Barnhardt v. Warden, North Central Correctional Complex
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING Petitioner's 16 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Sarah D. Morrison on 2/16/2021. (tb)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
RICHARD BARNHARDT, JR.,
CASE NO. 2:20-CV-3330
JUDGE SARAH D. MORRISON
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers
WARDEN, NORTH CENTRAL
OPINION AND ORDER
On January 25, 2021, Judgment was entered dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 15.) Petitioner has filed a Motion for
Reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 16.)
For the reasons that follow, Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 16) is DENIED.
Petitioner contends that reconsideration of final Judgment of dismissal is warranted
because the Court improperly dismissed his claims as procedurally defaulted and he is the victim
of a manifest miscarriage of justice.
Rule 59(e) provides that a motion to alter or amend judgment may be filed within 28 days
of the entry of judgment based on “(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an
intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.” CitiMortgage,
Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00680, 2015 WL 1000444, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2015 ) (quoting Intern
Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir. 2005)). “The Rule gives a district court the
chance ‘to rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately following’ its decision.” Banister
v. Davis, -- U.S. --, --, 140 S. Ct. 1698, 1703 (2020) (citing White v. New Hampshire Dep’t of
Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982)). It allows a district court to correct its own errors, thereby
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sparing the parties and appellate courts the burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings.
Esparza v. Anderson, No. 3:96-cv-7434, 2013 WL 774155, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2013)
(citing Howard v. United States, 533 F.3d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 2008)). However, “motions to alter
or amend, or for reconsideration, are not intended as a mechanism for a plaintiff to relitigate
issues previously considered and rejected, or to submit evidence which in the exercise of
reasonable diligence could have been submitted earlier.” Kittle v. State, No. 2:05-cv-1165, 2007
WL 543447, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2007) (citing Helton v. ACS Grp., 964 F. Supp. 1175,
1182 (E.D. Tenn. 1997)); Howard, 533 F.3d at 475. “In particular, courts will not address new
arguments or evidence that the moving party could have raised before the decision issued.”
Banister, 140 S.Ct. at 1702. Moreover, in view of the importance of finality in the justice
system, a motion to reconsider a final order should be granted only in extraordinary
circumstances, such as a complete failure to address an issue or claim. Solly v. Mausser, No.
2:15-cv-956, 2016 WL 74986 at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2016). It is not the function of a motion to
reconsider to renew arguments that the Court has already considered and rejected. See Lloyd v.
City of Streetsboro, No. 5:18-cv-73, 2018 WL 2985098, at *1 (N.D. Ohio June 14, 2018) (citing
McConocha v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio, 930 F.Supp. 1182, 1184 (N.D. Ohio
1996)). “When the ‘defendant views the law in a light contrary to that of this Court,’ its ‘proper
recourse’ is not by way of a motion for reconsideration but by ‘appeal to the Sixth Circuit.’” Id.
(quoting Dana Corp. v. United States, 764 F.Supp. 482, 489 (N.D. Ohio 1991)).
This Court has already considered, and rejected, the arguments Petitioner now raises. As
previously discussed, Petitioner waived his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
by failing to raise this same issue in the Ohio Court of Appeals or in the Ohio Supreme Court.
The Court denied Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel as plainly without
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merit and not on the basis of procedural default. Additionally, Petitioner waived any federal
claim in regard to the denial of his motion for a new trial by failing to present any federal claim
in the Ohio courts. Petitioner has provided no basis for reconsideration of that determination.
The alleged violation of state law with respect to the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion for
a new trial does not provide Petitioner a basis for relief -- “[t]o establish a constitutional due
process claim, [Petitioner] must demonstrate that the trial court's denial of his motion for new
trial was ‘so egregious’ that it violated his right to a fundamentally fair trial.” Pudelski v.
Wilson, 576 F.3d 595, 610-11 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Fleming v. Metrish, 556 F.3d 520, 535 (6th
Cir. 2009); Baze v. Parker, 371 F.3d 310, 324 (6th Cir. 2004)). Again, the record does not
reflect these circumstances here. The record likewise does not indicate that it is “more likely
than not” based on new evidence not previously presented at trial that no reasonable juror would
find Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt so as to permit consideration of Petitioner’s
procedurally defaulted claims on the merits. Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 589-90 (6th Cir.
Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 16) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Sarah D. Morrison
SARAH D. MORRISON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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