Begum v. United States Department of State et al

Filing 22

OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 20 Motion to Stay. Defendants' motion is GRANTED, in part, to the extent that the Court TEMPORARILY STAYS discovery pending resolution of the motion to dismiss. To the extent Defendants request that the Court pre-emptively limit discovery to the administrative record, Defendants' motion is DENIED, in part, without prejudice to the ability to raise the issue, as necessary, following resolution of the motion to dismiss. Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Preston Deavers on November 22, 2024. (jlk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
SHEPALI BEGUM,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action 2:24-cv-1784
Judge Michael H. Watson
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court to consider Defendants’ motion to stay discovery. (ECF
No. 20.) Plaintiff has responded. (ECF No. 21.) Defendants have not filed a reply and the time
for doing so now has passed. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED, in part, and
DENIED without prejudice, in part.
I.
Briefly, the Complaint, filed on April 16, 2024, alleges the following. Plaintiff is a
lawful permanent resident of the United States, residing in Columbus, Ohio. She filed a visa
petition on behalf of her son, a Bangladesh citizen on August 19, 2019. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 2,
10, 12-13.) On July 15, 2020, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services purportedly
approved the visa petition and sent it on for processing. (Id. at ¶¶15, 16.) A consular officer
interviewed Plaintiff’s son on February 5, 2024, but no decision has been issued. (Id. at ¶17.)
According to Plaintiff, Defendants have intentionally delayed a response to the visa application
pursuant to the Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program (“CARRP”), a program
the adoption of which she alleges violates, inter alia, the Administrative Procedures Act

(“APA”) and certain constitutional provisions. Plaintiff also asserts a due process claim.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief.
Defendants have moved to dismiss, arguing that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability
bars judicial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Further, they argue that Plaintiff’s constitutional
claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff does not have a right for her son to live in the United
States. Additionally, they assert that, even if the Court considers Plaintiff’s APA claim, it should
be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot allege facts demonstrating that Defendants have
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed the adjudication of the beneficiary’s visa
application. Defendants also assert that Plaintiff’s CARRP claims are unfounded.
Defendants have filed their current motion requesting that the Court stay discovery
pending the resolution of their motion to dismiss. They additionally request that, in the event
Plaintiff’s claims survive the motion to dismiss, the Court limit any factual development to the
administrative record. Plaintiff’s succinct response appears to be primarily addressed to the
latter issue.
II.
“A district court has the inherent power to stay proceedings based on its authority to
manage its docket efficiently.” Ferrell v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., Inc., No. 1:01-CV-447, 2005 WL
2709623, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2005) (citing In re Airline Pilots Ass'n v. Miller, 523 U.S.
866, 880 (1998) (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936))). The Court,
however, “must tread carefully in granting a stay of proceedings since a party has a right to a
determination of its rights and liabilities without undue delay.” Ohio Envtl. Council v. U.S. Dist.
Ct., 565 F.2d 393, 396 (6th Cir. 1977) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55).

In deciding whether to grant a stay, courts commonly consider the following factors: (1) the
stage of litigation; (2) whether the non-moving party will be unduly prejudiced or tactically
disadvantaged; (3) whether a stay simplifies the issues; and (4) whether the burden of litigation
on the parties and on the court is reduced. Grice Eng'g, Inc. v. JG Innovations, Inc., 691 F. Supp.
2d 915, 920 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (citations omitted). The movant bears the burden of showing both
a need for delay and that “neither the other party nor the public will suffer harm from entry of the
order.” Ohio Envtl. Council, 565 F.2d at 396.
In exercising its discretion, the Court has found that filing a case-dispositive motion is
insufficient to grant a stay of discovery. Bowens v. Columbus Metro. Library Bd. of Trs., No.
2:10-CV-00219, 2010 WL 3719245, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 2010) (citing Ohio Bell Tele. Co.,
Inc. v. Global NAPs Ohio, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-0549, 2008 WL 641252, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 4,
2008)) (denying the defendants' motion to stay discovery despite their pending summary
judgment motion). Indeed, if a motion does not raise an issue “which would be substantially
vitiated absent a stay” and there is no showing that the case will “certainly be dismissed” then “a
stay should not ordinarily be granted to a party who has filed a garden-variety Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.” Williams v. New Day Farms, LLC, No. 2:10-CV-0394, 2010 WL 3522397, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Sept 7, 2010).
Nevertheless, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has recognized that
“[l]imitations on pretrial discovery are appropriate where claims may be dismissed ‘based on
legal determinations that could not have been altered by any further discovery.’” Gettings v.
Bldg. Laborers Local 310 Fringe Benefits Fund, 349 F.3d 300, 304 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Muzquiz v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., Inc., 70 F.3d 422, 430 (6th Cir. 1995)). This Court,
however, retains broad discretion in determining whether to “stay discovery until preliminary

questions which may dispose of the case are answered.” Bangas v. Potter, 145 F. App'x 139, 141
(6th Cir. 2005) (citing Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 719 (6th Cir. 1999)).
III.
Applying the above factors, the Court concludes that, under the particular circumstances
of this case, it is a better exercise of its broad discretion to temporarily stay discovery pending
resolution of the motion to dismiss. Admittedly, this Court repeatedly has held that a gardenvariety motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) ordinarily is insufficient to warrant a stay of
discovery.1 The Court considers each case on its own merit, however, including the nature of the
issues in dispute. Here, while resolution of the pending dispositive motion could dispose of this
action, even short of that, the resolution could clarify the issues presented. Thus, from a
pragmatic perspective, a temporary stay pending such resolution could preserve both judicial and
counsel’s resources.
Moreover, this case is in its initial stages. For this reason, the Court cannot conceive how
Plaintiff will be unduly prejudiced or tactically disadvantaged by a short stay designed to
simplify the discovery process. Importantly, Plaintiff offers no argument on this point. And,
Plaintiff does not suggest that she lacks the information necessary to properly respond to the
motions to dismiss. Indeed, she filed her response to that motion prior to Defendants’ having
filed their motion to stay. (See ECF No. 14.)

1

Contrary to the representations in Defendants’ motion, it is an overstatement to suggest that
“district courts within this Circuit routinely stay or otherwise limit discovery ….” (ECF No. 20
at 1, citing Ahern Rentals, Inc. v. EquipmentShare.com, Inc., No. 10-1788, 2020 WL 2216944, at
*3 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2020); Quezambra v. United Domestic Workers of Am. AFSCME Local
3930, No. 19-cv-927-JLS-JEM, 2019 WL 8108745, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2019); Driscoll’s,
Inc. v. California Berry Cultivars, LLC, No. 19-493, 2019 WL 4822413, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1,
2019); Commerce &Indus. Ins. Co. v. Durofix, Inc., No. 16-111, 2018 WL 8332535, at *2 (D.
Haw. May 30, 2018)).) This Court, of course, cannot speak to the routine actions of district
courts in the Ninth Circuit.

At the same time, the Court sees no reason to address at this juncture the other issue
raised by Defendants’ current motion. That is, to the extent Defendants request that the Court
not only stay discovery, but pre-emptively limit any eventual discovery to the administrative
record, the Court will not resolve that issue on the current record. That issue would be addressed
more appropriately, as necessary, following a ruling on the motion to dismiss.
IV.
For these reasons, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED, in part, to the extent that the
Court TEMPORARILY STAYS discovery pending resolution of the motion to dismiss. To the
extent Defendants request that the Court pre-emptively limit discovery to the administrative
record, Defendants’ motion is DENIED, in part, without prejudice to the ability to raise the
issue, as necessary, following resolution of the motion to dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: November 22, 2024

/s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE