Buckhorn Inc v. Orbis Corporation et al

Filing 312

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART ORBIS'S MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES (Doc. 304). Signed by Judge Timothy S. Black on 7/11/2014. (mr1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
BUCKHORN INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ORBIS CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:08-cv-459
Judge Timothy S. Black

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART ORBIS’S MOTION
FOR SUPPLEMENTAL ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND EXPENSES (Doc. 304)
This civil action is before the Court on Defendant Orbis’s motion for attorneys’
fees and expenses (Doc. 304) and the parties’ responsive memoranda (Docs. 306, 308).
I. BACKGROUND 1
On April 22, 2014, the Court awarded Orbis $3,042,485.45 in attorneys’ fees,
costs, and expenses. (Doc. 302). Now, Orbis moves for an award of supplemental
attorneys’ fees and costs incurred from November 2013 through January 2014. Orbis
seeks $99,295.50 in attorneys’ fees and $17.25 in copying costs incurred in litigating the
initial award of attorneys’ fees and costs. Specifically, Orbis seeks a supplemental award
for the following work:

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Background facts are incorporated herein from Doc. 302.

Project

Hours

Fees

Preparing Motion for a Determination of Fee Award

99.2

$50,098.50

Preparing Opposition to Buckhorn’s Motion to Dismiss

12.0

$6,817.50

Preparing Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion for a
Determination of Fee Award
Total

78.3

$42,379.50

190.5

$99,295.50

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court has the “discretion to deny attorneys’ fees” and “refuse to enforce a
contractual attorney’s fee provision if an award of fees would be ‘inequitable and
unreasonable.’” Anderson v. Melwani, 179 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing
DeBlasio Constr. Co. v. Mountain States Constr. Co., 588 F.2d 259, 263 (9th Cir. 1978)
(the court did not err in denying fees where both parties were to blame for the dispute)). 2
A court “abuses its discretion if it awards contractually-authorized attorney’s fees under
circumstances that make the award inequitable or unreasonable.” Anderson, 179 F.3d at
766.
The starting point for determining the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees is the
“lodestar” amount. Niswonger v. PNC Bank Corp. & Affiliates Long Term Disability
Plan, No. 3:10cv377, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111648, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2011)
(citing Inwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 551 (6th Cir. 2008)). The
“lodestar” amount is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended
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Since the fee award is derived solely from a contract governed by California law, California
law controls. (Doc. 286 at 20).
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on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. (Id.) All that is necessary to prove the
reasonableness of attorney fees is “evidence supporting the hours worked and rates
claimed.” Granada Inv., Inc. v. DWG Corp., 962 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
III.

ANALYSIS

Orbis is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred
enforcing its rights under the Fee Provision of the Settlement License. See, e,g, Central
Soya Co., Inc. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“We
interpret attorney fees to include those sums that the prevailing party incurs in the
preparation for and performance of legal services related to the suit” and citing with
approval a district court case holding that such fees “include lawyer’s fees for time spent
on the issue of attorney fees.”).
A. Attorneys’ Hours 3
Plaintiffs argue that Orbis’s motion mirrors its previously submitted motion for
fees, which shows that much of the legal work necessary for the motion was already
included in the invoices previously submitted to the Court, and for which the Court
already issued an award. (Compare Docs. 261 and 286). Specifically, Orbis spent
approximately 138 hours preparing its first motion for fees, and now seeks an award for
another 99.2 hours for preparing a largely identical motion, plus 78.3 hours for its reply.
(Docs. 303 and 286). Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that Orbis’s ten page reply brief was
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This Court already established the reasonableness of Orbis’s attorneys’ rates. (Doc. 302 at 5).
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largely repetition of the same arguments Orbis made on multiple occasions. Moreover,
Orbis provides vague descriptions in its billing entries, such as “work on reply brief,”
without any detailed information. (Doc. 303, Bono Decl., Ex. 1).
Plaintiffs also criticize Orbis’s memorandum contra to its motion to dismiss,
which was five pages in length and involved a discussion of only one case. (Doc. 288).
Accordingly, Buckhorn argues that an inequity will result if this Court awards the entirety
of the supplemental attorney fees.
“[T]he determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to
the discretion of the trial court…The trial court makes its determination after
consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty,
the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention
given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” PLCM Group v.
Drexler, No. S080201, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3716, at *207 (Cal. May 8, 2000). “There is no
precise rule or formula…The district court may attempt to identify specific hours that
should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited
success.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436-7 (1983).
Plaintiffs argue that the loadstar amount should be reduced by one-third.
Conversely, Orbis argues that the hours it incurred in preparing its motion for a
determination of fees and costs is not “largely identical” to its earlier motion. Among
other things, Orbis maintains that it had to consider and research many issues raised by
Plaintiffs, including citations to forty cases and twenty footnotes, which was
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accompanied by a seven-page, twenty-five paragraph declaration with twenty-two
exhibits.
Upon careful review of Orbis’s declaration and invoice in support of their motion,
the Court finds that an inequity will result if this Court awarded the entirety of the
supplemental attorney fees. Specifically, the Court finds that Orbis spent an inordinate
amount of time briefing the motion for fees. Moreover, with entries such as “work on
reply brief,” the Court simply cannot find that 177.5 hours were required to brief the
motion for fees. Accordingly, the Court adjusts the lodestar value of the fees pertaining
to the motion for fees and therefore reduces the same by one-fourth (or 25%). ($92,478 $23,119 = $69,359). The Court finds that the time spent opposing the motion to dismiss
was reasonable.
B. Costs
This Court already determined that copying costs are reimbursable. (Doc. 302 at
PageID 11609) (citing Alvarado v. Nederend, No. 1:08cv1900, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
52793, at *27-28 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2011)). Orbis seeks $17.25 in copying costs
reasonably and necessarily incurred in connection with preparing the hundreds of
documents that Orbis submitted to document the reasonableness of fees and costs
incurred in this matter. (Doc. 302 at PageID 11612). Buckhorn does not oppose this
request.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for these reasons, Orbis’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs
(Doc. 304) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, Orbis is
awarded $76,176.50 in attorney’s fees and $17.25 in costs, for a total of $76,193.75.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 7/11/14

s/ Timothy S. Black
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge

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