.) Defendant Graves also
testified that Plaintiff Heid was identified as an STG affiliate because he “pretty much admitted .
. . the same thing that [Plaintiff] Damron did,” and because a tattoo check revealed STG
18

identifiers on his hand. (Id. at PAGEID # 1478.) Because Defendant Graves already has
addressed both the protocol and motivations behind “the decision to ascribe Plaintiffs as an STG
affiliate,” the Court need not compel further responses to Request Nos. 19-21.
The parties also dispute the burden associated with responding to Request No. 16, which
asks Defendant Graves to “[i]dentify any White adherents of the Hindu faith within ODRC
between 2014-2018AD.” (ECF No. 216 at PAGEID # 3141; ECF No. 218 at PAGEID ## 33773378; ECF No. 221 at PAGEID ## 3406-3407.) Upon review of the briefing, the Court finds
that Defendant Graves has met his burden of demonstrating that responding to Request No. 16
would be unduly burdensome, as doing so would require Defendant Graves to “cull through
hundreds of thousands of inmate records between 2014-2018 and not only determine who among
more than 250,000 inmates self-identified as [Hindu], but also who among them also selfidentified as being a member of a particular race.” (ECF No. 218 at PAGEID # 3378.) This is
an unreasonable demand of Defendant Graves and not proportional to the needs of this case,
especially given the minimal (if any) benefit that would result.
Accordingly, the Third Motion to Compel (ECF No. 216) is DENIED as to Defendant
Graves’ responses to Plaintiff Heid’s Interrogatories.
2.

Defendant Dolan’s responses to Plaintiff Heid’s interrogatories

Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant Dolan provided “evasive” responses to twenty-two
(22) interrogatories. (ECF No. 216 at PAGEID ## 3149-3164.) Generally speaking, the
interrogatories at issue seek information related to various screening decisions and the security
concerns and/or measures associated with various groups, including white separatists, and
various symbols, including the swastika. (Id.) In response to these interrogatories, Defendant
Dolan provided a number of objections, but nevertheless provided answers to the best of his
memory. (See ECF No. 216-2.) As Defendant Dolan noted, however, he “is no longer employed
19

by ODRC” and accordingly was limited to his memory for purposes of responding. (Id.) The
Court notes, however, that Defendant Dolan repeatedly responded that “he does recall that the
Publication Screening Committee voted to exclude [the publications at issue in this lawsuit]
because they were inflammatory, explicitly advocated for the use of violence to systemically
and. persistently suppress doctrines with which they disagreed, were not conducive to
rehabilitation, and were likely to lead to violence.” (Id.) In the subject briefing, Plaintiffs
repeatedly characterize Defendant Dolan’s response as “a blatant lie and misrepresentation,” and
turn away from the discovery dispute to argue the merits of their claims. (See ECF No. 216 at
PAGEID ## 3149-3164.) The merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, however, are not at issue here, as the
Court is instead tasked with determining whether Defendant Dolan’s responses were sufficient.
And here the Court finds that Defendant Dolan’s responses were sufficient, even if Plaintiff may
not like them. Accordingly, the Third Motion to Compel (ECF No. 216) is DENIED as to
Defendant Dolan’s responses to Plaintiff Heid’s Interrogatories.
3.

Defendant Williams’ responses to Plaintiff Heid’s interrogatories

Plaintiffs next argue that Defendant Williams provided “evasive” responses to sixteen
(16) interrogatories. (ECF No. 216 at PAGEID ## 3164-3173.) Generally speaking, the
interrogatories at issue seek information related to religious CDs, certain literature within the
ODRC library network, the definitions of various terms, and ODRC protocol regarding
swastikas. (Id.) Like the other Defendants, Defendant Williams asserted a number of objections,
but nevertheless answered Plaintiff Heid’s interrogatories to the extent she could. (See ECF No.
216-3.) To this end, the Court agrees that most of Plaintiff Heid’s interrogatories were
improperly submitted to Defendant Williams, as she correctly noted that she “is not an attorney
or the Religious Services Administrator, nor is she the [Deputy Warden of Special Services] or
the STG Coordinator,” and therefore was not equipped to answer a majority of Plaintiff Heid’s
20

interrogatories. (Id.) Because Defendant Williams served as the Deputy Warden of Special
Services from 2011-2016, she was able to adequately respond to some of Plaintiffs’ inquiries to
the extent she had personal knowledge. (Id.)
Beyond Defendant Williams’ responses, the Court also finds her objections to be well
taken and will not compel her to respond to irrelevant Personal Belief Requests (including, for
example, interrogatories which ask her to define certain words) or Legal Conclusions Requests
(including, for example, interrogatories which ask her to identify what constitutes “religious
exercise” and/or the infringement of Constitutional rights) which serve no purpose other than to
harass her. Accordingly, the Third Motion to Compel (ECF No. 216) is DENIED as to
Defendant Williams’ responses to Plaintiff Heid’s Interrogatories.
4.

Defendants Norris and Gobel’s responses to Plaintiff Heid’s interrogatories

Plaintiffs next argue that Defendant Norris provided “evasive” and “completely
irresponsive” answers to twenty-four (24) interrogatories, and that Defendant Gobel has “failed
to provide any response” to twenty-five (25) interrogatories. (ECF No. 216 at PAGEID ## 31733193.) With regard to Defendant Gobel’s interrogatories, Defendants concede that they cannot
find evidence that they served Defendant Gobel’s responses to Plaintiffs, and they state that
“[u]ntil now [they] had not been apprised that Mr. Gobel’s interrogatory responses had not been
received by Plaintiffs.” (ECF No. 218 at PAGEID # 3388.) Regardless, Defendants indicate that
“in case Plaintiffs did not previously receive copies of Mr. Gobel’s executed responses,
[Defendants] will have them reissued.” (Id.) 8
8

In their Reply brief, Plaintiffs take issue with Defendants’ position that they “had not been
apprised,” and Plaintiffs correctly point to a meet and confer letter, dated June 16, 2021, in which
Plaintiffs wrote that “[t]o date no responses were provided regarding Interrogatories sent to
Defendant Gobel.” (ECF No. 221 at PAGEID # 3415 (citing ECF No. 216-6 at PAGEID #
3326).) Plaintiffs also state that “[s]imply put, defense counsel is a liar and the Truth is not in
her.” (ECF No. 221 at PAGEID # 3415.) Plaintiffs already have been warned by the Court
21

Upon closer review of Defendant Norris’ responses and objections, the Court believes
that Defendant Norris only properly responded to Request Nos. 1-4, and that Defendant Norris’
responses to Request Nos. 5-25 are instead responsive to the interrogatories directed to
Defendant Gobel, as summarized below:
Interrogatory to Defendant
Norris:
Request No. 5: Identify any
security concern between
2012-2018 AD caused to the
ODRC by the Plaintiffs’
individual use to the swastika.
Request No. 6: Identify any
instance between 2012present where Plaintiffs have
used the swastika to violate
any section of AR 5120-9-37
(B)(1-5). (Please note, this
request is asking for an
instance in which the
Plaintiffs specifically used the
swastika for one of those
purposes; not the instance in
which ODRC officials have
assigned the Plaintiffs’ use of
the swastika to one of those
purposes for simply using the
swastika.).
Request No. 7: Identify any
security concern within
ODRC between 2012-2018
AD caused by the use of
library books which display
the swastika.

Interrogatory to Defendant
Gobel:
Request No. 5: Describe why
you found both words “Blood
and Honor” and the symbols
of lightning bolts was used in
a White Supremacy context
by Plaintiff Heid.
Request No. 6: Describe why
you found Plaintiff Heid's
ethno-religious use of the
swastika, the words “Blood
and Honor,” the Roman
Salute, and the lightning bolts
warranted a Rule 17
conviction.

Defendant Norris’
response:
Subject to the foregoing
objections: In a prison, use of
the swastika, Roman salute,
lightning bolts, and/or the
words “blood and honor” are
inherently inflammatory.
Subject to the foregoing
objections: In a prison, use of
the swastika, Roman salute,
lightning bolts, and/or the
words “blood and honor” are
inherently inflammatory.

Request No. 7: Describe why
you did not believe Plaintiff
Heid’s use of the swastika,
the words 'Blood and Honor,'
the Roman Salute, and the
lightning bolts were part of

Subject to the foregoing
objections: In a prison, use of
the swastika, Roman salute,
lightning bolts, and/or the
words “blood and honor” are
inherently inflammatory.

about their inflammatory language and unwarranted personal attacks. (See ECF No. 160 at
PAGEID ## 2504-2505.) The Court therefore CAUTIONS Plaintiffs, for the last time, that
future ad hominem attacks will not be tolerated, and may subject Plaintiffs to sanctions. See S.D.
Ohio Civ. R. Introductory Statement on Civility (“An opposing litigant, a lawyer who represents
that litigant, or a Judge who decides an issue has not thereby forfeited the right to be treated with
common courtesy.”).
22

Interrogatory to Defendant
Norris:

Request No. 8: Identify how
long the books, as identified
in Plaintiffs’ exhibit-198,
have been made available in
the RCI main library.

Request No. 9: Identify any
security concern within
ODRC between 2012-2018
AD caused by Plaintiffs’ use
of “Mein Kampf: The Ford
Translation.”

Request No. 10: Identify any
Hispanic gangs profiled
within ODRC.

Request No. 11: Identify any
Hispanic gangs profiled
within ODRC that use the six
pointed star in any context.

Interrogatory to Defendant
Gobel:
his ethno-religious
expressions.
Request No. 8: Describe any
context within ODRC where
a White person can use the
swastika, the words “Blood
and Honor,” the Roman
Salute, and the lightning bolts
as part of their culture
without being classified as an
STG affiliate or part of an
unauthorized group.
Request No. 9: Describe a
scenario within ODRC where
an Aryan American person
can use the swastika, the
words “Blood and Honor,”
the Roman Salute, and the
lightning bolts in an ethnic
context without being
classified as an STG affiliate
or part of an unauthorized
group.
Request No. 10: Describe a
scenario within ODRC where
an Aryan American person
can use the swastika, the
words “Blood and Honor,”
the Roman Salute, and the
lightning bolts in a religious
context without being
classified as an STG affiliate
or part of an unauthorized
group.
Request No. 11: Describe
why the words “Blood and
Honor” receive protection
under ODRC policies when
attached to the publication,
“Blood and Honor” by
W.E.B. Griffin (see Ex. 200), as found in RCI’s
library, but is characterized as
participating in a “White
23

Defendant Norris’
response:

Subject to the foregoing
objections: In a prison, use of
the swastika, Roman salute,
lightning bolts, and/or the
words “blood and honor” are
inherently inflammatory.

Subject to the foregoing
objections: In a prison, use of
the swastika, Roman salute,
lightning bolts, and/or the
words “blood and honor” are
inherently inflammatory.

Subject to the foregoing
objections: In a prison, use of
the swastika, Roman salute,
lightning bolts, and/or the
words “blood and honor” are
inherently inflammatory.

Subject to the foregoing
objections: Although in a
prison the use of the swastika,
Roman salute, lightning bolts,
and/or the words “blood and
honor” are inherently
inflammatory, the book
Blood and Honor written by
W.E.B. Griffin does not
glorify Hitler, Aryans, or the

Interrogatory to Defendant
Norris:

Interrogatory to Defendant
Gobel:
Supremacy” group when used
by pro Aryan American
publications.

Request No. 12: Identify if
any members of the Hispanic
Catholic sect use the six
pointed star.

Request No. 12: Describe
how an inmate’s due process
rights may be violated where
they are denied a meaningful
opportunity to present a
defense [to a] charged
conduct offense that has
Constitutional implications,
such as being punished for
ethnic expressions.

Request No. 13: Identify if
any members of the Hispanic
Catholic sect are gang
profiled.

Request No. 13: Describe the
opportunity afforded Plaintiff
Heid to establish a defense to
hearing of conduct report
RCI-15-8328.

Request No. 14: Identify the
person whose handwriting
appears on the Truth
Ministries, CSCS of Ohio's
mailing list as on the Court
record at Doc.68-3, Pg.ID:
1645-46.
Request No. 15: Describe
how the prison STG policy
can be Constitutional but
unconstitutionally applied to
an obscure religious sect.

Request No. 14: Describe
why the drawing central to
the issue of conduct report
RCI-15-8328 was not
withheld pursuant to AR
5120-9-19.

Defendant Norris’
response:
Third Reich. Instead, it
roundly vilifies them and
ends in their inglorious
humiliation and defeat.
Subject to the foregoing
objections: At a hearing
officer’s discretion, a conduct
report may be heard by the
hearing officer or referred to
the Rules Infraction Board.
Moreover, if the conduct
report is resolved by the
hearing officer, the Rules
Infraction Board Chairman
will review the decision.
Subject to the foregoing
objections: When a conduct
report is heard by a hearing
officer, the inmate is provided
an opportunity to present his
or her defense. Furthermore,
if the conduct report is
resolved by the hearing
officer rather than being
referred to the Rules
Infraction Board, the rules
Infraction Board Chairman
will review the decision.
Subject to the foregoing
objections: RC 5120-9-19
applies to publications.

Request No. 15: Describe
Subject to the foregoing
why the withholding
objections: RC 5120-9-19
procedures of AR 5120-9-19 applies to publications.
were not made available to
Plaintiff Heid in the
withholding of his hand
drawn birthday card central to
the issue of conduct report
RCI-15-8328.
24

Interrogatory to Defendant
Norris:
Request No. 16: Identify any
communications you were
part of regarding Plaintiffs
and the CS faith between
2012-2018 AD.

Interrogatory to Defendant
Gobel:
Request No. 16: Describe the
rule violation(s) and/or
permissibility of an inmate to
make a drawing of the cover
of a book which was
permitted [by] the prison’s
screening provisions.
Request No. 17: Identify any Request No. 17: Identify
participation you took in
ODRC’s position on conduct
removing the CS religious
that appeals to Aryan
literature from the RCI chapel Americans.
library in 2015 AD.
Request No. 18: Identify any Request No. 18: Identify
participation you had in the
ODRC’s position on content
removal of Plaintiffs’
whose rhetoric emphasizes
personal religious/political
the positive aspects of
literature at issue in this
National Socialist Germany.
lawsuit.

Defendant Norris’
response:
Subject to the foregoing
objections: RC 5120-9-19
applies to publications.

Subject to the foregoing
objections: Defendant cannot
formulate a response to such
an unbounded hypothetical.

Subject to the foregoing
objections: Since in a prison
the use of such things as the
swastika, Roman salute,
lightning bolts, and/or the
words “blood and honor” are
inherently inflammatory,
there are no positive aspects
of National Socialist
Germany.
Request No. 19: Define what Request No. 19: Describe if
Subject to the foregoing
“white supremacy” means as your decision to find Plaintiff objections: Not only are
used by ODRC.
Heid guilty of conduct report Defendant’s personal beliefs
RCI-15-8328 was influenced irrelevant, but also in a prison
by any political beliefs which environment, the use of the
oppose the existence of White swastika, Roman salute,
national/government.
lightning bolts, and/or the
words “blood and honor” are
inherently inflammatory.
Request No. 20: Define what Request No. 20: Describe if
Subject to the foregoing
“white separatism” means as your decision to find Plaintiff objections: Not only are
used by ODRC.
Heid guilty of conduct report Defendant’s personal beliefs
RCI-15-8328 was influenced irrelevant, but also in a prison
by any religious beliefs that
environment, the use of the
are in opposition to the
swastika, Roman salute,
Christian Separatist (“CS”)
lightning bolts, and/or the
faith.
words “blood and honor” are
inherently inflammatory.
Request No. 21: Identify any Request No. 21: Describe if
Subject to the foregoing
exemptions to the ODRC's
your decision to find Plaintiff objections: Not only are
STG classifications of “White Heid guilty of conduct report Defendant’s personal beliefs
Supremacist” or “White
RCI-15-8328 was influenced irrelevant, but also in a prison
25

Interrogatory to Defendant
Norris:
Separatist” that exist for
members of Aryan ethnicity.

Interrogatory to Defendant
Gobel:
by any adverse beliefs about
racial purity.

Request No. 22: In carrying
out your job duties have you
ever used personal
religious/racial/political
beliefs to suppress and/or
oppress any aspect of the
Aryan American ethnic
group.

Request No. 22: Describe if
your decision to find Plaintiff
Heid guilty of conduct report
RCI-15-8328 was influenced
by any political beliefs which
oppose the existence of the
Theocratic Republic.

Request No. 23: In carrying
out your job duties have you
ever used personal
religious/racial/political
beliefs to suppress and/or
oppress any aspect of the
Christian Separatist faith.

Request No. 23: Identify
ODRC’s position on
Plaintiffs beliefs which
promotes racial purity.

Request No. 24: Describe the
ODRC’s STG protocols when
encountering Aryan
Americans within ODRC.

Request No. 24: In carrying
out your job duties have you
ever used personal
religious/racial/political
beliefs to suppress and/or
oppress any aspect of the
religious teachings of the CS
faith.

Request No. 25: Identify how
the STG classifications are
not overly broad when it
comes to Aryan Americans
under ODRC’s custody

Request No. 25: In carrying
out your job duties have you
ever used personal
religious/racial/political
beliefs to suppress and/or
oppress any aspect of Aryan
American culture.

26

Defendant Norris’
response:
environment, the use of the
swastika, Roman salute,
lightning bolts, and/or the
words “blood and honor” are
inherently inflammatory.
Subject to the foregoing
objections: Not only are
Defendant’s personal beliefs
irrelevant, but also in a prison
environment, the use of the
swastika, Roman salute,
lightning bolts, and/or the
words “blood and honor” are
inherently inflammatory.
Subject to the foregoing
objections: Although Plaintiff
may believe whatever he
chooses to believe, in a prison
environment, the use of the
swastika, Roman salute,
lightning bolts, and/or the
words “blood and honor” are
inherently inflammatory.
Subject to the foregoing
objections: Not only are
Defendant’s personal beliefs
irrelevant, but also in a prison
environment, the use of the
swastika, Roman salute,
lightning bolts, and/or the
words “blood and honor” are
inherently inflammatory.
Subject to the foregoing
objections: Not only are
Defendant’s personal beliefs
irrelevant, but also in a prison
environment, the use of the
swastika, Roman salute,
lightning bolts, and/or the
words “blood and honor” are
inherently inflammatory.

(ECF No. 216 at PAGEID ## 3173-3193.) Indeed, it appears to the Court that Defendant
Gobel’s responses were inadvertently “copy and pasted” into Defendant Norris’ responses. As a
result, neither Defendant Norris nor Defendant Gobel has properly responded to Plaintiffs’
interrogatories. Accordingly, the Third Motion to Compel (ECF No. 216) is GRANTED as to
Defendant Norris and Defendant Gobel’s responses to Plaintiff Heid’s Interrogatories.
5.

Defendant Graves’ responses to Plaintiff Damron’s interrogatories

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Graves also has “failed to provide any response”
to twenty-five (25) interrogatories served by Plaintiff Damron. (ECF No. 216 at PAGEID ##
3193-3205.) In response, Defendants maintain that they served Defendant Graves’ responses on
May 28, 2021, but state that “in case Plaintiffs did not previously receive copies of Mr. Graves’
executed responses, [Defendants’ counsel] will have them reissued.” (ECF No. 218 at PAGEID
# 3388.) It is unclear to the Court whether Defendants have forwarded Defendant Graves’
responses to Plaintiffs. Accordingly, for the sake of clarity, the Third Motion to Compel (ECF
No. 216) is GRANTED as to Defendant Graves’ responses to Plaintiff Damron’s Interrogatories
to the extent he has not already re-served them.
IV.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Motion by Leave of Court to Compel
Defendants to Provide Adequate Responses to Discovery Request, ECF No. 184, is GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the Motion is GRANTED as to Request Nos.
4-7, 37, and 45 of Plaintiffs’ requests for the production of documents to the extent responses
have not already been provided, and DENIED IN PART as to the remainder of Plaintiffs’
discovery requests. Defendants are DIRECTED to respond to Request Nos. 4-7, 37, and 45 of
Plaintiffs’ requests for the production of documents by APRIL 30, 2022. Defendants shall serve
their response and shall file proof of service to the Court docket within SEVEN (7) DAYS of
27

service.
Additionally, the Motion by Leave of Court to Supplement Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel
Defendants to Provide Adequate Responses to Discovery Request, ECF No. 216, also is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the Motion is GRANTED as to
Defendant Norris’ responses to Plaintiff Heid’s Interrogatories, Defendant Gobel’s responses to
Plaintiff Heid’s Interrogatories, and Defendant Graves’ responses to Plaintiff Damron’s
Interrogatories, and it is DENIED as to the remaining interrogatories. Defendants Norris, Gobel,
and Graves are DIRECTED to respond to Plaintiffs’ interrogatories by APRIL 30, 2022.
Defendants Norris, Gobel, and Graves shall serve their responses and shall file proof of service
to the Court docket within SEVEN (7) DAYS of service.
As noted in the Court’s October 18, 2021, the discovery deadline in this case passed on
July 1, 2021. (ECF No. 209.) Except for as set forth above, the Court finds no reason to extend
the discovery deadline again. Accordingly, the parties are NOT to engage in any new or
additional discovery. The Court will set a dispositive motion briefing schedule by separate
order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: March 24, 2022

/s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers_________
ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

28