Campbell v. Warden Southeastern Correctional Institution

Filing 13

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Daniel Campbell. It is RECOMMENDED that the habeas petition be DENIED, and this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Objections to R&R due by 12/6/2024. Signed by Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura on 11/22/2024. (mas)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS
DANIEL CAMPBELL,
Petitioner,
vs.
WARDEN, SOUTHEASTERN
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
Respondent.

: Case No. 2:23-cv-3332
:
:
: Chief District Judge Sarah D. Morrison
: Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
:
:
:
:
:

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
Daniel Campbell, a state prisoner proceeding with counsel, has filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the Court to consider the
Petition (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1), the Return of Writ (ECF No. 7), Campbell’s Reply (ECF No. 12), and
the state court record. (ECF Nos. 6, 6-1, 6-2, 6-3). Because follow, it is RECOMMENDED that
this action be DISMISSED.
I.

Procedural History
State Trial Proceedings
Campbell was indicted on May 9, 2019, in the Court of Common Pleas for Fairfield

County Ohio on one count of gross sexual imposition, five counts of illegal use of minor in
nudity-oriented material or performance, and three counts of pandering sexually oriented matter
involving a minor. (ECF No. 6 at PageID# 37-43). Campbell’s counsel filed a Motion to
Suppress the evidence that formed the basis of the charges, which was obtained by Campbell’s
probation officer following a warrantless search. (Id. at PageID# 47-62). Following a hearing,
held on September 25, 2019, the trial court denied the Motion to Suppress. (ECF No. 6-1; ECF
No. 6 at 84-87). Campbell subsequently entered a guilty plea to eight of the nine counts, was

sentenced to seven years imprisonment, and was required to register as a tier one sex offender.
(ECF Nos. 6-2; ECF No. 6-3).
Direct Appeal
Campbell appealed his convictions to the Fifth District Court of Appeals (“Court of
Appeals”). (ECF No. 6 at PageID# 106-117). He asserted a single assignment of error, arguing
the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress. (Id. at PageID# 120). The Court of
Appeals rendered an opinion on August 18, 2020, which recounted the following relevant facts:
{¶3} Campbell was indicted for two counts of robbery in May 2012, and he entered
a guilty plea to one count in December 2012. Campbell pursued and exhausted his
appellate rights and in December 2015 he began serving his three-year sentence.
The trial court granted his request for judicial release in December 2017 and placed
him on community control. Campbell signed a document captioned
Acknowledgement, Agreement, & Additional Terms & Conditions of Community
Control and that document contains a term regarding questioning and searches that
states as follows:
{¶4} C. I consent to being questioned by any Community Control Officer. I consent
to searches of my person, my property, my vehicle, and my residence at any time
without a warrant. I understand this includes common areas and areas that are
exclusive to me.
{¶5} Campbell was compliant with the terms of his community control order. His
probation officer decided he was entitled to a reduced level of supervision but
planned to search his home, a process she described as a “home check,” prior to
changing his status. The probation officer relied upon the community control
conditions for authority to complete a search of Campbell’s residence and cell
phone without probable cause, reasonable grounds, or any other justification for the
search.
{¶6} Probation Officer Conn conducted the “home check” on August 1, 2018,
accompanied by other members of the probation office. Her colleagues secured the
back door of the residence while she and other officers approached the front door
and knocked. She was admitted by Campbell, and she explained her purpose. He
did not object and she entered the home with the other officers and instructed
Campbell to have a seat at the kitchen table while they conducted the search.
{¶7} During the search of Campbell’s bedroom a cell phone was discovered. The
cell phone was brought to Probation Officer Conn, and she reviewed text messages
on the phone to ensure that it was Mr. Campbell’s phone. She continued her search
2

of data accessible on the phone until she found what appeared to be pornographic
images of minors. Conn conferred with Senior Probation Officer Casey Jones
regarding how to proceed and Jones asked Campbell to confirm he owned this
phone. Campbell affirmed it was his cell phone. The search was postponed until
search warrants could be obtained for that phone and other electronic devices. The
affidavit requesting the search warrant relied upon the images discovered by Ms.
Conn when she looked through the cell phone.
{¶8} As a result of the discovery of pornographic images found on several
electronic devices owned by Mr. Campbell, he was charged with nine felony
offenses. Campbell filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered by probation
officer Conn contending that the search was not based on reasonable grounds to
believe he had violated the terms of his community control and was unlawful. [The
state] filed a memorandum contra contending that Campbell “knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently waived any of the limited Fourth Amendment
protected possessed in exchange for his release from prison.”
{¶9} The trial court conducted an oral hearing on the matter and heard testimony
from the probation officer, Kelsey Conn. Conn explained that she had been a
probation officer for five years and completed the probation officer training
required by the Supreme Court of Ohio. She described the process of reviewing the
terms of the conditions of community control with each of her probationers, which
includes a consent “to search any time without a warrant.” When asked about the
home visits, she confirmed that they are unannounced, and the purpose was to
confirm that the probationers were residing at their stated address and that there
were no additional violations of terms of probation such as firearms or drugs. Ms.
Conn also confirmed that the Fairfield County Probation Department conducts
random searches even if the probationer has not aroused any suspicion that they
might be in violation of the terms and conditions of their probation. She agreed that
they commonly search probationers who have complied with all of the terms of
their community control order.
{¶10} She confirmed that it was her common practice to do a home check when
she is considering reducing the probationer’s level of supervision to ensure
complete compliance before the transfer, and she had planned to complete such a
home check on Campbell prior to reassigning his case and towering his level of
supervision. Up to the date of this home check, Campbell had been compliant with
all the terms and conditions of his probation, had not tested positive for drugs, and
had attended all of his mental health counseling as ordered. Conn confirmed that
Campbell had not violated the terms and conditions of probation prior to August 1,
2018, and she had no suspicion, nor had she received information that he had
committed any violation prior to the inspection. Conn expressed her belief that this
fieldwork, or home check, was lawful or constitutional at the time it was conducted,
and she claimed that she reviews the policies and procedures of her department on
an annual basis to ensure that she is complying with the law.

3

{¶11} The trial court denied the motion to suppress finding that Campbell executed
a valid consent to search his property and that the law enforcement officer was
acting in good faith reliance upon a judicial order that the officer believed
authorized her to act.
(Id. at PageID# 173-176). The Court of Appeals reversed Campbell’s conviction and sentence,
finding that the search violated Ohio statutory law (Id. at 179-196), which “provide[s] more
protection to a probationer/parolee than what is required by the Fourth Amendment . . . .” (Id. at
184).
The State noted an appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted jurisdiction. (Id.
at PageID# 204-205, 244). On October 13, 2022, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Court
of Appeals and reinstated Campbell’s conviction, concluding that although there was a violation
of an Ohio statute, the exclusionary rule did not apply because there was no violation of the
Fourth Amendment. (Id. at 368-386).
Federal Habeas Corpus Petition
On October 9, 2022, through counsel, Campbell commenced the instant federal habeas
corpus petition. (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1). He raises one ground for relief:
GROUND ONE:

Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right Against
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

(ECF No. 1 at PageID# 6). Campbell summarizes his argument in the attachment to his petition:
Mr. Campbell raises one claim in his petition related to a Fourth Amendment
violation as the result of an unconstitutional search and seizure. The crux of Mr.
Campbell’s claim rests with the protections granted by the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, which guards against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In this case, Mr. Campbell property was subjected to search and seizure
absence any reasonable suspicion that any illegal activity was afoot.
(ECF No. 1-1 at PageID# 20).

4

Respondent argues in the Return of Writ that Campbell’s claims are barred by Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). (ECF No. 7 at PageID# 649-652). Campbell filed a Reply, arguing
that Stone v. Powell should not apply to him. (ECF No. 12).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The statutory authority of federal courts to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state

custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The United States Supreme Court has described AEDPA as “a
formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in
state court” and emphasized that courts must not “lightly conclude that a State’s criminal justice
system has experienced the ‘extreme malfunction’ for which federal habeas relief is the remedy.”
Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 20 (2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011));
see also Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (“AEDPA . . . imposes a highly deferential
standard for evaluating state–court rulings and demands that state-court decisions be given the
benefit of the doubt.”) (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted).
AEDPA limits the federal courts’ authority to issue writs of habeas corpus and forbids a
federal court from granting habeas relief with respect to a “claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings” unless the state-court decision either:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explained the meaning of
the standards found in § 2254(d)(1) as follows:
5

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the
writ “if the state court applies a rule different from the governing
law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we
have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Bell v.
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002)
(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06, 120 S.Ct. 1495,
146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). Under the “unreasonable application”
clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court
identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme
Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies the law or bases its
decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts, in light of
the record before the state court. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
100, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011); Williams, 529 U.S. at
412–13, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
Lang v. Bobby, 889 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 2018).
Moreover, under § 2254(d)(2), a state court’s factual determination is not “unreasonable”
merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion. Wood v.
Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). Instead, a state court’s factual findings are “only unreasonable
where they are ‘rebutted by clear and convincing evidence’ and do not have support in the
record.” Moritz v. Woods, 692 F. App’x 249, 254 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pouncy v. Palmer, 846
F.3d 144, 158 (6th Cir. 2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[f]actual
determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a
factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable
in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding[.]” Ayers v. Hudson, 623 F.3d
301, 308 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)). The burden
of satisfying AEDPA’s standards rests with the petitioner. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S.
170, 181 (2011).

6

III.

ANALYSIS
Campbell argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because the evidence supporting his

conviction was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (ECF No. 1, 1-1, 12). Respondent
contends that the claim is barred by the United States Supreme Court case, Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976). The Court agrees.
“[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for a full and fair litigation of a Fourth
Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground
that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Stone,
428 U.S. at 482 (footnotes omitted). Clearly established precedent explains that Powell’s
“‘opportunity for full and fair consideration’ means an available avenue for the prisoner to
present his claim to the state courts, not an inquiry into the adequacy of the procedure actually
used to resolve that particular claim.” Good v. Berghuis, 729 F.3d 636, 639 (6th Cir. 2013).
Consequently, “[i]n the absence of a sham proceeding, there is no need to ask whether the state
court conducted an evidentiary hearing or to inquire otherwise into the rigor of the state
judiciary’s procedures for resolving the claim.” Id.
Accordingly, the only relevant question for this federal habeas Court is whether Campbell
was provided an opportunity to present his Fourth Amendment claim to the Ohio state courts. He
presented his claim to the trial court during a suppression hearing, and again to the Fifth District
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio on direct appeal. Campbell was not denied an
opportunity to present his claim in state court and as a result, his Fourth Amendment claim is not
cognizable in habeas corpus.
Campbell argues that Stone v. Powell does not bar his claim because the Ohio Supreme
Court ignored relevant United States Supreme Court precedent and reached an erroneous

7

conclusion. (ECF No. 12 at PageID# 665-666). However, the Stone v. Powell bar applies
regardless of the merits of a habeas petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim:
Under Stone the correctness of the state courts’ conclusions is
simply irrelevant. The courts that have considered the matter “have
consistently held that an erroneous determination of a habeas
petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim does not overcome the Stone
v. Powell bar.” Gilmore v. Marks, 799 F.2d 51, 57 (3d Cir.1986);
see also, Willett, 37 F.3d at 1270 (citing cases). An argument
directed solely at the correctness of the state court decision “does
not go to the fullness and fairness of his opportunity to litigate the
claim [s], but to the correctness of the state court resolution, an issue
which Stone v. Powell makes irrelevant.” Siripongs v. Calderon, 35
F.3d 1308, 1321 (9th Cir.1994). As succinctly put by the Seventh
Circuit, “‘full and fair’ guarantees the right to present one’s case,
but it does not guarantee a correct result.” Cabrera v. Hinsley, 324
F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir.2003).
Beechler v. Timmerman-Cooper, No. 2:11-CV-696, 2012 WL 524440, at *15 (S.D. Ohio Feb.
16, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:11-CV-696, 2012 WL 871205 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 13, 2012).
Because Ohio provided Campbell with a procedural mechanism to litigate his Fourth
Amendment, this Court is without the power to address the merits of Ground One. Ground One
is therefore non-cognizable in federal habeas review and should be dismissed.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Campbell’s sole claim for relief is without merit. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that

the habeas petition be DENIED, and this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS:
1. Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF Nos.
1, 1-1) be DENIED with prejudice.
2. A certificate of appealability should not issue with respect to the Petition because
petitioner has not stated a “viable claim of the denial of a constitutional right” or
8

presented an issue that is “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” See
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 475 (2000) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,
893 & n.4 (1983)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).
3. With respect to any application by Petitioner to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, the
Court should certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal of any Order
adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in “good faith,” and
therefore DENY Petitioner leave to appeal in forma pauperis upon a showing of financial
necessity. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a); Kincade v. Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir.
1997).
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting
authority for the objection(s). A judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made. Upon proper objections, a judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or
in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence, or may
recommit this matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). The parties are further advised

9

that, if they intend to file an appeal of any adverse decision, they may submit arguments in any
objections filed, regarding whether a certificate of appealability should issue.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura
CHELSEY M. VASCURA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

10