Wilkins v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 14

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS - IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT: 1. Plaintiff's Statement of Errors (Doc. No. 12 ) be OVERRULED; 2. The Court AFFIRM the Commissioner's non-disability determination; and 3. The case be terminated on the Court's docket. Signed by Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry on 8/29/2024. (acw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION (COLUMBUS)
RUSSETTA W., 1
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

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Case No. 2:23-cv-02260
District Judge Edmund A. Sargus
Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2
Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on February
1, 2021. Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. After a hearing at
Plaintiff’s request, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Plaintiff was not
eligible for benefits because she was not under a “disability” as defined in the Social
Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Plaintiff
subsequently filed this action.
Plaintiff seeks an order remanding this matter to the Commissioner for the award
of benefits or, in the alternative, for further proceedings. The Commissioner asks the
Court to affirm the non-disability decision. For the reasons set forth below, the

See S.D. Ohio General Order 22-01 (“The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management
of the Judicial Conference of the United States has recommended that due to significant privacy concerns
in social security cases federal courts should refer to claimants only by their first names and last
initials.”).
1

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The notice at the end of this opinion informs the parties of their ability to file
objections to this Report and Recommendations within the specified time period.
2

undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that the Commissioner’s decision be
AFFIRMED.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts that she has been under a disability since January 1, 2016. 3

Plaintiff was twenty-eight years old on the SSI application date. Accordingly, Plaintiff
was considered a “younger person” under Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.963(c). Plaintiff has a “high school education and above.” See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1564(b)(4).
The evidence in the Administrative Record (“AR,” Doc. No. 7) is summarized in
the ALJ’s decision (“Decision,” Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 78-102), Plaintiff’s Statement of
Errors (“SE,” Doc. No. 12), and the Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition
(“Mem. In Opp.,” Doc. No. 13). Rather than repeat these summaries, the Court will
discuss the pertinent evidence in its analysis below.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Social Security Administration provides SSI to individuals who are under a

“disability,” among other eligibility requirements. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S.
467, 470 (1986); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 423(a)(1), 1382(a). The term “disability” means
“the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

Regardless of the actual or alleged onset of disability, an SSI claimant is not entitled to SSI benefits
prior to the date that the claimant files an SSI application. Thus, the relevant period of consideration in
this case begins on February 1, 2021. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.335; Koster v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 643 F.
App’x. 466, 478 (6th Cir. 2016) (“For purposes of SSI, which is not retroactive, the relevant period here
is . . . the date [the plaintiff] filed his protective application.”).
3

2

determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a).
This Court’s review of an ALJ’s unfavorable decision is limited to two inquiries:
“whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the ALJ
are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399,
406 (6th Cir. 2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”).
“Unless the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has made findings of
fact unsupported by substantial evidence,” this Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.
Emard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 953 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2020). Thus, the Court “may
not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of
credibility.” Id.
“Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing
administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the
agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)
(citation omitted). This limited standard of review does not permit the Court to weigh the
evidence and decide whether the preponderance of the evidence supports a different
conclusion. Instead, the Court is confined to determining whether the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, which “means—and means only—‘such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id.
(citation omitted). This standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which
the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts.” Mullen v.
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Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). Thus, the Court may be required to affirm the
ALJ’s decision even if substantial evidence in the record supports the opposite
conclusion. Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir.1997).
The other line of judicial inquiry—reviewing the correctness of the ALJ’s legal
criteria—may result in reversal even when the record contains substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ’s factual findings. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651
(6th Cir. 2009). “[E]ven if supported by substantial evidence, ‘a decision of the
Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and
where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a
substantial right.’” Id. (citations omitted). Such an error of law will require reversal even
if “the outcome on remand is unlikely to be different.” Cardew v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
896 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
III.

FACTS
A.

The ALJ’s Factual Findings

The ALJ was tasked with evaluating the evidence related to Plaintiff’s application
for benefits. In doing so, the ALJ considered each of the five sequential steps set forth in
the Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The ALJ made the following
findings of fact:
Step 1:

Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
February 1, 2021, the SSI application date.

Step 2:

She has the severe impairments of generalized anxiety disorder,
depressive disorder, personality disorder, and chronic headaches.

4

Step 3:

She does not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or equals the severity of one in the Commissioner’s
Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

Step 4:

Her residual functional capacity (RFC), or the most she can do
despite her impairments, see Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276
F.3d 235, 239 (6th Cir. 2002), consists of medium work as defined
in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c), subject to the following limitations:
“[S]he must avoid loud[-]noise workplace environments. The work
should be limited to simple work involving understanding,
remembering[,] and carrying out simple instructions, and not
involving detailed or complex instructions. The work must be free of
fast-paced production requirements, such as assembly line work, or
work that requires hourly production quotas. There should be few if
any workplace changes. There should be no more than occasional
interaction with supervisors and coworkers, with no tandem tasks,
and no interaction with the public. All the above limitations are as
defined in the Selected Characteristics of Occupations of the DOT.”
She is unable to perform any of her past relevant work.

Step 5:

Considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC,
there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that she can perform.

(Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 83-98.) These findings led the ALJ to conclude that
Plaintiff does not meet the definition of disability and so is not entitled to benefits. (Id. at
PageID 98-99.)
B.

State Agency Psychological Consultants

State agency psychological consultant Cynthia Waggoner, Psy.D. completed a
Disability Determination Explanation form in June 2021. (AR, Doc. No. 7-3 at PageID
170-71, 173-74.) Dr. Waggoner found moderate impairment in the “B Criteria” areas of
interacting with others and adapting or managing oneself. (Id. at PageID 170.) She found
mild impairment in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and no impairment in
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the area of understanding, remembering, or applying information. (Id.) In the mental RFC
section of the form, Dr. Waggoner indicated that Plaintiff was moderately limited in the
abilities of interacting appropriately with the general public and accepting instructions
and responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors. (Id. at PageID 173.) Dr.
Waggoner opined that Plaintiff could “interact with others on a brief and superficial
basis.” (Id.) In the area of adaptation, Dr. Waggoner indicated that Plaintiff was
moderately limited in the ability to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting.
(Id.) She opined: “[Plaintiff can] adapt to a work environment where duties are relatively
static and where change is infrequent.” (Id. at PageID 174.) Dr. Waggoner otherwise
found no significant limitations in the other areas of functioning that related to social
interactions and adaptation. (Id. at PageID 173-74.) Dr. Waggoner also indicated that
Plaintiff had no significant limitations in the area of understanding and memory and had
no more than mild limitations in sustained concentration and persistence. (Id. at PageID
173.)
Courtney Zeune, Psy.D. reviewed the updated record at the reconsideration level
in August 2021. (AR, Doc. No. 7-3 at PageID 179, 181-83.) Dr. Zeune adopted Dr.
Waggoner’s assessment. (Id.)
The ALJ evaluated the consultants’ assessments separately but provided the same
analysis for both. (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 91-92.) The ALJ concluded that
their assessments were “partially persuasive.” (Id.) The ALJ reasoned that the degree of
limitation that the consultants assessed was “consistent with what is reflected in the

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treatment records while not working,” but he explained that additional limitations were
warranted:
[S]uch records are also clear that [Plaintiff] has exacerbation when away
from home, and particularly when separated from her children, both
circumstances which would be present when at work, unless working from
home. The latter trigger seems to be somewhat connected with an abusive
childhood. In any event, given the record as a whole, exacerbation of her
anxiety would be expected while present in the workplace and away from
home and her children, and would be expected to interfere to some degree
with understanding, remembering and applying detailed instructions, and
with concentration, persistence and pace for detailed instructions and
extended periods of concentration, requiring additional limitations (1F/22,
25-29; 2F/9-10; 8F/6-7, 16-17, 43, 53-54, 79; 12F/57-58). Additionally,
episodic symptoms of headaches (3F/5; 8F/4; 11F/17, 19, 61, 64; 9F/9;
10F/9-10) would also be expected to be distracting and interfere with the
same domains of functioning.
(Id.)
IV.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s sole assertion of error is that the ALJ erred in his analysis of the state

agency psychological consultants’ prior administrative medical findings. (SE, Doc. No.
12 at PageID 999.) Plaintiff argues that reversal is warranted because the ALJ found that
the consultants’ assessments were partially persuasive, but he did not adopt their opinion
that Plaintiff could interact with others “on a brief and superficial basis” and did not
explain why he did not do so. (Id.) For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s arguments
are not well-taken and the ALJ’s decision should be affirmed.
A.

Applicable Law.

ALJs are required to analyze the persuasiveness of “all of the medical opinions” in
the record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c (emphasis added). A “medical opinion” is a “statement
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from a medical source about what [an individual] can still do despite [her]
impairment(s)” and whether the individual has one or more impairment-related
limitations or restrictions. 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a)(2). By contrast, a statement from a
medical source about an issue reserved to the Commissioner—such as whether an
individual is disabled—need not be addressed by the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b(c)(3).
Because Plaintiff filed her claim after March 27, 2017, the new regulations for
evaluating medical opinion evidence applied. Under these regulations, the ALJ “will not
defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any
medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) . . . .” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920c(a). Instead, the ALJ must evaluate the persuasiveness of each medical opinion
and prior administrative medical finding by considering the following factors: (1)
supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the plaintiff; (4) specialization; and
(5) any other factor “that tend[s] to support or contradict a medical opinion or prior
administrative medical finding.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c).
The first two factors—supportability and consistency—are the “most important.”
20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2) (emphasis added). The supportability factor recognizes that
“[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations
presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) . . . the more
persuasive the medical opinions . . . will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1). Therefore, an
ALJ’s supportability analysis addresses whether a medical professional has sufficient
justification for their own conclusions. See Crystal E.J. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:21CV-04861, 2022 WL 2680069 (S.D. Ohio July 12, 2022) (Preston Deavers, M.J.); accord
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Burke v. O’Malley, No. 8:23-cv-415, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48944, *8 (M.D. Fla. Mar.
20, 2024) (“Supportability addresses the extent to which a medical source or consultant
has articulated record evidence bolstering her own opinion or finding.”).
The consistency factor, by contrast, recognizes that “[t]he more consistent a
medical opinion(s) . . . is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical
sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) . . . will be.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920c(c)(2). The ALJ’s consistency analysis therefore must compare the medical
opinion at issue to evidence from “other medical and nonmedical sources.” Ford v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-00524, 2023 WL 2088157, at *17 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31,
2023).
The distinction between the supportability and consistency factors is relatively
clear when the opinion is from a treating provider. Providers commonly rely on the
records in their possession—including progress notes, test results, statements from the
claimant, and opinions from other medical providers—to support their medical opinions.
An ALJ can readily identify a provider’s records that purportedly support their opinion
and use them to analyze supportability. Then, when analyzing consistency, the ALJ can
readily compare the provider’s opinion to opinions and evidence from other providers.
Because each factor (supportability and consistency) considers different evidence, the
reviewing court can easily determine whether the ALJ has addressed each factor.
It can be more challenging to distinguish between supportability and consistency
when the opinion is from a state agency consultant. Because they do not have their own
treatment records, consultants must review and rely upon documents in the administrative
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record to support their opinions. The ALJ will, however, consider documents from the
same administrative record when analyzing both supportability and consistency. If the
consultant’s report clearly identifies the documents relied upon to support their opinions,
then the ALJ can conduct a supportability analysis that is based on those documents. But
if the consultant’s report does not clearly identify the documents that support their
opinions, then the ALJ’s ability to conduct separate supportability and consistency
analyses will be limited. See Kenneth B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:22-cv-672, 2024
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49191 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 19, 2024) (citing Tyrone H. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 2:22-cv-3652, 2023 WL 2623571, *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2023)).
Because they are the most important factors, the ALJ is required not only to
consider the supportability and consistency of all medical opinions in the record, but also
to “explain how he or she considered them.” 4 Dayna S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 3:21-CV00326, 2023 WL 2009135, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2023) (Gentry, M.J.) (citing to 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2) (internal punctuation omitted and emphasis added)). No
“specific level of detail” is required, as “the appropriate level of articulation will
necessarily depend on the unique circumstances of each claim.” Timothy B. v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 2:22-CV-03834, 2023 WL 3764304, at *7 (S.D. Ohio June 1, 2023)
(Bowman, M.J.) (internal citations omitted). Thus, ALJs need not use “magic words or
any specific phrasing” to comply with the applicable regulations. Id.

4
By contrast, the ALJ “may, but [is] not required to,” explain the consideration given to the remaining factors. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).

10

Nevertheless, an ALJ is required “to show his or her work.” Scott K. v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 3:21-CV-00129, 2022 WL 4484603, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2022)
(Silvain, M.J.) (internal citation omitted). Thus, “[t]his Court cannot uphold an ALJ’s
decision, even if there if there is enough evidence in the record to support the decision,
where the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an accurate and logical bridge
between the evidence and the result.” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877 (N.D.
Ohio 2011) (cleaned up) (internal quotations and citation omitted). See also Danyel P. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:21-CV-02405, 2022 WL 1514170, at *6 (S.D. Ohio May 13,
2022) (Preston Deavers, M.J.) (ALJ’s “inexplicable and illogical consistency” warranted
remand); Kimberly S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:21-CV-00310, 2022 WL 17820565,
at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2022) (Silvain, M.J.) (ALJs must “provide a coherent
explanation of [their] reasoning . . . in order to provide sufficient rationale for a reviewing
adjudicator or court”); Hardiman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:12-CV-00508, 2013 WL
3762266, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 16, 2013) (Preston Deavers, M.J.) (remanding case on the
ground that “the ALJ’s decision is internally inconsistent and incomplete”).
B.

The ALJ Did Not Reversibly Err In Evaluating The Findings Of The
State Agency Psychological Consultants.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to adequately evaluate the administrative
findings of Drs. Waggoner and Zeune because “the ALJ did not include ‘brief’ or
‘superficial’ when addressing [Plaintiff’s] ability to interact with others” in the RFC. (SE,
Doc. No. 12 at PageID 999.) Plaintiff concedes that the ALJ’s RFC limitation for no
interaction with the public is more restrictive than—and adequately accounts for—the
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consultants’ opinion regarding Plaintiff’s ability to interact with the public. (Id. at PageID
1001.) Plaintiff instead challenges the ALJ’s RFC limitations related to Plaintiff’s ability
to interact with coworkers and supervisors. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, “[t]he ALJ’s
inclusion of ‘occasional’ does not adequately address a limitation to ‘brief’ or
‘superficial.’” (Id.) Plaintiff also argues that “‘occasional’ and ‘superficial’ are not
interchangeable.” (Id. at PageID 1002.)
Plaintiff correctly asserts that the terms “occasional” and “superficial” are not
interchangeable. Social Security Ruling (SSR) 83-10 provides definitions of terms and
concepts that are frequently used in evaluating disability. 5 SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251
(S.S.A. January 1, 1983). The SSR defines “occasional” as occurring “from very little up
to one-third of the time.” 1983 WL 31251, at *5. Additionally, this Court has routinely
recognized that “occasional contact” refers to the quantity of time spent with individuals,
while “superficial contact” goes to the quality of the interactions. See Garvin v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20-CV-2566, 2021 WL 2200423, at *6 (S.D. Ohio June 1, 2021)
(Deavers, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-CV-2566, 2021 WL
2533191 (S.D. Ohio June 21, 2021) (Sargus, D.J.) (citing, e.g., Hutton v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 2:20-CV-339, 2020 WL 3866855, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 9, 2020) (Vascura,
M.J.), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Hutton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
2:20-CV-339, 2020 WL 4334920 (S.D. Ohio July 28, 2020) (Morrison, D.J.) (reversing

Although SSRs do not have the same force and effect as statutes or regulations, they “are ‘binding on all
components of the Social Security Administration’ and represent ‘precedent final opinions and orders and
statements of policy and interpretations’ adopted by the Commissioner.” Ferguson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 628 F.3d 269, 272 n.1 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1)).

5

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and remanding where ALJ explanation was lacking because “superficial interaction” is a
well-recognized, work-related limitation); Corey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:18-cv1219, 2019 WL 3226945, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 17, 2019) (Vascura, M.J.) (“[R]eversal is
warranted because the ALJ assigned significant weight to Dr. Marlow's opinions, but
failed to include limitations for ‘superficial' interactions.’”); Lindsey v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 2:18-CV-18, 2018 WL 6257432, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2018) (Vascura,
M.J.) (“‘Occasional contact’ goes to the quantity of time spent with [ ] individuals,
whereas ‘superficial contact’ goes to the quality of the interactions.” (emphasis added)
(citation omitted))).
However, although the ALJ was required to consider medical opinion evidence
when determining the RFC, he was not required to adopt them or adopt any such findings
verbatim. Poe v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009). Moreover,
even when an ALJ gives great weight to an opinion—which did not happen here—“there
is no requirement that an ALJ adopt a state agency psychologist’s opinion verbatim; nor
is the ALJ required to adopt the state agency psychologist’s limitations wholesale.”
Reeves v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App’x 267, 275 (6th Cir. 2015). At the same time,
“[i]f the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator
must explain why the opinion was not adopted.” Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p,
1996 SSR LEXIS 5, at *7 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996).
Plaintiff’s contention lacks merit because the ALJ adequately accounted for both
the quantity and the quality of social interaction in the RFC. As discussed above, the state
agency psychological consultants opined that Plaintiff was moderately limited in her
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ability to interact with others and so could “interact with others on a brief and superficial
basis.” (AR, Doc. No. 7-3 at PageID 170-71, 173, 179, 181-83.) The ALJ concluded that
the consultants’ assessments were “partially persuasive.” (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at
PageID 92.) In the RFC, he precluded Plaintiff from interacting with the public and
limited her to “no more than occasional interaction with supervisors and coworkers, with
no tandem tasks.” (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 87.)
The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s concession that the ALJ’s limitation of Plaintiff
to no interaction with the general public is more restrictive than—and thus more than
adequately accounts for—the State agency reviewers’ assessment that Plaintiff is limited
to superficial and/or occasional interaction with the general public. But the undersigned
disagrees with Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ’s RFC limitations do not account for the
consultants’ opinions regarding Plaintiff’s ability to interact with coworkers and
supervisors. The ALJ’s limitation for “occasional interaction” addresses the consultants’
opinions regarding the quantity of time (“brief”) that Plaintiff could spend with such
individuals. The ALJ’s additional limitation to “no tandem tasks” addresses the
reviewers’ assessments regarding the quality of the interactions (“superficial”) between
Plaintiff and her supervisors or coworkers. Thus, although the ALJ did not specifically
explain the differences between “brief,” “occasional,” and “superficial,” the ALJ
sufficiently accounted for the differences between these terms in the RFC.
Plaintiff further argues that even if the limitation to no tandem tasks is considered
a “quality-type of interaction,” the ALJ’s limitation accounts only for the consultants’
opinions related to interaction with coworkers—not for their opinions regarding
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interaction with supervisors. (SE, Doc. No. 12 at PageID 1002-03.) This contention, too,
is not well-taken.
Plaintiff asserts: “Tandem tasks are performed with coworkers. They are not in
any way related to supervisors. An employee does not regularly engage in collaborative
tasks with their supervisors. Thus, a limitation [t]o tandem tasks would not address a
limitation to superficial interaction with supervisors.” (Id. at PageID 1003.) Plaintiff does
not cite any caselaw to support this assertion. Yet courts in this district have found that a
limitation to “no tandem tasks” is a qualitative limitation that adequately accounts for an
opinion that limits a claimant to superficial interactions with “others”—which includes
both coworkers and supervisors. See, e.g., Latisha D.B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:22cv-3875, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129262, at *10 (S.D. Ohio July 25, 2023) (Litkovitz,
M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-cv-3875, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151981 (S.D. Ohio, Aug. 28, 2023) (Morrison, D.J.) (ALJ’s limitations for “no tandem
tasks or customer service responsibilities” account for the qualitative connotation of the
state agency psychological consultants’ limitation to “superficial interaction with
coworkers, supervisors, and the general public”); Dickinson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
2:19-cv-3670, 2020 WL 4333296, at *11-12 (S.D. Ohio July 28, 2020) (Preston Deavers,
M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:19-cv-3670, 2020 WL 5016823 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 25, 2020) (Graham, D.J.) (RFC limitation to no tandem tasks is “a qualitative
limitation on social interaction” and accounts for state agency psychological consultants’
opinion that the plaintiff needed “superficial contact with coworkers and supervisors”).

15

Likewise, several other district courts within this Circuit have concluded that the
same or similar terms account for the qualitative connotation of “superficial” interactions
with coworkers and supervisors. See, e.g., Kearns v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19 CV
01243, 2020 WL 2841707, at *12 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2020), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 3:19-cv-1243, 2020 WL 2839654 (N.D. Ohio June 1, 2020) (“the ALJ’s
limitation to no team or tandem tasks is a qualitative limitation on social interaction and
adequately addressed the opinion of Drs. Matyi and Finnerty that Kearns be limited to
superficial interaction with others”); Kelsey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-cv-280,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 236048, at *16-17 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 29, 2022), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:22-cv-280, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8698 (W.D. Mich.
Jan. 18, 2023) (restricting the plaintiff “to no interaction with the public, occasional
interaction with supervisors and coworkers, and no tandem or cooperative tasks”
constituted ‘significant limitations . . . on the quality of the interaction, essentially
amount[ing] to no more than superficial contact with supervisors and coworkers’).
The undersigned therefore concludes that the ALJ’s RFC limitation for “no
tandem tasks” adequately accounts for the state agency psychological consultants’
opinions that Plaintiff was limited to superficial interactions with coworkers and
supervisors.
Plaintiff’s contentions also lack merit because the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s social
functioning elsewhere in the decision and explained why he included certain social
limitations in the RFC, and these conclusions are supported by substantial evidence. For
example, the ALJ found at Step Three that Plaintiff has moderate limitation in the “B
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criteria” area of interacting with others. (Decision, Doc. No.7-2 at PageID 85-86.) The
ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s subjective complaints about difficulty getting along with
others, which included separation anxiety when she is away from her children, distrust of
others, anxiety when she leaves her home and goes out in public, fear of judgment,
isolation, and mood swings. (Id. at PageID 85.) The ALJ cited to medical records that
showed abnormalities such as depressed and/or anxious moods and pressured speech. (Id.
at PageID 86.) The ALJ balanced this evidence with treatments records that documented
Plaintiff’s abilities in these areas, such as making a new friend, taking her children trickor-treating, shopping for Christmas gifts on her own, and selling homemade crafts at yard
sales. (Id.) The ALJ also cited normal mental status findings that included a neutral
mood, good eye contact, and cooperative behavior. (Id.)
The ALJ also provided a detailed summary of Plaintiff’s medical records and
mental health treatment history in the RFC analysis. (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID
87-91.) Here, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of mood swings,
anxiety, panic attacks, and depression. (Id.) He also discussed Plaintiff’s daily activities,
including Plaintiff’s complaints of difficulties with driving, anxiety interacting with
others during her prior jobs, separation anxiety when she is away from her children,
distrust of others, difficulty relating to others, isolative behavior, and difficulty with
leaving home and going out in public. (Id.) The ALJ acknowledged several abnormal
objective examination findings that included depressed and anxious moods, a slumped
posture, racing thoughts, pressured or loud speech, difficulty making eye contact, and
restlessness. (Id. at PageID 89-91.) The ALJ compared these findings to other
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examinations that showed a neutral mood, an appropriate affect, clear speech, cooperative
behavior, good eye contact, goal-directed thought processes, appropriate judgment and
insight, and no suicidal or homicidal ideation. (Id.) The ALJ also cited Plaintiff’s reports
of abilities with daily activities such as doing some chores, caring for her minor children,
going grocery shopping with her husband, shopping for Christmas gifts on her own,
making and selling crafts, and engaging in self-care activities which included doing her
nails, cleaning, playing video games, and crafting. (Id. at PageID 88-91.) The ALJ found
that on balance, the evidence did not support Plaintiff’s allegations of symptom severity.
(Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 88-89.) He concluded that to account for Plaintiff’s
mental impairments, the RFC should limit Plaintiff to carrying out the range of simple,
routine tasks described in the RFC that involved occasional interaction with supervisors
and coworkers, with no tandem tasks, and no interaction with the public. (Id. at PageID
94.) These conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.
In sum, although Plaintiff may have preferred a different RFC than the one
determined by the ALJ, the ALJ thoroughly explained the bases for the RFC
determination as it relates to the State Agency psychologists’ proposed limitations and his
explanation is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s decision should therefore be
affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1.

Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. No. 12) be OVERRULED;

2.

The Court AFFIRM the Commissioner’s non-disability determination; and

3.

The case be terminated on the Court’s docket.
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s/ Caroline H. Gentry
Caroline H. Gentry
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within FOURTEEN days after
being served with this Report and Recommendations. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d),
this period is extended to SEVENTEEN days if this Report is being served by one of the
methods of service listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), or (F). Such objections shall
specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and Recommendation is
based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at an oral hearing, the
objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions
of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within FOURTEEN days after being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on
appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947,
949-50 (6th Cir. 1981).

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