Estate of Keandre Bost v. Franklin County/Franklin County Board of Commissioners et al
Filing
80
OPINION and ORDER granting 60 64 Defendants' Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 3/26/24. (sem)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
The Estate of Keandre Bost,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:22-cv-4476
V.
Judge Michael H. Watson
Franklin County, etal.,
Magistrate Judge Deavers
Franklin County Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Dallas L. Baldwin, the Franklin County Sheriff ("Sheriff Baldwin"), Franklin
County ("Franklin County"), and its Board of Commissioners, Kevin Boyce, John
O'Grady, and Erica Crawley ("Commissioners, " collectively, "Franklin County
Defendants"), move for judgment on the pleadings in this civil rights case. Mot,
ECF No. 64. Similarly, Correctional Officers Stephen Withrow ("Withrow"),
Jackie Lucas ("Lucas"), and Justin Coffey ("Coffey") ("Correctional Officer
Defendants, " together with Franklin County Defendants, "Defendants") move for
judgment on the pleadings. Mot., ECF No. 60. For the following reasons,
Defendants' motions are GRANTED.
I.
FACTS1
The Estate of Keandre Bost ("Plaintiff") alleges the following. From
September 23, 2021, to December 7, 2021, Keandre Bost ("Bost") was a pretrial
1 The Court accepts Plaintiff's factual allegations as true for Defendants' motions. See
Fritz v. Charter Twp. ofComstock, 592 F. 3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010).
detainee at Franklin County Corrections Center I ("FCCC I"). Am. Compl. ^ 1,
ECF No. 46. He informed "staff" of his mental illness and prior suicide attempts
when he was booked into the jail. Id. ^ 36. Bost was assigned various
classification levels, moved cells multiple times, was transported to and from the
hospital several times, was placed on and off safety watches and mental health
observations, and attempted suicide during his time at the jail. Id. ^ 36-65. All
of those actions were taken by staff who are not named as Defendants. See id.
Bost tragically hung himself in his jail cell on December 7, 2021, and died several
days later. /c/. ^ 1.
Additional factual allegations concerning the specific Defendants are
addressed below.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c) generally follows the same rules as a motion to dismiss the
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). " Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass'n, 958 F. 3d
470, 480 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing D'Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F. 3d 378, 383 (6th Cir.
2014)). "For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all wellpleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken
as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless
clearly entitled to judgment. " Fritz, 592 F. 3d at 722 (citing JPMorgan Chase
Bank v. Winget, 510 F. 3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted)).
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As with a 12(b)(6) motion, a claim survives a motion for judgment on the
pleadings if it "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, 570 (2007)). "The
plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement, ' but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. " Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U. S. at 556). This standard "calls for enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [unlawful conduct]."
Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, 556 (2007). A pleading's "[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,
on the assumption that all the allegations in the [pleading] are true (even if
doubtful in fact). " Id. at 555 (internal citations omitted). The Court "must
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the [non-moving party]."
Engler v. Arnold, 862 F. 3d 571, 574 (6th Cir. 2017). However, the non-moving
party must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do. " Twombly, 550 U. S. at 555.
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff sues Franklin County Defendants in their official capacities only.
Am. Compl. ^ 9-10, ECF No. 46. Plaintiff sues Franklin County Defendants for
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983;
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and wrongful
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death and survivorship under Ohio law. Am. Compl. ^ 96-131, ECF No. 46.
Franklin County Defendants move to dismiss each claim. Mot., ECF No. 64.
Plaintiff sues Correctional Officer Defendants in their individual capacities
only. Am. Compl. ^ 12-14, ECF No. 46. Plaintiff sues Correctional Officer
Defendants for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, pursuant to 42
U. S. C. § 1983; and wrongful death and survivorship under Ohio law. Am. Compl.
1T1T 123-31, ECF No. 46. They also move to dismiss each claim. Mot., ECF No.
60.
The Court begins by addressing Plaintiff's federal claims before turning to
the state-law claims.
A.
Federal Claims
1. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs under 42 U. S.C.
§1983
a. Franklin County Defendants
The import of Plaintiff's § 1983 deliberate indifference claim against
Franklin County Defendants is that Franklin County Defendants chose Armor
Health of Ohio, LLC to provide medical services in Ohio's jails knowing that
Armor Health of Ohio, LLC's parent company, Armor Correctional Health
Services, Inc., had a history of providing inadequate medical care-to the extent
that it had been expelled from multiple jails and even barred from operating in
New York state. Am. Compl. ^ 23-28, ECF No. 46. Therefore, Franklin County
Defendants are liable for Armor hlealth of Ohio LLC's deliberate indifference to
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Plaintiff's serious medical needs, because Defendant's "policy" of hiring Armor
Health of Ohio, LLC was the "moving force" behind Armor Health of Ohio LLC's
violation of Plaintiff's constitutional right. /cf. ^ 117.
This theory of liability is precluded by the Court's prior Opinion and Order,
ECF No. 61, which found that the Amended Complaint failed to state that any
employee of Armor Health of Ohio, LLC was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's
serious medical needs. Because no Armor Health of Ohio, LLC employee
violated Bost's constitutional rights, Franklin County Defendants likewise did not
violate Best's constitutional rights by choosing Armor Health of Ohio, LLC to
provide medical care to Bost (and others). In other words, without an underlying
violation by Armor Health of Ohio, LLC, there is nothing to hold Franklin County
Defendants liable for. See Chambers v. Sanders, 63 F. 4th 1092, 1101-02 (6th
Cir. 2023) ("With no underlying rights violation plausibly established in their
complaint, we affirm the district court's dismissal of [plaintiffs'] Monell claim
against the city. "); Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F. 3d 606, 622 (6th Cir. 2014) ("There
can be no liability under Mone//without an underlying constitutional violation."
(citation omitted)). Thus, Plaintiff's claim fails to the extent it alleges Franklin
County Defendants' custom, practice, or policy was the moving force behind
Armor Health of Ohio LLC's deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical
needs.
Plaintiff also alleges municipal liability based on the deliberate indifference
of Correctional Officer Defendants. Am. Compl. ^116, ECF No. 46. Because
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the Court finds, below, that Plaintiff fails to state a deliberate indifference claim
against Correctional Officer Defendants, Franklin County Defendants are entitled
to judgment on the pleadings on this theory of Monell liability as well.
In conclusion, Franklin County Defendants are entitled to judgment on the
pleadings on all of Plaintiff's § 1983 deliberate indifference claims.
b. Withrow, Lucas, and Coffey
Correctional Officer Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint lacks
factual allegations that state a claim for deliberate indifference and, alternatively,
that they are qualifiedly immune from a deliberate indifference claim.
As explained in the Court's prior Opinion and Order, to state an underlying
Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a pretrial detainee's
serious medical need, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he "had a sufficiently
serious medical need"2 and (2) that "each defendant acted deliberately (not
accidentally), and also recklessly in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm
that is either known or so obvious that it should be known. " Helphenstine v.
Lewis Cnty., 60 F. 4th 305, 317 (6th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). In cases involving
suicide, the second element (/. e., the subjective prong) may be satisfied if the
defendant "recklessly overlooked a pretrial detainee's strong likelihood of
suicide-even if [the defendant] did not subjectively recognize it. " Lawler as next
2 No defendant disputes that the objective element was adequately pleaded, and the
Court therefore does not address it.
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fried ofiawler v. Hardeman Cty., Tenn., No. 22-5898, 2024 WL 656912, at *1
(6th Cir. Feb. 16, 2024) (citing Helphenstine, 60 F. 4th at 316-17).
Correctional Officer Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint lacks
any factual allegations that, if true, would show they recklessly overlooked Best's
strong likelihood of suicide. Mot. 6-7, ECF No. 60. The Court agrees.
Although the Amended Complaint contains myriad factual allegations
about other correctional officers taking various actions with respect to Bost, it is
sparse on facts concerning Correctional Officer Defendants. Aside from alleging
that Correctional Officer Defendants worked for Franklin County as correctional
officers, acted during the pertinent timeframe within the scope of their
employment and under color of law, and acted pursuant to official policies, Am.
Compl. ^ 8, 12-14, 116, the Amended Complaint is silent as to Correctional
Officer Defendants' knowledge or involvement in the underlying events.
In fact, the Amended Complaint alleges that Withrow and Lucas3 were
assigned on the date in question to the floor on which Bost was housed and
"conducted their final watch tour and headcount at 10:40 PM. " Am. Compl.
^66-67, EOF No. 46. Regarding Coffey, the Amended Complaint alleges that
he "began his first watch tour and initial headcount at 11:19 PM" and discovered
Bost hanging from his cell bars at 11:23 PM. Id. ^ 68-69. It further alleges that
each Correctional Officer Defendant untimely performed their rounds. Id. ^ 91.
3 Lucas was seemingly inadvertently referred to as "Lewis" in various parts of the
Amended Complaint. See id. Iflf 66-67.
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No other facts about Correctional Officer Defendants are contained in the
Amended Complaint.
Correctional Officer Defendants correctly assert:
There are no facts alleged these officers were aware of the reasons
or circumstances for Mr. Bast's movements throughout the jail. There
are no facts alleged suggesting that they had any interactions with Mr.
Bost prior to his suicide, or that they actually witnessed or noticed
anything about Mr. Bost suggesting that he was about to commit
suicide, to which they were deliberately indifferent. And there are no
facts suggesting that the officers witnessed, were aware, or were
informed that Mr. Bost was taking any action to commit suicide.
Mot. 6, ECF No. 60. Therefore, even taking as true the allegation that they
performed their rounds late, the Amended Complaint does not adequately allege
Correctional Officer Defendants recklessly overlooked a strong likelihood of
suicide.
In response, Plaintiff argues that the Amended Complaint sufficiently
alleges that Correctional Officer Defendants were aware of Best's serious
medical need, citing paragraph 75 of the Amended Complaint. That paragraph
reads, "[d]espite Defendants' knowledge of Keandre Bast's despondency, his
need for mental health care, and risk of injury, they were deliberately indifferent
to his risk of suicide, particularly by hanging. " Am. Compl. ^ 75, ECF No. 46.
This allegation, however, is nothing more than a legal conclusion that
Correctional Officer Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Bost's serious
medical need. The phrase "despite Defendants' knowledge of Keandre Best's
despondency [and] his need for mental health care" cannot be construed as
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plausibly alleging that Correctional Officer Defendants possessed knowledge of
Best's despondency or need for mental health care when the remaining factual
allegations in the Amended Complaint show, at most, that other correctional
officers had that knowledge. Not once does it allege that anyone, at any time,
relayed information concerning Best's mental state to Correctional Officer
Defendants or that they independently became aware of the same.
Plaintiff's further contention-that it can be inferred from the Amended
Complaint that Correctional Officer Defendants failed to timely perform their
rounds in order to ease their work responsibilities-therefore
is unhelpful.
Whether the delay was caused by selfish reasons or not, the Amended
Complaint simply does not plausibly allege that Correctional Officer Defendants
delayed their rounds in circumstances in which they should have known of Best's
strong likelihood to suicide.
Because the Amended Complaint lacks facts that make plausible an
allegation that any Correctional Officer Defendant knew or should have known of
Bast's strong likelihood to suicide, the Amended Complaint fails to state a § 1983
deliberate indifference claim against any Correctional Officer Defendant, and
they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to such claims.
2.
Discrimination Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the sen/ices, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
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to discrimination by any such entity. " 42 U. S. C. § 12132. "To make out a prima
facie case under the ADA, " a plaintiff must allege "that he has a disability; that he
is otherwise qualified; and that he is being excluded from participation in, being
denied the benefits of, or being subjected to discrimination under the program
solely because of his disability. " Centaurs v. Haslam, No. 14-5348, 2014 WL
12972238, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 2, 2014) (cleaned up).
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint contains the blanket allegation that Franklin
County Defendants "failed and refused to reasonably accommodate [Plaintiff's]
mental disabilities and to modify their jail facilities, operations, services,
accommodations and programs to reasonably accommodate his disability . . .
when he was in their custody. " Am. Compl. ^ 100, ECF No. 46. It does not,
however, provide any details about how Plaintiff was excluded from participating,
or denied the benefits of, any jail service, program, or activity. Nor does it
describe the purported accommodation he required to permit participation in such
service, program, or activity.
Moreover, the wrongful denial of mental health treatment, alone, "does not
provide a basis for relief under the ADA. " Brown v. Ohio, No. 1:17-cv-764, 2018
WL 798881, at *4 (S. D. Ohio Jan. 5, 2018) (citations omitted), report and
recommendation adopted by 20^8 WL 776268 (S. D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2018). That is,
absent allegations of discrimination or failure to accommodate because of a
disability, a mere deliberate indifference claim does not also state an ADA claim.
Centaurs, 2014 WL 12972238, at *1 ("Centaurs alleged that he was being denied
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medical treatment in violation of the ADA but did not allege that he was denied
treatment because of his disability. "); Whitley v. Mich. Dept. ofCorr., 2022 WL
16847679, at * 3 (W. D. Mich. Nov. 10, 2022) ("[T]he ADA is not violated by a
prison's simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners,
which is what Plaintiff alleges here. " (cleaned up)); Watson v. Mohr, No. 2:17-cv-
457, 2017 WL 6383812, at * (S. D. Ohio Dec. 14, 2017) ("Plaintiff fails to meet the
pleading requirement, in part at least, because his ADA claim is merely an Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim in another statutory guise. "), report and
recommendation adopted by 20'\Q\NL
836484 (S. D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2018).
Here, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges the denial of mental health
treatment but does not allege that Plaintiff was discriminated against, excluded
from participation in, or denied the benefits of anything because of his disability.
Plaintiff does not even attempt to argue otherwise in response to Franklin County
Defendants' motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state a
claim under the ADA, and that claim against Franklin County Defendants is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
B.
State-Law Claims
Having dismissed all federal claims, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims. See United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966) ("Certainly, if the federal
claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional
sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well" (modified by Rosado v.
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Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 402-04 (1970)). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's state-law claims against Armor Health of Ohio,
LLC, Franklin County Defendants, and Correctional Officer Defendants.
IV.
CONCLUSION
This case is tragic. Still, to hold a defendant liable for deliberate
indifference, a complaint must allege facts that make plausible an inference that
the specific defendant either knew or should have known of the plaintiff's serious
medical need. Plaintiff failed to allege such facts here. The Court therefore
DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's federal claims for failure to state a
claim and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's state-law claims due to
a declination of supplemental jurisdiction. 4 The Clerk shall terminate ECF Nos.
60 and 64 and close this case.
ITISSOORDERED.
^. /
/^ / ^ / -/
y^/^/L,
'^
MICHAEL H. WATSON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 Although Plaintiff requests leave to amend the Complaint in lieu of dismissal without
prejudice, the request is not accompanied by any developed argument or a copy of the
proposed Second Amended Complaint. Moreover, Plaintiff was already provided an
opportunity to amend the Complaint to correct pleading deficiencies. See ECF Nos. 45,
43, and 46. As such, dismissal without prejudice is appropriate. See Kuyatv.
BioMimetic Therapeutics, Inc., 747 F.3d 435, 444 (6th Cir. 2014) ("Both because the
plaintiffs did not present an adequate motion and because they did not attach a copy of
their amended complaint, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint based on the final sentence of the plaintiffs'
memorandum in opposition. ").
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