Jane Doe (J.N.K.) v. Red Roof Inns, Inc. et al

Filing 44

ORDER denying as moot 33 Motion for Leave to File; denying 37 Motion to Change Venue; granting in part and denying in part 20 Motion to Dismiss. DENYING RRI Defendants request to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Michigan; and GRANTING their motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs perpetrator liability claim and DENYING as to all other claims. Signed by District Judge Algenon L Marbley on 3/11/2025. (cw)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
J.N.K.,
Plaintiff,
v.
RED ROOF INNS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 2:24-cv-00389
Judge Algenon L. Marbley
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

OPINION & ORDER
This matter comes before this Court on: (1) Defendants Red Roof Inns, Inc., RRF Holding
Company LLC, Red Roof Franchising, LLC, and RRI West Management, LLC’s (“RRI
Defendants”) motion to transfer venue or, in the alternative, to dismiss for failure to state a claim
(ECF No. 20); (2) RRI Defendants’ motion for leave to respond to Plaintiff J.N.K.’s notice of
supplemental authority (ECF No. 33); and (3) Defendant Mahadeva Madison Heights Holdings,
LLC’s (“Mahadeva” or “Franchisee”) motion to transfer venue (ECF No. 37). For the reasons that
follow, this Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART RRI Defendants’ motion to
transfer venue or, in the alternative, to dismiss. (ECF No. 20). Specifically, RRI Defendants’
request to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Michigan is DENIED; and their motion to
dismiss is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s perpetrator liability claim and DENIED as to all
other claims. Additionally, because this Court does not rely on any authority contained in
Plaintiff’s notice of supplemental authority, RRI Defendants’ motion for leave (ECF No. 33) is
DENIED AS MOOT. Finally, this Court DENIES Defendant Mahadeva’s motion to transfer
venue. (ECF No. 37).

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I.

BACKGROUND

This case arises under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”),
18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Plaintiff J.N.K., a Michigan resident, alleges that, from 2013 to
January 31, 2014, she was repeatedly sex trafficked at 32511 Concord Dr., Madison Heights,
Michigan 48071 (“Madison RRI”). (ECF No. 1 ¶ 8, 27–28). During this time, Plaintiff alleges that
her traffickers “controlled her through physical violence and force,” “made her engage in
commercial sex acts for their financial benefit,” “posted ads of her online without her consent,”
beat her when she tried to leave, and kept her “under constant surveillance.” (Id. ¶ 24). She states
that she was never allowed to keep any of the money she made, and one trafficker forced her “to
get a large tattoo of his name on her back.” (Id.).
In January 2024, Plaintiff sued the franchisors, managers, and operators of the Madison
RRI (“RRI Defendants”);1 and its owner and operator, Mahadeva Madison Heights Holdings,
LLC (“Franchisee”), seeking damages under the TVPRA’s civil liability provision. 18 U.S.C.
1595(a). She explains that RRI Defendants’ control and supervision over the Madison RRI
included “collection and review of surveillance footage,” “capture, retention, and analysis of . . .
extensive guest data and detailed reports about hotel operations through reservation and property
management systems,” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 71, 78), “monitor[ing] news stories and law-enforcement
reports regarding criminal activity,” and “carefully monitoring online reviews and other customer
feedback.” (Id. ¶¶ 56–57). Plaintiff’s reason for initiating this action in this district, as alleged in

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“RRI Defendants” include Red Roof Inns, Inc.; RRF Holding Company, LLC; Red Roof Franchising,
LLC; and RRI West Management which, according to Plaintiff, “operated, controlled, and/or managed” the
Madison RRI. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 14). Describing the relationship between these entities, Plaintiff alleges that
Red Roof Inns, Inc. and RRI West Management share a common parent company (id. ¶ 15); RRF Holding
Company, LLC is the direct subsidiary of Red Roof Inns, Inc. (id. ¶ 13); and RRI West Management; Red
Roof Inns, Inc.; and Red Roof Franchising, LLC are corporate affiliates. (Id. ¶ 15).

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the Complaint, is that RRI Defendants operated the Madison RRI “from a central location at the
RRI corporate offices in New Albany, Ohio.” (Id. ¶ 22). Plaintiff contends that her claims against
Franchisee likewise arose out of the “Franchisee’s contacts with Ohio through Franchisee’s
relationship with the RRI [] Defendants.” (Id. ¶ 23).
Given the degree of control and supervision that RRI Defendants maintained over the
Madison RRI, Plaintiff asserts that RRI Defendants “knew or should have known” about her sex
trafficking based on “obvious indicators” and “well-known ‘red flags’ for sex trafficking in the
hospitality industry.” (Id. ¶ 64). These signs include “paying with cash or prepaid cards, having
high volumes of men who [are] not registered guests in and out of their room at unusual times,
arriving with few possessions for extended stays, and other signs . . . .” (Id. ¶ 66). Aside from the
trafficking she herself endured, Plaintiff alleges that “multiple trafficking victims [were] exploited
at the subject RRIs prior to [J.N.K.’s] trafficking” who exhibited these “red flags” that were
“observed by hotel staff and management.” (Id.).
As for her own trafficking, Plaintiff alleges that employees at the Madison RRI “observed
or were made aware of” these “obvious signs of trafficking,” as well as other indicators. (Id. ¶ 75).
For example, Plaintiff alleges she would stay at the RRI “for multiple days at a time” and “had to
go to the front desk each day to pay for the rooms again.” (Id. ¶ 74). These rooms were “frequently
paid for with cash or prepaid cards,” and J.N.K. “would book two rooms at a time, one for her and
one for her trafficker and his enforcers.” (Id.). When booking the rooms, Plaintiff notes that “hotel
staff observed her and saw that she was emotional, nervous, scared, and often bruised”; that she
was “dressed provocatively”; and that she “had little to no baggage.” (Id.). Plaintiff also asserts
that she “showed signs of malnourishment, poor hygiene, fatigue, sleep deprivation, untreated

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injuries and/or unusual behavior.” (Id.). Other indicators “consistent with the modus operandi of
her trafficker,” according to Plaintiff, included:
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Other girls were being trafficked at the same hotel at the same time
as J.N.K. by her trafficker.

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J.N.K. lacked freedom of movement, was constantly monitored and
had no control over or possession of money or her identification.

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J.N.K. appeared at the hotel with significantly older men.

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J.N.K. and others in her party were not forthcoming about their full
names, home addresses or vehicle information when registering.

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Excessive amounts of alcohol and drugs were in the rooms rented
by J.N.K. and others in her party.

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The “Do Not Disturb” door hanger was used very frequently.

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Housekeeping staff was usually prevented from entering the room
for regular cleaning, towel exchange, and other standard room
services.

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J.N.K. requested extra towels from housekeeping. Hotel staff
observed that she was dressed provocatively and was emotional,
nervous, scared, and often bruised.

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Jane Doe (J.N.K.) had multiple johns every day. These individuals
entered and left at unusual hours and were present at the hotel for
brief periods of time.

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There was heavy foot traffic in and out of Jane Doe (J.N.K.)’s room
involving men who were not hotel guests. This traffic was visible to
hotel staff.

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After Jane Doe (J.N.K.) checked out, hotel cleaning staff would
have noticed sex paraphernalia like condom wrappers and lubricant.

(Id.). Plaintiff further contends that Defendants and her traffickers had “an implicit understanding”
that allowed her traffickers to operate openly and “with little regard for concealment.” (Id. ¶ 65).
Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on January 31, 2024, asserts three “causes of action” under the
TVPRA against RRI Defendants: (1) a claim for perpetrator liability; (2) a claim for beneficiary

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liability; and (3) a claim for vicarious liability. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 115–128). On April 1, 2024, RRI
Defendants moved to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Michigan under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a)
or, in the alternative, to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a TVPRA claim. (ECF No. 20).
Plaintiff opposed (ECF No. 24), and RRI Defendants replied. (ECF No. 30). Franchisee also
moved to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Michigan (ECF No. 37), which Plaintiff
opposed (ECF No. 38), and Franchisee replied (ECF No. 39). On August 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed
a notice of supplemental authority (ECF No. 32) informing this Court of an out-of-circuit decision
denying a hotel franchisor’s motion to transfer venue, see Jane Doe (T.D.B.) v. G6 Hosp., LLC,
No. 9:23cv174, ECF. No. 50 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2024). RRI Defendants moved for leave to oppose
Plaintiff’s notice (ECF No. 33), and Plaintiff replied (ECF No. 34). These matters are now ripe for
resolution.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
Section 1404(a) governs the transfer of a civil action from one federal district to another.
It provides:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Courts considering transfer under § 1404(a) must first determine whether the
requested transferee forum provides a proper venue for the action. See e.g., Dayton Superior Corp.
v. Yan, 288 F.R.D. 151, 169 (S.D. Ohio 2012). As the Supreme Court explained, the statute “does
not condition transfer on the initial forum’s being ‘wrong’.” Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist.
Ct. for W. Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 59 (2013). Instead, it “permits transfer to any district where
venue is also proper”—that is, “where the case might have been brought.” Id. Once the court
determines that the action could have been brought in the alternative venue, it proceeds to consider
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whether transferring the case would serve the convenience of parties and witnesses and otherwise
promote the interest of justice. See Tanyike v. United States, 603 F. Supp. 3d 572, 580 (S.D. Ohio
2022). A court, guided by a number of private and public interest factors, enjoys “broad discretion”
when making this determination. Reese v. CNH Am. LLC, 574 F.3d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2009). Those
factors include:
(1) convenience of the witnesses; (2) availability of judicial process
to compel the attendance of unwilling or uncooperative witnesses;
(3) location of the relevant documents or records, and the relative
ease of access to sources of proof; (4) residence and convenience of
the parties; (5) relative financial means and resources of the parties;
(6) locus of the operative facts and events that gave rise to the
dispute or lawsuit; (7) each judicial forum’s familiarity with the
governing law; (8) the deference and weight accorded to the
plaintiff’s choice of forum; and (9) trial efficiency, fairness, and the
interests of justice based on the totality of the circumstances.
See Tanyike, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 580 (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947)).
Transfer is inappropriate, however, when it merely shifts the burden of inconvenience. See
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 645–46 (1964). A plaintiff’s choice of forum is therefore
entitled to “great deference” and “should only be rejected if the above factors weigh heavily in
favor of the defendant.” In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1130, 1132-33 (S.D. Ohio
1982); see also Capitol Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Splash Dogs, LLC, 801 F. Supp. 2d 657, 672–73
(S.D. Ohio 2011) (noting that there is “a strong presumption in favor of a plaintiff’s choice of
forum,” which may be overcome “‘only when the private and public interest factors clearly point
towards trial in the alternative forum.’” (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255
(1981)). By contrast, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is “given little weight” if “none of the conduct
complained of occurred in the forum selected by the plaintiff.” Capitol, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 672–
73 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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The moving party bears the burden of establishing that transfer is warranted to allow for
the litigation to proceed in a more convenient forum, not merely “a forum likely to prove equally
convenient or inconvenient.” Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 645–46; Centerville ALF, Inc. v. Balanced
Care Corp., 197 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1049 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
B. Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
A district court may dismiss a cause of action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Such a motion “is a test of
the plaintiff’s cause of action as stated in the complaint, not a challenge to the plaintiff’s factual
allegations.” Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 958–59 (6th Cir. 2005). In ruling on a
12(b)(6) motion, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Total Benefits Plan. Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434
(6th Cir. 2008). If more than one inference may be drawn from an allegation, the court must resolve
the conflict for the plaintiff. Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993). The court cannot
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id.
The court is not required, however, to accept as true mere legal conclusions unsupported
by factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although liberal, Rule 12(b)(6)
requires more than bare assertions of legal conclusions. Allard v. Weitzman, 991 F.2d 1236, 1240
(6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A
complaint’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). It must contain “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim is plausible when it contains

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“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III.

LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Transfer to the Eastern District of Michigan
RRI Defendants argue that transfer to the Eastern District of Michigan is appropriate
because Plaintiff is a Michigan resident whose allegations arise from events in Michigan. (See
generally, ECF No. 20 at 11–17).2 Franchisee, a Michigan-based entity, urges transfer for similar
reasons. (See ECF No. 37 at 4 (“Plaintiff resides in Michigan, the property is in Michigan, and the
registered agent for the former owner, [Franchisee], is in Michigan.”). Opposing both motions,
Plaintiff disputes that the location of relevant events is Michigan because “a significant portion of
her claims center on RRI Defendants’ corporate wrongdoing originating from their Ohio
headquarters.” (ECF No. 24 at 29 (citing ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 26-28); ECF No. 38 at 7).
In determining whether transfer is appropriate, this Court balances the private and public
interest factors at stake. Because Defendants’ motions raise substantially similar arguments and
seek the same relief, this Court addresses them together.
1. Private Interest Factors
Private interest factors include convenience of witnesses, where the operative facts
occurred, the location of the documentary evidence, and possibility of prejudice in either the forum
or the transfer states. W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Potts, 908 F.2d 974 (6th Cir. 1990). While the plaintiff’s
choice of venue should typically be given considerable weight, such choice is given less weight

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Defendants do not argue that venue in the Southern District of Ohio is improper. Nor do the parties argue
that the Eastern District of Michigan is an improper venue.

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when the cause of action “has little connection with the chosen forum.” DRFP, LLC v. Republica
Bolivariana de Venezuela, 945 F. Supp. 2d 890, 902-03 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
a. Convenience of the Witnesses
Because Plaintiff alleges that she was trafficked at a Red Roof branded property in
Michigan, Defendants contend that “nearly every witness” likely to be called in this lawsuit is
located in Michigan. These include: (1) Plaintiff’s traffickers; (2) Madison RRI staff; (3) local law
enforcement; (4) Plaintiff’s family members; and (5) “johns” and others that Plaintiff might have
encountered. RRI Defendants also contend that these Michigan-based witnesses will be beyond
the subpoena power of this Court at the time of trial.
Plaintiff discounts Defendants’ argument as speculative and conclusory. Given the time
that has passed since J.N.K.’s trafficking, she argues that “it is possible and even likely that many
of the witnesses who were present in Michigan at the time of J.N.K.’s trafficking do not currently
live there.” (ECF No. 24 at 32). Even if some witnesses currently live in Michigan, Plaintiff
maintains that the “witnesses who can testify about RRI corporate matters are located at the
headquarters in New Albany, Ohio.” (Id. at 31–33). Plaintiff also notes that RRI Defendants “have
not identified a single witness who would be subject to compulsory process in the Eastern District
of Michigan who is not willing to testify [] in Ohio.” (ECF No. 24 at 28).
This Court has analyzed this factor in another hotel sex trafficking case, observing that
there is “no guarantee that non-party witnesses will be located at the scene of their trafficking”
when “years have passed since [plaintiffs] were trafficked.” See In re Hotel TVPRA Litig., No.
2:22-CV-1924, 2023 WL 3075851, at *18–19 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2023) [hereinafter HTL] (citing
L.G. v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., No. 2:22-CV-1924, 2022 WL 4091837, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 7,
2022)). Additionally, regardless of where this litigation is brought, “there is no guarantee that

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non-party witnesses will be present or respond to subpoena.” See HTL, 2023 WL 3075851, at *18–
19; L.G., 2022 WL 4091837, at *4 (explaining that alleged sex traffickers are unlikely to appear at
trial regardless of subpoena). And because “Red Roof has its principal place of business in the
Southern District of Ohio,” transfer would not necessarily make litigation more convenient, as it
would still “inconvenience [RRI] Defendants by requiring their executive witnesses to travel . . . .”
HTL, 2023 WL 3075851, at *18. Because the proposed transferee court is likely to pose the same
level of inconvenience, this factor thus weighs against transfer.
b. Locus of Operative Facts and Access to Proof
Defendants argue that the key actions and events here, the alleged trafficking, took place
in Michigan and thus “any physical evidence—including the premise itself, is in . . . Michigan—
not Ohio.” (See ECF No. 20 at 14). In support, RRI Defendants cite Mooney v. Genzyme Corp., a
case filed in the Southern District of Ohio by two Ohio-based plaintiffs who brought product
liability claims against a Massachusetts-based company after ingesting an allegedly contaminated
substance in Ohio. See No. 1:19-CV-791, 2020 WL 3839904 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 2020). Transferring
the case to the District of Massachusetts, the Mooney court reasoned that the alleged actions that
caused the contamination and the alleged cover-up of that contamination had occurred in
Massachusetts. Id. at *3.
Unlike Mooney, however, Plaintiff here specifically alleges that a significant portion of the
RRI Defendants’ wrongful conduct took place in Ohio. For example, she alleges that “RRI
Defendants participated in a joint venture . . . from a central location at the RRI corporate offices
in New Albany, Ohio, within the Southern District of Ohio.” (See ECF No. 1 ¶ 22). She elaborates
that RRI Defendants “operat[ed] the subject hotel[] from a central location at the RRI corporate
offices”; “distributed revenue earned from the subject hotels among themselves from RRI

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corporate offices”; “developed policies for the subject hotels from RRI corporate offices”; and
“dictated policies related to safety, security, human trafficking, employee training and response as
well as other subjects from their principal place of business in the Southern District of Ohio.” (Id.).
As this Court explained when denying transfer in a similar case:
What occurred at the Defendants’ headquarters in New Albany,
Ohio, goes to the heart of Plaintiff’s Complaint, pointing to
Defendants’ corporate knowledge and lack of proper training to
hamper and detect trafficking on their properties. Plaintiff does not
allege that the actual hotel employees were responsible for her
trafficking, rather, the employees did not address the clear signs of
Plaintiff’s trafficking due to improper training and insufficient
policies on the corporate level. While Plaintiff’s alleged trafficking
arose in Maryland and Michigan, the claim at issue arises in Ohio,
based on Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants have corporate
knowledge of the training and policies related to trafficking.
See L.G., 2022 WL 4091837, at *4. Indeed, where the allegations revolve around sex trafficking
and corporate policies to ignore said sex trafficking, this Court routinely finds allegations of a
“generalized inconvenience—that the alleged trafficking took place at hotel locations in [another
District], and therefore, relevant documents and witnesses will be located there—and not ‘a
specific hardship.’” See Doe S.W. v. Lorain-Elyria Motel, Inc., No. 2:19-CV-1194, 2020 WL
1244192, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2020); A.C. v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., No. 2:19-CV-4965, 2020
WL 3256261, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 16, 2020).
Franchisee nonetheless argues that, because RRI Defendants are not the only defendants
here, this case is distinguishable from those in which this Court denied transfer. Specifically,
Franchisee cites relies on HTL, 2023 WL 3075851, for the proposition that venue in this district is
proper only if “[Plaintiff] was trafficked in the Southern District of Ohio.” (ECF No. 37 at 4). That
reading mischaracterizes this Court’s ruling. In HTL, this Court considered 35 cases alleging
similar TVPRA violations against various hotel defendants. The defendants sought to change

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venue, and, in its discretion, this Court transferred six cases because the Southern District of Ohio
was neither the site of the alleged trafficking, nor the headquarters where the corporate decisionmaking connected to the alleged trafficking took place. See HTL, 2023 WL 3075851, at *20–22.
As such, this Court concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over certain hotel defendants,
rendering venue improper, explaining:
[B]ecause the trafficking alleged in these claims occurred outside of
the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, and these
defendants were not incorporated nor have their principal places of
business in the Southern District of Ohio . . . . venue cannot be
proper under § 1391(b)(2) in the Southern District of Ohio, but it
could be proper in the districts where Plaintiffs were trafficked or
where the corporation defendants are “at home.”
HTL, 2023 WL 3075851, at *11 (emphasis added). Although Plaintiff’s trafficking occurred
outside the district, the harm she alleges stemmed from decisions and policies that RRI Defendants
issued “from a central location at the RRI corporate offices in New Albany, Ohio.” (ECF No. 1 ¶
22). Her claims against Franchisee likewise arose out of the “Franchisee’s contacts with Ohio
through Franchisee’s relationship with the RRI [] Defendants.” (Id. ¶ 23). Given RRI Defendants’
presence in this district, this Court routinely permits similar claims against them to proceed here,
even if the alleged trafficking took place elsewhere. See G.M. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 725 F.
Supp. 3d 766, 775 (S.D. Ohio 2024); K.F. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 2:22-CV-3839, 2024
WL 1256052, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2024); T.D.P. v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 3d
784, 793 (S.D. Ohio 2024).
Nor would it be too burdensome to transfer any records that allegedly exist in Michigan to
Ohio. See Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. and Indem. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 474 F. Supp.
2d 474, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[L]ocation of relevant documents is largely a neutral factor in
today’s world of faxing, scanning, and emailing documents.”), aff’d, 599 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2010).
Without “identifying some documentary evidence that would be unavailable in this district or is
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too bulky or difficult to transport, this factor matters little.” Doe S.W., 2020 WL 1244192, at *4.
Because “[t]he documents and information related to Defendants’ alleged corporate knowledge are
in Ohio, [] transferring this case to [Michigan] would merely shift the inconvenience.” L.G., 2022
WL 4091837, at *4.
Defendants have therefore not demonstrated that this factor “clearly favor[s] a change of
venue.” See Doe S.W., 2020 WL 1244192, at *1–*3 (quoting MJR Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, No.
2:06-cv-0937, 2007 WL 2781669, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2007)). This factor therefore slightly
weighs against transfer.
c. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum
Plaintiff—a Michigan resident—chose to file this lawsuit in the Southern District of Ohio.
Typically, “‘unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed.’” Reese, 574 F.3d at 320 (quoting Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
727 F.2d 608, 612 (6th Cir. 1984)); see also Helmer v. Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis &
Miles, P.C., No. 1:20-CV-105, 2020 WL 5250435, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 3, 2020) (“A plaintiff’s
choice of venue . . . holds great weight and should only be disturbed upon a significant showing
that the public and private interests at stake weigh in favor of transfer.”). That said, where “‘the
cause of action has little connection with the chosen forum,” a plaintiff’s choice of forum is given
less weight than such choice would be given otherwise.” DRFP, LLC v. Republica Bolivariana De
Venez, 945 F. Supp. 2d 890, 902-03 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
RRI Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s choice of forum is a neutral factor because Plaintiff
is a Michigan resident. (ECF No. 20 at 16–17). But RRI Defendants fail to demonstrate that there
is “no connection between the events at issue and this district.” Cf. Tanyike, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 581

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(emphasis added). As this Court explained above and in other cases, the executive decision-making
relevant to Plaintiff’s TVPRA claims occurred at RRI’s headquarters in New Albany, Ohio. See
L.G., 2022 WL 4091837, at *4 (“What occurred at the Defendants’ headquarters in New Albany,
Ohio, goes to the heart of Plaintiff’s Complaint, pointing to Defendants’ corporate knowledge and
lack of proper training to hamper and detect trafficking on their properties.”); HTL, 2023 WL
3075851, at *20 (recognizing that location of “Red Roof’s executive decision-making would likely
be at their headquarters in New Albany, Ohio.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s choice of forum weighs against transfer.
2. Public Interest Factors
The public interest to be considered under § 1404(a) includes “[d]ocket congestion, the
burden of trial to a jurisdiction with no relation to the cause of action, the value of holding trial in
a community where the public affected live, and the familiarity of the court with controlling law.”
Jamhour v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 211 F. Supp. 2d 941, 945 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (citing Gulf Oil, 330
U.S. at 508). RRI Defendants argue that trial in Ohio would be burdensome given that the incident
occurred in Michigan, involving Michigan staff, Michigan law enforcement, along with out-ofstate traffickers and a non-resident. (ECF No. 20. at 15). They also assert that the community
affected by the trial is Michigan, and Michigan is the community that has familiarity with the
Madison RRI, not Ohio. (Id.).
These arguments, however, again ignore Plaintiff’s focus on RRI Defendants’ policies,
procedures, and management practices, as decreed from RRI corporate headquarters in New
Albany, Ohio. (See ECF No. 1 ¶ 60 (“Sex trafficking was a brand-wide problem for RRI originating
from management level decisions at their corporate offices in Ohio.”). When a company is
incorporated in a state, there can be a compelling public interest in deciding a controversy

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involving that company at home. North v. McNamara, 47 F. Supp. 3d 635, 648 (S.D. Ohio 2014);
see L.G., 2022 WL 4091837, at *4.
Although they recognize that “[t]he Southern District of Ohio, and specifically this Judge,
has more than 30 pending TVPRA cases,” RRI Defendants nonetheless maintain that “[b]oth
jurisdictions are familiar with the controlling law” and note that the Eastern District of Michigan
has “seen multiple TVPRA cases.” (ECF No. 20 at 16 n. 2). Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends
that “maintaining a centralized venue for a docket of human trafficking cases filed against RRI
Defendants under the TVPRA” in this district weighs against transfer, as does Ohio’s “important
interest in regulating the conduct of RRI Defendants who have their principal place of business
here and who allegedly engaged in corporate wrongdoing here.” (ECF No. 24 at 34–35). Plaintiff
also cites this Court’s expertise “in applying the TVPRA in the hospitality context” and rejects
RRI Defendants’ suggestion—”that the District Court of Michigan has equal experience”—as
“unfounded.” (Id. at 35).
As Plaintiff correctly points out, several pending cases in the Southern District of Ohio are
related to this matter, which this Court has managed for years. Trying this case in this district would
thus promote judicial economy, systemic integrity, and fairness. See DRFP, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 903
(“[T]he Court finds that—considering efficiency and other practical concerns—[other] factors are
balanced, if not outweighed, by the fact that this Court has already gained extensive experience
and familiarity with this action.”). As another court in this Circuit noted, “having [] related
litigation moving on a potentially conflicting track in a different district” frustrates the
administration of justice. Sacklow v. Saks Inc., 377 F. Supp. 3d 870, 881 (M.D. Tenn. 2019); Cont’l
Grain Co. v. The FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960) (“To permit a situation in which two cases

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involving precisely the same issues are simultaneously pending in different [d]istrict [c]ourts leads
to the wastefulness of time, energy and money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent.”).
Accordingly, the public interest factors weigh against transfer. See L.G., 2022 WL
4091837, at *4.
****
RRI Defendants fail to show that the relevant factors are “strongly in favor of a transfer,”
First Bank of Marietta v. Bright Banc Sav. Assoc., 711 F. Supp. 893, 896–97 (S.D. Ohio 1988), or
identify any jurisdictional or venue deficiencies to justify transfer, HTL, 2023 WL 3075851, at
*21. This Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motions to transfer. (ECF Nos. 20, 37).
Additionally, because this Court does not rely on any authority contained in Plaintiff’s notice of
supplemental authority (ECF No. 28), RRI Defendants’ motion for leave to oppose the notice is
DENIED AS MOOT. (ECF No. 33).
B. Motion to Dismiss
RRI Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s TVPRA claims should be dismissed because: (1) the
claims are barred by the TVPRA’s 10-year statute of limitations; and (2) Plaintiff’s allegations fail
to support a plausible TVPRA claim. This Court addresses each argument in turn.
1. Statute of Limitations
The TVPRA requires that a claim be “commenced not later than . . . 10 years after the cause
of action arose.” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c)(1). The Sixth Circuit has recognized that Rule 12(b)(6) is
“generally an inappropriate vehicle for dismissing a claim based upon the statute of limitations,”
unless the allegations affirmatively show a claim is time-barred. Cataldo v. United States Steel
Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012). This is because the statute of limitations is an affirmative
defense, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), and a plaintiff “generally need not plead the lack of affirmative

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defenses to state a valid claim.” Cataldo, 676 F.3d at 547 (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216
(2007)). But where “the allegations in the complaint affirmatively show that the claim is timebarred,” dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. Id. (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 215); see
Father Flanagan’s Boys Home v. Donlon, 449 F. Supp. 3d 739, 743 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (“A motion
to dismiss based on the statute of limitations . . . can be granted only where the defense appears
valid from the face of the Complaint alone.”).
RRI Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims are untimely because the alleged trafficking
at the Madison RRI occurred between 2013 and January 31, 2014, but Plaintiff “did not bring a
claim for any of these trafficking incidents until January 31, 2024.” (ECF No. 20 at 17–18).
Plaintiff maintains that she brought her claims “within 10 years after the last date of her
trafficking.” (ECF No. 24 at 23). According to Plaintiff, she “had no obligation to plead around”
the statute of limitations. (Id.). But even if the statute of limitations bars any portion of her claims,
she argues that equitable tolling principles forestall the expiration of the limitations period.
Because Plaintiff’s allegations do not affirmatively show that her claims are time-barred,
dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds is inappropriate. See Cataldo, 676 F.3d at 547. In other
contexts, the statute of limitations begins to run “when a plaintiff has a complete and present cause
of action [and] can file suit and obtain relief” or “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know
of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Am. Premier Underwriters, Inc. v. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., No. 1:08-CV-346, 2015 WL 759849, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2015), aff’d, 839
F.3d 458 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (explaining when a cause
of action accrues for constitutional claims). But as this Court held in a similar case, Plaintiff’s
TVPRA claims are “precisely the sort to which the ‘continuing violation’ doctrine should apply,”
such that “the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the pattern of wrongful conduct has

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concluded.” See S.R. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 2:23-CV-1731, 2024 WL 3226126,
at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 28, 2024).
A continuing violation exists if: “(1) the defendants engage in continuing wrongful
conduct; (2) injury to the plaintiffs accrues continuously; and (3) had the defendants at any time
ceased their wrongful conduct, further injury would have been avoided.” Broom v. Strickland, 579
F.3d 553, 555 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensley v. City of Columbus, 557 F.3d 693, 697 (6th Cir.
2009)). Because Plaintiff’s trafficking “injury arises from a ‘numerous and continuous series of
events’ that extends into the statutory period,” the continuing violation doctrine permits her “‘to
reach back to the beginning of a claim even if that beginning lies outside of the statutory period.’”
S.R., 2024 WL 3226126, at *2 (quoting Ali v. Khan, 336 F. Supp. 3d 901, 910 (N.D. Ill. 2018)
(internal citations omitted) (applying the continuing violation doctrine to a TVPRA claim)).
Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations that she was under the continuous control and coercion
of her traffickers through at least 2016, (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 30, 129), are sufficient to support an
inference that any failure on her part “to meet the legally-mandated deadline unavoidably arose
from circumstances beyond [] [her] control.” Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum,
209 F.3d 552, 560-61 (6th Cir. 2000). Questions about timeliness are therefore better left for
summary judgment (or ultimately trial), when this Court can evaluate compliance with the statute
of limitations on a more complete factual record. See E.S. v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 3d
420, 432 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (concluding that “whether the statute of limitations should be tolled
involves fact questions that are better resolved at summary judgment,” where plaintiff argued “that
the statute of limitations for her claim is tolled due to the force and coercion Plaintiff underwent
by her trafficker”); Franco v. Diaz, 51 F. Supp. 3d 235, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[W]hen plaintiffs
raise an equitable tolling argument, a court must deny a motion to dismiss based on the statute of

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limitations unless all assertions of the complaint, as read with required liberality, would not permit
the plaintiffs to prove that this statute was tolled.” (alteration in original) (quoting In re S. African
Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2009))).
This Court therefore declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims as time-barred.
2. Sufficiency of TVPRA claims
RRI Defendants also challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations to state a plausible
claim for liability under the TVPRA’s civil provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1595. That provision provides:
An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil
action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially
or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that
person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of
this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may
recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.
18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). As the statutory text makes clear, Section 1595 creates two kinds of civil
liability: perpetrator liability and beneficiary (or participant) liability. G.G. v. Salesforce.com, Inc.,
76 F.4th 544, 552–53 (7th Cir. 2023). To establish a “violation of this chapter” under Section
1595(a), sex trafficking victims look to 18 U.S.C. § 1591, the provision of the TVPRA that sets
forth criminal penalties for sex trafficking. Section 1591 provides:
(a) Whoever knowingly—
(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, ... recruits,
entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains,
patronizes, or solicits by any means a person; or
(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from
participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation
of paragraph (1),
knowing, or, except where the act constituting the violation of
paragraph (1) is advertising, in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of
force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any
combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a
commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years

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and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b).
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a).
Because Plaintiff seeks to hold RRI Defendants directly and vicariously liable for TVPRA
violations under both a beneficiary theory and perpetrator theory, this Court proceeds by first
assessing Plaintiff’s direct liability claim under the perpetrator theory; then her direct liability
claim under the beneficiary theory; and, finally, her indirect liability claim.
a. Direct Liability
Having extensively analyzed the civil liability of hotel defendants in TVPRA sex
trafficking cases, see S.R., 2024 WL 3226126, at *2 (collecting cases), this Court begins—as
always—by noting that a civil claim under Section 1595(a) can be a standalone claim, and
defendants need not have committed the underlying criminal sex trafficking offense under Section
1591 for a plaintiff to maintain an action under Section 1595(a). See M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels &
Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959, 964 (S.D. Ohio 2019); G.G., 76 F.4th at 553 n.4 (“Courts
unanimously agree that a civil defendant under Section 1595 need not have violated Section
1591.”). Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegation that she is a victim of sex trafficking within the
meaning of § 1591 (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 116, 119) is sufficient, at the pleading stage, to establish that
she is a “victim of a violation of this chapter” under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).

(1) Perpetrator Liability
Plaintiff’s first cause of action asserts that Defendants are liable as “perpetrators” of 18
U.S.C §1591(a) violations. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 116–18). To survive dismissal on this claim, the
Complaint must plausibly allege that RRI Defendants knowingly and in interstate or foreign
commerce either: (a) recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, maintained,

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patronized, or solicited a person; or (b) benefitted from knowingly assisting, supporting, or
facilitating, the recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, obtaining, maintaining,
patronizing, or soliciting of a person. 18 U.S.C. § 1591. Plaintiff must also plead sufficient facts
to support RRI Defendants’ actual knowledge “that means of force, threats of force, fraud . . . or
any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex
act.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591. As this Court recognized in M.A., Section 1591’s knowledge standard is
much higher than the “should have known” standard required for beneficiary liability. M.A., 425
F. Supp. 3d at 966; see also Acevedo v. Exp. Realty, LLC, 713 F. Supp. 3d 740, 764–65 (C.D. Cal.
2024).
RRI Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to allege that they had “actual knowledge”
of J.N.K.’s trafficking. Plaintiff retorts that her allegations “support an inference that Franchisee,
hotel staff and management had actual knowledge of, or at least were willfully blind to the
trafficking at the [Madison] RRI and yet participated in harboring her and facilitating her
trafficking.” (ECF No. 24 at 22 n. 19). Specifically, Plaintiff points to the following portions of the
Complaint:
75.

Based upon information and belief, multiple employees at the
RRI, including management-level employees, observed or were
made aware of these obvious signs of trafficking while acting
within the scope and course of their employment.

76.

As such, Defendants knew or were willfully blind to the fact that
Jane Doe (J.N.K.) was being trafficked at the subject RRI property.

77.

Given these obvious signs, RRI Brand Defendants knew or should
have known about the trafficking of Jane Doe (J.N.K.) based on
its policy or protocol that required hotel staff to report suspected
criminal activity including sex trafficking.

117. Defendants are perpetrators within the meaning of 18 U.S.C
§1595(a) because they . . . violated 18 U.S.C §1591(a)(1) when,
through the acts and omissions described throughout this
Complaint, they harbored individuals (including Jane Doe
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(J.N.K.)) knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the
victims would be caused, through force, coercion, or fraud, to
engage in commercial sex acts while at their respective hotel
properties.
(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 75–77, 117)). These allegations, however, hew more closely to legal conclusions
than factual allegations. Because this Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (legal
conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations”), bare contentions that RRI Defendants
knew that Plaintiff was being trafficked, without more, is insufficient. The cases Plaintiff cites do
not compel a different conclusion.
In Canosa v. Ziff, for example, the court held that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that
Harvey Weinstein’s “TWC Companies” violated 18 U.S.C. § 1591 by “actively participat[ing] in
the recruitment and enticement of women, knowing that those women would—or would likely—
be coerced by Weinstein into engaging in what amounted to a commercial sex act with him.” No.
18 CIV. 4115 (PAE), 2019 WL 498865, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2019). There, the complaint
alleged that “the TWC Companies maintained women on their payroll whose responsibilities
including introducing Weinstein to young women and covering up his assaults”; “the TWC
Companies knew that Weinstein’s recurrent practice—indeed, pattern—was to lure women like
Canosa into pretextual meetings and then subject them to forced sexual acts[] [but] . . . nevertheless
continued to pay for and facilitate Weinstein’s interstate and foreign travel, on which trips some
assaults, including of [Plaintiff], occurred”; “employees of the TWC Companies gave Weinstein
the medications he required to perform sexual acts and cleaned up after his sexual assaults”; and
“the TWC Companies expressly or tacitly linked tangible job benefits to the commission of the
forced sexual advances and sexual assaults aforesaid.” Id. The facts alleged in Canosa therefore
directly link the entities and the trafficker in a way that Plaintiff’s allegations do not here.

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Likewise, in United States v. Bhimani, No. CR 3:17-324, 2021 WL 5179196
(M.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2021), the court upheld the criminal liability of a motel owner and its general
manager under the TVPRA based on “ample evidence” showing that the general manager
“knowingly rented rooms to drug and sex traffickers, gave discounts, hired drug dealers and users
to work at the hotel, did not fire them once they learned about drug activity, allowed criminal
guests to check in under assumed names, allowed guests to check in without showing
identification, refrained from kicking guests out despite disruptive, criminal behavior, and allowed
criminals to stay and work out of their room and pay the room rate with the proceeds.” Id. at *9.
Although Plaintiff here alleges that RRI Defendants and hotel staff were “willfully blind” to her
sex trafficking, she fails to allege sufficient facts to support such an inference or other facts that
resemble the circumstances in Bhimani. The case is of even less import, given that it was a criminal
case and the facts there were considered under a different procedural posture.
Finally, Ricchio v. McLean, 853 F.3d 553 (1st Cir. 2017), which reversed the dismissal of
a TVPRA claim, involved facts that were more overt than what Plaintiff alleges here. There, the
complaint alleged that the motel operators had prior commercial dealings with the trafficker and
intended to reinstate these dealings for profit “in circumstances in which [the trafficker’s] coercive
and abusive treatment of [the victim] as a sex slave had become apparent” to the motel operators.
Id. at 555. The allegations in Ricchio included a “high-five” while discussing “getting this thing
going again,” a past business relationship between the trafficker and hotel owner, and allegations
that one of the hotel owners had gone to the victim’s room and “had shown indifference to
Ricchio’s obvious physical deterioration.” Id. Ricchio alleged that while “in plain daylight view
of the front office of the motel,” her trafficker “kick[ed] her and force[d] her back toward the rented
quarters when she had tried to escape.” Id. Although Plaintiff contends that RRI Defendants’

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“familiar[ity]” with the population of traffickers at the hotel and “implicit[] encourage[ment]” of
their illegal activities constitute “harboring . . . and knowing facilitation” (ECF No. 24 at 22 n. 19),
her allegations “do not rise to the level of obviousness present in Ricchio.” See M.A., 425 F. Supp.
3d at 966. Nor do the facts alleged “suggest a direct agreement between her trafficker and any of
the hotel defendants,” or “that a specific hotel staff member saw her in a deteriorated state.” Id.
Absent any facts to suggest that RRI Defendants possessed actual knowledge of J.N.K.’s
trafficking, RRI Defendants cannot be held liable as sex trafficking “perpetrators” under section
1595(a). Accordingly, this Court GRANTS IN PART RRI Defendants’ motion (ECF No. 20) to
the extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s perpetrator liability claim and DISMISSES that claim
against RRI Defendants.
(2) Beneficiary Liability
Plaintiff’s claim under the TVPRA’s beneficiary theory of liability, which does not require
actual knowledge, fares better. To survive dismissal on this claim, the Complaint must plausibly
allege that: (1) RRI Defendants “knowingly benefitted, financially or by receiving anything of
value”; (2) from participating in a venture; [and] (3) that they “knew or should have known [that
the venture] engaged in an act in violation of [the TVPRA].” § 1595(a). As this Court noted in
Doe, “a plaintiff may satisfy these elements by showing that ‘defendant’s own acts, omissions, and
state of mind establish each element.’” See Doe v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., No. 2:23-CV-3459, 2024 WL
3759761, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2024) (quoting J.L. v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 3d 1048,
1060 (D. Colo. 2021)).
i.

Knowing Benefit

The “knowing benefit” element merely requires that RRI Defendants knowingly receive a
financial benefit, not that RRI Defendants have actual knowledge of an illicit venture. A.C., 2020

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WL 3256261, at *4. As this Court found in M.A., “the rental of a room constitutes a financial
benefit from a relationship with the trafficker sufficient to meet this element of the § 1595(a)
standard.” M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 965; accord H.H. v. G6 Hosp., LLC, No. 2:19-CV-755, 2019
WL 6682152, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2019); see also J.L., 521 F. Supp. 3d at 1061 (concluding
that allegations that a hotel defendant received a percentage of room revenue where trafficking
occurred, was sufficient to meet the knowing benefit element under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a)); Gilbert
v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 423 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1137 (D. Colo. 2019) (finding that the forced labor
provision of § 1589(b) does not “require[ ] the party to benefit from the [forced] labor or services
for liability to attach”).
Because Plaintiff alleges that RRI Defendants rented rooms to her traffickers and benefited
financially from those rentals (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 86, 90, 108, 109, 116), Plaintiff’s allegations are
enough to satisfy the element of “knowing benefit” under Section 1595(a).
ii.

“Participated in a venture”

Plaintiff has also alleged sufficient facts to establish that Defendants’ conduct constitutes
“participation in a venture” under Section 1595(a). As this Court held in M.A., Defendants need
not have actual knowledge of the sex trafficking or perform an overt act to have “participated” in
a sex trafficking venture for TVPRA liability to attach; “otherwise the ‘should have known’
language in § 1595(a) would be meaningless.” 425 F. Supp. 3d at 971; see also G.G., 76 F.4th 544
(participation under TVPRA’s civil remedy provision does not require direct participation, criminal
violation of TVPRA, or actual knowledge of criminal wrongdoing); A.B. v. Hilton Worldwide
Holdings Inc., 484 F. Supp. 3d 921, 937 (D. Or. 2020) (agreeing with this Court’s reasoning in
M.A. that a plaintiff is “not required to allege actual knowledge of a sex trafficking venture or the
performance of an overt act in order to sufficiently plead the ‘participation in a venture’ element

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of her § 1595 claim”). Plaintiff, however, “must allege at least a showing of a continuous business
relationship between the trafficker and the hotels such that it would appear that the trafficker and
the hotels have established a pattern of conduct or could be said to have a tacit agreement.” See
M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (citing Jean-Charles v. Perlitz, 937 F. Supp. 2d 276, 288–89 (D.
Conn. 2013)).
J.N.K.’s allegation here—that RRI Defendants “received increased revenue each time a
room was rented at the [Madison] RRI . . . because the payments these defendants received
pursuant to their agreement with Mahadeva were primarily determined by gross room revenue”—
satisfies the “participation in a venture” element. (See ECF No. 1 ¶ 96). Resisting this conclusion,
RRI Defendants argue that the “legitimate and routine commercial operations cannot constitute
participation in a venture that violates the TVPRA.” (ECF No. 20 at 22). In support, they cite the
Eleventh Circuit’s decisions in Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F. 4th 714 (11th Cir. 2021) and
K. H. v. Riti, Inc., No. 23-11682, 2024 WL 505063 (11th Cir. Feb. 9, 2024). In Doe # 1, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the Section 1595(a) beneficiary claims against hotel franchisors failed because
the plaintiffs “provided no plausible allegations that the franchisors took part in the common
undertaking of sex trafficking.” Doe #1, 21 F. 4th at 721 (emphasis added). According to the
Eleventh Circuit, the Does’ allegations “that the franchisors sent inspectors to the hotels who would
have seen signs of sex trafficking and that they received reviews mentioning sex work occurring
at the hotels” were insufficient because “observing something is not the same as participating in
it.” Id. Riti likewise rejected a similar claim, reiterating that “allegations of financial benefit alone
are not sufficient to establish that the defendant participated in a sex trafficking venture and
observing signs of sex trafficking is not the same as participating in it.” Riti, 2024 WL 505063, at
*4 (emphasis added).

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But both Doe and Riti analyzed plaintiffs’ claims that defendants participated in a sextrafficking venture, not the commercial ventures that J.N.K. pleads here. (See ECF No. 1 ¶ 99
(explaining the ways in which RRI Defendants engaged in “a commercial venture with other
Defendants and with hotel staff”). In Doe #1, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that its analysis may
have been different if the plaintiffs had pled the hotel franchisor defendants had participated in
commercial ventures operating the hotel rather than alleging that they participated in sextrafficking ventures. 21 F.4th at 727. The Doe #1 plaintiffs, however, had not done so and had
refused an opportunity to amend. Id. Thus, neither Doe #1 nor Riti applies to the commercial
ventures that J.N.K. pleads here. See C.T., 2023 WL 3510879, at *4 (“Since this case finds itself
in waters the Eleventh Circuit declined to wade in, Doe #1 is not determinative.”); A.R. v. Wyndham
Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 2:21-CV-04935, 2022 WL 17741054, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 2022)
(because plaintiff “alleges that Defendant ‘participated in a commercial business venture under §
1595[ ] by receiving royalties from Plaintiff’s traffickers renting rooms at their branded
locations,’” the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Doe # 1 “is not controlling”). Indeed, both the
Eleventh and Seventh Circuits have recognized that the relevant “venture” under Section 1595
need not be “specifically a sex trafficking venture” and can instead be a “commercial venture” like
running or expanding a business that facilitates sex trafficking. See G.G. v. Salesforce.com, Inc.,
76 F.4th 544, 554 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Doe #1, 21 F.4th at 727).
Because Plaintiff’s allegations raise a plausible inference that RRI Defendants participated
in hotel-operating commercial ventures that rented rooms to people that RRI Defendants should
have known were engaged in sex trafficking, the Complaint satisfies the “participation in a
venture” requirement. See M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 968 (defendant who continues an ongoing
business relationship with traffickers, including by continuing to rent rooms to them, after the

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defendant should know that the business relationship facilitates trafficking, participates in a
§1595(a) venture); A.R., 2022 WL 17741054, at *7 (recognizing defendant’s “business venture
with the franchisee hotels” as sufficient to show participation in a venture under Section 1595);
T.P., 2022 WL 17363234, at *11 (recognizing this theory of venture).
iii.

“Knew or should have known” that the venture violated the TVPRA

A defendant cannot be liable under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) unless it “knew or should have
known” that the venture was engaged in sex trafficking. Unlike a perpetrator claim, RRI
Defendants need not have actual knowledge of trafficking crimes for beneficiary liability to attach,
as the “should have known” language in Section 1595(a) permits constructive knowledge. M.A.,
425 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (citing Jean-Charles, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 288–89).
RRI Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff fails to satisfy this element are multi-fold. First,
they contend that “the ‘obvious’ signs Plaintiff alleges are not tied to any of the [Madison RRI]
employees.” (ECF No. 20 at 25). Second, they argue that the signs allegedly observed by
employees at the Madison RRI—Plaintiff’s trafficker using prepaid cards; condoms or lubricant
left in the hotel rooms after check-out; heavy foot traffic in and out of Plaintiff’s room; and Plaintiff
dressing provocatively—do not “plausibly suggest Defendants knew or should have known
Plaintiff was allegedly being trafficked.” (Id.). “At most,” RRI Defendants contend, they are signs
of prostitution, not sex trafficking.” (Id.). Third, RRI Defendants emphasize that “[b]road
allegations of sex trafficking in the hotel industry do not allege that these Defendants had
knowledge that this Plaintiff was subject to trafficking at a particular hotel.” (Id.). Finally,
according to RRI Defendants, Plaintiff cannot establish constructive knowledge “by listing
customer reviews and news articles about various Red Roof branded properties not at issue here.”
(Id. at 28).

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But RRI Defendants’ reading of the Complaint misses key factual allegations. For one, in
addition to the signs RRI Defendants reference, Plaintiff also alleges visible indicators of
trafficking based on her appearance, demeanor, movements throughout the hotel, and her
interactions with her trafficker and hotel staff. She alleges that hotel staff, including at front desk
staff and housekeeping, observed that she was emotional, nervous, scared, and often bruised; and
that she showed signs of untreated injuries. (See ECF No. 1 ¶ 74). These allegations take Plaintiff’s
claim outside what might constitute consensual commercial sex acts, and into the coerced sex
trafficking territory prohibited by the TVPRA. For this reason, and as explained below, the cases
on which RRI Defendants rely are not on point and, hence, not controlling.
In J.B. v. G6 Hosp., for example, the plaintiff described instances when she was either in a
car in the parking lot or in rented rooms to argue that motel staff “should have been aware” that
she was being trafficked. No. 19-CV-07848-HSG, 2020 WL 4901196, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20,
2020) (emphasis added). The plaintiff, however, had noted that the car windows were covered up
and “never allege[d] that she saw or approached employees with or without her trafficker.” (Id.).
Finding the allegations insufficient, the court contrasted the case with M.A., in which the plaintiff
alleged that she had “visible physical changes, such as bruising, . . . and that [d]espite her desperate
pleas and screams for help, after being beaten or choked at the Defendants’ hotel properties, the
hotel staff ignored her . . . .” M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 962. Although a plaintiff need not allege
facts as egregious as M.A. to state a claim, the court in J.B. noted that “allegations that the victim
sought help and was seen by employees with physical injuries or other facts suggesting coercion
allow courts to infer that motel or hotel employees should have known that human trafficking was
occurring, as opposed to other criminal conduct, such as prostitution.” J.B., 2020 WL 4901196, at
*10.

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Likewise, in A.B. v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc., the court acknowledged that “factual
allegations listing indicia of trafficking (i.e., condition of the hotel room, frequent male visitors)
may support a theory that a hotel where Plaintiff was trafficked knew or should have known of
Plaintiff’s trafficking.” 484 F. Supp. 3d at 938–39. But because the plaintiff there “merely allege[d]
that she repeatedly ‘encountered’ the same hotel staff who paid no attention to her” and did not
allege “she had prominent bruises, brandings, or other visible injuries,” the allegations could not
show that the hotels knew or should have known that the commercial sex was a result of fraud,
force, or coercion. Id. at 941.
Plaintiff’s allegations, to be sure, do cover the broader problem of sex trafficking in the
hotel industry. But her allegations go farther. Unlike the plaintiffs in the cases above., J.N.K.
alleges that she appeared emotional, nervous, scared, and often bruised when interacting with hotel
staff; that there was visible “heavy foot traffic in and out of Jane Doe (J.N.K.)’s room involving
men who were not hotel guests”; and that “[h]ousekeeping staff was usually prevented from
entering the room.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 74). These allegations are sufficient, at the motion to dismiss
stage, to suggest that RRI staff should have known that Plaintiff was being sex trafficked. Plaintiff
also alleges sufficient facts to impute the constructive knowledge of on-the-ground hotel staff to
RRI Defendants by way of direct, day-to-day control through, among other things, RRI
Defendants’ monitoring of the premises; imposing robust reporting and recordkeeping
requirements; controlling “a fully integrated database” that franchised hotels must use to access
customer data, reservations, and other information; mandating specific training for Franchisee and
hotel management at franchised hotels; mandating on-site training for hotel staff at franchised
hotels; controlling channels for guests to report complaints; and retaining the ability to require all
franchised hotels to participate in centralized operational services. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 101–104).

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This Court has previously held that a defendant’s notice of “the prevalence of sex
trafficking generally at their hotels,” the failure “to take adequate steps to train staff in order to
prevent its occurrence,” and signs that “should have alerted staff to [Plaintiff’s] situation” meet the
constructive knowledge requirement. M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 968. In comparable environments,
this Court has also rejected arguments that hotel defendants “must have had knowledge or
constructive knowledge with respect to Plaintiff specifically and that a generalized awareness of
sex trafficking in its low-cost hotels is insufficient.” See T.D.P., 725 F. Supp. 3d at 798–99. As this
Court reasoned in T.D.P., “the express terms of [18 U.S.C. § 1595] impose liability for benefiting
from a venture that the Defendant knew or should have known was engaged in violations of §
1591, not violations of § 1591 with respect to a particular person.” Id.
In the context of the other facts alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff’s allegations are
sufficient to support a plausible claim under the TVPRA’s beneficiary theory. While, ultimately,
these allegations may be unsubstantiated on a fuller record, they satisfy the three-pronged
requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1595 to survive a motion to dismiss. See M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 971–
72 (denying motion to dismiss of hotel parent company defendants where plaintiff pled that
defendants controlled employee training, room pricing, provided online booking platform, and
conducted inspections); T.D.P., 725 F. Supp. 3d at 798–99 (same).
This Court therefore DENIES RRI Defendants’ motion (ECF No. 20) to the extent it seeks
dismissal of Plaintiff’s beneficiary claim.
b. Indirect Liability
Plaintiff's third and final cause of action asserts that, in addition to direct liability, RRI
Defendants are also indirectly liable for TVPRA violations under theories of vicarious liability,
specifically as they pertain to joint venture, alter ego, and agency. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 123–128).

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RRI Defendants urge dismissal of Plaintiff's vicarious liability claim for two reasons, although
neither is persuasive.
(1) Vicarious Liability under the TVPRA
RRI Defendants argue that “vicarious liability is not a viable theory under the TVPRA,”
because the statute “predicates liability on a defendant’s personal knowledge and individual
participation in a venture,” which “represents a ‘clear and explicit’ choice to forgo common law
indirect liability principles.” (ECF No. 20 at 30). But although the TVPRA does not address the
issue of indirect or vicarious liability, this Court is guided by “the rule of statutory construction []
that statutes are to be interpreted with reference to the common law and generally be given their
common law meaning absent some indication to the contrary.” See United States v. Monasterski,
567 F.2d 677, 682 (6th Cir. 1977) (citing Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952);
Thomas v. United States, 189 F.2d 494, 501 (6th Cir.), cert. den. 342 U.S. 850 (1951)); see Meyer
v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285–86 (2003) (“[T]he Court has assumed that, when Congress creates a
tort action, it legislates against a legal background of ordinary tort-related vicarious liability rules
and consequently intends its legislation to incorporate those rules.”).
For this reason, federal courts adjudicating this issue routinely rely on common law to fill
in the gaps. See T.D.P., 725 F. Supp. 3d at 799 (“A plaintiff can also satisfy the elements of § 1595’s
beneficiary theory by imputing to the defendant the acts, omissions, and state of mind of an agent
of the defendant through indirect or vicarious liability.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Treminio v. Crowley Mar. Corp., 649 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1232 (M.D. Fla. 2023) (“Upon
review of the relevant authority, the Court declines to find that the TVPRA precludes vicarious
liability.”); J.L., 521 F. Supp. 3d at 1064–65 (“While the TVPRA is silent on the issue of indirect

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liability, numerous district courts have rejected the argument that the TVPRA does not permit
agency liability.”).
The Sixth Circuit, to be sure, “has yet to rule on whether the federal or state common law
of vicarious liability should be applied under the TVPRA.” See T.D.P., 725 F. Supp. 3d at 799.
Nonetheless, district courts have applied both state and federal common law of vicarious liability
to assess indirect liability claims under the TVPRA. See e.g., A.B. v. Marriott Intern., Inc., 455 F.
Supp. 3d 171, 194–95 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (applying Pennsylvania agency law); S.J., 473 F. Supp. 3d
at 158–59 (applying New York agency law); Doe by Doe v. Piraino, 688 F. Supp. 3d 635, 652
(M.D. Tenn. 2023) (“Federal common law agency principles apply to [TVPRA] claims.”); J.L.,
521 F. Supp. 3d at 1064 (“Because the TVPRA is silent [on the issue of indirect liability], courts
have held that the federal common law of agency should apply.”); A.B., 484 F. Supp. 3d at 939
(“examin[ing] vicarious liability as a question of federal common law.”); see also S.C. v. Wyndham
Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 3d 771, 778 (N.D. Ohio 2024) (“Courts split on whether to
apply federal common law or state law. But either choice leads to the same outcome.”); K.O. v. G6
Hosp., LLC, 728 F. Supp. 3d 624, 649 (E.D. Mich. 2024) (“find[ing] that the analysis is largely the
same under federal common law and Michigan law and, as such, will . . . apply Michigan common
law”)
In M.A., the seminal case charging hotel defendants with sex trafficking violations of the
TVPRA, this Court analyzed vicarious liability under Ohio common law—a decision that
“stemmed from the fact that the limited references to the federal common law of vicarious liability
drew directly from Ohio common law and Restatements.” See A.R. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts,
Inc., No. 2:21-CV-04935, 2022 WL 17741054, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 2022) (citing M.A., 425
F. Supp. 3d. at 971–72). Since M.A. was decided, however, a growing body of case law has

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emerged to suggest that the TVPRA’s silence on the issue of vicarious liability supports applying
federal common law. See Piraino, 688 F. Supp. 3d at 652; A.B., 484 F. Supp. 3d at 939; J.L., 521
F. Supp. 3d at 1064; Doe (K.E.C.) v. G6 Hosp., LLC, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2024 WL 4501095, at
*12 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2024); Doe (L.M.) v. 42 Hotel Raleigh, LLC, No. 5:23-CV-235-FL, 2024
WL 4204906, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2024) (“Courts evaluating federal statutory claims,
including under the TVPRA, generally draw upon the federal common law of agency.”); Doe v.
Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, No. 8:23-cv-1554, 2023 WL 8888836, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13,
2023); A.D. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 4:19cv120, 2020 WL 9550005, at *3 (E.D.
Va. Sept. 21, 2020) (same); J.C. v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., No. 20-CV-00155-WHO, 2020 WL
3035794, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2020) (“[T]he TVPRA is silent on the issue of indirect liability,
which suggests that the federal common law of agency should apply.”). In more recent rulings, this
Court has therefore applied federal common law to vicarious liability claims under the TVPRA,
explaining that this approach “brings the analysis in line with the Sixth Circuit’s approach to
applying the federal common law of vicarious liability to federal statutes that do not expressly
provide direction on vicarious liability arguments.” See A.M., 728 F. Supp. 3d 787, 802 (S.D. Ohio
2024); G.M., 725 F. Supp. 3d at 782; T.D.P., 725 F. Supp. 3d at 799. Moreover, “because there is
little to no substantive difference between federal and Ohio common law standards for agency and
joint employer vicarious liability,” the analysis “under both federal and state common law results
in the same outcome.” A.R., 2022 WL 17741054, at *8.
Seeking to circumvent these well-settled principles, RRI Defendants urge this Court to
adopt the position in Doe v. Varsity Brands, LLC, No. 1:22-CV-02139, 2023 WL 4931929 (N.D.
Ohio Aug. 2, 2023), which held that 18 U.S.C. § 2255—the section of the Child Abuse Victims’
Rights Act (“CAVRA”) that provides a civil cause of action for certain enumerated crimes—does

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not provide for secondary liability. (See ECF No. 20 at 31 (citing Varsity Brands, 2023 WL
4931929, at *7-8)). But like other federal courts assessing indirect liability claims under CAVRA,
this Court analyzed the statutory text and found “no reason to believe that Congress intended to
prohibit plaintiffs from suing beneficiaries of and participants in the many crimes enumerated in
[18 U.S.C.] § 2255.” See T.D.P., 725 F. Supp. 3d at 791; see also Jane Doe No. 8 v. Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (concluding that a cruise
line could be held liable under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 for the sexual crimes of its employees).
Because this Court holds that the TVPRA allows for vicarious liability, RRI Defendants’
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim on this basis must be rejected.
(2) Principal-Agency Liability
RRI Defendants’ second argument challenges the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations to
support an agency relationship. “To succeed under an agency theory, Plaintiff must show both: (1)
that Defendant and its franchisee[] were in an agency relationship; and (2) that [the franchisee]
hotel[] or hotel staff are plausibly liable under § 1595(a).” A.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts,
Inc., 728 F. Supp. 3d 787, 803 (S.D. Ohio 2024), partially amended on reconsideration on other
grounds sub nom. In re Hotel TVPRA Litig., No. 2:21-CV-4933, 2024 WL 4945135 (S.D. Ohio
Dec. 3, 2024).
i.

Agency Relationship

The Sixth Circuit looks to the Restatement of Agency when applying “federal common law
principles of agency.” See Johansen v. HomeAdvisor, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 577, 586 (S.D. Ohio
2016). An agency relationship exists when a principal “manifests assent” to an agent “that the
agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent
manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” See Restatement (Third) of Agency, § 1.01

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(2006) (emphasis added). A defining element of agency “is the principal's right to control the
agent's actions,” such as “[t]he power to give interim instructions.” Restatement (Third) of
Agency § 1.01 cmt. f (explaining that “[t]he power to give interim instructions” is what
“distinguishes principals in agency relationships from those who contract to receive services
provided by persons who are not agents”); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 713 (2013) (“An
essential element of agency is the principal's right to control the agent's actions.” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)). In determining whether an agency relationship exists, the
question is “how much the agent ‘retained control, or the right to control, the mode and manner of
doing the work contracted for.’” M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 971–72 (quoting Beddia v. Goodin, 957
F.2d 254, 257 (6th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted)).
Generally, the existence and extent of the agency relationship is a question of fact that is
better addressed later in the proceedings. See Brainard v. Am. Skandia Life Assur. Corp., 432 F.3d
655, 661 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Given that the existence of an agency relationship is a question of fact,
rather than one of law, . . . the court should have denied [the defendant’s] motion if any conflicting
evidence of an agency relationship between plaintiffs and [the defendant] was presented.”).
Nonetheless, a plaintiff must still set forth plausible allegations that an agency relationship exists
for her claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Foremost–McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“It is . . . clear that the plaintiff bears the burden of
asserting facts sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss regarding the agency relationship.”);
S.Y. v. Naples Hotel Co., 476 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1258 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (“Plaintiffs . . . do not need
to prove an agency relationship at this stage, but simply set forth plausible allegations that one
exists . . . .” (citations omitted)).

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While the mere existence of a franchise does not establish an agency relationship, the
franchise model does not preclude wholesale franchisors from vicarious liability under an agency
theory. Bricker v. R & A Pizza, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 2d 615, 623 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (“[T]he existence
of a franchisor-franchisee relationship between persons does not in itself preclude the existence of
a principal-agent relationship between them.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). To
determine whether “a principal-agent relationship exists, courts consider the same factors ‘as in
the absence of a franchisor-franchisee relationship.’” Bricker, 804 F. Supp. 2d at 623 (quoting
Taylor v. Checkrite, Ltd., 627 F. Supp. 415, 416 (S.D. Ohio 1986)). Accordingly, franchisor hotels
may be held vicariously liable under an agency theory for the wrongful acts of their franchisees,
or franchisees’ employees, when the hotel franchisor has direct control of, or the right to control,
the day-to-day operations of the franchisee. See A.M., 728 F. Supp. 3d at 803.
Taken as true, the Complaint plausibly alleges an agency relationship between RRI
Defendants and Franchisee. Plaintiff alleges that RRI Defendants exercised day-to-day control
over the Madison RRI by: (1) controlling all details of the guest reservation, check-in, and payment
processes through management of and control over all systems used for those processes; (2)
controlling room prices, discounts, and reward programs; (3) requiring franchisees to use
centralized property management systems for their operations; (4) collecting reservation, payment,
and occupancy data through a fully integrated database maintained by RRI Defendants; (5)
regularly inspecting RRI branded properties; (6) controlling all marketing and facility designs for
RRI branded properties; (7) requiring use of standardized training methods for employees; (8)
mandating specific training for Franchisee and hotel management at franchised hotels; and (9)
providing benefits to employees of franchised properties; (10) adopting and enforcing detailed
policies dictating the means and methods used for day-to-day operations; and (11) dictating,

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supervising, and overseeing policies and protocols regarding detecting and responding to human
trafficking. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 89–93, 103).
These allegations satisfy the pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 to
demonstrate RRI Defendants’ control over Franchisee for purposes of an agency relationship. See
Doe S.W. v. Lorain-Elyria Motel, Inc., No. 2:19-CV-1194, 2020 WL 1244192, at *7–8 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 16, 2020) (finding allegations of “profit sharing, standardized training methods, building
specifications, standardized rules of operation, regular inspection of the facility, and price fixing”
sufficient to support agency relationship between franchisor and franchisee hotel); A.B., 484 F.
Supp. 3d at 940 (finding similar allegations sufficient to plead an agency relationship under federal
common law but dismissing indirect liability claim on other grounds).
ii.

Franchisee’s Liability

Plaintiff’s allegations also satisfy the second requirement to succeed on her agency
theory—that the Franchisee itself committed a wrong that can be imputed on RRI Defendants. See
A.M., 728 F. Supp. 3d at 804. This Court applies the three-pronged test established by 18 U.S.C.
§ 1595, and already used to assess RRI Defendants’ direct liability, to Franchisee as well: (1)
Franchisee must “knowingly benefit[], financially or by receiving anything of value”; (2) from
participating in a venture; (3) that it “knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation
of this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).
First, Plaintiff alleges that the Franchisee financially benefited from renting rooms to
traffickers, therefore satisfying the first prong. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 96–97). RRI Defendants’ contention
that the Complaint contains “no allegations” that “any employees ‘knowingly benefitted’ from a
trafficking venture” lacks merit. (See ECF No. 20 at 20). As explained in Section III.B.2.a.(2).i

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supra, the rental of a room constitutes a financial benefit from a relationship with the trafficker
sufficient to satisfy the “knowing benefit” element.
See M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 965 (“[T]he rental of a room constitutes a financial benefit
from a relationship with the trafficker sufficient to meet this element of the [section] 1595(a)
standard.”). Second, Plaintiff’s allegations raise a plausible inference that Franchisee, along with
RRI Defendants, participated in a hotel-operating commercial venture that profited from Plaintiff’s
sex trafficking. (See ECF No. 1 ¶ 99). Finally, the Complaint plausibly alleges that Franchisee had
constructive knowledge that Plaintiff was being trafficked by observing red flags consistent with
sex trafficking, including Plaintiff’s bruising, demeanor, movements throughout the hotel, and her
interactions with hotel staff. RRI Defendants’ contention that the Complaint contains “no
allegations” that the “organizations, independent of their employees, had any knowledge of
Plaintiff’s trafficking,” (ECF No. 20 at 20), misunderstands the beneficiary theory of TVPRA civil
liability. As explained in Section III.B.2.a.(2).iii supra, “actual knowledge” is not required for a
plaintiff to hold defendants civilly liable as beneficiaries of her sex trafficking.
To reiterate, Plaintiff’s allegations at this stage are just that: allegations. But where more
than one inference may be drawn from an allegation, this Court must resolve the conflict in favor
of the plaintiff. Mayer, 988 F.2d at 638. Because Plaintiff’s allegations, viewed most favorably to
her, support an agency relationship between RRI Defendants and Franchisee, and Plaintiff
adequately alleges Franchisee’s liability under the TVPRA’s beneficiary theory, RRI Defendants’
motion to dismiss the vicarious liability claim is denied.

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****
RRI Defendants’ motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART; the motion to dismiss is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s perpetrator liability claim and
DENIED as to all other claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART RRI
Defendants’ motion to transfer venue or, in the alternative, to dismiss. (ECF No. 20). Specifically,
RRI Defendants’ request to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Michigan is DENIED; and
their motion to dismiss is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s perpetrator liability claim and
DENIED as to all other claims. Additionally, because this Court does not rely on any authority
contained in Plaintiff’s notice of supplemental authority, RRI Defendants’ motion for leave (ECF
No. 33) is DENIED AS MOOT. Finally, this Court DENIES Defendant Mahadeva’s motion to
transfer venue. (ECF No. 37).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
________________________________________
ALGENON L. MARBLEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: March 11, 2025

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