Jarrell v. National Personnel Records Center et al
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS recommending that 18 Plaintiff Stephen Jarrell's Motion for Summary Judgmentbe DENIED; 22 Defendant National Personnel Records Center's Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED; and, this case be terminated on the docket of this Court. Objections to R&R due by 10/10/2013. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sharon L Ovington on 9/23/13. (mm1)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
STEPHEN PAUL JARRELL,
Case No. 3:11cv00434
District Judge Timothy S. Black
Chief Magistrate Judge Sharon L. Ovington
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS2
Suspecting that the United States Army or someone else had tampered with his
military records, Plaintiff Stephen Paul Jarrell asked for, and received, a copy of his
personnel file from Defendant National Personnel Records Center. He examined the file and
concluded that someone had tampered with its contents.
Jarrell brings the present case pro se contending that Defendant “negligently and [/]
or willfully failed in its duty to safeguard the records entrusted to it and that such failure
harmed Plaintiff….” (Doc. #10, PageID at 37).
The case is presently before the Court upon Jarrell’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. #18), Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. #21), Defendant’s Motion for
Attached hereto is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and
Summary Judgment (Doc. #22), Jarrell’s Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. #24),
Defendant’s Reply (Doc. #25), Jarrell’s Reply (Doc. #26), and the record as a whole.
Jarrell’s Military Service and Discharge
Construing the evidence of record in Jarrell’s favor establishes the following.
To his credit, Jarrell enlisted in the United States Army in March 1971. After
completing preliminary procedures, such as physical examinations, he reported for basic
training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Things went poorly from the start. One week after
basic training began, Jarrell and a friend left Fort Jackson without leave. Upon Jarrell’s
return home, his family convinced him to return to basic training, and they drove him back
to Fort Jackson.
Almost immediately after Jarrell arrived back at the base, his platoon leader assaulted
him, pinning him to the ground and striking his head about 12 times. (Doc. #18, PageID at
After the attack, Jarrell and his family members prepared written statements
describing the incident and submitted their statements to the Office of the Fort Commander.
Jarrell also identified his attacker to his Company Commander, Captain Eugene Neville.
Later, Captain Neville took him to a room where six soldiers were assembled. None was the
assailant Jarrell had previously identified to Captain Neville, and Jarrell told Captain Neville
so. Captain Neville then told Jarrell that he must be confused and that the investigation was
completed. (Doc. #18, PageID at 97).
On or about April 17, 1971, Jarrell’s mother received a letter from Lieutenant
Colonel Kenneth M. Koester, informing her:
Since your departure from Fort Jackson, Stephen has completed 2½ days of
training, and appears to be adjusting well. I last talked to him today and he
indicates he is getting along fine….
* * *
Investigation of the assault on Stephen is complete. The Investigating Officer
took sworn testimony from many individuals in an attempt to find an eye
witness to the assault. In addition, Stephen was given an opportunity to
identify his assailant. Positive identification could not be made and there was
insufficient evidence to substantiate who committed the assault.
I will continue to closely monitor Stephen’s progress and if I may be of further
assistance, please feel free to write.
(Doc. #18, PageID at 95).
Unfortunately, however, Jarrell was not doing well even though he had been assigned
to a new Company. Jarrell explains, “I could no longer follow commands such as march
right or left because I was just as liable to go the wrong way.” Id., PageID at 97. Jarrell was
also subjected to “harassment and constant intimidation” in the days following the assault.
He concluded that the Army would neither properly investigate the attack nor provide him
with adequate medical treatment for the injuries he sustained. Id. As a result, on April 17,
1971, Jarrell left Fort Jackson for the second time, again without leave.
Over the next six months, Jarrell did not seek medical treatment for the injuries he
sustained during the attack in order to avoid arrest for being absent without leave. (Doc.
#18, PageID at 98). Jarrell’s strategy only worked for a while. He was arrested in October
1971 and subsequently discharged from the Army under “other than honorable conditions.”
(Doc. #18, PageID at 89).
Jarrell submits a copy of an Army memorandum dated November 5, 1971 that relates
to the recommendation and approval of his discharge from the Army with an Undesirable
Discharge Certificate. (Doc. #18, PageID at 86). According to Jarrell, the memorandum
demonstrates that the Army’s record of the medical examination he received at discharge
was included in his personnel file on November 5, 1971.
Jarrell’s Medical Complications
According to Jarrell, during the days immediately after the assault, he had difficulty
following simple directions. He also alleges that he suffered a temporary loss of memory –
including memories of the assault itself – and a decline in gross motor skills. And he states
that over the next few years he developed great difficulty with chewing and swallowing
food. (Doc. #18, PageID at 97).
In 1977, an oral surgeon determined that Jarrell had a broken bone that prevented
him from swallowing properly and caused him to grit his teeth together while eating. Jarrell
alleges that this had gradually loosened his teeth from the underlying bone, with two results:
(1) he lost all his teeth, and (2) the bone once holding his teeth fragmented, and bone
fragments worked their way out of his gums in small pieces over many years, requiring
several dental surgeries to completely remove. (Doc. #18, PageID at 98).
To help him with these problems, Jarrell sought medical and dental benefits from the
Veterans Administration. When his application was denied due to his the character of his
discharge from the Army, Jarrell petitioned the Army Board for Correction of Military
Records and the Army Discharge Review Board to change his status. His petitions were
denied, and he was left without veterans’ medical or dental benefits.
Jarrell’s Previous Case Against The U.S. Army
In 1994 Jarrell filed a Complaint in this Court against the U.S. Army under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. He charged that the Army had removed or destroyed records
related to the 1971 assault, and fabricated or forged documents related to his dishonorable
discharge, such as the report from his physical examination at the time of discharge. He
claimed that his application for veterans’ benefits was denied because of these problems
with his records, and he sought $5,000,000 in damages. (Doc. #22, PageID at 147-52).
Granting the Army’s motion to dismiss Jarrell’s claims, United States Magistrate
Judge Michael R. Merz affirmed the prior findings of the U.S. Army Claims Service,
concluding: (1) Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), prevented Jarrell from financial
compensation for his alleged injuries because his injuries had been “integrally related to his
military service,” and (2) his Complaint was time-barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act’s
two-year statute of limitations. (Doc. #22, PageID at 151).
Jarrell’s Present Allegations and Claims
Jarrell alleges the following in his pro se Amended Complaint:
Claim Number 1. National Personnel Records Center failed to notify
Archivist and Attorney General about missing records. On Oct. 23, 1978 Mr.
Petterson and Adjudication Officer for the Veterans Administration stated
that the V.A. had received my entrance medical examination but not my
discharge medical examination. On 10/30/78 a person from the National
Personnel Records Canter with the signed name of J. White stated that all my
medical records were sent to the V.A. on 9/14/78. The NPRC was aware on
10/23/78 that a record in their system of records was missing. In addition,
despite evidence that the discharge exam should have been in my records
jacket, the NPRC failed to notify the Attorney General in order that he could
track down the missing record in accordance with 44 USC Chapter 31.
Claim Number 2. National Personnel Records Center deleted information on
records sent to this court. In June of 1994 I filed a tort claim against the
Army. Lieutenant Colonel Richard P. Laverdure certified that the records
jacket, sent to this court and, pertaining to me were copies of the original
records. The NPRC, which was aware that my discharge exam was missing,
did or allowed an unknown person or person’s access to someone else’s
records for the purpose of obtaining and altering that person’s discharge
exam, improperly allowed that person(s) to put the altered document in my
file, and then provided the altered document to the court.
Claim Number 3. National Personnel Records Center altered records sent to
this court. In the same tort claim the NPRC did or allowed an unknown
person or persons to alter my discharge certificate (DD 214) as part of the
certified packet of records, pertaining to me, and sent to this court.
Claim Number 4. National Personnel Records Center fabricated records sent
to this court. Since the evidence of record shows that my records jacket was
complete when I was discharged from the Army, it must be assumed that the
NPRC did or allowed an unknown person or persons to alter and[/]or delete
certain medical and dental records, pertaining to an assault on me April 12,
1971 and sent to this court. The evidence will show that the records in
question are a complete fabrication.
Claim Number 5. National Personnel Records Center failed again to notify
the Archivist and Attorney General about records missing from the file. On
Feb. 13, 1997 a person from the V.A. whose name and address have been
deleted sent a request to the NPRC for records of an assault on me on April
12, 1971. A person from the NPRC whose name and title are hard to make
out stated that on 4/24/97 there were no records of an assault on me in the
file. Once again despite clear evidence that there should be records of the
assault in my file the NPRC failed to notify the Attorney General [about] the
missing records in accordance with 44 USC Chapter 31 sub sec 3106.
(Doc. #10, PageID at 34-36).
Jarrell’s Amended Complaint “requests the court to order the defendant to pay
damages of lost wages and medical and dental benefits from January 1972 to the present
day and time.” Id., PageID at 37.
Summary Judgment Standards
When, as here, parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court
grants or denies each motion for summary judgment on its own merit, applying the
standards described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Taft Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d
240, 248 (6th Cir. 1991).
A party is entitled to summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute over any
material fact and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Barker v.
Goodrich, 649 F.3d 428, 432 (6th Cir. 2011).
To resolve whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court draws all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Richland
Bookmart, Inc. v. Knox County, Tenn., 555 F.3d 512, 520 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89
L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). With these reasonable inferences in the forefront, “[t]he central issue
is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Jones v. Potter,
488 F.3d 397, 402-03 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); quoting, in part, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251-52 (1986)). “Accordingly, ‘[e]ntry of summary judgment is appropriate ‘against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’”
Whitfield v. Tennessee, 639 F.3d 253, 258 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). An
insufficient showing by the moving party cannot prevail, even if its factual underpinnings
have not been challenged by the non-movant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
“‘The filing of cross-
motions for summary judgment does not necessarily mean that the parties consent to
resolution of the case on the existing record or that the district court is free to treat the case
as submitted for final resolution on a stipulated record.’” Id. (citations omitted). Summary
judgment may not be appropriate where the parties disagree as to which facts in a stipulated
record are material. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. United States Filter Corp., 245 F.3d 547 (6th Cir.
Jarrell’s Claims Under The Federal Records Act
Jarrell contends that Defendant “was and is in violation of the Federal Records Act”
– specifically, 44 U.S.C. §3106. (Doc. #18, PageID at 80-81).
“The Federal Records Act is a collection of statutes governing the creation,
management, and disposal of records by federal agencies.” Public Citizen v. Carlin,
Archivist of United States, 184 F.3d 900, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Ginsburg, C.J.). Section
3106, upon which Jarrell relies, is one such statute. It states:
The head of each Federal agency shall notify the Archivist1 of any actual,
impending, or threatened unlawful removal, defacing, alteration, or destruction of
records in the custody of the agency of which he is the head that shall come to his
attention and with the assistance of the Archivist shall initiate action through the
Attorney General for the recovery of records he knows or has reason to believe have
been unlawfully removed from his agency….
“[T]he term ‘Archivist’ means the Archivist of the United States[.]” 44 U.S.C. §2901(11).
44 U.S.C. §3106 (footnote added). When the Archivist, himself, learns of similar problems
with an agency’s records, he assists the agency’s head in gaining the help of the Attorney
General to recover the records “unlawfully removed and for other redress provided by law.”
44 U.S.C. § 2905(a). And, if the agency head does not act within a reasonable time, “the
Archivist shall request the Attorney General to initiate such an action, and shall notify the
Congress when such a request has been made.” 44 U.S.C. §2905(a).
Assuming, momentarily, that Defendant failed to satisfy the duties described in either
of these statutes, the remedies Jarrell seeks founder. In his Amended Complaint, Jarrell
seeks an Order requiring Defendant “to pay damages of lost wages and medical and dental
benefits from January 1972 to the present day and time.” (Doc. #10, PageID at 37). This
relief is unavailable to him.
“There is no waiver of sovereign immunity for a damages claim in the Federal
Records Act ….” Pragovich v. United States, 602 F. Supp.2d 194, 195 (D.D.C. 2009); see
Morrow v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 2d 71, 79 (D.D.C. 2010) (In light of the
Government’s sovereign immunity, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
monetary claims against the U.S. under the Federal Records Act and the Administrative
Procedures Act). Consequently, the Federal Records Act provides no support for Jarrell’s
attempt to obtain monetary damages.
Jarrell also seeks a wholly different remedy:
The court should restore me to the position I would have been in had the
Government maintained complete and accurate records of my military service.
Specifically, I ask the court to order the government to grant me an honorable
discharge with back pay and promotional considerations, or alternatively, to
grant me a medical discharge with a service-connected disability or both.
(Doc. #1, PageID at 4).
The problem Jarrell encounters here is the doctrine announced in Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 149 (1950).
Feres and its progeny indicate that suits brought by service members
against the Government for injuries incurred incident to service are barred by
the Feres doctrine because they are the “type[s] of claims that, if generally
permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the
expense of military discipline and effectiveness.” United States v. Shearer,
473 U.S. , 59, 105 S.Ct. , 3044 [(1985)]. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733, 743, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2555, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974). “[T]o accomplish its
mission the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and
esprit de corps.” Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507, 106 S.Ct. 1310,
1313, 89 L.Ed.2d 478 (1986).
United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 691, 107 S.Ct. 2063 (1987). As Jarrell previously
learned when Magistrate Judge Merz dismissed Jarrell’s 1994 case, the Feres doctrine
presents a high hurdle to overcome. Magistrate Judge Merz concluded – as did the U.S.
Army Claims Service during Jarrell’s administrative proceedings – that Feres barred Jarrell
from using the Federal Tort Claims Act (1) to challenge the Army’s decision not to upgrade
his discharge or (2) to challenge the U.S. Veterans Administration’s (VA’s) denial of his
requests for benefits. See Doc. #22, PageID at 150-51. This is no less true in the instant case
where Jarrell seeks an Order requiring the Army to upgrade the character of his discharge
and award him lost back pay. The Feres doctrine bars this judicial remedy. See Bowen v.
Oistead, 125 F.3d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Feres doctrine is applicable whenever a legal
action would require a civilian court to examine decisions regarding management,
discipline, supervision, and control of members of the armed forces of the United
States.”)(citation omitted); see also Murphy v. Dep't of the Army, C12-1476 JSC, 2012 WL
1294003 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012) (United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58, 105 S.Ct.
3039, 87 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985) stated “that ‘whether to discharge a serviceman’ is a
professional military judgment of the type contemplated in Feres[.]”).
As to Jarrell’s other sought-after remedy – an Order requiring the VA to provide him
with medical and dental benefits – to grant this remedy, this Court would have to reverse the
VA’s decision denying his application for benefits. But, the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act
vests exclusive jurisdiction in the VA Board of Veterans’ Appeals to review VA’s benefits
decisions, which (in turn) are subject to review in the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims,
followed by review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See 38
U.S.C. §§ 7525(a), 7292; see also Beamon v. Brown, 125 F.3d 965, 967 (6th Cir. 1997).
This Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review or alter the VA’s decision to
deny Jarrell’s application for medical and dental benefits. Robbins v. U.S. Dep't of Def.,
2:11CV567-WKW, 2012 WL 3023261 (M.D. Ala. June 28, 2012) (citing Beamon, 125 F.3d
at 974), Report and Recommendation adopted, 2:11-CV-567-WKW, 2012 WL 3022593
(M.D. Ala. July 24, 2012).
Defendant argues, citing Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
445 U.S. 136, 148-50, 100 S.Ct. 960 (1980), that it is entitled to summary judgment because
the Federal Records Act does not provide Jarrell with a private right of action to address
potential Federal Records Act violations. Kissinger, however, does not directly apply to the
present case. Kissinger left open the question of what remedies might be available to a
private plaintiff like Jarrell. Id., 445 U.S. at 150, n.5, 100 S.Ct. 960 (“We need not address
what remedies might be available to private plaintiffs complaining that the administrators
[now, the Archivist] and the Attorney General have breached a duty to enforce the [Federal]
Records Act, since no such action was brought here.”).
Defendant also points to the possibility that Jarrell might utilize, to a limited extent,
the Administrative Procedures Act to litigate his present Federal-Records-Act claims. (Doc.
#22, PageID at 130-32). Yet Jarrell’s potential use of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5
U.S.C. 702, is foreclosed, as discussed above, under sovereign immunity, the Feres
doctrine, and the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act.
Jarrell may also not proceed under the Administrative Procedures Act because such a
claim is time barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations. See Sierra Club v.
Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 631 (6th Cir. 1997) (applying 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)). Jarrell asserts, for
example, that Defendant received notification of missing records in 1978 and again in 1997,
but he did not discover that Defendant had taken no action to investigate these discrepancies
until he visited in 2011. See Doc. #18, PageID at 81. The evidence of record does not
support this. Instead the evidence conclusively shows that his allegations of records
tampering began as early as 1988 when he wrote to the Veterans’ Administration: “I
received the records I am presenting to you through the Freedom of Information Act
sometime between 1976 & 1979. I recently discovered that these records have been altered
and[/]or tampered with in an attempt to cover up my treatment at the Dispensary on April
12, 1971….” (Doc. #22, PageID at 174). In addition, Jarrell sued the Army on those
grounds in 1994. See id., PageID at 144; see infra, V(B). The present documents of record
therefore preclude any reasonable dispute over the fact Jarrell knew about the problems with
his personnel records more than six years before he filed the present case (in December
2011). He is therefore time barred, under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), from utilizing the
Administrative Procedures Act to litigate his present Federal Records Act claims.
Turning to Jarrell’s Motion for Summary Judgment and attached documents, a
thorough examination of his assertions, arguments, and other filings does not reveal either a
legal or evidentiary basis that negates the above problems with his Federal Records Act
claims. See Doc. #s, 18, 24, 26. His Motion for Summary Judgment therefore lacks merit.
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Jarrell’s claims under
the Federal Records Act.
Jarrell’s Claims Under The Privacy Act
Jarrell claims that Defendant failed to perform its duties set forth in 5 U.S.C.
552(g)(1).2 (Doc. #1, PageID at 3).
With specific exceptions, the Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits a federal agency
disclosing “any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of
communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by,
Section 552(g)(1) states:
The head of each agency shall prepare and make publicly available upon request, reference
material or a guide for requesting records or information from the agency, subject to the
exemptions in subsection (b), including—
(1) an index of all major information systems of the agency;
(2) a description of major information and record locator systems maintained by the agency;
(3) a handbook for obtaining various types and categories of public information from the
or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains.” 5 U.S.C. §
552a(b). The United States District Courts have subject matter jurisdiction over some
categories of claims brought under the Privacy Act. See 5 U.S.C. 552a(g)(1).
Defendant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because Jarrell’s claim
under the Privacy Act is barred by its two-year statute of limitations. Jarrell argues that in
1994 he had no reason to know about Defendant’s complicity with the record tampering and
that it was not until he visited the National Personnel Records Center in 2011 that he first
discovered similar copier marks on multiple documents, a date inconsistency, and
correspondence about requests that he had not made.
A claim under the Privacy Act “may be brought . . . within two years from the date
on which the cause of action arises ….” 5 U.S.C. §552a(g)(5). A cause of action under the
Privacy Act arises when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of an agency’s violation.
See Lockett v. Potter, 259 Fed.Appx. 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Oja v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers, 440 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2006); Davis v. United States
Dep’t of Justice, 204 F.3d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 2000).
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment because Jarrell’s claims under the
Privacy Act are time barred. His claims fall outside the applicable statute of limitations
because the evidence of record shows no genuine dispute over the fact that in 1994 he knew,
or had reason to know, about the Privacy-Act violations he now raises. See Lockett, 259
Fed. Appx. at 786; Oja, 440 F.3d at 1135; Davis, 204 F.3d at 726. Jarrell asserted in his
June 1994 Complaint that Army personnel (1) “altered and or destroyed records concerning
an assault on me”; (2) “did further harm to me . . . by fabricating my discharge physical”;
and (3) “did more harm to me by forging certain discharge documents.” (Doc. #22, PageID
at 144). He also stated in his June 1994 Complaint, “I have just recently become aware of
the forgeries and other record discrepancies.” Id. Because Jarrell raised his recordtampering allegations and claims in his June 1994 Complaint, there is no genuine dispute
that by June 1994, Jarrell knew, or had reason to know, about the alleged records tampering
of which he now complains. In light of Jarrell’s allegations in his 1994 Complaint, no
reasonable juror could agree with his conclusion – i.e., that he had no reason to know
Defendant allowed someone to tamper with his personnel records until he examined the
records in 2011. As a result, the Privacy Act’s statute of limitations began to run no later
than June 1994 and expired two years later, no later than June 1996.
The Privacy Act’s statute of limitations contains an exception when “an agency has
materially and willfully misrepresented any information required under this section to be
disclosed to an individual and the information so misrepresented is material to establishment
of the liability of the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(5). In that situation, the statute runs from
the time the misrepresentation is discovered. However, such misrepresentation “pertains to
information that the agency was required to disclose under the statute and willfully failed to
disclose. In order for the exception to apply, the undisclosed information must be material to
the establishment of liability under the Act.” Boyd v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
36917 (S.D. Ohio, March 18, 2013). Jarrell presents no evidence that reasonably supports
an allegation that Defendant willfully misrepresented information that was material to
establishing its own liability. See Doc. #s 18, 24, 26.
Turning to Jarrell’s Motion for Summary Judgment, attached documents, and other
filings, a thorough examination of his arguments and evidence fails to reveal a legal or
evidentiary basis for concluding that his claims under the Privacy Act are timely and that he
is entitled summary judgment in his favor on these claims. His Motion for Summary
Judgment therefore lacks merit.
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Jarrell’s claims under
the Privacy Act.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. Plaintiff Stephen Jarrell’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #18) be
2. Defendant National Personnel Records Center’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. #22) be GRANTED; and,
3. This case be terminated on the docket of this Court.
September 23, 2013
s/ Sharon L. Ovington
Sharon L. Ovington
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being
served with this Report and Recommendations. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d), this period
is extended to seventeen days because this Report is being served by one of the methods of
service listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), (E), or (F). Such objections shall specify the
portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in
support of the objections. If the Report and Recommendations are based in whole or in part
upon matters occurring of record at an oral hearing, the objecting party shall promptly
arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions of it as all parties may agree
upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the assigned District Judge otherwise
directs. A party may respond to another party=s objections within fourteen days after being
served with a copy thereof.
Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on
appeal. See United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
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