Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 10

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS - IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT: 1. Plaintiff's Statement of Errors (Doc. No. 8 ) be OVERRULED; 2. The Court AFFIRM the Commissioner's non-disability determination; and 3. The case be terminated on the Courts docket. Objections to R&R due by 9/13/2024. Signed by Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry on 8/30/2024. (srb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
ROBERT J., 1
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

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Case No. 2:23-cv-02469
District Judge Michael H. Watson
Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2
Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on
November 7, 2017. Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. After
a hearing at Plaintiff’s request, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that
Plaintiff was not eligible for benefits because he was not under a “disability” as defined
in the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council granted Plaintiff’s request for review,
vacated the ALJ’s decision, and remanded the case for resolution of several issues. On
remand, a different ALJ held a hearing and issued a written decision, again concluding
that Plaintiff was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review
of that decision. Plaintiff subsequently filed this action.

See S.D. Ohio General Order 22-01 (“The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management
of the Judicial Conference of the United States has recommended that due to significant privacy concerns
in social security cases federal courts should refer to claimants only by their first names and last
initials.”).
1

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The notice at the end of this opinion informs the parties of their ability to file
objections to this Report and Recommendations within the specified time period.
2

Plaintiff seeks an order remanding this matter to the Commissioner for the award
of benefits or, in the alternative, for further proceedings. The Commissioner asks the
Court to affirm the non-disability decision. For the reasons set forth below, the
undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that the Commissioner’s decision be
AFFIRMED.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts that he has been under a disability since December 31, 2007. 3 He

was forty-four years old on the date that he filed his SSI application. Accordingly,
Plaintiff was considered a “younger person” under Social Security Regulations. See 20
C.F.R. § 416.963(c). Plaintiff has a “high school education and above.” See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.964(b)(4).
The evidence in the Administrative Record (“AR,” Doc. No. 7) is summarized in
the ALJ’s decision (“Decision,” Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 54-80), Plaintiff’s Statement of
Errors (“SE,” Doc. No. 8), and the Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (“Mem.
In Opp.,” Doc. No. 9). Rather than repeat these summaries, the Court will discuss the
pertinent evidence in its analysis below.

Regardless of the actual or alleged onset of disability, an SSI claimant is not entitled to SSI benefits
prior to the date that the claimant files an SSI application. Thus, the relevant period of consideration in
this case begins on November 7, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.335; Koster v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 643 Fed.
Appx. 466, 478 (6th Cir. 2016) (“For purposes of SSI, which is not retroactive, the relevant period here is
. . . the date [Plaintiff] filed his protective application.”).
3

2

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Social Security Administration provides SSI to individuals who are under a

“disability,” among other eligibility requirements. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S.
467, 470 (1986); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 423(a)(1), 1382(a). The term “disability” means
“the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a).
This Court’s review of an ALJ’s unfavorable decision is limited to two inquiries:
“whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the ALJ
are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399,
406 (6th Cir. 2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”).
“Unless the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has made findings of
fact unsupported by substantial evidence,” this Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.
Emard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 953 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2020). Thus, the Court “may
not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of
credibility.” Id.
“Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing
administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the
agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)
(citation omitted). This limited standard of review does not permit the Court to weigh the
evidence and decide whether the preponderance of the evidence supports a different
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conclusion. Instead, the Court is confined to determining whether the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, which “means—and means only—‘such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id.
(citation omitted). This standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which
the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts.” Mullen v.
Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). Thus, the Court may be required to affirm the
ALJ’s decision even if substantial evidence in the record supports the opposite
conclusion. Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir.1997).
The other line of judicial inquiry—reviewing the correctness of the ALJ’s legal
criteria—may result in reversal even when the record contains substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ’s factual findings. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651
(6th Cir. 2009). “[E]ven if supported by substantial evidence, ‘a decision of the
Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and
where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a
substantial right.’” Id. (citations omitted). Such an error of law will require reversal even
if “the outcome on remand is unlikely to be different.” Cardew v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
896 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
III.

FACTS
A.

The ALJ’s Factual Findings

The ALJ was tasked with evaluating the evidence related to Plaintiff’s application
for benefits. In doing so, the ALJ considered each of the five sequential steps set forth in

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the Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The ALJ made the following
findings of fact:
Step 1:

Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
November 7, 2017, the SSI application date.

Step 2:

He has the severe impairments of bipolar disorder, depressive
disorder anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
schizoaffective disorder, schizophrenia, lumbar degenerative disc
disease, and alcohol use disorder.

Step 3:

He does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or equals the severity of one in the Commissioner’s Listing of
Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

Step 4:

His residual functional capacity (RFC), or the most he can do despite
his impairments, see Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235,
239 (6th Cir. 2002), consists of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.967(b), subject to the following limitations: “[H]e is able to
understand, remember and carry out simple 1-2 step instructions. He
is able to concentrate, persist and maintain pace for 2[-]hour
intervals while performing simple tasks. He is able to occasionally
interact with supervisors[] and coworkers but can have no interaction
with the general public. He is able to adapt to routine changes in the
workplace.”
He has no past relevant work.

Step 5:

Considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC,
there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that he can perform.

(Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 59-71.) These findings led the ALJ to conclude that
Plaintiff does not meet the definition of disability and so is not eligible for benefits. (Id. at
PageID 72.)

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B.

State Agency Psychological Consultants

State agency psychological consultant Laura Cutler, Ph.D. completed a Disability
Determination Explanation form in March 2018. (AR, Doc. No. 7-3 at PageID 189-94.)
Dr. Cutler found moderate impairment in all four “Paragraph B” areas of functioning. (Id.
at PageID 189.) In the mental RFC section of the form, Dr. Cutler indicated that Plaintiff
was markedly limited in the ability to interact appropriately with the general public. (Id.
at PageID 193.) She otherwise opined that Plaintiff was moderately limited in the abilities
of carrying out detailed instructions, maintaining attention and concentration for extended
periods, working in coordination with or in proximity to others without being distracted
by them, accepting instructions and responding appropriately to criticism from
supervisors, getting along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting
behavioral extremes, and responding appropriately to changes in the work setting. (Id. at
PageID 192-94.) In terms of functional limitations, Dr. Cutler opined that Plaintiff was
able to: understand, remember, and carry out simple one- and two-step instructions;
sustain attention for two-hour segments for simple tasks; tolerate occasional (defined as
one-third of the time) contact with coworkers and supervisors in nonpublic settings; and
adapt to routine changes as needed within the preceding parameters. (Id. at PageID 194.)
Michelle Bornstein, Psy.D. reviewed the updated record at the reconsideration
level in June 2018, and she essentially adopted Dr. Cutler’s assessment (Id. at PageID
205-10.)
The ALJ concluded that the state agency psychological consultants’ assessments
were “persuasive.” (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 70.) The ALJ explained that their
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findings were “generally supported by and consistent with the record, which reflects
adequate mental functioning for basic work-related activities despite his noncompliance
with treatment recommendations (see 3F/5, 10F/8, 15F/5).” (Id.) By way of example, the
ALJ cited a June 2018 mental status examination, “when [Plaintiff] was adhering to his
treatment recommendations,” that showed “a euthymic mood and normal exam findings.”
(Id. (citing AR, Doc. No. 7-7 at PageID 837).) The ALJ also cited the February 2018
report from consultative psychologist Dr. Green which documented “average
intelligence, intact attention, normal remote and short-term memory with only mild
impairments in concentration and immediate memory,” and “cooperative and friendly
[behavior] despite his complaints (4F/3).” (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 70 (citing
AR, Doc. No. 7-7 at PageID 788).) Additionally, the ALJ cited treatment notes that
“reflect[ed] that he was cooperative even when he was not taking his medication, though
his eye contact was sometimes avoidant (e.g. 7F/6, 13F/11).” (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at
PageID 70 (citing AR, Doc. No. 7-7 at PageID 804, 956).) The ALJ further explained that
although the consultants did not review all of the evidence, “more recent evidence is of a
similar character, with breaks in treatment, medication noncompliance, and varying
mental status exam findings (13F/11, 15F/5, 16F/14).” (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID
70 (citing AR, Doc. No. 7-7 at PageID 956, 1049; AR, Doc. No. 7-8 at PageID 1100).)
IV.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts just one error: “The ALJ misconstrued the state agency expert’s

opinion when creating the RFC.” (SSE, Doc. No. 8 at PageID 1212.) Specifically,
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred because he found that the consultants’ findings were
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persuasive but did not adopt the consultants’ proposed limitation that Plaintiff work in a
non-public work setting. (Id. at PageID 1212.) According to Plaintiff, the ALJ’s RFC
limitation for “no interaction with the general public” is “materially different” from the
consultants’ limitation. (Id. at PageID 1213-14.) Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ’s failure
to address this inconsistency makes it impossible to adequately review the ALJ’s
decision.” (Id. at PageID 1215.) Because these assertions are not well-taken, the
undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court affirm the Commissioner’s
decision.
A.

Applicable Law.

Determination of the RFC is a task reserved for the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 416.946(c);
see also Webb v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he ALJ is
charged with the responsibility of evaluating the medical evidence and the claimant’s
testimony to form an ‘assessment of his [RFC]’”). A claimant’s RFC describes the most
he can do in a work setting despite his physical and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.945(a)(1). When formulating the RFC, the ALJ must consider the claimant’s
“ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements of work.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.945(a)(4). The ALJ must base the RFC on all relevant evidence in the record,
including the claimant’s descriptions of his limitations and symptoms, objective medical
evidence, medical opinions, other medical evidence, evidence from non-medical sources,
and prior administrative medical findings. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1)-(5).
Notably, “[t]he responsibility for determining a claimant's [RFC] rests with the
ALJ, not a physician.” Poe v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009)
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(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c)). An ALJ is required to consider medical opinion
evidence when determining the RFC, but he is not required to adopt them or adopt any
such findings verbatim. Poe, 342 F. App’x at 156-57 (6th Cir. 2009). In addition, “[t]he
determination of a plaintiff’s RFC is entirely within the purview of the ALJ, and this
Court will defer to that finding even if there is substantial evidence in the record that
would have supported an opposite conclusion.” Rieder v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20CV-05858, 2021 WL 5881784, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 13, 2021) (internal quotations and
citation omitted) (Preston Deavers, M.J.).
Nevertheless, an ALJ is required “to show his or her work.” Scott K. v. Comm’r of
the SSA, No. 3:21-CV-00129, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175673, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
27, 2022) (Silvain, M.J.) (internal citation omitted). Thus, “[t]his Court cannot uphold an
ALJ’s decision, even if there if there is enough evidence in the record to support the
decision, where the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an accurate and logical
bridge between the evidence and the result.” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp. 2d 875,
877 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (cleaned up) (internal quotations and citation omitted). See also
Danyel P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:21-CV-02405, 2022 WL 1514170, at *6 (S.D.
Ohio May 13, 2022) (Preston Deavers, M.J.) (ALJ’s “inexplicable and illogical
consistency” warranted remand); Kimberly S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:21-CV00310, 2022 WL 17820565, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2022) (Silvain, M.J.) (ALJs must
“provide a coherent explanation of [their] reasoning . . . in order to provide sufficient
rationale for a reviewing adjudicator or court”); Hardiman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
2:12-CV-00508, 2013 WL 3762266, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 16, 2013) (Preston Deavers,
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M.J.) (remanding case on the ground that “the ALJ’s decision is internally inconsistent
and incomplete”).
B.

The ALJ Did Not Reversibly Err In Assessing Plaintiff’s RFC.

Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred because he did not account for the
psychological consultants’ limitation to a “nonpublic setting” is not well-taken. The ALJ
complied with applicable regulations when he found that the consultants’ findings were
persuasive—which Plaintiff does not dispute. For the reasons discussed below, the ALJ’s
RFC limitation for “no interaction with the general public” is supported by substantial
evidence, and the ALJ’s decision should be affirmed.
Defendants point to two cases from this district to support the assertion that the
ALJ did not err by limiting Plaintiff to “no interaction with the general public.” (Mem. In.
Opp., Doc. No. 9 at PageID 1222-23 (citing Slaughter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:19cv-4867, 2020 WL 2988468, at *8 (S.D. Ohio June 4, 2020) (Vascura, M.J.), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 2:19-cv-4867, 2021 WL 1102617 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 23,
2021) (Sargus, D.J.); Good v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20-cv-3781, 2021 WL
4771262, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 13, 2021) (Deavers, M.J.), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 2:20-cv-3781, 2021 WL 6134169 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 29, 2021) (Morrison,
D.J.)).) The undersigned finds that both cases are persuasive.
In Slaughter, the state agency psychological consultant opined that Plaintiff
“would be expected to be able to respond appropriately in a solitary/nonpublic work
setting with occasional/intermittent interactions with coworkers and supervisors.” 2020
WL 2988468, at *4. The court concluded that the ALJ did not err when he assigned
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partial weight to the state agency psychological consultant’s opinion and limited the
plaintiff to “occasional interaction with supervisors and coworkers, but no interaction
with the general public.” Id. at *2, 7. The court reasoned that the ALJ explained why the
plaintiff was not as limited as the consultant opined and cited to evidence in the record to
support that conclusion. Id. at *8. The court also noted that, even if the ALJ had adopted
the consultant’s findings, he was “not required to recite the medical opinion of a
physician verbatim in his [RFC] finding.” Id. (citing Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F.
App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009)). The court found that the ALJ’s RFC sufficiently
accounted for the consultant’s opinion regarding the plaintiff’s social interaction
limitations and that “the ALJ was not required to offer an explanation for why he did not
parrot [the consultant’s] opined limitation verbatim.” Slaughter, 2020 WL 2988468, at
*8.
Similarly, the court in Good held that an ALJ did not reversibly err when she
included an RFC limitation to “avoid interactions with the public” – despite assigning
great weight to the state agency psychological consultants who opined that the plaintiff
required “a separate work area in a non-public setting.” 2021 WL 4771262, at *3, 6-7.
First, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the consultants’ findings equated to
an opinion that the plaintiff required complete isolation, and it found that the ALJ’s
limitation regarding public interaction “properly incorporate[d]” the consultants’ opinion.
Id. at *6-7. The Good court also noted that “the ALJ was under no obligation to adopt the
opinions verbatim.” Id. at *6 (citing Reeves v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App’x 267,
275 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Even where an ALJ provides ‘great weight’ to an opinion, there is
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no requirement that an ALJ adopt a state agency psychologist’s opinions verbatim; nor is
the ALJ required to adopt the state agency psychologist's limitations wholesale.”)).
Second, the court concluded that the ALJ’s RFC—and specifically the level of social
interaction set forth in the RFC—was supported by substantial evidence. Id. at *7.
This case is particularly analogous to Good. Similar to the state agency
psychological consultants in Good, the consultants in this case limited Plaintiff to work in
“nonpublic settings.” (AR, Doc. No. 7-3 at PageID 194, 209.) And much like the ALJ in
Good, the ALJ here concluded that the consultants’ findings were persuasive and limited
Plaintiff to “no interaction with the general public” in the RFC. (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2
at PageID 62.) For the same reasons that the Good court articulated, the undersigned
Magistrate Judge concludes that the ALJ’s RFC limitation regarding public interaction
“properly incorporates” the consultants’ opinions. Good, 2021 WL 4771262, at *6. First,
the ALJ was not required to adopt the consultants’ limitation for “nonpublic settings”
verbatim. See id. Second, the ALJ’s RFC—specifically the limitation at issue for no
interaction with the general public—is supported by substantial evidence. See id. at *7.
The ALJ acknowledged many of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints related to his
bipolar disorder, depressive and anxiety disorders, and schizophrenia in the decision,
including social withdrawal and isolation, irritability, paranoia, anti-social tendencies,
and some reports of homicidal ideation. (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 61, 63-64.)
The ALJ also summarized the medical records that documented Plaintiff’s treatment for
his mental health symptoms. (Id. at PageID 60-62, 65-69.) The ALJ acknowledged that
Plaintiff was involuntarily hospitalized in December 2017, shortly after the SSI
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application date, for complaints of homicidal ideation and auditory hallucinations. (Id. at
65.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had been off medication for approximately two years
prior to the admission. (Id.) The ALJ further noted that providers treated Plaintiff with
medication for a bipolar-type schizoaffective disorder, and that Plaintiff tolerated the
medications well. (Id. at PageID 65-66.)
The ALJ described a February 2018 consultative psychological evaluation and
acknowledged Plaintiff’s reports of irritability, anxiety, and hearing voices that “tried to
make him harm others.” (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 66.) Significantly, Plaintiff
told the evaluating psychologist that “his persistent incarceration had been the biggest
barrier to consistent employment.” (Id.) The ALJ cited several abnormal mental status
findings such as a depressed mood, paranoid ideation, poor judgment, and mildly
impaired concentration and immediate memory. (Id.) The ALJ also cited other normal
findings which included cooperative and friendly behavior, an appropriate appearance,
normal psychomotor activity, unremarkable thought processes, adequate insight, intact
attention, and normal remote and short-term memory. (Id.)
The ALJ then summarized Plaintiff’s treatment after that time, which included
several visits to behavioral urgent care centers and emergency departments, as well as
several behavioral treatment intake evaluations. (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 6769.) The ALJ acknowledged many of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints which included
rapid-cycling moods, paranoia, irritation, anger management issues, interpersonal
difficulties, isolation, auditory hallucinations, depressive symptoms, anhedonia, panic
attacks, insomnia, and suicidal ideation but with no plans. (Id.) The ALJ also
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acknowledged many of the abnormal mental status findings that providers documented
during these visits, such as avoidant eye contact, a depressed or anxious mood, anger and
irritability, a flat affect, anhedonia, some impairment in immediate memory and attention,
poor insight, distractibility, and thought process abnormalities that included flashbacks,
paranoia, and rumination. (Id.) The ALJ compared this evidence to other examinations
which showed a euthymic affect, good eye contact, appropriate dress, adequate grooming
and hygiene, cooperative behavior, normal and articulate speech, normal psychomotor
activity, intact attention, no memory problems, average estimated intelligence, fair to
intact insight and judgment, no abnormal thought content, and organized, logical, linear,
and goal-directed thought processes. (Id.) The ALJ further noted that Plaintiff denied
suicidal ideation, homicidal ideation, and command hallucinations on several occasions.
(Id.)
Moreover, in the “Paragraph B” analysis at Step Three, the ALJ specifically
evaluated Plaintiff’s ability to interact with others and explained why he found
moderate—as opposed to marked—impairment in Plaintiff’s ability to interact with
others. (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 61.) The ALJ cited to many of the abnormal
and normal findings discussed above. (Id.) The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff reported
attending “a whole lot” of classes for a rehabilitation program, and that Plaintiff stated
that he was able to use public transportation and go out alone. (Id.) The ALJ reasoned
that this evidence showed “some ability to interact appropriately in public.” (Id.) The
ALJ balanced this evidence and concluded that Plaintiff experiences moderate limitation
in the area of interacting with others. (Id.) Significantly, Plaintiff did not assert any errors
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related to the ALJ’s “Paragraph B” findings and has not alleged that the ALJ should have
found marked impairment in this area. (See generally SE, Doc. No. 8.)
The ALJ concluded that the balance of the objective evidence did not support
Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling symptoms. (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID 64-69.)
Even so, the ALJ accounted for this evidence by limiting Plaintiff to simple, one- to twostep tasks that involve concentration for two-hour periods, occasional interaction with
coworkers and supervisors, no interaction with the general public, and routine changes.
(Id. at PageID 62 69.) Because the ALJ’s limitation for “no interaction with the general
public” is supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ did not err by failing to adopt
verbatim the psychological consultants’ limitation for a “nonpublic setting.”
Plaintiff contends that the consultants’ opinion and the ALJ’s RFC limitation were
“materially different from one another.” (See SE, Doc. No. 8 at PageID 1213-14.) For the
reasons discussed above, the ALJ’s RFC limitation for no interaction with the general
public “properly incorporates” the consultants’ opinions that Plaintiff was limited to
working in a non-public setting. See Good, 2021 WL 4771262, at *6. Plaintiff cites to a
case from another district in this circuit to support the assertion that the limitations are
distinctly different and that the ALJ’s RFC “does not accurately reflect” the consultants’
opinions. (SE, Doc. No. 8 at PageID 1214 (citing Hawkins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
5:20-cv-1245, 2021 WL 2227380, at *6-7 (N.D. Ohio, June 2, 2021)).) It is true that the
vocational expert in that case testified that a “nonpublic setting” could have different
meanings. Hawkins, 2021 WL 227380 at *7. But Hawkins is distinguishable. The ALJ in
this case did not limit Plaintiff to a “nonpublic setting” – as discussed above he limited
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Plaintiff to “no interaction with the general public.” (Decision, Doc. No. 7-2 at PageID
62.) Additionally, the vocational expert at the October 2021 hearing did provide any
testimony to clarify the scope of any of the ALJ’s limitations like in Hawkins. (AR, Doc.
No. 7-2 at PageID 112-14.) Instead, the vocational expert testified that a hypothetical
individual of Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience—and with the ALJ’s RFC
for a reduced range of light work, including the limitation for no interaction with the
general public—would be able to perform jobs in the national economy. (Id.) More
importantly, as discussed above the ALJ was not required to adopt the consultants’
limitations “wholesale” or verbatim. See Good, 2021 WL 4771262, at *6 (citing Reeves,
618 F. App’x at 275); Slaughter, 2020 WL 2988468, at *8 (citing Poe, 342 F. App’x at
157).
A disability claimant bears the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that
he is entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912. The burden is on a claimant to
furnish medical and other evidence about his impairments and the effects of his
impairments on the ability to work. Id. Here, Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ erred
by failing to include verbatim the consultants’ limitation regarding public interaction. As
discussed above, the ALJ thoroughly evaluated the medical evidence related to Plaintiff's
impairments and explained his reasons for including the related functional restrictions in
the RFC. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged that the ALJ committed any other errors.
Plaintiff has not argued or shown that the evidence before the ALJ required the inclusion
of different or greater limitations to account for any other difficulties related to Plaintiff’s
mental impairments. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that the ALJ erred when he relied on VE
16

testimony that accurately reflected Plaintiff's functional limitations. For these reasons,
Plaintiff has not met his burden of proving that the ALJ's decision is unsupported by
substantial evidence. The ALJ’s decision should therefore be affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1.

Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. No. 8) be OVERRULED;

2.

The Court AFFIRM the Commissioner’s non-disability determination; and

3.

The case be terminated on the Court’s docket.
s/ Caroline H. Gentry
Caroline H. Gentry
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within FOURTEEN days after
being served with this Report and Recommendations. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d),
this period is extended to SEVENTEEN days if this Report is being served by one of the
methods of service listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), or (F). Such objections shall
specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and Recommendations is
based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at an oral hearing, the
objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions
of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
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assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within FOURTEEN days after being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on
appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947,
949-50 (6th Cir. 1981).

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