Hardy v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 18

ORDER adopting Report and Recommendations re 14 Report and Recommendations.; overruling 15 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge James L. Graham on 3/11/25. (ds)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
:
Ryan H.,1
:
: Case No. 2:23-cv-02296
Plaintiff,
:
v.
: Judge Graham
:
Commissioner of Social Security,
: Magistrate Judge Bowman
:
Defendant.
:
OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff Ryan H. (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action challenging the nondisability finding
made by Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). See Statement of Errors,
doc. 11. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) which found
Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors unpersuasive and recommended that the Commissioner’s
nondisability finding be affirmed. Doc. 14. Plaintiff’s objections to the R&R are now before the
Court and ripe for ruling. Doc. 16. For the reasons that follow, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s
objections, ADOPTS the R&R, in full, and therefore AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s
nondisability finding and DISMISSES this case.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Social Security
The Magistrate Judge accurately set forth the relevant standards which guide the benefit
determination decisions of the Social Security Administration as well as the standard of review
applied by the Court when reviewing such decisions:

1

Pursuant to General Order 22-01, due to significant privacy concerns in social security cases, any opinion, order,
judgment, or other disposition in social security cases in the Southern District of Ohio shall refer to plaintiffs only by
their first names and last initials.

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To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be under a
“disability.” See 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a). Narrowed to its statutory
meaning, a

“disability”

includes

only

physical

or

mental

impairments that are both “medically determinable” and severe
enough to prevent the applicant from (1) performing his or her past
job and (2) engaging in “substantial gainful activity” that is available
in the regional or national economies. See Bowen v. City of New
York, 476 U.S. 467, 469-70 (1986).
When a court is asked to review the Commissioner’s denial
of benefits, the court’s first inquiry is to determine whether the ALJ’s
non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)
(additional citation and internal quotation omitted). In conducting
this review, the court should consider the record as a whole.
Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). If
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s denial of benefits, then that
finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in
the record to support a finding of disability. Felisky v. Bowen, 35
F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994). As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
The Secretary’s findings are not subject to reversal
merely because substantial evidence exists in the
record to support a different conclusion.... The
substantial evidence standard presupposes that
there is a ‘zone of choice’ within which the Secretary
may proceed without interference from the courts. If
the Secretary’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court must affirm.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct.1148,
1154 (2019) (holding that substantial evidence is evidence a

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reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion
and that the threshold “is not high”).
In considering an application for supplemental security
income or for disability benefits, the Social Security Agency is
guided by the following sequential benefits analysis: at Step 1, the
Commissioner asks if the claimant is still performing substantial
gainful activity; at Step 2, the Commissioner determines if one or
more of the claimant’s impairments are “severe;” at Step 3, the
Commissioner analyzes whether the claimant’s impairments, singly
or in combination, meet or equal a Listing in the Listing of
Impairments; at Step 4, the Commissioner determines whether or
not the claimant can still perform his or her past relevant work; and
finally, at Step 5, if it is established that claimant can no longer
perform his or her past relevant work, the burden of proof shifts to
the agency to determine whether a significant number of other jobs
which the claimant can perform exist in the national economy. See
Combs v. Com’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006); 20
C.F.R. §§404.1520, 416.920. A plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to
prove by sufficient evidence that he is entitled to disability benefits.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). Thus, a claimant seeking benefits must
present sufficient evidence to show that, during the relevant time
period, he suffered an impairment, or combination of impairments,
expected to last at least twelve months, that left him unable to
perform any job. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)…
Under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a), an ALJ must evaluate the
“persuasiveness” of each medical opinion by considering multiple
factors, the “most important” of which are “supportability” and
“consistency.” Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 916.920c(b)(2). Supportability
focuses on the provider's explanations for his or her opinions,

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including whether the opinions are supported by relevant objective
medical evidence (such as lab results or imaging studies) or other
supporting explanations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1). Consistency is
defined as the extent to which an opinion or finding is consistent
with evidence from other medical or nonmedical sources. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920c(c)(2). The regulations include a mandatory articulation
requirement to “explain how [the adjudicator] considered the
supportability and consistency factors.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2).
Doc. 14, # 1474-75.2
Objections to a Report and Recommendation
If a party raises timely objections to the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge,
the court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Hardy v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 554 F. Supp. 3d 900, 904 (E.D. Mich. 2021) “The filing of objections
provides the district court with the opportunity… to focus attention on those issues-factual and
legal-that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.” Hardy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 554 F. Supp. 3d
900, 904 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (quoting United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981) and
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985)). Therefore, “only those
specific objections to the magistrate's report made to the district court will be preserved for
appellate review.” Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Tchrs. Loc. 231, Am. Fed'n of Tchrs., AFL-CIO, 829
F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).

2

Page numbers following the “#” symbol refer to the ECF PAGEID numbering system.

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SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
Neither party raises any issues with the Magistrate Judge’s recitation of the administrative
record in the R&R:
On September 18, 2018, Plaintiff filed an application for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits, alleging disability
beginning the date of his application based on a combination of
impairments primarily relating to residual effects from childhood
cancers and his corresponding treatments. After his application was
denied initially and on reconsideration, Plaintiff sought an
administrative hearing. On May 19, 2022, Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) Gregory Kenyon held an evidentiary hearing at which
Plaintiff and his father provided testimony, together with an impartial
vocational expert. ([A.R.] 268-309).[3] On June 21, 2022, ALJ Kenyon
issued an adverse written decision. ([A.R.] 240-267). The Appeals
Council denied further review on May 12, 2023, leaving the ALJ’s
decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Proceeding
through the same counsel who represented him at his administrative
hearing, Plaintiff filed this appeal.
Plaintiff was 18 years old on the date of his alleged disability
and remained in the “younger individual” age category through the
date of the ALJ’s decision. He completed high school and, at the
time of the hearing, was enrolled as a senior at The Ohio State
University, Marion campus. ([A.R.] 247). In college, he has earned
mostly A’s and B’s in coursework designed to lead to a degree in
social work. ([A.R.] 285). He currently lives with his parents. ([A.R.]
274). Plaintiff has no past relevant work and no employment at a
level that would qualify as substantial gainful activity. However, in
3

Citations to the Administrative Record (“A.R.,” see doc. 7), including to hearing transcripts, refer to the Bates
number(s) printed on the bottom-right corner.

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addition to attending college, he has worked 20-25 hours per week
as a cashier for Discount Drug Mart since 2018. ([A.R.]246; [A.R.]
278; see also [A.R.] 755 (reporting that he obtained a job at Discount
Drug Mart while a senior in high school)).
Most of Plaintiff’s impairments are residuals from a
combination of childhood cancers and the chemotherapy that he
underwent to survive them. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the
following severe impairments: “residuals of a remote prior juvenile
pilocytic astrocytoma (brain cancer) including bilateral foot drop and
fascial paralysis, residuals of a lumbar laminectomy, residuals of
leukemia and resulting radiation and chemotherapy including loss of
all hearing in right ear, and partial loss of hearing in the left ear.”
([A.R.] 246). The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff has nonsevere
impairments of “bilateral foot pain secondary to gastrocnemius
equinus, hammer toe and hallux valgus,” and a “mental impairment
of an adjustment disorder with depressed mood.” ([A.R.] 247).
Plaintiff does not dispute the ALJ’s conclusion that none of his
impairments, either singly or in combination, met or medically
equaled the severity of a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. ([A.R.] 251).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retains the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a range of work at the
sedentary exertional capacity, further limited as follows:
occasional crouching, crawling, kneeling, stooping,
balancing, and climbing of ramps and stairs; no
climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; no exposure to
hazards such as unprotected heights or dangerous
machinery; no operation of automotive equipment; no
concentrated exposure to vibrations; occasional use of
the lower extremities for pushing and pulling; and no
concentrated exposure to loud noise.

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([A.R.] 252). Based upon testimony from the vocational expert
(“VE”), the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff remains capable of
performing jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy, including the representative jobs of Charge Account
Clerk, Bench Assembler, and Weight Tester. ([A.R.] 260).
Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under
a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act. ([A.R.] 261).

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in his analysis of the
opinion evidence provided by Dr. Natalie Meyer (consulting psychologist), Dr. Herbert Grodner
(consulting physician), and Dr. Philip Simon (treating physician). The Magistrate Judge found no
error as to the analysis of opinion evidence from Dr. Meyer and Dr. Grodner. The Magistrate Judge
found an “articulation error” in the analysis of the opinion evidence from Dr. Simon, but concluded
that the error was harmless, and remand was unwarranted. In his objections, Plaintiff argues that
the error was not harmless, and also states his objections to the conclusions as to Dr. Meyer and
Dr. Grodner but refers only to the arguments presented in his Statement of Errors. The Court
addresses the challenged portions in the order they are presented in the R&R and the ALJ’s
decision.
Dr. Meyer
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to incorporate opinion evidence from Dr. Meyer into
Plaintiff’s RFC. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ considered the opinions of Dr. Meyer
“persuasive to the extent that they are consistent with the overall evidentiary record,” (A.R., 250)
but the ALJ failed to incorporate “any allowance for additional time,” (doc. 11, # 1447) despite

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Dr. Meyer opining that Plaintiff “might continue to require additional time to complete tasks.”
A.R., 250. Citing Irvin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Plaintiff argues “it is harmful error for an ALJ to
find opinion evidence credible and thereafter fail to incorporate all aspects of the opinion into the
[RFC] assessment.” Doc. 11, # 1448 (citing 573 Fed.Appx. 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2014)).
In Irvin, the ALJ wrote that his RFC assessment “mirrored the findings” of two reviewing
physicians. Id. However, both physicians had opined that the claimant had manipulative
limitations, which the ALJ did not include in his RFC. Id. As such, by not incorporating “all aspects
of the opinion[s],” (doc. 11, # 1448) the ALJ’s decision was contradictory on its face, constituting
error. Id.
The instant case shows no such contradiction. Here, the ALJ’s findings as to the opinion
evidence of Dr. Meyer are consistent with the ALJ’s determinations as to Plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ
found Dr. Meyer’s opinions “persuasive to the extent they are consistent with the overall
evidentiary record.” A.R., 250. The short answer to Plaintiff’s objection on this point is that an
“additional time” limitation is not consistent with the overall evidentiary record, as sufficiently
explained by the ALJ. Three (3) different doctors opined as to Plaintiff’s mental impairments—
Dr. Meyer, Dr. Katherine Fernandez, and Dr. David Dietz. Id. Of the three (3), only Dr. Dietz
found that Plaintiff had any medically determinable mental impairment. Id. As the ALJ
summarized, Dr. Dietz found that “[Plaintiff’s] adjustment disorder was not severe in nature, as it
had caused no more than mild limitation in his ability to interact with others and no limitations in
his ability to understand, remember or apply information, concentrate, persist, or maintain pace
and adapt or manage.” Id. (citing A.R., 334-35). Dr. Fernandez “found no evidence of a medically
determinable mental impairment.” Id. (citing A.R., 318). Likewise, Dr. Meyer herself determined
that Plaintiff “does not meet criteria for a DSM-5 diagnosis at this time.” A.R., 757.

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The Court also agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that “Dr. Meyer’s vague and
equivocal statements that Plaintiff ‘may’ need extra time or ‘may’ be slower to complete tasks than
others his age simply do not equate to an opinion that Plaintiff requires any specific functional
workplace limitation.” Doc. 14, # 1481. Furthermore, those statements from Dr. Meyer are not
based on her own observations of Plaintiff’s functioning, but rather appear to be contextualizing
her conclusions within Plaintiff’s broader medical history. A.R., 758. Dr. Meyer observed that
Plaintiff “had no difficulty following conversationally and responding to direct questions,” and
that “he was able to complete verbal reasoning and math calculation tasks.” Id. But Dr. Meyer
further noted,
[Plaintiff’s] processing speed was previously assessed to be a
significant difficulty when compared with his other cognitive
abilities. [Plaintiff] may be slower to complete tasks than other
people his age. He receives extra time on tests, a scribe, and
electronic notes prior to classes. He may continue to require
additional time to complete tasks.
Id. (emphasis supplied). As the Magistrate Judge noted in the R&R, Plaintiff’s additional-time
accommodations were provided in an educational context—a context which “differs significantly
from the performance of unskilled jobs in the workplace.” Doc. 14, # 1482. In sum, the Court finds
no error in the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Meyer’s opinions and overrules Plaintiff’s objections in
that regard.
Dr. Grodner
As with the analysis of Dr. Meyer’s opinions above, Plaintiff’s objection on this point
refers only to the arguments made in his statement of errors. In other words, the objection is not
specifically responsive to the reasoning in the R&R as to the opinion evidence of Dr. Grodner.4 In

The reasoning in the R&R, however, is specifically responsive to the arguments raised in Plaintiff’s statement of
errors.
4

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his statement of errors, Plaintiff alleges two errors as to the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Grodner’s
opinions. First, Plaintiff contends that “the ALJ’s analysis collapses the supportability and
consistency factors, in stating that Dr. Grodner’s clinical observations are generally consistent with
the record as a whole.” Doc. 11, # 1446. Second, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to include
upper-right extremity limitations in its formulated RFC, which Plaintiff alleges to be inconsistent
with the Dr. Grodner’s findings. Id.
As to the first error, alleging that the ALJ failed to properly articulate “how [he] considered
the supportability and consistency factors” (20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2)), the Court agrees with the
Magistrate Judge that “the ALJ adequately discussed both supportability and consistency here”:
With respect to “supportability,” the ALJ noted that “Dr. Grodner had
the opportunity to personally interview, observe, and objectively
examine the claimant, [but] he did not provide a specific function-byfunction analysis of what the claimant could do despite his
impairments.” (Tr. 258). With respect to “consistency,” the ALJ found
Dr. Grodner’s “clinical observations and findings…[to be] generally
consistent with the evidentiary record as a whole” and therefore
found his opinion to be “persuasive to the extent it is not inconsistent
with the …capacity to perform sedentary level work.” (Tr. 258).
Therefore, the ALJ sufficiently discussed each of the two factors.
Accord Hardy, 2021 WL 4059310 *3 (affirming where the ALJ cited
the applicable regulatory requirements, referenced that the medical
source had conducted a clinical interview, and “implicitly observed”
that the opined limitation was “not supported by information in his
report and his own observations … during the evaluation.”).
Doc. 14, # 1485. The articulation requirement as to the supportability and consistency factors does
not require a specific level of detail. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical

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Evidence, 82 FR 5844-01 (“the appropriate level of articulation will necessarily depend on the
unique circumstances of each claim.”). Plaintiff has articulated no argument which would dissuade
the Court from following the persuasive reasoning of the Magistrate Judge.
As to the second error, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the
ALJ’s omission of right-arm limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC “is substantially supported by Dr.
Grodner’s report as well as by the record as a whole.” Doc. 14, # 1486. The ALJ observed that Dr.
Grodner did not “provide a specific function-by-function analysis” of Plaintiff’s functional
capacity.5 A.R., 258. Specifically, relevant to Plaintiff’s right arm, Dr. Grodner noted:
He had a mild weakness, 4 out of 5, in the right upper extremity and
right lower extremity… Grip strength was 10 psi on the right and 20
psi on the left with the dynamometer. At this time, he is more lefthand dominant. He could grasp and manipulate. He picked up a
small coin and paperclip without difficulty.
A.R., 765. Plaintiff contends that, due to the ALJ’s omission of limitations pertaining to Plaintiff’s
right arm, the RFC “allows for constant use of the right upper extremity, despite Dr. Grodner’s
indication of difficulty with repetitive movement on the right side and primary use of his left, nondominant hand.”6 Doc. 11, # 1446-47. Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that the Vocational Expert
(“VE”) “testified that a restriction to occasional use of the dominant upper extremity for handling
and fingering would eliminate all but one sedentary occupation.” Id. at # 1447.
Setting aside the ambiguity as to which is Plaintiff’s “dominant” side, the Magistrate Judge
observed that “no medical source opined that Plaintiff was limited to ‘occasional’ handling and
fingering—a limitation that would be inconsistent with Plaintiff’s ongoing employment as a

The Court understands this to refer to the fact that Dr. Grodner’s report does not specifically address the Plaintiff’s
capacity in the terms listed in 20 C.F.R. § 416.922, such as, e.g., “walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling,
reaching, carrying, or handling,” and that his report does not distill his findings into an RFC summary.
6
In his report, Dr. Grodner states that Plaintiff “is right-hand dominant” (A.R., 763) before later noting “at this time,
he is more left-hand dominant.” A.R., 765. Plaintiff’s testimony similarly indicates that, despite his original righthandedness, he has developed functional aptitude with his left hand. See A.R., 279 (“I used to write right-handed but
slowly I drifted to my left hand.”).
5

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cashier.” Doc. 14, # 1487. As such, the Court finds no error with ALJ’s analysis of the opinion
evidence from Dr. Grodner.
Dr. Simon
The bulk of Plaintiff’s briefing on his objections concerns the opinion evidence from his
treating physician, Dr. Philip Simon. As to this evidence, the Magistrate Judge concluded,
In sum, both the physical and mental RFC as determined were
substantially supported. Any different RFC opinions by Dr.
Simon were so lacking in support that the ALJ’s failure to
explicitly discuss their supportability was harmless on the
record presented.
Doc. 14, # 1494-95. Plaintiff specifically objects to the “harmless” finding, arguing that the failure
to articulate the supportability factor “prejudiced Plaintiff on the merits.” Doc. 16, # 1501 (citing
Rabbers v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 582 F.3d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 2009)).
Plaintiff cites Rabbers for the proposition that the ALJ’s failure to follow the regulations
constitutes “reversible error.” Doc. 16, # 1501. But his reliance on Rabbers appears unfounded, as
the Sixth Circuit ultimately held that “the ALJ’s failure to rate the B criteria, while error, was
harmless in this case.” 582 F.3d at 661. In Rabbers, the court discussed the (since-abandoned)
“treating physician rule,” which required additional weight given to a treating source, and how an
ALJ’s failure to adhere to that rule was not harmless when it undermined “[an] important purpose”
of the rule: “to ensure that a claimant understands the disposition of his or her case.” Id. at 657.
But even that error could be harmless when “the treating physician’s opinion is ‘so patently
deficient that the Commissioner would not possibly credit it.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004)). The Social Security Administration did away with
the treating physician rule in 2017, though the claimant’s understanding of the disposition of their
case remains no less important. But in that regard, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s contention

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that remand is required because “without fuller explanation, [the Court] cannot engage in
meaningful review of the ALJ’s decision.” Doc. 16, # 1502 (quoting Reed v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 3:20-CV-02611-CEH, 2021 WL 5908381, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 14, 2021)).
In this case, as to Dr. Simon’s opinion evidence, the ALJ determined:
While some of the limitations assessed by Dr. Simon are consistent
with and supported by the evidentiary record, and have been
partially incorporated in the residual functional capacity herein, his
opinion that the claimant was limited to sedentary level work for a
maximum of six hours per day and could work for less than three
consecutive weeks per month is not supported by the totality of the
objective evidence. Nor is this limitation consistent with the
claimant’s demonstrated activities of daily living, including
attending college while working part-time 20-25 hours per week
performing above sedentary level work-related activity.
A.R., 259. The Court is satisfied that the ALJ sufficiently articulated the supportability and
consistency factors as to the opinion evidence of Dr. Simon. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s
statement that a portion of Dr. Simon’s opinion “is not supported by the totality of the objective
evidence” (id.) is flawed because it “collapses the consistency and supportability factors into one
analysis and fails to acknowledge the distinction between, and specific analysis relevant to, the
two factors.” Doc. 11, # 1444.
For support, Plaintiff cites Reusel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:20-CV-1291, 2021 WL
1697919 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2021), but, like Rabbers, supra, Reusel does not provide the support
that Plaintiff seeks. In Reusel, the court observed that the ALJ’s analysis came “dangerously close
to mixing up ‘supportability’ and ‘inconsistency.’” 2021 WL 1697919 at *7 n.6. But the court
further observed that “the law does not require ALJ’s to use perfect diction… only that ALJs
provide enough context for the court to trace their reasoning.” Id. Thus, despite the ALJ describing
an opinion as—like Dr. Simon’s here—“not supported by the evidence,” the Reusel court could
conclude that “this was plainly an inconsistency finding.” Id.
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Similarly, here, the Court has no difficulty tracing the reasoning of the ALJ. As Plaintiff’s
primary care physician, Dr. Simon saw Plaintiff for a variety of issues, most of which were entirely
unrelated to his disabling conditions. See doc. 14, # 1488 (describing Dr. Simon’s treatment history
of Plaintiff as including a pre-operative exam, an ER follow-up, an appointment to prescribe an
antidepressant, and treatment for conjunctivitis). “Therefore,” the Magistrate Judge concluded, “it
is clear that Dr. Simon relied solely on Plaintiff’s medical history.” Id. at # 1492. To the extent
that Dr. Simon opined on postural limitations based on Plaintiff’s medical history, the ALJ
discussed the pertinent medical records throughout the opinion, and, in any event, determined that
Plaintiff should be limited to sedentary work. Id. In sum, the Court finds no error as to the ALJ’s
consideration of Dr. Simon’s opinion, therefore overrules Plaintiff’s objections in that regard.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court find no error in the ALJ’s non-disability
determination. Therefore, Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED, the Magistrate Judge’s R&R
is ADOPTED, the Commissioner’s non-disability finding is AFFIRMED, and this case is
DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ James L. Graham
JAMES L. GRAHAM
United States District Judge
DATE: March 11, 2025

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