Hill v. Chamber-Smith et al

Filing 34

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - CONCLUSION: In sum, for the reasons stated, the undersigned Magistrate Judge ORDERS that Plaintiff's access-to-court claim(s) against Defendant Chambers- Smith may PROCEED to further development. The stay p reviously imposed in this matter (Notation Order, Oct. 31, 2023) is LIFTED. The undersigned Magistrate Judge further RECOMMENDS as follows: 1. That the remainder of Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U. S.C. § 1915A; 2. That Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 2 ) be DENIED; and 3. That Defendant Judge Navarre's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 31 ) be GRANTED and Plaintiff's claims against Judge Navarre be DISM ISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Objections to R&R due by 2/20/2024). Signed by Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry on 2/5/2024. (srb)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
vs.
:
ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH, et al., :
:
:
Defendants.
:
TYRICE HILL,

Case No. 2:22-cv-03742
District Judge James L. Graham
Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, an Ohio inmate
proceeding without the assistance of counsel, originally brought claims against Annette
Chambers-Smith, Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction
(“ODRC”), as well as various state and institutional officials. (Complaint, Doc. No. 1;
First Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 5; Second Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 7.) After
the Court conducted its initial required screen of these pleadings, the Court permitted
Plaintiff to proceed on his access-to-court claim(s) against Defendant Chambers-Smith
and dismissed the remaining claims. (Doc. No. 19.)
Plaintiff subsequently filed a Third Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 24) that sets
forth additional claims against multiple defendants. This matter is now before the
undersigned Magistrate Judge for an initial screen pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, as well
as a report and recommendation on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc.
No. 2) and Defendant Judge Navarre’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 31).
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I.

SECTION 1915 SCREEN AND MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 31)
A.

Legal Standard

The Court’s screen of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 7) set
forth the legal standards applicable to a Section 1915 review. (Doc. No. 12, PageID 41718.) Briefly, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 requires the Court to conduct an
initial screen of Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint and dismiss any portion that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary damages from a party immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
The standard for determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted applies equally to Section 1915 screens and to motions to
dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d
468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a
complaint must set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Court must construe the
complaint in plaintiff’s favor, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and
determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Hill, 630
F.3d at 470-71. Thus, the complaint must include factual allegations that are well-pleaded
and plausible.
Factual allegations are well-pleaded if they are specific and support the plaintiff’s
claims. Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (courts need not accept
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“non-specific factual allegations and inferences”). “[A] legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation” is not well-pleaded and need not be accepted as true. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555; see 16630 Southfield Ltd. Partnership v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d
502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[C]onclusory allegations … that the defendant violated the
law” do not state a claim on which relief can be granted); Frazier, 41 F. App’x at 764
(6th Cir. 2002) (courts need not accept “unwarranted legal conclusions”).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also 16630
Southfield Ltd. Partnership v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotations and citation omitted) (“[T]he sufficiency of a complaint turns on its
factual content, requiring the plaintiff to plead enough factual matter to raise a plausible
inference of wrongdoing.”). Whether an inference is plausible “depends on a host of
considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for
the defendant’s conduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
This Court liberally construes a pro se complaint and holds it “to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). This standard may require “active interpretation in some cases [in order] to
construe a pro se petition to encompass any allegation stating federal relief.” Franklin v.
Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, a pro se complaint must adhere to
the “basic pleading essentials” and the Court should not have to guess at the nature of the
claim asserted.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Instead, the
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complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007).
B.

Analysis

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint largely repeats the factual allegations set
forth in his prior complaints, including “a lengthy recitation of facts surrounding
Plaintiff’s arrest, guilty plea, conviction, sentencing, re-sentencing, appeals, and
collateral challenges brought in state and federal court, beginning in 2004.” (Doc. No. 12,
PageID 420.) As Defendant Judge Navarre notes and Plaintiff acknowledges, this is welltrodden ground. (Doc. No. 24, PageID 468, 471-73 (describing Plaintiff’s attempts at
post-conviction relief); Doc. No. 31, PageID 599-600 (describing the circumstances that
led to Plaintiff being declared a vexatious litigator in Ohio).) Moreover, as the Northern
District of Ohio previously explained to Plaintiff, see Hill v. City of Toledo, No. 3:20CV-00493, 2020 WL 6701988, at *2-3 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2020), reconsideration of
these proceedings by this Court is barred by the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint should be
dismissed to the extent that it can be construed as setting forth any claim challenging
Plaintiff’s state-court criminal conviction.
In addition, Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed with respect to Defendants
Kral1 and Bowman-English. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Kral and Bowman-English

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Although Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint names a defendant George Karl (Doc. No. 24, PageID 461),
Defendant Judge Navarre indicates that the former Chief of Police to whom Plaintiff refers is, in fact, George Kral.
(Doc. No. 31, PageID 597.)

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violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by establishing or permitting
policies that led to his arrest without probable cause. (Doc. No. 24, PageID 496-97.)
These claims, while related to Plaintiff’s state-court conviction, do not necessarily imply
its invalidity and therefore are not barred by the Heck doctrine. Sanders v. Detroit Police
Dep’t, 490 Fed. Appx. 771 (6th Cir. 2012). However, as the Northern District of Ohio
also explained to Plaintiff, these claims are clearly time-barred. See City of Toledo, 2020
WL 6701988, at *3. Specifically, although the original state warrant that Plaintiff seeks to
challenge was issued in 2004, more than eighteen years before Plaintiff commenced this
action, a two-year statute of limitations applies. Id. (citing LRL Properties v. Portage
Metro Housing Authority, 55 F.3d 1097 (6th Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, these claims are
untimely and should be dismissed.2
As Defendant Judge Navarre correctly notes (Doc. No. 31, PageID 604),
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Judge Navarre and Bowman-English must be
dismissed on the basis of judicial immunity. This fact, too, has already been explained to
Plaintiff by the Northern District of Ohio, which stated:
Judges Franks and Navarre are absolutely immune from suits for damages
based on their decisions from the bench in [Plaintiff’s] criminal case. They
are accorded this broad protection to ensure that the independent and
impartial exercise of their judgment in a case is not impaired by the
exposure to damages by dissatisfied litigants. Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d
1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). For this reason, absolute immunity is overcome
only in two situations: (1) when the conduct alleged is performed at a time
when the Defendant is not acting as a judge; or (2) when the conduct
alleged, although judicial in nature, is taken in complete absence of all
subject matter jurisdiction of the court over which he or she presides. Id. at
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The Prayer for Relief in the Third Amended Complaint seeks “[a]n injunction ordering that the time be reinstated
to file a [Section] 1983 civil complaint against [Defendants] George Karl and Vallie Bowman-English for the
violation of Hill’s constitutional rights.” (Doc. No. 24, PageID 398.) The Court has no power to issue such an order.

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1116. Common Pleas Courts have subject matter jurisdiction over state
criminal cases and the actions in question of Judges Franks and Navarre are
decisions they made from the bench in the course of Plaintiff’s criminal
trial and subsequent proceedings. They are entitled to absolute immunity in
this case.
City of Toledo, 2020 WL 6701988, at 3.
This reasoning obviously applies to Defendant Judge Navarre. It also applies to
Defendant Bowman-English, Clerk of the Toledo Municipal Court (Doc. No. 24, PageID
462). See, e.g., Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1988) (extending absolute quasijudicial immunity to court clerk). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint
should be dismissed with respect to Defendants Judge Navarre and Bowman-English.
This leaves only Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Chambers-Smith who,
Plaintiff alleges, “creat[ed] or permitt[ed] the [ODRC] policy” that deprived Plaintiff of
“meaningful access to the courts.” (E.g., Doc. No. 24, PageID 470). These allegations,
although not repeated verbatim, are functionally identical to those contained in Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 7). The undersigned has already screened those
allegations and determined that, “[a]t this early stage of the proceedings, without the
benefit of an answer or other briefing, . . . Plaintiff’s access-to-courts claim(s) may
proceed to further development against Director Chambers-Smith.” (Doc. No. 12, PageID
423 (internal emphases omitted).) The undersigned reaffirms this conclusion with respect
to Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 24), which is now the operative
complaint in this case.

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II.

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (DOC. NO. 2)
On October 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No.

2) in which he seeks two types of relief. First, he requests an order requiring Defendants
to “provide [him] with” a specified attorney “for direct representation” in his concluded
2004 state-court criminal case and his now-dismissed3 appeal to the Sixth Circuit. (Doc.
No. 2, PageID 276.) Second, he asks the Court to “order rec[i]ssion of the plea agreement
[that Plaintiff] entered in[to on] January 10, 2005.” (Id. at PageID 277.)
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to such an injunction under the familiar fourfactor test established by the Sixth Circuit. (Doc. No. 2, PageID 278-86.) See, e.g., United
States v. Bayshore Assocs., 934 F.2d 1391, 1398 (6th Cir. 1991). He further argues that
the Court may issue a preliminary injunction to affirmatively correct a party’s conduct,
rather than merely to preserve the status quo. (Id.) The Court need not reach these
arguments because it is clear that Plaintiff is not entitled to the requested relief.
As to the first prong of Plaintiff’s proposed injunction, this Court has no power to
enjoin Defendant Judge Navarre to take any action in Plaintiff’s state-court criminal case.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “in any action brought against a judicial official for an act or
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”
Defendant Judge Navarre is a judicial officer, and her decision not to appoint post-

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On November 16, 2022, the Sixth Circuit denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on the
ground that his appeal lacked an arguable basis in law. Hill v. Chambers-Smith, No. 22-03557, 2022 U.S. App.
LEXIS 31708 (6th Cir. Nov. 16, 2022). The court then affirmed that decision and denied reconsideration on January
17, 2023. Hill v. Chambers-Smith, No. 22-03557, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 1013 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 2023).

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conviction counsel in Plaintiff’s state-court criminal case was clearly taken in her judicial
capacity. Absent evidence that Defendant Judge Navarre violated a declaratory decree or
that a declaratory decree was unavailable, Plaintiff is barred from obtaining injunctive
relief against Defendant Judge Navarre in this Court. See Burdine v. Huffman, 229 F.
Supp. 2d 704 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (finding that federal-court injunction ordering state-court
judge to appoint specific counsel was barred under the “judicial official” provision of
Section 1983 or, alternatively, under Younger abstention).
As to the second prong of Plaintiff’s proposed injunction, Plaintiff’s state-court
guilty plea cannot be voided by means of an injunction. A State’s breach of a plea
agreement may constitute a violation of the U.S. Constitution. Dixon v. Alexander, 741
F.2d 121, 123 (6th Cir. 1984). But such a violation is “cognizable under [28 U.S.C.]
§ 2254,” not under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. In other words, because Plaintiff’s challenge to
his plea bargain necessarily challenges “the fact or length of [Plaintiff’s] confinement,”
id. at 124 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973)), “his sole remedy is a
writ of habeas corpus.” Phillips v. Coleman, 191 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1999) (table) (citing
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490; Dixon, 741 F.2d at 124-25).
Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge determines that Plaintiff’s Motion
for Injunctive Relief (Doc. No. 2) is not well-taken, and RECOMMENDS that the Court
deny the Motion.
III.

CONCLUSION
In sum, for the reasons stated, the undersigned Magistrate Judge ORDERS that

Plaintiff’s access-to-court claim(s) against Defendant Chambers-Smith may PROCEED
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to further development. The stay previously imposed in this matter (Notation Order, Oct.
31, 2023) is LIFTED.
The undersigned Magistrate Judge further RECOMMENDS as follows:
1. That the remainder of Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A;
2. That Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 2) be DENIED; and
3. That Defendant Judge Navarre’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 31) be GRANTED
and Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Navarre be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.

Finally, Plaintiff is once again CAUTIONED that he must keep the Court
informed of his current address at all times and most immediately inform the Court of
any transfer, release, or other change of address. FAILURE TO PROMPTLY
UPDATE HIS ADDRESS OR TO COMPLY WITH ANY PORTION OF THIS
ORDER MAY RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE FOR FAILURE TO
PROSECUTE.

IT IS SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.
/s/ Caroline H. Gentry
Caroline H. Gentry
United States Magistrate Judge

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Notice of Procedure on Objections
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within FOURTEEN days after
being served with this Report and Recommendations. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d),
this period is extended to SEVENTEEN days if this Report is being served by one of the
methods of service listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), or (F). Such objections shall
specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and Recommendation is
based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at an oral hearing, the
objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions
of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within FOURTEEN days after being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on
appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947,
949-50 (6th Cir. 1981).

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